Awhile back, John Vertegaal wrote: >>> ... Where does [Marx] lay out the circumstances whereby money "capital" >>> _is_ indeed causal to the production of surplus value, i.e. non-fictitious? >>> And if he ever does so, what are his assumptions?<<<
BTW, here and below, the word “facilitate” (or the phrase "help cause") is better than “cause,” since any real world event’s occurrence is over-determined, i.e., has more than one cause. No single cause is the sole cause, except under rare conditions. My response was: >> Up to full-capacity or potential output, the extension of money credit >> raises demand,<< John V, now: > I could start this response by asking you to define, in terms of some > premises, exactly what it is that's being extended. But since you've made it > clear in the past, as well as below, you're not prepared to do that, I'll > have to take a different tack. < I’m perfectly willing to define either credit or money, though I didn’t see that issue as relevant. See any half-decent money and banking textbook. John, how do you define these terms? How do your definitions differ from those of textbooks, if indeed they do? > I've interrupted the sentence already here, for if this part of it doesn't > convey the entire truth _in equilibrium_, the rest doesn't either. You seem > to assume here that at full-capacity, inflation is likely to set in; thus > altering the state of affairs. < It’s only when full capacity is exceeded that the inflation that I was describing hits. A related kind of inflation can hit below _general_ full capacity utilization if crucial sectors hit full capacity utilization earlier, creating bottlenecks for other sectors. (Thus, inflation can occur if demand for GDP rises “too quickly.”) Inflation can also arise for other reasons, e.g., due to the kinds of cut-backs in oil supplies that occurred during the 1970s. I don't get the reference to "equilibrium." What equilibrium are you talking about, John? > But it doesn't make any difference. Because whether below or at full > capacity, the final output for sale at any time, embodies the disbursed > income available to buy it. < That’s true by definition in macroeconomics. However, in the national income accounts the market-value (price) of output = that of disbursed income only because some of income received is “spent” by firms purchasing their own inventories (unwanted inventory accumulation). So the truth of the definition can apply in a desired aggregate spending = aggregate supply disequilibrium. > Therefore the raised demand due to an "extension of money credit" extends the > claim to final output beyond available final output, at _any_ rate of > capacity utilization. Whether retailers are more inclined to raise prices > under conditions of full employment than otherwise, is beside the point of > there being exactly as much extra "money" in the system than is necessary for > keeping retail accounts current and facilitate reproduction, in either case.< Up to a certain point, many businesses normally operate with unused capacity, so that their supply is quite elastic if not infinitely so. Thus, increased demand (due to credit expansion) doesn’t automatically cause significant inflation until full capacity and bottlenecks are encountered. This also leads to significant rises in real output, employment, and incomes. John, are you assuming that Say’s bogus “Law” applies, so that real output can never be increased (except due to long-term supply-side growth)? If you are making such an outrageous assumption, you should make it explicit. Of all the bad assumptions that economists sneak into their discussions, Say's Law may be the most common. > In addition to that, there is the feasibility of interest repayment. In the > aggregate, these charges too have to come out of income. And if the income of > a certain sector in the population already surpasses inherent propensities to > spend directly, the interest now payable by borrowers to savers only adds to > the existing disequilibrium; upsetting the available demand further. < With elastic supply, there is extra output created (and labor-power hired) and thus income realized and distributed. The increased income can allow the payment of interest. I do not know what the “existing disequilibrium” refers to. Are you saying that the situation of less than full employment of labor-power and means of production is “only” a disequilibrium and therefore not real (as many neoclassical economists do in criticizing Keynes)? I also don’t understand how demand can be “upset.” > _Net_ saving is never an equilibrium condition.< What??? In Keynesian equilibrium, total saving equals total investment (broadly defined) and net saving (net of depreciation) equals net investment, following standard NIPA definitions. What do _you_ mean by “net saving”? Or you using some unorthodox definition? Please make your definitions clear, especially if they differ from the standard ones. > Although the disequilibrium can be offset by (money) credit creation, it > punishes everyone by lowering the value of the unit of account; either real, > or potential ad infinitum.< That is the Classical, “new Classical,” or Say’s Law perspective. If resources are underutilized (as they are now in the US, with 9 percent unemployment), then an increase in demand – whether due to credit extension or increases in income – does not automatically cause a reduction of the value of the unit of account (i.e., money). I do not understand the phrase “either real, or potential ad infinitum.” Please explain. > This uncertainty (or better said: indeterminacy) of the value of the unit of > account lies at the heart of money _not_ being a cause, able to create an > effect. More later.< Huh? This is quite unclear. Me, continuing what I was saying above: >> which allows greater realization of surplus-value.<< John: > Really? Then how do you square that with the below: "some paper ... wealth > turns out ... to be _truly_ fictitious, which means that its issuance ... did > not facilitate the production of surplus-value. This happens if the borrowed > money or money received ... is spent on current consumption..." Sure, I admit > I'm pulling it out of context, omitting the parts that do not fit. But you > still have to explain the difference between the demand for consumption goods > above and the one below; where the above does and the below doesn't > facilitate the production of what you [and an old German guy who’s often > forgotten] call surplus-value. < I don’t quite get what you are saying here, John, but here goes. Some paper wealth (most stocks & bonds) represents claims on wealth that allows its owner to garner part of society’s surplus-value and thus pay interest or dividends to those owning the stocks and bonds. On the other hand, some paper wealth represents claims on the income of people who can’t afford to pay interest or dividends. One example occurs late in a Ponzi scheme, where the scammer can no longer sell new shares to pay dividends to the old share-holders. (This is “after the fact” fictitious capital.) Another is the case where money was lent to someone who was desperate (starving or whatever) but the loan doesn’t get him out of that situation, so he can’t make payments. On a more moderate level, short-term loans to pay for consumption (e.g., using one’s MasterCard) does not lead to the production of surplus-value, so that paying the fees or interest has to come by reducing consumption later. (The MC holder is willing to pay those fees in order to get liquidity – or didn’t know how large the fees were when they agreed to paying them.) Me: >> which in turn allows more profit (property income) to be received by the >> capitalists. However, this thought is not developed much, especially since >> v3 of CAPITAL was never finished.<< John: > Without having an actual theory of what money _is_, any kind of "development" > never goes beyond wishful thinking. I take it that the entire line of > reasoning as expressed here is your interpretation of Marx, rather than Marx > himself; and as such it's based on what you _think_ money (credit) is. If > that's true, after the above, how can you possibly maintain that your Marxian > reasoning isn't linear?< Marx had a clear theory of what “money is.” (Unfortunately, he messed things up for later readers by assuming that it was gold.) I don’t think that his theory is significantly different from that seen in current textbooks, as long as they’re not of the Monetarist sort (which see money as only a means of payment and a unit of account and not as a store of value). His theory is different from the standard one only because he puts in the context of capitalist society. Orthodox economists, in contrast, assume that simple commodity production prevails and/or that money is a “veil” (i.e., that the economy acts “as if” it used barter instead). In this context, the word “linear” is totally and utterly meaningless. When I refer to “money” or “credit,” I know what most economists mean by those terms, so that my sentences have meaning even though I don’t define them. But most people don’t use “linear” in the way that John does. It makes even less sense since Marx’s thinking is instead dialectical. In fact, many people object to that type of thinking. Me: >> The extension of credit also “greases the wheels of commerce,” i.e., it >> speeds up much of capitalism’s dynamics including the tendency toward >> overproduction (see chapter 27 of v3). > As for Marx, he doesn't have a theory of money either; or, if I'm mistaken, > where and/or how did he define (M)?< See the first three chapters of CAPITAL, volume I. But he didn’t follow the standard method of definition, since he saw concepts as defining themselves in practice in a specific social context. “Money” means something different under capitalism than it does under commodity production in general (the focus of the first three chapters). John: >>> As far as I understand Marx, _work and work only_, produces (surplus) >>> value… Just above the Sismondi footnote [Marx] writes that "... money >>> wealth in general,.. has resolved itself into an accumulation of claims of >>> ownership upon labour". That may well lead to "allow[ing] payment of >>> interest on it". But for the division of value after it was produced to be >>> a _cause_ (or factor) of production, a set of assumptions is required with >>> which I'm unfamiliar.<<< I don’t see how “division of value after it was produced” is the same as the extension of credit (the force that can facilitate accumulation). Creditors extend credit because they hope that they’ll get a piece of the surplus-value action, but that doesn’t mean that they always get it. Financial investments don't always pay off. In any event, we can think of a different scenario in which the division of value after it was produced promotes accumulation: if those who are more prone to accumulate rather than buy luxury goods receive a bigger piece of the surplus-value, that raises the rate of accumulation (all else constant). (I omitted the long quote from me) John: > Much of your argument about the causation of surplus-value is conducted in > terms of use-values. Use-values aren't relevant when it comes to initiate the > production and later apportioning of output in a capitalist economy. < In order for surplus-labor to be realized as surplus-value, it must produce a surplus product (use-values) that someone wants and can afford to pay for. So use-values are quite relevant. >... How exactly does something, without having a denominator, "finance"? < A fraction has a “denominator,” but we weren’t talking about fractions. John, do you perhaps mean a “definition”? Since both money and credit have definitions (see any textbook), they can be used to finance activities. If I lend you money (i.e., give you credit), then you are able to pay for (i.e., finance) your purchase of something. Period. I don’t see why I have to explain such basics. > But an even more fundamental problem with the above comes to the fore in your > failing to answer the posed question: which assumptions either Marx or you > use, in order to arrive at the conclusion that financial capital can somehow > be causal to production. Instead, you take a look at the empirical economic > world from a certain perspective, then discern some “facts", and start > arguing your point; which is no more than a sermon to the choir, already > holding your point of view. The upshot of it being - you seem to assume that > in order to conduct a logical discourse, it isn't at all necessary to base > that on a stated set of assumptions….< See above: if a society has unused resources, the extension of credit can allow spending on real factories and the like, which eventually raise the productivity of labor-power. That’s “causal of production.” If labor-power’s wage does not rise in step, that means that it usually produces enough income to pay the interest on the loan. By the way, this story can make sense even if Say’s “Law” applies: the extension of credit (and lower interest rates) might encourage a re-allocation of society’s resources (including labor-power) away from luxury-goods production to capital-goods production. This shift would eventually raise the productivity of labor-power, again being “causal of production.” This second story seems to be the one that you’re describing, John. But it's hardly the _only_ story. This second story assumes that resources move quite easily between sectors. In fact, they have to move almost as easily as credit does. Any kind of reasonable discussion must have some shared assumptions, so any reasonable discussion has some element of “preaching to the choir.” You do not present a full-scale model of capitalist reality and don’t explain your assumptions (such as your apparent belief in Say’s Law), so I don’t see why I have to explain a full-scale model with all assumptions made clear. John once said: >>> Money is a unit of the accounting process associated with new wealth >>> creation by work, and disbursed as income for the distribution of that >>> wealth. It has no value independent from the created wealth.<<< Me: >> Do you mean "new _real_ wealth" (i.e., means of production and the like, >> that promote the production of surplus-value)? I'll assume that you do. If >> so, your statements make more sense.<< > There is no (economic) wealth but real wealth. Financial wealth in any of its > forms is make-believe or fake wealth.< If it’s “fake wealth,” why do people want it? As a way of proving that you think that financial wealth is “fake,” you should give me yours. I'll give you my address and you can mail it to me. Assuming that “fake wealth” means “only a claim on real wealth but not real wealth itself,” the phrase makes more sense. Even then, money wealth can have _liquidity value_. Suppose I own shares of stock that are _truly_ fake, i.e., representing claims on some business that does not have the capability to pay me interest or dividends because they don’t have access to sufficient surplus-value. If I’m the only one who knows this fact, then I can quickly sell my fake wealth and turn it into a claim on real wealth. Alternatively, in the case of bonds, I might use my power as a creditor – backed by the state, which is really good at backing creditors – to force those who owe me money by reducing their own consumption (instead of paying out of surplus). > Means of production is a necessary intermediate in the creation of wealth. > The former though, is valueless in the absence of a return [which represents > a claim on surplus-value??]; and returns require debit entries by others > altogether, who in turn need to pass these costs on down to the retail level > for resolution. [???] So [if?] wealth is to be consumed final output, added … > in use-values … to the wealth of readily available natural and domestic > utilities; the latter situated outside the economy, so wealth (sans > "economic") ends up there too.< I don’t understand your prose, John. It may be too poetic for me. Anyway, I agree with you that the means of production are necessary to the creation of wealth. But in many cases, they aren’t _sufficient_. It’s great to own a factory, but in order to actually use it, such things as markets and credit (not to mention an available supply of labor-power) are required. For example, in 2008’s financial crisis, a lot of businesses couldn’t get credit except at extremely high interest rates. This prevented not only new investment in real means of production but also the continued operation of existing stocks of means of production (shops, factories, etc.) > I've shown a couple of times in the past already, that Marx's notion of > surplus value rests on the fallacy of composition. My line of reasoning, > never shown to be incorrect by you, concludes that the determination of > aggregate surplus value takes place through capitalists' final demand for > output (consumption). Before that, it's indeterminate; i.e. unable to _cause_ > anything. And afterward it's gone and thus again unable to cause anything.< I have never seen your analysis. Where did you publish it? I can’t demonstrate that your ideas are incorrect unless I see them. I don’t know what your assumptions are; nor do I know how you define “money” or “credit.” In fact, as far as I can see from my next paragraph, I’m agreeing with you (except for your sloppy use of macroeconomic concepts). I agree that it is final demand (not just by capitalists but by workers) that allows the _realization_ of surplus-value, which is not just consumption spending but also investment spending (purchasing new means of production). Before surplus-value is realized, it’s not “indeterminate” as much as it’s _abstract_ (an unrealized promise). As I said above, it’s not sufficient for workers to do surplus-labor. They have to produce use-values that people are willing and able to buy. Once the surplus product has been purchased, the surplus-value is no longer abstract. After the surplus-product has been purchased, it’s true that services disappear and are “thus able to cause anything” (though at the time they were performed they can cause a chain of events that can persist for a long time). But goods can be durable and some of them (the means of production) can raise the productivity of labor-power. This can promote _real_ surplus-value production. > … When at any time economic growth is expedient [??], money can and will be > created out of thin air, thereby establishing a debt, how can it possibly be > valuable in any sense of the word, outside of distributing that growth? < Sure, in many cases the supply of credit is elastic. But sometimes (e.g., 2008) it’s not. Sometimes demand is the dominant force, limiting the volume of credit actually issued, but sometimes supply is. I don’t know what “distributing growth” means. And by “growth,” do you mean supply-side growth (growth of potential output), demand-side growth (the rise of actual output up to potential), or both? If you’re going to insist that I define “money” (despite the existence of a consensus among economists concerning what that word means), you have to define your terms, including “growth” and “cause.” (rhetorical question skipped.) > Conventional economics takes it for granted that loans for investment in > means of production cause growth.< As before, the word “facilitates” seems more apt than “cause.” Obviously, either supply-side or demand-side growth can be boosted by having credit made more available, allowing people to spend on the means of production (one kind of “real wealth”), but there are a lot of other factors that “cause” this investment to occur. In the real world of society, causation is usually over-determined. > But analyzing the process in terms of the economy's ultimate purpose [??] > shows the very opposite. < I don’t believe in teleology: the economy doesn’t have any kind of “ultimate purpose.” Smith thought that the economy should serve consumers, but that’s more a matter of a _normative_ commitment than a description of fact. I think Marx was more correct: under capitalism, the economy acts _as if_ its “ultimate purpose” was to accumulate capital (increasing the power of capitalists). But even then, working class resistance can prevent this purpose from being achieved. Even then, what’s good for individual capitalists can be bad for their class as a whole in the long run: the drive to accumulate might cause an environmental melt-down, for example. > For the new personal income being made available for making purchases at the > retail level, exceeds the retail output embodied (or better said: the on its > behalf currently made available personal income to reproduce it) income. This > means that every time a capital expansion is attempted, those who did have a > hand in producing currently available retail output occur a loss of > purchasing power, because of having to share it with those who recently took > personal possession of newly created money, who had no hand in producing > current final output. If this now surplus income is captured by retailers in > profits, through a price rise, the deprivation of general purchasing power is > direct; otherwise, in spite of appearing to be a source of valid savings in > the aggregate, they are just hidden losses. For at any time in the future, > the exact same conditions apply. So as "savings", by those who at varying > degrees are empowered to do so, it will remain a surplus to any then current > production forever; which in effect means a potential future inflation, > without further (CB) influences.< This assumes that the amount of output available is fixed, i.e., that Say’s Law applies. A bad assumption. > Thus, no matter how you look at it [as long as it’s not a Keynesian or a > Marxian way], forced [??] economic growth through investment in additional > means of production, however this is defined, can only come about thanks to > the vast majority unwittingly putting up with a small _loss_ … And a factual > step backward in value [??], cannot simultaneously be a _cause_ of advance.< For me (and for Marx), the growth of investment in additional means of production also involves the “vast majority unwittingly putting up with a small _loss_.” That loss refers to the labor that working people do beyond the amount needed to pay for their consumption goods, i.e., surplus-value. > New derivative final output, eventually making its way to the retail level, > could at that time be of increased benefit. But the empirical evidence shows > that such benefits have been entirely swooped up, during a number of decades, > by those who just lost even the last vestiges of rational entitlement. If the > foregoing doesn't make an open-and-shut case that investment banking and > related activity is economically invalid; I don't know what possible further > evidence would be required.< You’re talking about the failure of “trickle down.” I’d agree with that (except for certain historical eras), but that hardly negates a Marxian point of view. In fact, the failure of trickle down is totally consistent with it. Marx presumed that it would fail. >… Fundamentally though, it has to do with the purpose of the system, under >(dynamic) equilibrium conditions. Just like accounting cannot be made sensible >without first assuming "going-concern" production, i.e. a valid system in >equilibrium; economics requires a similar foundation. Whatever valid purpose >is assumed, it has to be (self-evidently) in equilibrium as a starting out >position; for logic doesn't allow us to argue from a point of departure that >conveys a falling apart already. < As noted, I don’t think capitalism has a “purpose.” Further, accounting does not require equilibrium to be true. Instead, accounting is true by definition (though in practice there may be errors & omissions). In our economy, in addition, the nature of the equilibrium is not unique, assuming it exists. In standard Keynesian theory, which assumes that equilibrium exists, it can be at full employment but it could also be with involuntary unemployment. To my mind, in contrast, I’d say that equilibrium is a notional (imaginary) concept that’s sometimes useful for understanding the real world but often is deceptive. > Marxians however, by setting up a paradigm from the assumption that the > system is ruled by the abhorrent drive to exploit labour, have thereby placed > themselves in the untenable position of needing to reason from what they > (rightly) consider _not_ to be valid.< I think the Marxian assumption is that any society is ruled by those with the most power (for us, the capitalists). They seek to take advantage of and then to expand their ability to exploit labor. However, as noted above, there are other forces that play a role in capitalist society and the capitalists themselves can get themselves into deep trouble. > All posited arguments about the (nasty) causation of capital, i.e. its > equations, imply an equilibrium without any internal tendencies for > disruption…. Does your interpretation of Marxian economics still accommodate > an economic disequilibrium at all; and if so, how?< Huh??? Have you ever heard the phrase “internal contradiction”? it’s central to the Marxian notion of how real-world societies operate. While Marx had some equilibrium notions (his “reproduction schemes” in volume II, equalization of profit rates in volume III, etc.), they get much too much attention from economists, who are trained at an early age to value equilibrium as a core concept. But Marx’s volume II point is that his reproduction schemes represent equilibrium conditions that may be really hard to attain or to maintain. His various crisis theories all suggest that these conditions will be endogenously broken. The story of equalization of profit rates, though more plausible as a real-world phenomenon, is also disrupted in any crisis. As usual in Marx, there are tendencies (toward profit-rate equalization) but also counter-tendencies (crises, the rise of monopolies, etc.) I'd guess that by using the words "nasty" and "abhorrent," you're trying to say that Marxists can't separate their normative and political commitments from their positive and analytical perspectives. So what? no-one can make that separation. Those who believe in Say's "Law," for example, typically see capitalism as inherently benevolent and harmonious until some nasty or abhorrent outside agitators mess things up. In the ellipsis above: > Instead of being able to show it's fundamentally all fake, they end up confirming the equilibrium position of supply-siders; which you seem to take even one step further, by confirming such position of the financial sector as well. < This is a silly insult, especially since (as far as I can tell), you assume that Say’s Law applies, which is a fundamental assumption of the supply-siders. I don’t have any more time or patience. This e-mail is already much, much too long, so I’ll stop. -- Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante. _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
