My comments interjected

tom walker wrote:

So what does Nitzan and Bichler propose to do in
response to that alleged fetishization of so-called
real capital? They propose to "reverse" the
distinction. Call finance capital "real" and
industrial capital "fictitious." That's all very well
taken in terms of clearing out cobwebs but it simply
reproduces the underlying temptation for
fetishization. One can as easily fetishize the present
value of expected future earnings as one can a
machine. Just ask Frank Partnoy.


I agree, but I think that the danger of fetishizing is inherent once we
impose a structure on society; in other words, once we theorize it. In
Section 3 of "New Imperialism or New Capitalism?", as elsewhere in our
work, we treat capitalization as the architecture of capitalist power
articulated by the capitalist nomos. In other words, capitalization a
socially created logic. Forgive me for quoting our own work in the
interest of expediency:

"... we do not pretend to offer a general theory of ‘capitalist
society.’ We limit ourselves to the study of the ‘capitalist order’
only, the order of those who rule. To rule means to see the world from a
singular viewpoint, to be locked into a unitary logic, to be subservient
to your own architecture of power. Dominant capital cannot deviate from
the boundaries of this architecture, even if it wants to. Its individual
members are forced to accept the very logic they impose on the rest of
humanity. And the more effective they are in imposing that logic, the
more predictable they themselves become. This is why their world could
be theorized and to some extent predicted."

From the viewpoint of dominant capital, capitalization IS a fetish.
This fetish is what we try to understand. Hopefully, we will not turn it
into our own fetish.

But what do we get if we dig deeper into the
distinction between real and fictitious capital? That
distinction has its precise counterpart in the much
criticized distinction between productive and
unproductive labour. One could say (for the sake of
argument) that "productive labour is to real capital
as unproductive labour is to fictitious capital." So,
if we reverse the distinction between fictitious and
real capital, we should have to also reduce the terms
between productive and unproductive labour.

Lo and behold! That is precisely what that (sniff)
"post-Marxist" Virno was suggesting. Well, pretty
close. Actually, he says something more like the old
distinction is dissolved in the new forms of labour.
Which brings me to another distinction involving the
word "real," the distinction between the formal and
real subsumption of labour under capital in the labour
process. Marx was saying in the previously unpublished
"chapter six" that these relationships had evolved
from one to the other form, so there's no reason to
expect them to suddenly stop evolving.

But maybe Marx tried to explain things with too much
misplaced concreteness. This is where I would detour
back to the oblivious "anonymous pamphlet of 1821."
There we find an extensive discussion of fictitious
capital and unproductive labour -- a discussion,
moreover, that places fictitious capital at the core
of a distinctive accumulation process, separate from
and counter to the process of accumulating "real
wealth" (which for the author of the pamphlet was
disposable time and the facilities for procuring that
disposable time).

"But it is here that /power/ has ever interfered, and
by misdirecting the labour of one part, and destroying
the labour of another, no longer permits a real
accumulation of surplus produce, nor consequently such
an increase of capital as shall reduce the value of
existing capital, or reduce the capitalist to the
necessity of labouring again."



I think here we differ. Useful things are created by human beings who
transform nature through their labor (some useful things exist without
labor). But in our view, that "labor," whether productive or
unproductive (if that could be at all decided), is a qualitative
process. As such, it does not -- and cannot -- contain the quantitative
"code" for understanding the pecuniary process of accumulation, not
exactly and not even approximately. This is what we argue in the paper.

Jonathan Nitzan wrote:

"We argue against the very notion that capital derives
its pecuniary quantities from some "substantive"
reality based on "stuff" (whether  measured in utils
or abstract labor). As we see it, capital is the
numerical architecture of capitalism, the basic code
of the "capitalist  nomos". Marx's distinction between
"real" and "fictitious" capital  should be reversed.

"Finance is the only real form of capital. The
notions that machines can have a "quantity" is the
fiction.    Finance, or capitalization, represents the
present value of expected  feature earnings. The
earnings and their discounting mechanism have  nothing
do with the quantity of any "stuff" such as machines,
goods or  services. Rather, they are the numerical
representation of the power of  exclusion. This power
permeates the entire social process, from the
assembly line, through formal politics, to religion,
culture,  consumption and what not. In that sense,
capital represents the  capitalization of power."

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