http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GB25Ae04.html
COMMENT Indonesia's open door ushers in political Islam By Eric Teo Chu Cheow (Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS) It has been two months since the tsunami disaster in Aceh claimed tens of thousands of lives, with the death toll continuing to rise. Many observers believe that this unfortunate incident has "opened" Aceh and perhaps even Indonesia as a whole to the West. Indeed, Aceh has been intermittently "closed" to international scrutiny and an international presence for the past 30 years as Acehnese secessionists battled Jakarta for an independent state. Undoubtedly, the tsunami has physically opened Aceh to Western humanitarian relief, with the support of the Indonesian armed forces (TNI) that instead of battling Free Aceh Movement (GAM) secessionists are aiding Acehnese in tsunami disaster management. These two novelties could change the political situation in Aceh considerably as Jakarta seeks to win the hearts and minds of the Acehnese from the separatists and as peace talks between Jakarta and GAM continue after a "constructive" second round in Helsinki, Finland. At the same time, however, the TNI has tried to restrict the movement of relief workers outside the provincial capital Banda Aceh and the Jakarta government has called for foreign troops to leave the province, a move that clearly dampened Western enthusiasm about Indonesia's reconciliation with the West, especially the United States and Australia. Despite this setback, the TNI is being progressively rehabilitated in the eyes of the US administration, Congress, and public opinion. But the TNI may also have strengthened its political influence within Indonesia, thanks to growing concerns about Western interference and rising nationalism in Indonesia. What perhaps has been less noticeable is the rise of political Islam since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's October inauguration, which could be linked to domestic, regional and international events; this rise is concurrent with the stirring of Indonesian nationalism. So although Aceh may have been physically opened, there are doubts that the province and Indonesia as a whole have been psychologically opened to the West as well. After Yudhoyono's election, two radical Muslim parties, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), seem to have gained a political foothold in Indonesia. Both PKS and PBB supported Yudhoyono's candidacy against the established secular political parties, Golkar and incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri's Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). Today, the presidents of the PKS and PBB occupy the presidencies of the MPR (Consultative Assembly) and the State Secretariat respectively. As an indication of their political strength, these two parties opposed and delayed the appointment of two liberal-minded female ministers, who were deemed too close to the International Monetary Fund or too much in favor of liberalization. Although the election of Vice President Jusuf Kalla as chairman of Golkar may have lifted some "Islamist" pressure from Yudhoyono, the PKS has distinguished itself as the best-organized and most admired humanitarian relief organization in Aceh, rivaling both the TNI and Western aid agencies there. Concerns have been expressed that the PKS and PBB could press for the introduction of Islamic Sharia laws in Indonesia; their growing influence in the president's immediate entourage could encourage radical Muslims and their activities in pesentrens (religious schools) across the archipelago. They may also embolden potential Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) radicals who support embattled cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the alleged spiritual leader of the JI currently on trial for treason, as well as the Bali bombers, who have been sentenced but are appealing the trial decisions. Political Islam in Indonesia may also be fanned by developments in southern Thailand. The violence there took on a political dimension when Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra accused his country's Muslim neighbors of fomenting unrest in Thailand's three southern Malay-Muslim provinces. Thaksin accused Malaysia of holding training camps for Thai Muslims in the Malaysian jungle, despite strong denials from Malaysia, and blamed Indonesian extremists for supporting the separatist insurgency in Thailand. But by pointing the finger at Jakarta, Thaksin might encourage Indonesian Muslim radicals to aid their brethren in southern Thailand against Buddhist Bangkok, just as they morally support Filipino Muslims against Catholic Manila. Current Muslim problems in Southeast Asia could thus further radicalize Indonesian Muslims and encourage political Islam, especially after Thaksin's impressive election victory. His Thai Rak Thai party claimed 75% of the seats in parliament, but lost soundly in the south, where voters overwhelming threw their support behind the opposition Democrats, maintaining the country's political divide. Beyond the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesians have been incensed by Australian moves - real or purported - ranging from media discussions in Canberra to acquire and deploy missiles that could be put in range of Indonesia, to the decision to create a 1,000-nautical-mile maritime surveillance zone, both of which are thought to encroach on Indonesian sovereignty. This fear has been heightened thanks to Canberra's close support for and collaboration with the US in its fight against international terror; Prime Minister John Howard is commonly perceived in Jakarta as President George W Bush's "deputy sheriff" in the region. Many have also never forgotten or forgiven Australia for having helped "liberate" East Timor, which is viewed as a profound humiliation for Indonesia. It is hoped therefore that Canberra would tread carefully in its approach to Aceh's relief operations, even though it has pledged a generous US$760 million in humanitarian relief, the majority of it going to Indonesia. The rise of political Islam also has clear links to broader Muslim issues, as moderate Indonesian Muslims have become increasingly critical of Washington's policies in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire. Yudhoyono's first overseas trip was to attend Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat's funeral in Cairo, a clear indication of Indonesia's Islamic priorities and convictions. On the other hand, Jakarta's rapprochement with Washington is moving forward discreetly and relations with the US are cool, even though the US supports Yudhoyono, especially in the fight against terrorism in Southeast Asia. Yudhoyono cannot move fast, primarily because of the domestic Muslim lobby. Washington-Jakarta rapprochement could thus be held hostage to the rise of political Islam. Aceh may be a small opening that allows the TNI and the US military to cooperate and work together, and perhaps even permit rapprochement and the resumption of US military training to the TNI, but bilateral ties have not realized their full potential. The rise of political Islam in Indonesia is a fundamental aspect of Yudhoyono's Indonesia. The tsunami relief operations may have opened Aceh, and even Indonesia, but the rise of both political Islam and Indonesian nationalism appears to have consolidated in tandem. Australia, the US and other Western governments must be aware of this parallel phenomenon and should not be lulled by the illusion of a seemingly pro-West Indonesia in the making. President Yudhoyono must continue to balance between a pro-Western business outlook and Indonesia's inherent Islamic and nationalistic inclinations. Eric Teo Chu Cheow, a business consultant and strategist based in Singapore, is council secretary of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA). He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS) ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> What would our lives be like without music, dance, and theater? Donate or volunteer in the arts today at Network for Good! http://us.click.yahoo.com/pkgkPB/SOnJAA/Zx0JAA/uTGrlB/TM --------------------------------------------------------------------~-> Post message: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] List owner : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/ Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
