hi, Stephens, +1 (again) to MaD (mandatory as default); I've been following the thread and trying to thing of an MTU mechanism that is meaningful in an IETF context. Unfortunately for that, that we've done a reasonably good job of layering security -- making it simple to integrate in makes it simple to separate out as well.
I really think the best we can do is MaD with guidance for usage that enumerates specific, limited cases in which it makes sense to turn off. Cheers, (another) Brian On Oct 15, 2013, at 11:28 PM, Stephen Farrell <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On 10/15/2013 10:21 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: >>> >> Again, we'll have to see what more-that-MIT positions are put >> forth before we'll be able to resolve this speculation on both >> of our parts. > > Fully agree. Brian Carpenter mentioned one in an earlier > mail (on-by-default with an option to turn off) but we've > not seen others proposed so far. > > S. > _______________________________________________ > perpass mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/perpass
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