Thank you. But, my question was more about how Qubes gets installed and does it use any system properties to customize the install?
I know what you are saying though. If running Windows/macOS, a piece of firmware of a device (or bios) could be infected. And when booting Qubes from the external device, it could infect it. Then again, that argument could be made against 100% of all PCs, laptops, motherboards of custom builds, etc - even brand new devices. So are you ever safe? Perhaps if you built your own device from scratch and coded your own BIOS. The edge case you mention would most likely be valid only from a targeted attack, not part of a toolkit. Say if a state actor wanted access to my Qubes install, they would need to know some very specific information: * specific macbook with specific hardware (very likely, AppleCare registered and all, blogging/bragging of hardware used, etc). * the exact mSATA drive and USB device I use for Qubes OS (very likely, I can just blog about it - or they can get NewEgg purchase history). * knowledge of exact firmware versions installed on those devices. Virtually, they would need to exploit some Windows/macOS 0-day to gain access to the machine (somewhat likely, sure). Physically, they would need to evil-maid my machines when we are gone on vacation or something (plausible, sure). The attack would have to look like this: 1) They could devise a custom mSATA firmware to install onto the device. Well, that would require me having the Qubes OS usb device attached when booting under some other OS installed on that machine. So, always disconnect it before booting native OS. Easy. 2) They could use the exploit to infect the BIOS, or Nvidia GPU firmware - something that would boot when booting the Qubes install. 2A) that could install a keylogger, to gain access to the /boot LUKS partition password (like an evil-maid attack). plausible, yes - at a very edge case. 2B) that could install some other firmware installer, that waits for the linux kernel to boot and then side-loads itself into the boot process, or exploit some Qubes 0-day to gain root on the device. very unlikely, but plausible, yes. So plausible? Sure, with explicit details in hand. But that is acceptable to me as the level of sophistication required to pull off that level of attack, with knowledge of devices and their exact firmware versions, most likely would only come from state actors. (*cough* Stuxnet *cough*) If you are worried about state actors, then yes format your machines and install only Qubes. -E On Thursday, May 25, 2017 at 11:14:30 PM UTC-4, cooloutac wrote: > On Thursday, May 25, 2017 at 1:00:18 PM UTC-4, Eric Duncan wrote: > > Hello: > > > > Does Quebes perform a machine-specific installation? IOWs, can I install > > Quebes on a single USB device and share it across different machine setups? > > > > E.g. if I install Qubes on an 8 core desktop, w/64GB ram, SSD (just keep it > > simple - only 1 SSD), Nvidia GPUs, etc - can I then take that exact same > > install and boot it in my Core i7 dual-core tablet with only 8 gb of ram > > without any issues? > > > > I ask because of two reasons: > > > > * I cannot format entire HDDs to dedicate to Qubes OS. I still do some > > Windows 10, iOS and Linux development and need macOS for other various > > things. A dual-boot setup is not "secure." > > > > * I was thinking of setting up an mSATA drive and USB3 adapter for Quebes, > > encrypt the partitions and evil-maid protection and etc, and boot it in > > multiple devices. > > > > I currently have it installed as a dual-boot on my Lenovo Helix (full > > support for 4.x btw!). But, I'd like to boot Quebes on my desktop and > > other machines I use... > > > > ...while keeping it secure, by using the entire mSATA drive for Quebes. > > > > Thanks in advance! > > -E > > > > Ps, I have already attempted to try this with a USB3 stick and had possibly > > unrelated failures. Hence, why I am asking about the installation process > > and hardware configurations- if any. > > > > Before I invest into an external drive setup, I'd like to know if there are > > any foreseen issues first. > > I'm not sure it would really be keeping it secure that way either. dual boot > is not only unsafe cause it can change /boot but also because other os could > infect hardware. In other words windows or mac could infect the firmware or > netcard, gpu, cdrom, etc... which could then sniff or infect your usb > installation. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/fd946589-e655-4b66-a80d-2c6f5c418030%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
