Highly recommended article. A few comments:
 
Some people  -actually most people, overwhelmingly-
think that "religion" necessarily only means, say,  things that  happen
on Sunday morning in a church, or a Buddhist in meditation, or
high mass at Christmas, or Hindus worshipping Krishna, or the like.
But, while such matters have their own value and elicit interest
for any number of reasons, in a sense that is all epiphenomena,
the surface of the ocean as it were. The metaphor is old
but it should not obscure the importance of the subject.
 
Beneath the waves is something built into all of us: We cannot help
ourselves from thinking in terms of religion. But most of the time we
don't realize that this is what we are doing. Why not? Because  "religion"
is superficially conceived as spiritual rituals, sacred stories,  mysteries
of holy books, and so forth. While it is true that such things are  part of
formal religion the more interesting question is: How deep  does
religious thinking go?  
 
William Irwin Thompson, back in the 1970s, made the telling point  that
we just have a few ways open to us for our thinking needs. Sometimes
we need to think like a hunter or warrior, for example. Sometimes we
need to think like a farmer, and plant and plan for the future, as  
objectively
as is in us to do. Which is true even if we never fire a gun ,  re: war or 
hunting,.
or never work a field using a plow or scythe. When needed, a hunter
or farmer mode of thinking kicks in. This is inescapable.
 
What is also inescapable is a shaman's mentality. We are all part  shamans.
This is also unavoidable.
 
That is, sometimes we "believe."  There isn't enough evidence to  "know" and
we need to make a decision. Belief kicks in, in by far most cases  
determined
more by what friends a family also believe than anything else.  Rational
fact-based courses to belief are uncommon. Most of the time belief
reflects our psychological processing of the opinions of others.
After the fact we assign rational explanations that make it seem
as if there is no belief at all. And that, my friends, is  self-delusion.
 
Here is a terrific article that makes a compelling case that  economics
can and often does have a religious dimension. Not to recognize this
for what it is, is dangerous  -because it conceals from us the  basis
of decisions made by  economists  -in psychology, not objective  science.
It does not matter if an economist is an Atheist, sometimes Atheists
are the most "religious" people you can find.
 
This is also the case for politics.  Not just a little, not just  "around 
the edges,"
and not just occasionally. This is fundamental and if it isn't 24/7
it is damned often and every day.
 
The point is: We all are critics of other people's religions. But we  need
to get good at being critical of our own, whether a religion is an  actual
organized faith like Judaism or Mormonism, or whether it is a
political cause ( take your pick, Libertarianism, Greenism, Socialism,  
etc),
or, we now can see, a system of economics.
 
Billy
 
 
--------------------------------
 
Bloomberg
 
 
 
Is Economics a Science or a Religion?

By _Mark Buchanan_ (http://www.bloomberg.com/view/bios/mark-buchanan/)  
July  17, 2013

 
Is economics a science or a religion? Its practitioners like to think of it 
 as akin to the former. The blind faith with which many do so suggests it 
has  become too much like the latter, with potentially dire consequences for 
the real  people the discipline is intended to help.  
The idea of economics as religion harks back to at least 2001, when 
economist  Robert Nelson published a _book_ 
(http://books.google.com/books/about/Economics_As_Religion.html?id=bJHgKS0lbtkC)
  on the subject. Nelson argued 
that the  policy advice economists draw from their theories is never “
value-neutral” but  foists their values, dressed up to look like objective 
science, 
on the rest of  us. 
 
Take, for example, free trade. In judging its desirability, economists 
weigh  projected costs and benefits, an approach that superficially seems 
objective.  Yet economists decide what enters the analysis and what gets 
ignored. 
Such  things as savings in wages or transport lend themselves easily to 
measurement in  monetary terms, while others, such as the social disruption of 
a 
community, do  not. The mathematical calculations give the analysis a 
scientific wrapping, even  when the content is just an expression of values.  
Similar biases influence policy considerations on everything from labor 
laws  to climate change. As Nelson put it, “the priesthood of a modern secular  
religion of economic progress” has pushed a narrow vision of economic  “
efficiency,” wholly undeterred by a history of disastrous outcomes.  
Rational Responses 
The economic zeal reached its peak several years back, when a number of  
economists openly celebrated what they called economic imperialism -- the 
notion  that the inherent superiority of their way of thinking would lead it to 
displace  all other social sciences. Academics sought to bring the advanced 
calculus of  rationality -- with its assumption that everything can be 
explained by people’s  perfectly rational responses to incentives -- to the 
primitives in fields  ranging from sociology to anthropology.  
The imperial adventure lost much of its momentum in the wake of the 2008  
financial crisis. More attention has turned to the psychological, or 
behavioral,  revolution, which has established that the rational ideal of 
economic 
theory  isn’t even a good starting point as a crude caricature of the way 
real people  act. We’re often goal-oriented, of course, but we seek those goals 
through  imperfect heuristic rules and trial and error, learning as we go. 
If anything,  rationality is the anomaly in human life.  
Of equal significance is a growing acceptance of Nelson’s larger point: 
that  economics is riddled with hidden value judgments that make its advice far 
from  scientific. In one notable development, the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives  published a _paper_ (http://economics.mit.edu/files/8741)  by 
economists Daron Acemoglu and James  Robinson that examines how value judgments 
-- in this case, the dismissal of  political repercussions -- have undermined 
well-intentioned economic  interventions.  
Most economists, for instance, see the weakening of trade unions in the 
U.S.  and other Western nations in the past few decades as a good thing, 
because  unions’ monopoly power over wages impairs companies’ ability to adapt 
to 
the  demands of the market. As Acemoglu and Robinson point out, however, 
unions do a  lot more than influence the supply and cost of labor. In 
particular, they have  historically played a prominent role in creating and 
supporting democracy, in  limiting the political power of corporations, and in 
mitigating income  inequality.  
Narrow policy analyses have repeatedly led economists to push for policies  
that have had unexpected consequences for the balance of political power.  
Acemoglu and Robinson cite the push to privatize industries in _Russia_ 
(http://topics.bloomberg.com/russia/)  in the  1990s. The idea was that private 
ownership, no matter how it came about, would  ultimately benefit the entire 
economy. In practice, a rigged process gave rise  to an illegitimate 
oligarchy and an increase in inequality that set the stage  for the ascendance 
of 
President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime.  
Tragic Flaw 
More recently, the gospel of economic efficiency helped lay the groundwork  
for the financial crisis, mostly by encouraging overconfidence in the 
wonders of  financial engineering. Theory-induced dreams of market discipline 
provided  justification for stripping away entirely sensible regulations, such 
as barriers  between commercial and investment banking, and for avoiding 
oversight of the  booming trade in derivatives. One result was an extremely 
wealthy financial  lobby that is still working hard to block reform.  
In all these cases, the tragic flaw lies in the heady confidence that comes 
 with a one-size-fits-all theoretical framework. There’s a real danger in 
seeing  economics as an objective science from which all values have been 
stripped.  Nelson preferred an older, more modest perspective on economics 
espoused by  Frank Knight, a founder of the University of Chicago’s free-market 
school of  thought. Knight _expressed_ 
(http://mises.org/books/risk_uncertainty_profit_knight.pdf)  the view that 
truly careful social and economic  
analysis emphasizes the limits to human knowledge and “the fatuousness of  
over-sanguine expectations” from economic-policy designs, including those  
favoring free enterprise.  
In short, economists would do well to derive their prescriptions from  
observations of how the world really works, with a healthy respect for its  
complexity. Faith is no substitute for informed inquiry.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
(Mark Buchanan, a theoretical physicist and the author of “Forecast: What  
Physics, Meteorology and the Natural Sciences Can Teach Us About Economics,” 
is  a Bloomberg View columnist.)

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