While I suspect most participants are aware of this, just in care some don't I thought I'd just point out that it's futile to look for a "perfect" voting system -- Kenneth Arrow proved that long ago, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem
Alex On Tue, Oct 23, 2018 at 9:08 AM Tim Peters <tim.pet...@gmail.com> wrote: > > [Donald Stufft <don...@stufft.io>] > >> ... >> I’m struggling to find a resource besides that doesn’t also include >> shilling for another voting system or isn’t a lengthy paper but >> https://rangevoting.org/IRVpartic.html gives an example and >> https://rangevoting.org/TarrIrv.html is a more complex example. >> > > The rangevoting site has a great deal of info about all sorts of voting > systems. Over a decade ago, Ka-Ping Yee (who used to be very active in > Python development) ran some _visual_ voting simulations on 5 popular > systems, which scared him (& me) away from IRV forever: > > http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ > > """ > The following images visually demonstrate how Plurality penalizes centrist > candidates and Borda favours them; how Approval and Condorcet yield nearly > identical results; and how the Hare method yields extremely strange > behaviour. Alarmingly, the Hare method (also known as "IRV") is gaining > momentum as the most popular type of election-method reform in the United > States (in Berkeley, Oakland, and just last November in San Francisco, for > example). > """ > > That said, in the absence of political factions maneuvering to increase > their own power over time, with money and marketing clout to persuade > voters to play along, I'm not much concerned about the system used for a > one-shot vote. Even if we all strive to be as "strategic" and/or > "tactical" as possible, we'll all be pushing in different directions. > > One massive (to my eyes) advantage of range voting is that it never pays > to give your true favorite less than your top score, or your true > least-favorite more than your bottom score. (Note: the "approval voting" > used for PSF elections is essentially range voting limited to two possible > scores - and it should be very easy in that context to see that it can't > pay to approve a candidate you don't approve of, or vice versa.) > _______________________________________________ > python-committers mailing list > python-committers@python.org > https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-committers > Code of Conduct: https://www.python.org/psf/codeofconduct/ >
_______________________________________________ python-committers mailing list python-committers@python.org https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-committers Code of Conduct: https://www.python.org/psf/codeofconduct/
