Sven Semmler:
In addition to my fairly standard dvm based on whonix-ws connected to
sys-whonix based on whonix-ws I have now done the following:
1) cloned sys-whonix to sys-whonix-id
2) created app-signal based on whonix-ws
3) installed signal in whonix-ws
4) connected both app-email-private and app-signal to sys-whonix-id
The idea being:
1) sys-whonix and the instances of whonix-ws connected to it are for truly
anonymous browsing. I have never nor will I ever type in anything even remotely
identifying into those qubes.
2) sys-whonix-id is used more like a VPN in that the endpoint of the connection
(my email provider or my phone in case of signal) knows very well who I am ...
not anonymous at all. However no one in between my PC and those end points
should be able to tell.
Here is my assumption I would like to check against the members of this group:
while both instances (since cloned) will use the same entry guards, the
resulting TOR circuits will be different and there is no way the traffic on the
one connection can be correlated to the other - right?
/Sven
Hi,
I'm certainly no expert, but i'm not sure having two sys-whonix vms is
necessary here. Whonix vms have stream isolation so different whonix
appvms, or even different applications within the same vm, will use
different tor circuits.
Of course it's possible that just coincidentally two applications in the
same or different vms could happen to use the same exit node for a
period of time, but that would also be possible if they use separate
sys-whonix proxy vms.
But i might be missing something here, so somebody please correct me if so.
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