Memang tidak bakal mengherankan. Kalau militer tidak sabar yang salah juga
pemerintah. Orang kitanya juga sudah nggak sabar. Udah deh, daripada sibuk
menerima gelar 3 doktor honoris kausa, mending ngurusin Poso, Ambon, Papua.
Gitu aja kok repot-repot.
Memang saya juga salut atas usaha minta dukungan asing untuk integritas
bangsa. Untuk itu Gus Dur saya kasih nilai 9, dan Habibie nilainya 1 (satu).
Untuk KKN dua-duanya nilainya 8, dengan nilai tertinggi dipegang Suharto
yaitu 9. Well, saya rasa pendapat saya satu aliran sama orang-orang UI
(artikel yg disebut Oom Priyo itu).. hehe...:)
Eh, jangan lupa suruh militer ke barak tuh. Entar ketidakpuasan masyarakat
diterjemahin sebagai dukungan agar militer ambil peran politik lagi baru
tahu rasa lho.
Anjas
------------
>From: Yohanes Sulaiman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Reply-To: Indonesian Students in the US <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Indonesia's Military Grows Impatient with Wahid
>Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2000 08:17:46 -0700
>
>Stratfor.com's Global Intelligence Update - 14 June 2000
>
>Indonesia's Military Grows Impatient with Wahid
>
>
>Summary
>
>Indonesia's armed forces are purging their ranks, removing generals
>loyal to President Abdurrahman Wahid. The military has reasserted
>itself, emphasizing its concerns about Indonesia's instability and
>the threat of separatism. For the moment, the generals are still
>behind Wahid, but he needs to resolve Indonesia's problems - or the
>military will do it for him.
>
>
>Analysis
>
>After several months, Indonesia's military is re-emerging from the
>shadows. On June 13, the head of Indonesia's armed forces (TNI),
>Admiral Widodo Adisucipto, warned that the country was sliding
>further into chaos and that the government's first concern was to
>prevent the nation's disintegration. Widodo's statement typifies
>the military's concern about Indonesia's territorial integrity and
>its dissatisfaction with President Abdurrahman Wahid's efforts to
>solve the problem. The armed forces are still backing Wahid - he is
>still the best of a number of bad choices - but his options are
>severely constrained if he wants to stay in power.
>
>The military high command appears to be bracing itself in
>preparation for a conflict with President Wahid. A TNI spokesman
>told Antara news agency June 9 that a reshuffle of the top echelons
>was in the works. Considering that Wahid has already inserted his
>own loyalists into the top ranks, further reshuffling suggests that
>the military wants to undo the damage. The process has already
>begun; the Straits Times reported that Lt. Gen. Agus
>Wirahadikusumah will lose his post as the chief of the army's
>Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad). Agus was installed on March 29
>and is regarded as a close aide of Wahid and a vocal military
>reformer.
>
>This reshuffling comes on the heels of a series of very public
>warnings from the armed forces. Since the middle of May, military
>figures have continually expressed impatience about resolving the
>economic turmoil, social instability and rampant separatism that is
>tearing the archipelago nation apart. Hinting at solutions, the
>army has begun referring to the People's Consultative Assembly
>(MPR) as the highest power in the land - rather than the president.
>
>Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, the chief of territorial affairs of the
>Indonesian Defense Force, brought up the idea of continued, and
>perhaps increased, military representation in the People's
>Consultative Assembly - quite startling in light of the fact that
>recent military reforms mandate the military withdraw from politics
>by 2004. Most threatening were the General's references to the
>"democratization failure" in Pakistan, and the military takeover
>that rectified the problem, according to Agence France Presse.
>This rhetoric represents a major shift from statements made as
>recently as April 20, when military leaders emerged from their
>annual meeting declaring their desire to stay out of politics. The
>trigger for this change most likely occurred during the May 12
>cease-fire agreement between the government and separatists in the
>province of Aceh.
>
>The cease-fire was a breakthrough in the decades-long conflict, but
>it gave the rebels a hint of legitimacy. Most of the military
>virulently opposes any accommodation of the separatists - seeing it
>as encouragement for other separatists and the beginning of the end
>of Indonesian unity. In fact, some observers blame the military for
>a recent series of assassinations of the Acehnese leadership.
>
>Another reason for this newfound assertiveness is that the armed
>forces may have finally organized themselves after being
>politically routed by Wahid early in his term. Not long after
>taking office, the president brought in a number of new commanders
>and reshuffled many of the old. He replaced the head of the armed
>forces, a position traditionally held by the army, with an admiral
>and directed resources toward the navy.
>
>This exacerbated tensions between army officers - mostly those
>loyal to ex-president Suharto - and the navy, which maintains an
>institutional unity and outlook rooted in the populist nationalist
>agenda of the late president Sukarno. But inter-service rivalries
>appear to have taken a back seat to greater concerns about the
>state of the nation.
>
>The armed forces still back Wahid, more by default than by his own
>virtues. The military has few favorable options. A military
>takeover could stabilize Indonesia - after a period of massive
>bloodshed and anarchy. The military would not only need to suppress
>communal fighting in the Spice Islands and separatists in Aceh and
>Irian Jaya, it would have to fight in the heart of Indonesia, as
>student demonstrators and pro-democracy activists would inevitably
>take to the streets. This would stretch the army to its limits,
>with 250,000 regular troops trying to control a country of 200
>million. In the meantime, the economy would collapse to near
>subsistence levels as the last remaining foreign investors fled.
>The alternative, however, is to sit and watch as Indonesia tears
>itself apart. Wahid has been busy, but relatively ineffective in
>negotiating an end to the violence and in encouraging foreign
>investment. The rest of the government is consumed with political
>infighting, which may be Wahid's salvation.
>
>The military is not yet willing to take over the country, and there
>is no other viable political figure to take Wahid's place. Military
>intervention will be complete, or not at all. Thus, for the moment,
>Wahid stays.
>
>The armed forces have repeatedly stated that their first priority
>is the national unity and territorial integrity of Indonesia.
>Wahid's decision to use negotiations, rather than repression, to
>reel in restive provinces threatens that unity - especially if that
>negotiation amounts to de facto independence. The military's
>patience is wearing thin, but it appears to have given Wahid one
>last chance to fix the situation.
>
>Wahid, however, is stuck. He cannot negotiate with the provinces
>without offering them some form of independence or autonomy - which
>is unacceptable to the military. Fixing Indonesia's economy will
>quell some of the violence, but no companies will invest as long as
>social unrest continues. Wahid made it a point not to send troops
>against the separatists, but he now has little other choice. Soon
>Wahid will bow to the military, allowing it to take control of the
>provinces.
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