On 5/16/2011 9:38 AM, Jim Devine wrote: > Awhile back, John Vertegaal wrote: >> ... Where does [Marx] lay out the circumstances whereby money >> "capital" _is_ indeed causal to the production of surplus value, >> i.e. non-fictitious? And if he ever does so, what are his >> assumptions?< > > Up to full-capacity or potential output, the extension of money > credit raises demand, > I could start this response by asking you to define, in terms of some premises, exactly what it is that's being extended. But since you've made it clear in the past, as well as below, you're not prepared to do that, I'll have to take a different tack. I've interrupted the sentence already here, for if this part of it doesn't convey the entire truth _in equilibrium_, the rest doesn't either. You seem to assume here that at full-capacity, inflation is likely to set in; thus altering the state of affairs. But it doesn't make any difference. Because whether below or at full capacity, the final output for sale at any time, embodies the disbursed income available to buy it. Therefore the raised demand due to an "extension of money credit" extends the claim to final output beyond available final output, at _any_ rate of capacity utilization. Whether retailers are more inclined to raise prices under conditions of full employment than otherwise, is beside the point of there being exactly as much extra "money" in the system than is necessary for keeping retail accounts current and facilitate reproduction, in either case.
In addition to that, there is the feasibility of interest repayment. In the aggregate, these charges too have to come out of income. And if the income of a certain sector in the population already surpasses inherent propensities to spend directly, the interest now payable by borrowers to savers only adds to the existing disequilibrium; upsetting the available demand further. _Net_ saving is never an equilibrium condition. Although the disequilibrium can be offset by (money) credit creation, it punishes everyone by lowering the value of the unit of account; either real, or potential ad infinitum. This uncertainty (or better said: indeterminacy) of the value of the unit of account lies at the heart of money _not_ being a cause, able to create an effect. More later. > which allows greater realization of surplus-value. > Really? Then how do you square that with the below: "some paper ... wealth turns out ... to be _truly_ fictitious, which means that its issuance ... did not facilitate the production of surplus-value. This happens if the borrowed money or money received ... is spent on current consumption..." Sure, I admit I'm pulling it out of context, omitting the parts that do not fit. But you still have to explain the difference between the demand for consumption goods above and the one below; where the above does and the below doesn't facilitate the production of what you call surplus-value. > which in turn allows more profit (property income) to be received by > the capitalists. However, this thought is not developed much, > especially since v3 of CAPITAL was never finished. > Without having an actual theory of what money _is_, any kind of "development" never goes beyond wishful thinking. I take it that the entire line of reasoning as expressed here is your interpretation of Marx, rather than Marx himself; and as such it's based on what you _think_ money (credit) is. If that's true, after the above, how can you possibly maintain that your Marxian reasoning isn't linear? > The extension of credit also “greases the wheels of commerce,” i.e., > it speeds up much of capitalism’s dynamics including the tendency > toward overproduction (see chapter 27 of v3). > As for Marx, he doesn't have a theory of money either; or, if I'm mistaken, where and/or how did he define (M)? >> As far as I understand Marx, _work and work only_, produces >> (surplus) value… Just above the Sismondi footnote [Marx] writes >> that "... money wealth in general,.. has resolved itself into an >> accumulation of claims of ownership upon labour". That may well >> lead to "allow[ing] payment of interest on it". But for the >> division of value after it was produced to be a _cause_ (or factor) >> of production, a set of assumptions is required with which I'm >> unfamiliar.< > > Money or financial or paper wealth represents a _legal claim_ on > society's total value and surplus-value, but it does not directly > organize the production of surplus-value or cause surplus-value to > be created. Thus, it's possible for a promise to pay interest (the > flip-side of a claim such as a bond) may exceed the actual > surplus-value available to pay that interest. Usually, however, if > promised interest payments are “too high,” the direct effect is to > hurt dividends (which are a residual income). Of course, some debtors > can't make interest payments and thus are insolvent. > > It’s true that “work and work only” produces surplus-value, but that > only refers to the _direct_ causation. Technical change and the > capitalist accumulation of means of production can and usually do > raise the effectiveness of labor (use-values produced per unit of > labor done) and, all else constant, the productivity of labor-power > hired (use-values produced per hour of labor-power hired). If the > real wage (the bundle of use-values paid per hour of labor-power > hired) is constant, as Marx assumes in much of v1, rising > effectiveness of labor reduces the value of labor-power (the amount > of labor that must be done to produce the real wage bundle). This > means that there’s more value left over for surplus-value. Marx calls > this “relative surplus-value” creation. > > This means that it’s possible for the issuance of paper wealth > (bonds, stocks) to finance or facilitate real accumulation of means > of production which in turn causes the flow of surplus-value to > increase. If that happens, then the initially fictitious capital > (paper wealth, whose market price is based on expected future income > streams, not actual ones) turns out after the fact to be a > realizable claim, actually paying its owners interest or dividends. > > On the other hand, some paper or fictitious wealth turns out after > the fact to be _truly_ fictitious, which means that its issuance and > sale did not facilitate the production of surplus-value. This > happens if the borrowed money or money received from selling new > stocks is spent on current consumption, waste, failed wagers or > speculation, programs that benefit non-capitalists, and the like. > > Now look at the government's borrowing. The issues and sale of > government bonds _may or may not_ promote labor productivity and > thus raise the flow of surplus-value that could be used as a source > of interest income for the bond-holders. However, even the most > productive government real investment may not produce enough income > _for the government_, as most or all of the benefits are captured by > the “private” sector (capitalists). For example, the building of a > high-speed railway may help business and the economy’s production a > lot but government ends up having to pay the interest on the deal. > Thus, it seems that the interest has to be paid by raising taxes or > cutting outlays. > > But there’s an additional point: if the economy’s potential or > full-capacity output rises (and tax laws, transfer programs, and > government purchases do not change), that leads to what Keynesians > call a “fiscal dividend”: more tax revenues will be reaped at the > potential output level than than was reaped before – so that > tax-hikes and outlay cuts aren’t needed to pay interest on the > government debt. The fiscal dividend happens normally since potential > normally increases -- except that it normally disappears as tax laws, > transfer programs, and government purchases are changed. But building > a high-speed railway might raise the fiscal dividend by speeding up > the growth of potential output, so that the interest on the > government debt issued to pay for it can be paid (at least in part). > Much of your argument about the causation of surplus-value is conducted in terms of use-values. Use-values aren't relevant when it comes to initiate the production and later apportioning of output in a capitalist economy. It seems to me that Marx had a better grip on that than you. How exactly does something, without having a denominator, "finance"? But an even more fundamental problem with the above comes to the fore in your failing to answer the posed question: which assumptions either Marx or you use, in order to arrive at the conclusion that financial capital can somehow be causal to production. Instead, you take a look at the empirical economic world from a certain perspective, then discern some "facts", and start arguing your point; which is no more than a sermon to the choir, already holding your point of view. The upshot of it being - you seem to assume that in order to conduct a logical discourse, it isn't at all necessary to base that on a stated set of assumptions. However, whether this is being recognized or not, any mere mortal having acquired a "certain" perspective implies their holding of assumptions; and the fundamental Marxian one is the exploitation axiom. Below, I'll get to the point more than once that exploitation (just like the value of money) is indeterminate in terms of exchange-values, and thus not able to be a cause of anything in an exchange-value economy. >> Money is a unit of the accounting process associated with new >> wealth creation by work, and disbursed as income for the >> distribution of that wealth. It has no value independent from the >> created wealth.< > > Do you mean "new _real_ wealth" (i.e., means of production and the > like, that promote the production of surplus-value)? I'll assume > that you do. If so, your statements make more sense. > There is no (economic) wealth but real wealth. Financial wealth in any of its forms is make-believe or fake wealth. More later... Means of production is a necessary intermediate in the creation of wealth. The former though, is valueless in the absence of a return; and returns require debit entries by others altogether, who in turn need to pass these costs on down to the retail level for resolution. So wealth is to be consumed final output, added _non pecuniarily_ (i.e. in use-values) to the wealth of readily available natural and domestic utilities; the latter situated outside the economy, so wealth (sans "economic") ends up there too. I've shown a couple of times in the past already, that Marx's notion of surplus value rests on the fallacy of composition. My line of reasoning, never shown to be incorrect by you, concludes that the determination of aggregate surplus value takes place through capitalists' final demand for output (consumption). Before that, it's indeterminate; i.e. unable to _cause_ anything. And afterward it's gone and thus again unable to cause anything. > When you say that “money” has no value independent from the created > new (real) wealth, do you mean that financial or money claims in > general (which includes bonds, stocks, etc.) have no value > independent of the new real wealth that was financed by these claims’ > issuance? Again, I’ll assume that you do, since it makes more sense. > Yes, except I'd say "financed". Think about it for a moment. When at any time economic growth is expedient, money can and will be created out of thin air, thereby establishing a debt, how can it possibly be valuable in any sense of the word, outside of distributing that growth? Btw, the same goes for the mortgaging of (e.g.) existing realty, it just adds to the mix of to be resolved debts. And then there is the beguiling notion of leveraging, whose only raison d'être is being growth causing. How is it, that with the av. yearly real growth per capita (excl. FIRE sector and asset inflation) in the developed world being in the 2% range for about a couple of generations now; leveraging, upwards from 10x, hasn't been able to do better than e.g. the Swedish steel industry, not making _any_ capital investments whatsoever during an extended post-war period? Doesn't all this indicate that real economic growth has a source other than finance? And even if some alternative set of assumptions can show it to be a source of growth; compared to all the money going into it, it's got to be a piss-poor source at that. Given the spectacular growth of the FIRE sector these last 40 yrs or so, the financial establishment has done quite well for itself, convincing policymakers that leveraging is the only way to go, but at what costs? The question is rhetorical, because the answer is obvious; stagnating real incomes for just about everyone still employed, massive unemployment, and an accumulation of paper "wealth" with which nothing substantial can be bought. Conventional economics takes it for granted that loans for investment in means of production cause growth. But analyzing the process in terms of the economy's ultimate purpose shows the very opposite. For the new personal income being made available for making purchases at the retail level, exceeds the retail output embodied (or better said: the on its behalf currently made available personal income to reproduce it) income. This means that every time a capital expansion is attempted, those who did have a hand in producing currently available retail output occur a loss of purchasing power, because of having to share it with those who recently took personal possession of newly created money, who had no hand in producing current final output. If this now surplus income is captured by retailers in profits, through a price rise, the deprivation of general purchasing power is direct; otherwise, in spite of appearing to be a source of valid savings in the aggregate, they are just hidden losses. For at any time in the future, the exact same conditions apply. So as "savings", by those who at varying degrees are empowered to do so, it will remain a surplus to any then current production forever; which in effect means a potential future inflation, without further (CB) influences. Thus, no matter how you look at it, forced economic growth through investment in additional means of production, however this is defined, can only come about thanks to the vast majority unwittingly putting up with a small _loss_ (Sismondi's! theory of growth). And a factual step backward in value, cannot simultaneously be a _cause_ of advance. New derivative final output, eventually making its way to the retail level, could at that time be of increased benefit. But the empirical evidence shows that such benefits have been entirely swooped up, during a number of decades, by those who just lost even the last vestiges of rational entitlement. If the foregoing doesn't make an open-and-shut case that investment banking and related activity is economically invalid; I don't know what possible further evidence would be required. > I still don’t understand what you’re saying here, however. Perhaps > it’s a language problem. > I think it's because we argue from entirely different assumptions; but perhaps, after the foregoing explanation, you understand it better now. Fundamentally though, it has to do with the purpose of the system, under (dynamic) equilibrium conditions. Just like accounting cannot be made sensible without first assuming "going-concern" production, i.e. a valid system in equilibrium; economics requires a similar foundation. Whatever valid purpose is assumed, it has to be (self-evidently) in equilibrium as a starting out position; for logic doesn't allow us to argue from a point of departure that conveys a falling apart already. Marxians however, by setting up a paradigm from the assumption that the system is ruled by the abhorrent drive to exploit labour, have thereby placed themselves in the untenable position of needing to reason from what they (rightly) consider _not_ to be valid. All posited arguments about the (nasty) causation of capital, i.e. its equations, imply an equilibrium without any internal tendencies for disruption. Instead of being able to show it's fundamentally all fake, they end up confirming the equilibrium position of supply-siders; which you seem to take even one step further, by confirming such position of the financial sector as well. Does your interpretation of Marxian economics still accommodate an economic disequilibrium at all; and if so, how? > So if this income [from ownership of financial claims] > No! you're entering a wrong path, by taking for granted the validity of claims that Sismondi and Marx deem invalid. You assume the validity of the financial sector from empirical observation. This cannot be done as axioms are obtained from outside the system these pertain to! I don't see how you can interpret the above otherwise than "income ... from work". In other words, the buyer of the bonds has a day job. A salary-drawing job that implies debit entries to be offset by credits, in the absence of which economic contraction occurs and jobs are lost. >> is extracted to become "capital" for buying bonds with, it loses >> its value as soon as its purchasing power is transferred and >> consummated by government income earners. The purchasing of bonds >> doesn't turn the inherent circular nature of the economy into a >> linear one, regardless of "powerful" institutional convention.< > > Please explain what this linear/circular stuff means. Maybe a > diagram would help. BTW, I don’t think of the capitalist economy as > being “linear” at all. At least I don’t think I do: it’s unclear > what “linear” means in this context. > No need for a diagram. Linear in this context means that, within a certain domain, there is a direct link between cause and effect. Kick a ball and it takes off, exploit labour and raise profits, invest and grow, buy bonds and claim economic output, "the extension of money credit raises demand"... So if, to whatever degree, you hold the latter four to be true, you think of the the capitalist economy as being a linear structure of determinate added-up micro quantities, that follow a pathway through time. Circular, here, means that the totality of the system determines itself. Effects aren't identifiable individually from a single cause, but are composed from a multitude of similar causes, by others, inversely adding up in value to the extent of its "obvious" cause; whereby the values of cause and effect multiply out to unity, i.e., a round-about determination takes place. The simplest model of a monetary (exchange-value) economy, one step up from direct barter, that makes this process clear, would concern three producers each having an employee, and a banker; all seven living of the three production units, without waste. In addition to that there are three, at the moment self-sustaining, outsiders. But the principle to be exposed, holds for an economy of any size. In this tiny economy, it is evident that no producer (capitalist) alone can increase exchange-value. Each could improve their lot in life by an increase in the consumption of their own product, through increasing its supply by working longer hours, making it cheaper by cutting wages, and/ or by hiring extra help to make use of a division of labour effect; but that could only result in greater use-values. For the realization of an increase in _exchange-value_, one or both other producers would have to engage in similar behaviour; as the total possible demand for the output of the first, is limited to the added-up inverse supply of the others. So, as soon as returns become paramount, demand rules; and the demand is in no way related to any particular supply, seeking returns. Linearity in cause and effect just isn't realistic in any kind of exchange-value economy. The notion that supply creates its own demand is an anathema to any accountant. But by axiomatically holding on to exploitation, Marxians essentially argue their point as if capitalists are hellbent to raid the output of their workers for self-betterment. Being supply-siders in the tradition of Ricardo, they cannot deal with a situation where demand determines the value of supply; which, as shown above, happens to be the state of affairs in any exchange-value economy. Demand-stressing Keynesians are about halfway there, but they too can't let go of the idea that the values of supply quantities are yet determinate, because "doing" economics would then become impossible. Although the above model would lend itself well for developing the financial aspect, this reply is getting way too long as is. > I also don’t know what the> “powerful” institutional convention< > that you refer to is. > Is the power of finance to have its own way really that inscrutable? I used the scare quotes because ultimately its power cannot be exercised under equilibrium conditions. For more, please read the critique that I mentioned when coming into this thread. > Are you referring to the normal practice of paying interest on debt > to avoid default and/or bankruptcy? > No. The paying of interest is valid if the payor received or still is receiving a benefit. The benefit from bonds, if there ever was one, is long gone. > If you don't make interest payments, the courts will punish you > (unless you can flee the country or fight the bankruptcy court, both > of which can be expensive). Not only that, but financial markets > will punish you, by raising the risk premium on future loans. That > encourages most people to obey this convention. In fact, it's more > than a "convention," since it's backed by the coercive power of the > state and the financial market's electronic herd. > Non sequitur. >> The conventional right to claim a portion of future wealth creation >> is based on something that, in the reality of the economy being a >> circular means to an exogenously located end, no longer exists.< > > I don’t understand what this means at all. > No wonder. You totally lost track of what I was saying. > What is it that “no longer exists”? > Valid purchasing power. You tell me what it is that still does exist, when the income disbursed through to be resolved debit entries is used to buy bonds with, becomes transferred to government income earners and spent directly by them, so that its purchasing power is gone; while, in the aggregate, credits did continue to flow in, keeping the system in a dynamic equilibrium and now allow an unencumbered reproduction to take place; just as if those now holding bonds had directly spent their income. >> If you believe that the money from bonds [i.e., interest payments?] >> can produce surplus-value [which I don’t], > You are contradicting yourself here, as compared to a previous post... <<The "capital" is truly fictitious if the money from the bonds does not go to produce surplus-value>> Change of heart? Some other explanation? I realize of course that in your discourse above you tried reformulating "produce" into the less stringent "facilitate", "promote", "speed up"..; but all are still on the pushing side of a cause/effect relationship. Money cannot push. As income it can (demand-)pull the disequilibrium of debts and/or debit entries back into equilibrium, but as "capital" it's totally impotent. >> you believe that money has a value independently. In that case, >> define (M) please.< > > I don’t believe that interest payments can produce surplus-value; as > noted, the financial claims on capital income (surplus-value) can be > out of line with the surplus-value that’s actually produced. > However, if realized, real interest income can be the basis for > further accumulation of means of production, etc., just as other > forms of property income can. > My contribution to this thread started with analyzing a piece Sismondi wrote regarding the imaginary nature of bond "capital"; the essence of the latter, Marx agreed with. You interjected the idea that the money from the bonds can yet be productive if employing labour that produces surplus value and thus allowing interest to be paid. Thus the latter apparently being the determinant of the former, regardless of how the former was obtained. So, with an economic status quo of personal income resolving economy-deep debit expenditures; the withholding of this resolution is economically valid, because a later stealing from labour (by not granting them the full output from their productivity), makes it so? How does your line of reasoning not play right into the hands of money-loving capitalists and their apologists? >> As I see it, the difficulties arise in the main from assumptions >> you don't want to let go of. [what are those??] > I've been mentioning a number of them throughout this reply. Another important one is that you assume that when natural resources enter the system of accounts, they retain their natural positive values; instead, these become debit entries that require resolution. In other words, all economic entities entering the system from exogeneity now have negative values; that, if not being offset by positive (credit) returns, decrease the system's size. >> The economic process is indivisibly circular. [yes, but the circle >> grows larger every day.] > The _potentiality_ of the circle does (in debit entries). >> By assuming that (M) is a determinate quantity that causes >> _certain_ effects [which I do not], > Then how do you interpret "the extension of money credit raises demand"?? (M) is indeterminate? The raised demand isn't actually certain yet? >> you cut through the circularity and replace it from that point >> onward with a linearity. [huh??] > Still? You need it spelled out further? >> If you agree that the economic process is circular, which you did a >> couple of times in past conversations with me already, you're >> contradicting yourself; unless you can come up with a definition of >> (M) that somehow proves otherwise.< > > Since I don’t understand the assumptions you attribute to me, it’s > hard to see any contradiction. What are _your_ assumptions? > My own assumptions are that the economy is a human-made system, a set of _means_ that transforms real, exogenously located resource inputs toward determinate ends that are situated in that same exogeneity; so that the system's benefits can be _added_ to our natural existence in compatible (use-value) terms. Correlations are that in terms of units of account, such a result requires a full canceling out of the totality of factors, or a netting to zero over time; possibly necessitating value changes of the unit of account itself, that are not readily perceptible. As an ongoing process it neither has, nor generates, determinate own-values at any point in time; meaning that it cannot create internal residuals of any kind. Entities like: labour power, expertise, material resources, capital, funds, surpluses, ..., are either exogenous in nature and drawn from there into the system as required inputs, or are mythical and don't exist in the reality of the stated assumptions at all. > It would be off-topic to define money (i.e., M). You’re not talking > about money _per se_; instead, you’re talking about paper or > financial or money wealth. As above, that refers to legal claims on > future income. Legal claims on income aren’t always realized, but > mostly they are. > I cannot think of anything more essential in a logical discourse, than being able to distinguish between the elements we hold to be positive and those we hold to be negative in sign. It's how we establish truth or falsity. If some element at times appears to be positive and negative at other times, we know that either our premises are, or our logic is, faulty, or perhaps even both are; and it's time to start theorizing from scratch. It is by no means controversial that all new money entering the system represents a to be resolved debt, i.e. a negative. Thus if after a certain time it appears that this money, in whatever form it's being held, has now taken on a positive quality; then pretending to still know what we are talking about, by no means makes it so. John V _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
