The PDA makes denial of health insurance benefits relating to
pregnancy sex discrimination without regard to whether an employer
denies men coverage for some other condition that affects only men.
Denying coverage for a prescription drug that prevents pregnancy, a
risk to which only women are exposed, may therefore be sex
discrimination under the PDA even if men are not denied coverage for
vasectomies. Whether the cost of prevention of pregnancy, as distinct
from the health related cost of pregnancy, counts as one of the risks
and burdens associated with pregnancy the PDA was intended to relieve
women from bearing under employer provided health insurance and other
employee benefit programs might better frame the question a court
ultimately will have to answer.
Michael R. Masinter 3305 College Avenue
Professor of Law Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
Nova Southeastern University 954.262.6151 (voice)
masin...@nova.edu 954.262.3835 (fax)
Quoting "Vance R. Koven" <vrko...@gmail.com>:
Whatever else may be right or wrong with Gilbert or the statute, Griswold
was a constitutional claim based on the flat prohibiting by legislation of a
form of birth control for women, whereas the EEOC finding in Belmont Abbey
is a matter of what the college will fund as part of its private health
insurance. Presumably women are still free to obtain contraception on their
own nickel.
Have we ascertained that the Belmont Abbey insurance policy, and the
college's internal policy, permitted men to obtain condoms and/or more
medically-oriented forms of birth control (e.g. vasectomies, spermicides)?
If so, then there's a live sex-discrimination issue. If not, then the EEOC
decision may be subject to question.
Vance
On Sat, Aug 15, 2009 at 5:10 PM, Steven Jamar <stevenja...@gmail.com> wrote:
I'm not sure how paul arrives at his characterization of my response to an
inquiry of another in which I sketch a possible way a court could go wrong.
Nonetheless, it seems to me that even though Gilbert was overturned by
legislation, the legislation did not in fact reach the illogic of the
court's reasoning, but rather the outcome of that reasoning.
While I think that a court that would reason as I hypothesized one might
would be wrong in doing so in light of the dialogue between the Court and
Congress(see boumediene), I fear I have seen such toturing of laws often
enough to not consider such error to beyond the realm of possibility.
I guess I don't quite see how a statute based claim with EP overtones would
impact a constitutional liberty-based privacy claim, though at times we do
cross those sorts of boundaries.
Stev
Sent from Steve Jamar's iPhone
On Aug 15, 2009, at 1:57 PM, Paul Finkelman <paul.finkel...@yahoo.com>
wrote:
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Vance R. Koven
Boston, MA USA
vrko...@world.std.com
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