On 12/01/2016 04:37 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > The tool run by qvm-usb does support alternative device identification > - using product and vendor ID. Also to specify which device to attach. > This isn't exposed by qvm-usb tool, because it may be ambiguous, but may > be useful here. See README for more details: > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-app-linux-usb-proxy > I acknowledge that your solution is better in some aspect: it exists and > works :)
It seems, from my brief testing, that all Yubikeys of the same version have the same product and vendor ids. That still might be preferable to grepping for "Yubikey" though. > Is communication with YubiKey encrypted, or at least somehow > authenticated? Otherwise malicious USB VM could easily perform some kind > of man in the middle attack and for example sign document you really > didn't want to sign. Or decrypt arbitrary data. It's possible even when > physical confirmation (button) is required - by simply waiting until you > perform *some* operation. It is authenticated, but unfortunately I don't think in a secure way. When you use any OpenPGP smart card you have to set a PIN to use it, and you have to authenticate with the smart card using the PIN. In the case of Yubikeys, you type the PIN using the gpg pinentry program (some smart card readers have physical keypads to type the PIN, so software keyloggers on the computer can't steal the PIN). But I'm pretty sure that the PIN you type in, in plaintext, gets sent to the Yubikey, so your usbvm could probably log the PIN the very first time you use your smart card, and then use it as much as it wants after that without you knowing. Also, I'm pretty sure none of the communication is encrypted. To decrypt a message on a smart card, you send the ciphertext (and a PIN, if it isn't cached) to the smart card, and it decrypts it responds with the plaintext. So likely, the usbvm could spy on the plaintext of decrypted messages. Unfortunately Yubikeys don't support pressing the physical button for secret key operations. Those are preserved for 2FA and static passwords. > This is general problem with USB devices, which are hard to solve with > the current USB infrastructure (USB VM can do anything with any device > connected to it). Without some fundamental USB rework - probably at > hardware layer, I think the only alternative is protecting the data at > individual device protocol level (like you do with encrypted USB sticks > for example). Sad, but reality. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/6c322b41-e60f-d577-d15d-6cf7884ee8cf%40micahflee.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
