(stripped down the recipient list). Quoting Carles Xavier Munyoz Bald� ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > On Wednesday 11 September 2002 13:41, Alan Brown wrote: > > On Wed, 11 Sep 2002, Carles Xavier Munyoz [iso-8859-1] Bald� wrote: > > > Using TSL in the pop3 communication for read the messages from your > > > mailbox has no sense because the messages have traversed the internet > > > until reach your mailbox in clear text. > > > > 20% of all my SMTP mail arrives on my server via 168-bit encrypted > > sessions. > > Ok, but when the email is delivered to the user mailbox or to the MTA queue it > is in plain text, isn't it ? > > If you want a totally secure email communication, the best nowadays option is > peer to peer encryption using public key cryptography technology.
We are talking about different things and different solutions. Transit encrpytion is where the main risk of email has been. TLS and SSL (pop & imap) answer this. They are standards, they are widely supported. TLS is supported in stock releases of Postfix, Sendmail, and Exchange; it's an unsupported add on for qmail (Google for dlb's comments on any additions to qmail1 for more on that) Content encryption still calls for that ever elusive key infrastructure. Sure, I have a CA at home and at my company, but personal certs aren't recognized outside of that. PGP and GPG are still not simple enough for Mom to setup and use. Yes, there are mailers (Eudora is notable) that make it easy to use once setup, but getting it there and maintaining it is not easy. So yeah, I keep public keys in LDAP for use by my peers. Content encryption also has a number of other issues that are way off topic for this list (qpopper and mta's don't encrypt content). Content management being one of several issues at corps. > > At some point, I (and lots of other admins) will start refusing > > unencrypted sessions. I've already switched off ALL unencrypted POP3, > > IMAP, FTP and terminal(telnet) sessions and am working on NNTPS next. > Yes, I agree, but this point is still far :-) I wouldn't got that far, but I *will* treat unencrypted mail differently. I can block partners from sending in cleartext, keeps badness from happening. I can take responsibility for the security of my message store (where clear text mail IS). This isn't a new concept: In 1994, I was in an Athena environment. Pretty much no cleartext, nothing without strong authentication. 25MHz machines. Root password posted on the wall because root was a safe "guest login" with very few privs.
