http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1093/focus.htm

12 - 18 April 2012
Issue No. 1093
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875

In the shadow of revolution

Egypt's Coptic Christians are celebrating Easter this year amidst fears of the 
rise of the Islamists and sadness at the loss of the late Pope Shenouda III, 
writes Sameh Fawzi

Click to view caption
>From top: Egypt's Copts celebrating Easter in a church in Cairo; the funeral 
>of Pope Shenouda III

Michael Shalabi, owner of a fish-and-chip shop in the iconic British seaside 
resort of Brighton, seems to be the very model of an Egyptian Coptic expatriate 
who has no fears about the future. The walls of Shalabi's shop are decorated 
with photographs of the late Coptic Pope Shenouda III, and any Egyptian Muslim 
friends have come by to express their condolences.

"I felt that my own father had passed away when Shenouda died," Shalabi says. 
"But when I saw the great expressions of national unity at the Pope's funeral, 
all my fears for the future of Egypt evaporated. This great man united 
Egyptians in his death as much as he did in his life."

While millions of Egyptians took to the streets last year to oust former 
president Hosni Mubarak and his cronies from power in the 2011 January 
Revolution, as many millions if not more came out onto the streets to mourn the 
late Pope Shenouda.

However, Shalabi's comparative lack of concern may not be shared by other 
members of the Coptic community, whether in Egypt or abroad. Another Coptic 
expatriate, who asked to remain anonymous, said that he had moved to the United 
Kingdom partly because of fears about the future of Egypt's Coptic Christians 
under Islamist rule.

In addition to fears of being treated as "second class citizens" under Islamist 
rule, present among many Copts, this man said that he feared that competition 
among the Islamists themselves in the upcoming presidential elections could 
result in violence. If that happened, he said, Egypt's Copts could pay a 
disproportionate price.

Such contrasting positions are to be found not only in the Coptic community 
inside and outside Egypt, but also among segments of the wider Egyptian 
society. However, as a religious minority group, the Copts may have special 
fears about the future, coming at least in part from decades of unresolved 
problems. These have included restrictions on building and repairing churches, 
under-representation in political and professional organisations, the lack of a 
fair share of key positions in the state apparatus, and perceptions that there 
has been a decrease in religious tolerance in Egypt.

Now the Copts have the additional worry that these problems may get worse under 
an Islamist government, whether this is dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood or 
by the Salafist groups.

The Islamists have long been portrayed by many Copts as religious fanatics, 
particularly by those who feel that they were targeted by the successive waves 
of Islamic radicalism that occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Islamist discourse 
on the Copts in particular and non-Muslims in general sometimes also contains 
edicts stripping non-Muslims of full citizenship rights.

Nahla is one young Egyptian Copt who believes that the Islamists intend to 
discriminate against the Copts. "If the Islamists could deport us from Egypt, 
they would do so," she said. While there may be some fanatical Islamists who 
air such extreme opinions, this idea is far from being the official position of 
the Islamist groups, and there are many Islamist groups and thinkers who argue 
for a version of inter-faith relations based on equity and justice.

In this regard, generalised fears of those sometimes described as Islamists 
only increases fears and hinders the flow of normal interactions among 
Egyptians who have coexisted despite their religious differences for millennia.

Nevertheless, the recent death of Pope Shenouda may have increased fears of 
future discrimination among the Copts. Seham is a public employee who lives in 
a Cairo suburb among majority Muslim neighbours. She headed to the Coptic 
Orthodox Cathedral in Cairo after she learned of the death of Pope Shenouda, 
feeling that "I had lost a father who used to defend my rights." Seham like 
thousands of others waited in the long queue of Coptic mourners to get a 
glimpse of the body of Pope Shenouda seated on St Mark's throne.

For many Copts, the late pope, with his charismatic personality and clear 
presence in the public sphere, was a defender of the Copts against any 
prejudices they might have to endure. However, this situation was hardly ideal, 
since it raises the question of the neutrality of the state vis-³-vis the 
country's different religious communities and places a heavy emphasis on the 
Coptic Church as the de facto defender of Egypt's Copts. This is at least 
questionable in a modern, notionally secular state, and it may indicate an 
inability by state agencies to represent and meet the expectations of all 
citizens.

When the state fails to deliver, other organisations, sometimes religious, are 
tempted to take over the state's role, benefiting from the loyalty that should 
belong to the state. Under the former Mubarak regime, the state failed 
satisfactorily to address many people's socio-economic needs, and as a result 
many resorted to other organisations, such as religious groups, for financial 
support, medical care, and rapid help in a crisis.

Some Muslims joined Islamist groups as a result of the inadequacy of the state 
apparatus, while many Copts were drawn ever closer to the Coptic Church. The 
state's declining role in the provision of social services led all the 
country's religious organisations, including the Coptic Church, to strengthen 
their presence in the public and private spheres.

Now that Pope Shenouda is no longer present to lead the Church, this picture is 
unlikely to change since the Coptic Church, like the various Islamist 
organisations, is making up for the lack of socio-economic services in society. 
If the state is able to restore its developmental and service-providing role, 
then it seems likely that the Church and other religious organisations will 
also return to a more restricted role in Egyptians' public and private lives.

Moreover, the role of the Church, and of Shenouda's role within it, was hardly 
uncontested during the Mubarak years by Coptic intellectuals and activists, 
many of whom claimed that Shenouda's leadership of the Church had worked to 
prevent them from participating effectively in public life and had even 
suffocated the Coptic political class.

Milad Hanna, a prominent leftist intellectual, has been a critic of Pope 
Shenouda over recent years, and other Coptic intellectuals like Gamal Asaad 
have followed the same path. The late Pope tended to overshadow other Coptic 
figures because of his charisma and popularity, leading many to complain that 
the state didn't treat Coptic intellectuals as interlocutors, preferring to 
deal with the Church hierarchy alone.

This was exacerbated by the perception among many Egyptians, Muslim and 
Christian alike, that Shenouda was a wise man able to discourage sectarian 
tensions. As a result, he had a strong following even in the Muslim community, 
with one bishop of the Coptic Orthodox Church saying that many Muslims had 
expressed their admiration and respect for Pope Shenouda, some even printing 
thousands of copies of his photograph and publicly distributing them. The Pope 
had helped all Egyptians, and not just Christians, to overcome some difficult 
times in a calm and effective manner, he said.

Today, there is a widespread hope in society that the next Coptic pope will 
follow his predecessor's path. Metropolitan Bakhomios, or locum tenens, 
sometimes called the acting patriarch of the Church, has said that he is keen 
to follow in the path blazed by Shenouda during the transitional period after 
the death of the former pope. Bakhamios's public statements and official visits 
to the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the prime minister, 
the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar and the Grand Mufti of the republic have revealed 
his understanding of his role as being modeled on that set out by Shenouda.

"He thinks carefully before acting, and he relies upon teamwork rather than 
individual choices," one senior bishop said. The interim period overseen by 
Metropolitan Bakhomios may last a few months or a few years, particularly if 
there is controversy over the election of a new pope. This period will also see 
a certain amount of upheaval attendant on the election of the new president, 
with fears of a confrontation between the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood 
possibly being in the offing.

Bishop Moussa, responsible for youth in the Coptic Church and believed to be a 
candidate for the papacy, is supported by a large number of bishops in the 
Church's synod. He has said that Copts, like other citizens, should feel free 
to cast their votes however they may choose in the forthcoming presidential 
elections without any interference from the Church, something believed to be 
essential in keeping the Coptic community distant from the competition among 
political forces.

Nevertheless, some commentators believe that the Church may signal its support 
for one of the candidates, even if it does not do so publicly. It is unlikely 
to favour candidates with an Islamist background, particularly after the Copts 
were allegedly marginalised by the Islamist-dominated committee set up to draft 
the country's new constitution, something that led to their withdrawal from the 
committee, along with representatives of Al-Azhar.

Yet, regardless of who is the next president of Egypt, the new pope will likely 
follow in the footsteps of Pope Shenouda by working to help sustain national 
unity, peace-building and the Palestinian cause. Additionally, the acting 
patriarch Metropolitan Bakhomios and the new pope will have to face up to 
various inherited problems in the Church's relationship with the state, 
especially regarding the building and repair of churches and the Coptic 
personal status laws. However, these purely Coptic issues may well be 
temporarily overshadowed by the troubled political situation nationwide.

At root, the situation of Egypt's Copts is not so very different from that of 
any other citizens who want to be fully-fledged members of the national 
community. The law should be applied equally, and legal problems should be 
addressed. The building of places of worship and the relationship between the 
religions should be strictly governed by a single code of law that guarantees 
equality. Moreover, the political system should represent all segments of 
society, and, that being so, the Copts should have a reasonable presence in 
elected institutions according to their individual merits and contributions.

All this cannot be achieved in the absence of a tolerant cultural setting, 
meaning that any inherited slights or wounds should now be made good on. This 
is particularly important since religious tolerance has been decreasing in 
Egypt, and in order to restore it a campaign should be instigated to look into 
media content or school curricula that directly or indirectly encourage 
misunderstandings.

In this regard, responsibility also lies on the shoulders of the religious 
majority in creating a tolerant atmosphere and healthy inter-faith 
relationships. In Egypt, the religious mainstream supports co-existence and 
refuses any calls for discrimination. However, if the present negative 
atmosphere continues, there are fears that even some formerly moderate 
Egyptians may become intolerant, meaning that today the majority should work to 
provide spaces for inter-faith interactions and halt the recall of religious 
edicts from the mediaeval period that may cause some Muslims to believe that 
they are superior to non-Muslims and that Christian participation in politics 
at the national and local levels should be curbed. Naturally, this is not a 
one-way process: Christians, too, should respond positively, in order to leave 
behind unjustified fears.

The management of religious diversity should not be like a football game, in 
which competing teams respect each other, or are expected to respect each 
other, while both competing to gain the lead. This kind of zero-sum-game 
mentality should be rejected and a more healthy way of relating encouraged. It 
is not enough to say that the Christian community in Egypt should be respected, 
or to declare that all Egyptians share the same racial, linguistic and cultural 
background.

All this is good, of course, but there is also a need to promote the idea that 
Egypt's cultural heritage has been accumulated over many centuries of 
interactions between Muslims and Christians. In particular, the importing of 
cultural norms and practices from Gulf countries that either do not have, or do 
not value, cultural and religious diversity in the way Egyptians do is a danger 
to the unique Egyptian model of religious coexistence and homogenous culture.

Finally, Egypt's present problems, including those relating to its religious 
mix, should be addressed in a transparent manner through public institutions. 
This means that the society should develop public policies to solve any 
problems related to religious diversity, on an agreed-upon legal framework for 
building and repairing churches, for example, or on achieving the better 
political representation of Christians and eliminating tensions between people 
of different religious affiliations.

Such policies can help to promote the accumulation of social capital between 
the different religious communities, preventing the conflicts that may take 
place between Muslims and Christians. All these things require public policies 
in the form of laws, bylaws, and ministerial decrees, these encouraging the 
spread of rational reflection, dialogue, and the possibility of learning from 
mistakes.

Easter this year will be different for many Copts, particularly in the absence 
of Pope Shenouda. However, tears and condolences may not be enough to calm a 
sometimes frightened people or tackle pre-existing problems. Let us admit that 
all Egyptians are worried about the future, even if this sense of anxiety may 
be higher among Christians, a numerical minority living among an overwhelmingly 
Muslim majority. Yet, these fears cannot be dealt with in isolation: they have 
to be managed through a democratic political system based on equality, justice 
and freedom.

Egypt's Copts are as eager for equality and justice as their Muslim fellows. 
This can be a good start for building a new system that accommodates all and 
excludes none. And this not just a dream: in Tahrir Square Egyptians united 
under one banner reading the "people want to pull down the regime." Now they 
face the task of erecting a new regime. The future will show whether they are 
as good at building as they were at destroying. Whatever the case may be, the 
future of Egypt's Copts is insolubly linked to the future of Egypt as a whole. 

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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