It doesn't make sense to call religious truth claims offensive (although that is common parlance), but it does make sense to say that an employee who doesn't believe such a claim should not have to display the claim or its symbols. The employee has a legitimate interest in not appearing to promote what he considers to be a false belief. And this interest should be well within the religious accommodation protections of Title VII.
Except, apparently, in the Eleventh Circuit. On Mon, 20 Dec 2010 11:47:20 -0500 Eric Rassbach <erassb...@becketfund.org> wrote: > >I took Alan's example re re Confederate flags etc. to be raising the issue of >hostile work environment discrimination claims. Of course for such a claim to >be successful, a lone requirement that employees display something offensive >would not be enough; you'd have to show some other pattern of discrimination >on the basis of the protected class at issue. (Wrt the Confederate flag >example, it is certainly the case that a lot of businesses in the South >display Confederate battle flags and require their employees to do so; though >it is probably bars more than banks.) > >I think a religious discrimination hostile work environment claim would be >really hard to make out based on the display of one religion's symbol. >Competing truth claims are a feature, not a bug, of religious life, so it >doesn't make sense to call one group's truth claims or the symbols >representing those truth claims "offensive" or discriminatory per se. > > >________________________________________ >From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] >On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu] >Sent: Monday, December 20, 2010 10:33 AM >To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >Subject: RE: Federal regulators apparently force bank to take down >religioussymbols > > Alan: Can you flesh out the discrimination theory more? I > take it that the claim is that requiring everyone to display something would > constitute discrimination (not just failure to accommodate religious beliefs, > or creation of an allegedly hostile environment), and that this would trigger > a requirement of exemption even outside the context of religious > discrimination, where such exemption is statutorily required is that right? > It seems like an odd sort of discrimination claim, but Id like to hear more > about it. (I take it that this would practically be of some more importance > because some companies include in their corporate symbols items that some > people may find offensive based on membership in various groups, whether the > symbols are religious, allegedly racially offensive, and so on consider the > litigation over Sambos Restaurants, or the use of American Indian symbols, > or other things that might well be a part of company logos, displayed on compa ny >vehicles, and so on.) > > By the way, some jurisdictions ban discrimination based on > political affiliation, and of course government entities are generally barred > by the First Amendment from certain kinds of discrimination based on > political affiliation. Would requiring all employees to display company > symbols that are opposed by one or another political party constitute > forbidden political affiliation discrimination? > > Eugene > >From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu >[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brownstein, Alan >Sent: Friday, December 17, 2010 4:36 PM >To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >Subject: RE: Federal regulators apparently force bank to take down >religioussymbols > >Do you think there is a discrimination issue as well as an accommodation issue >in cases like this, Eugene. Suppose a bank in a southern state insists that >all employees have confederate flags on their desks or work stations? Does an >African-American employee have a claim under Title VII? What about displays >that proclaim the superiority or virtue of the white race? > >Alan > >_______________________________________________ >To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > >Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. > Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people >can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward >the messages to others. Douglas Laycock Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
