Jeremy, going back to your original proposal – we agree with you that this 
ballot should focus on improving the requirements re timelines for responding 
to certificate problem reports and revocation requests (in Ballot 213, allowing 
more time for investigation of non-critical requests), and that the ballot 
should not create any new public reporting requirements.

Our auditors already test us for compliance with BR 4.9.1, 4.9.3, and 4.9.5, 
including timeliness of our responses to certificate problem reports and 
revocation requests.  See quoted material from BR WebTrust audit criteria 
below.  We don’t see any value in having CAs also post some sort of reports to 
the Forum (the Forum is not an enforcement agency) or even to the browser root 
programs, for that matter, if they face delays in completing the response 
process for some reason (e.g., slowness by the certificate holder in responding 
with necessary information, etc.).  So we don’t favor including new reporting 
language in Ballot 213.

Of course, if CAs are encountering problems in completing revocation request 
responses within the new timelines, they can bring information forward to the 
Forum with suggestions for changes in the BRs if appropriate, just as Jeremy 
has done with this Ballot.

Here are the relevant portions of BR WebTrust on this issue – very extensive:

Principle 2: SSL Service Integrity

The Certification Authority (CA) maintains effective controls to provide 
reasonable assurance that:

·       Subscriber information was properly collected, authenticated (for the 
registration activities performed by the CA, Registration Authority (RA) and 
subcontractor) and verified;

·       The integrity of keys and certificates it manages is established and 
protected throughout their life cycles.



CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND STATUS CHECKING



BRWT Sec. 5.1 (BR 4.9.3)

The CA maintains controls to provide reasonable assurance that a process is 
available 24x7 that the CA is able to accept and respond to revocation requests 
and related inquiries, and that the CA provides a process for Subscribers to 
request revocation of their own certificates.



BRWT Sec. 5.2 (BR 4.9.3, 4.9.5, 4.10.2)

The CA maintains controls to provide reasonable assurance that it:

·       has the capability to accept and acknowledge Certificate Problem 
Reports on a 24x7 basis;

·       identifies high priority Certificate Problem Reports;

·       begin investigation of Certificate Problem Reports within 24 hours:

·       decides whether revocation or other appropriate action is warranted; and

·       where appropriate, forwards such complaints to law enforcement.





BRWT Sec. 5.3 (BR 4.9.1.2, 6.1.5, 6.1.6)

The CA maintains controls to provide reasonable assurance that Subscriber 
Certificates are revoked within 24 hours if any of the following events occurs:

1. The Subscriber requests in writing that the CA revoke the Certificate;

2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not 
authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;

3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key corresponding to 
the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or no longer 
complies with the requirements of SSL Baseline Requirements Sections 6.1.5 and 
6.1.6;

4. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;

5. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its 
material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use;

6. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a 
Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer 
legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name 
Registrant’s right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services 
agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, 
or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name);

7. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to 
authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name;

8. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in 
the Certificate;

9. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with 
these Requirements or the CA’s Certificate Policy or Certification Practice 
Statement;

10. The CA determines that any of the information appearing in the Certificate 
is inaccurate or misleading;

11. The CA ceases operations for any reason and has not made arrangements for 
another CA to provide revocation support for the Certificate;

12. The CA’s right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is 
revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue 
maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;

13. The CA is made aware of a possible compromise of the Private Key of the 
Subordinate CA used for issuing the Certificate;

14. Revocation is required by the CA’s Certificate Policy and/or Certification 
Practice Statement; or

15. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable 
risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties (e.g. the CA/Browser 
Forum might determine that a deprecated cryptographic/signature algorithm or 
key size presents an unacceptable risk and that such Certificates should be 
revoked and replaced by CAs within a given period of time).



BRWT Sec. 5.4 (BR 4.9.1.2, 6.1.5, 6.1.6)

The CA maintains controls to provide reasonable assurance that Subordinate CA 
Certificates are revoked within 7 days if any of the following events occurs:

1. The Subordinate CA requests revocation in writing;

2. The Subordinate CA notifies the Issuing CA that the original certificate 
request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization;

3. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Subordinate CA’s Private Key 
corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise or 
no longer complies with the requirements of SSL Baseline Requirements Sections 
6.1.5 and 6.1.6,

4. The Issuing CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused;

5. The Issuing CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in 
accordance with or that Subordinate CA has not complied with these Baseline 
Requirements or the applicable Certificate Policy or Certification Practice 
Statement;

6. The Issuing CA determines that any of the information appearing in the 
Certificate is inaccurate or misleading;

7. The Issuing CA or Subordinate CA ceases operations for any reason and has 
not made arrangements for another CA to provide revocation support for the 
Certificate;

8. The Issuing CA’s or Subordinate CA's right to issue Certificates under these 
Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the Issuing CA has 
made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository;

9. Revocation is required by the Issuing CA’s Certificate Policy and/or 
Certification Practice Statement; or

10. The technical content or format of the Certificate presents an unacceptable 
risk to Application Software Suppliers or Relying Parties (e.g. the CA/Browser 
Forum might determine that a deprecated cryptographic/signature algorithm or 
key size presents an unacceptable risk.

From: Public [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Jeremy Rowley 
via Public
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2017 12:58 PM
To: Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]>
Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL]Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 213 - Revocation Timeline Extension

I understand what you are saying, but revocation timelines seems like a 
different topic than challenges facing the space.  There should be a mailing 
list for challenges, but I don’t think it should be tied to changing the 
revocation timelines already in the BRs.

From: Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2017 1:18 PM
To: Jeremy Rowley 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Cc: CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Ballot 213 - Revocation Timeline Extension



On Wed, Sep 13, 2017 at 3:10 PM, Jeremy Rowley 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Sure, but I plan on uploading all these to the Mozilla dev list.  Emailing the 
CAB Forum as well seems like duplicative effort, especially since the emails 
aren’t going to be readily collaborated.  If the CABForum is going to collect 
the problem reports, some format other than email would be much better for data 
collection.

I'm not sure I understand your point about collaborated, but I think you may be 
misunderstanding the goal.

I appreciate the desire for transparency and engagement with the community, and 
I hope all CAs aspire to that level. However, I think the goal here is 
minimally to ensure public visibility, in a self-managed form (that is, I have 
difficulty imagining the CABF requiring an MDSP posting). I think going above 
and beyond is good, but i think we should set minimum reasonable requirements.

As I noted, I'm not wedded to the idea of public@, but I think there should be 
a CABF-managed, publicly-visible list for discussion about the challenges here 
in this space :)

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