On 7/18/19 11:53 AM, Chris Laprise wrote:
Description:
------------
Qubes-VM-hardening
Leverage Qubes template non-persistence to fend off malware at VM
startup: Lock-down, quarantine and check contents of /rw private storage
that affect the execution environment.
* Acts at VM startup before private volume /rw mounts
* User: Protect /home desktop & shell startup executables
* Root: Quarantine all /rw configs & scripts, with whitelisting
* Re-deploy custom or default files to /rw on each boot
* SHA256 hash checking against unwanted changes
* Provides rescue shell on error or request
* Works with template-based AppVMs, sys-net and sys-vpn
A bug fix has been posted and released as version 0.8.5. Updating is
recommended (see Notes)...
Github link - https://github.com/tasket/Qubes-VM-hardening#notes
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Chris Laprise, [email protected]
https://github.com/tasket
https://twitter.com/ttaskett
PGP: BEE2 20C5 356E 764A 73EB 4AB3 1DC4 D106 F07F 1886
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