I don't disagree. But what is wrong with the notion of introducing an _additional_ layer of certification? Signed script and/or html would most certainly make it way harder to de-face a website or sneak malicious code into an environment. I strongly believe that just for this reason alone, we should think about signed content - even without additional potentially unsafe functionality.


On 11/19/2014 09:21 AM, Pradeep Kumar wrote:


As Josh said earlier, signing the code (somehow) will not enhance security. It will open doors for more threats. It's better and more open, transparent and in sync with the spirit of open web to give the control to end user and not making them to relax today on behalf of other signing authorities.

On 19-Nov-2014 8:44 pm, "Michaela Merz" <michaela.m...@hermetos.com <mailto:michaela.m...@hermetos.com>> wrote:

    You are correct. But all those services are (thankfully) sand
    boxed or read only. In order to make a browser into something even
    more useful, you have to relax these security rules a bit. And
    IMHO that *should* require signed code - in addition to the users


    On 11/19/2014 09:09 AM, Pradeep Kumar wrote:

    Even today, browsers ask for permission for geolocation, local
    storage, camera etc... How it is different from current scenario?

    On 19-Nov-2014 8:35 pm, "Michaela Merz"
    <michaela.m...@hermetos.com <mailto:michaela.m...@hermetos.com>>

        That is relevant and also not so. Because Java applets
        silently grant access to a out of sandbox functionality if
        signed. This is not what I am proposing. I am suggesting a
        model in which the sandbox model remains intact and users
        need to explicitly agree to access that would otherwise be


        On 11/19/2014 12:01 AM, Jeffrey Walton wrote:

            On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 12:35 AM, Michaela Merz
            <mailto:michaela.m...@hermetos.com>> wrote:

                Well .. it would be a "all scripts signed" or "no
                script signed" kind of a
                deal. You can download malicious code everywhere -
                not only as scripts.
                Signed code doesn't protect against malicious or bad
                code. It only
                guarantees that the code is actually from the the
                certificate owner .. and
                has not been altered without the signers consent.

            Seems relevant: "Java's Losing Security Legacy",
            http://threatpost.com/javas-losing-security-legacy and
            "Don't Sign
            that Applet!",

            Dormann advises "don't sign" so that the code can't
            escape its sandbox
            and it stays restricted (malware regularly signs to do so).

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