Dear all, A reminder that Wes Wrigley will be talking today at SMG on "Sider's Ontologese Introduction Instructions" (abstract below).
As usual, we'll meet from 1-2.30pm in the Philosophy Faculty Board Room. Feel free to bring your lunch. All welcome! I hope to see many of you there. Dan. Abstract: In response to Hirsch’s deflationary arguments, Sider attempts to introduce a special ‘Ontologese’ quantifier to preserve the substantivity of fundamental debates in metaphysics. He provides a list of instructions for metaphysicians, which he argues suffice to give the new quantifier a meaning that carves nature at the joints. I argue that these instructions will not allow someone to start speaking Ontologese if their prior language is sufficiently deviant with respect to it, and that natural languages may be in such a position. I explore three options for Sider to circumvent this problem, and argue that none are successful. On 2017-02-05 17:42, D. Williams wrote: > Dear all, > > This Thursday our own Wes Wrigley will be at Serious Metaphysics > talking on "Sider’s Ontologese Introduction Instructions" (abstract > below). > > As usual, we'll meet from 1-2.30pm in the Philosophy Faculty Board > Room, with roughly 45 minutes of presentation and then 45 minutes of > discussion. Feel free to bring along your lunch. > > All welcome! I hope to see many of you there. > > Dan. > > Abstract: > > In response to Hirsch’s deflationary arguments, Sider attempts to > introduce > a special ‘Ontologese’ quantifier to preserve the substantivity of > fundamental > debates in metaphysics. He provides a list of instructions for > metaphysicians, > which he argues suffice to give the new quantifier a meaning that > carves > nature at the joints. I argue that these instructions will not allow > someone > to start speaking Ontologese if their prior language is sufficiently > deviant > with respect to it, and that natural languages may be in such a > position. I > explore three options for Sider to circumvent this problem, and argue > that > none are successful. -- Daniel Williams PhD Candidate in Philosophy Email: [email protected] Trinity Hall, Cambridge _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
