On 2017-03-28 at 08:33 -0400, 'Blacklight447' via qubes-devel wrote: > The basic idea was that you have to provide a password to decrypt the > vms data, so you can boot and use it, allowing you to be sure only you > can access its data. This could even be potentially combined with an > option to export the encrypted vm, to later boot it in a clean version > of qubes os. > > Im not looking for just a password prompt, since those do not provide > any real security, unless your threat model is preventing someone to > access your vm"s when you forgot to shutdown or lock your machine. > You can use a HVM with LUKS disk. The password will be asked on boot, just as when booting a physical OS with an encrypted disk.
However, being a HVM there will be less integration with other qubes (maybe the support tools can be installed -and work- on HVM, too?). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/1490745879.925.22.camel%4016bits.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
