On Sunday, February 11, 2018 at 9:51:56 AM UTC+1, Yuraeitha wrote: > On Sunday, February 11, 2018 at 9:18:16 AM UTC+1, Matteo wrote: > > > Does anyone know the 'alt+space+f'(fullscreen) command, or where to find > > > it? Or are there none available in /bin /usr/bin or similar? > > > > i think that you have to press that keys on the keyboard, is not a > > terminal command (in fact you can't find in /usr/bin) > > > > if you press alt+space bar a menu should pop up, the same menu can be > > seen by clicking in the title bar of the window, from there you can see > > maximize, minimize, close, and probably also fullscreen that can be > > quickly selected with f. > > > > note that qubes by default doesn't allow fullscreen, unless you enable > > it. also usually websites and programs have a easily accessible > > fullscreeen button (youtube). > > > > but i'm not sure about what you want to do. > > hope it helps > > In Qubes 4 I never had to enable it btw, oddly, it just works. > > I've solved the problem since posting, I was looking the entirely wrong place > all along, but new ideas for clues came along after I had posted. So I > deleted the topic since it had no views/posts at the time anyway and was > resolved. But it seems it wasn't deleted after all x) But thinking it over > again, perhaps this can help others looking to solve this too. > > I've found two methods to solve it, although the second is only half solved. > It was a bit like treasure hunting, here's the results. > > 1'st approach: > wmctrl -r :ACTIVE: -b toggle,fullscreen > If this is written in dom0 terminal, or any AppVM terminal, then the window > will go fullscreen. This is the one one may want if keybinding, and pressing > an active keybind while another window of choice is active. Write a .sh > script file in dom0, and save the command. Then it's just a matter of using > dom0 keybinding to activate it. Which gives much more flexibility to > alt+space+f, for example changing it to alt+f or numpad at the other side of > the room for remote pre-configured controls, i.e. using Qubes as a large > screen on a distance. It has many uses, just use ones own imagination to find > one. Also I believe this is the command Qubes uses internally when pressing > alt+space+f, but I did not manage to confirm that. Also another variant is to > use; > wmctrl -r :SELECT: -b toggle,fullscreen > This variant essentially turns ones mouse into a click to fullscreen > whichever window one may pick with the mouse. One can still keyboard alt+tab > between windows, without loosing the pointer to click, if the window is > buried under the other windows. But for keybinding purposes, the ACTIVE > variant is better suited than SELECT, at least for my own needs. > > 2'nd approach: > This is only half solving the problem, but simply writing in dom0, 'xdotool > key alt+space' will bring up the XFWM4 popup menu, though I did not find a > way to "chain it" to then select the last key, "f". But since I had the above > solution already, I did not venture deeper to solve it, it needs the last > step if anyone wants to use this approach. I'm personally content with the > 1st approach though, it solves everything for my own needs. > > > On the security side of things, then dom0 controlled fullscreen "should" be > fine, for as long it stays in the control of dom0, and not the VM. If the VM > can change the fullscreen, it's my understanding it can exploit the user in > social hacking. But if you control which VM has access to fullscreen, then > you can also limit this issue, and are less likely to fall victim. That's my > understanding, it may be I misunderstood the attack vector, but I think its > correctly understood. The reason full-screen is bad, as I've understood it, > is that social hacking can happen when you least expect it, so if you > manually enter fullscreen, for a VM with limited and locked-down purposes, > i.e. heavily firewalled with one of few purposes to the internet, then you're > much less likely to fall victim to screen social hacks. Do feel free to > correct me if I'm wrong about that, though, I don't think the security is any > different than using alt+space+f, since it's essentially the same thing, and > also controlled from dom0.
"or any AppVM terminal" scratch those 4 words out, I don't know why I wrote these, when its neither feasible nor secure to do it inside an AppVM <.< but it of course only works in dom0 terminal from a technical/practical perspective too. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/85a01587-3aff-4002-8db1-53ff290ff20a%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.