Well, you should have said truth can't exist without minds. Truth is a property of propositions or sentences. Only sentences or propositions are true or false.
_You_ define propositions as mental states. That is a dumb view. Since you are speaking frankly, I will too. No one thinks that propositions are mental states. That's silly. Propositions are the contents of some mental states. Thus belief is a mental state, but a specific belief, that capitalism sucks, has the propositional content "capitalism sucks," which is not a mental state, but a proposition describing a state of affairs in the world. (Possibly true, possiblr flase, but that;s never no mind.) Your insistence that realism about propositions or numbers is idealism is puzzling, but you are entitled to stipulate whatever definitions you want for terms. jks --- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I wrote:>> A "proposition" requires a proposer, a > sentient being. . . . propositions can't exist > without minds. Which was my point. Propositions > involves some kind of _understanding_, something > that cannot be done without a sentient mind.<< > > JKS writes: > Jim takes the other side (from me) of > a debate in philosophy of mind and language... > [people not here to defend themselves] have argued > for versions of the claims he states, maintaining > that it is somehow incoherent to have truths without > minds, propositions without someone to entertain > them. There are really serious arguments for this > idea, but I think it is wrong.< > > NO. NO. NO. I didn't say that "truth" doesn't exist > without minds. I said that "understandings of truth" > (i.e., propositions) don't exist without minds, > while of course propositions are often false. > Please be more careful in your reading of what I > write. > > JKS: > I go with [various dropped names] for the > other view: indeed, I will go beyond what I have > said and state that I think that it is possible > (though not true in this world) that _we_ don't have > minds, that eliminative materialism is true -- if > so, the propositions "there are no minds," or "Jim > has no mind" are true, although there is ipso facto > no one to entertain them.< > > that's a completely different question, something > that has absolutely nothing to do with what I was > writing about. (If you're a pragmatist, then you > know that it's also a silly question.) > > I wrote: > I'm all in favor of pragmatism, but the > idea that propositions (mental states) exist > independent of proposers (sentient critters) is > idealism.< > > > Jim, call it whatever you like.< > > I wasn't name-calling. The important thing is to > avoid the confusion of "realism in general" and > idealist realism (Platonism). It's also important to > know that assuming that thought (e.g., propositions) > exists independent of thinkers is basically > religious. (If you think that propositions exist > independent of our minds, then you must be saying > that there's some sort of mind (or rather, Mind) in > the universe that thinks about propositions.) I've > known good people who are Platonic and religious. > It's not shameful in any way. But you should come to > terms with your religion rather than pretending that > it isn't a religion. Or are you stating your > position in an unclear way? > > > Given my definition of realism, which is that > realism about X means that X exists independent of > the mind, it is realism about propositions.< > > Of course, it's realism. But it's not very smart. > How can a proposition (which is a mental state) > exist outside of a mind? > > Suppose that X is a "truth," something that does > exist outside of one's mind (e.g., E = Mc^2). What > I'm saying is that _my understanding of_ X exists > only in my mind. How many times do I have to repeat > this? > > > I think you mean it is not materialistic or > physicalistic. Actually it is neutral on whether > propositions can in some sense be reduced to > something physical, although I rather doubt that > they can. I'm not a physicalist if that is someone > who thinks that the only things there are physical > ones. ...< > > I've never been impressed by the "crude materialist" > (physicalist) view that everything can be reduced to > "matter in motion." For me, "materialism" involves > an emphasis on human practice in a historical > process (stressing what people do over what they > think or say) and an empirical orientation rather > than a sole focus on idealized models or theories > and their "elegance." (Of course, I'm not a > reductionist: what people think or say is part of > the picture, just as theories help us understand > empirical reality.) > > JD > > > > > > > > > > > __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com
