> On Oct 23, 2018, at 7:56 AM, Antoine Pitrou <anto...@python.org> wrote: > > > Le 23/10/2018 à 13:55, Donald Stufft a écrit : >> >> We’re using IRV and I accept that, but I just want to point out that IRV >> still has a form vote splitting (in electoral parlance, vote splitting >> is the “favorite betrayal criterion” >> - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ. IRV only protects against >> vote splitting when you have a very weak or a very strong candidate >> ranked first. > > Do you have a non-video link to an explanation? > > If some form of tactical voting is possible, as a voter I'd like to know > about it. >
To be clear, *all* voting systems have some form of tactical voting as part of them, so this isn’t unique to IRV. I was mostly just pointing out that IRV isn’t a panacea, you can still get a vote splitting like effect. Interestingly, IRV also has the property that sometimes the simple act of voting your true preference *at all* can cause your true preference to lose, and sometimes you would have been better off not voting at all. I’m struggling to find a resource besides that doesn’t also include shilling for another voting system or isn’t a lengthy paper but https://rangevoting.org/IRVpartic.html <https://rangevoting.org/IRVpartic.html> gives an example and https://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html <https://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html> is a more complex example.
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