> > Thanks, and point taken on not focusing on security implications. > > I found a thread from last year where some third-party devs are concerned > about the implications of letting qvm-run -p run wild: > > https://github.com/SietsevanderMolen/i3-qubes/issues/15 > > It's a good idea, but I think I'm looking for a more secure solution - if > it's out there.
I'm trying this for a solution: - Creating sys-transfer-station VM - Set it as internal VM (this VM will never be used for anything but transferring files) - qubes.Filecopy policy: $anyvm sys-transfer-station allow - As the computer shuts down, add to qubes.Filecopy policy: sys-transfer-station sys-net-profiles allow - Transfer files - Remove "sys-transfer-station sys-net-profiles allow" I think this might do the trick... any comments on how this would be insecure? Seems somewhat similar to the qubes-dom0-update mechanism with sys-firewall. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/42ad2989-7b08-459f-976e-e89a58670c54%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
