Dear all, This Thursday Sean Fleming from the Department of Politics and International Studies will be at Serious Metaphysics talking on "How to Interpret Action-Sentences about States" (abstract below).
We'll meet from 1.00-2.30pm in the Philosophy Faculty Board Room, with roughly 45 minutes of presentation and 45 minutes of discussion. Feel free to bring along your lunch. All welcome! I hope to see many of you there, Dan. Abstract - How to Interpret Action-Sentences about States: Action-sentences about states are commonplace. Journalists report that ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’, politicians denounce ‘Russia’s attempts to influence the US election’, and academics debate whether ‘Britain will stay in the single market’. What does it mean to say that a state is acting, and what ontological commitments (if any) does this way of speaking entail? There are two common answers in philosophy and social science. According to the metaphorical interpretation, action-sentences about states are figures of speech with no important ontological implications. ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’ is merely shorthand for ‘some North Koreans conducted a nuclear test’. According to the literal interpretation, action-sentences about states commit us to the view that states are agents in their own right. ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’, like ‘Beethoven conducted a symphony’, ascribes a single action to a single agent. I propose a third interpretation. Action-sentences about states are ‘attributive’, like sentences about clients who act vicariously through lawyers or estate agents. Just as we say ‘Jane bought a house’ even though her estate agent bought the house in her name, we say ‘North Korea conducted a nuclear test’ even though its officials conducted the nuclear test in its name. In each of these sentences, the subject is the entity that is considered to be responsible for the action, not the agent that performed the action. I conclude that action-sentences about states are not shorthand, but nor do they commit us to the view that states are agents. -- Daniel Williams PhD Candidate in Philosophy Email: [email protected] Trinity Hall, Cambridge _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
