oops, that should read over n+1 instead of n.
On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 1:45 PM, Michael Worley <mwor...@byulaw.net> wrote: > Some at the time of Vietnam thought otherwise: > > In *Imus v. United States* 447 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1971), drafted Utahns > where LDS Missionaries got an exemption claimed "The appellees assert in > effect that the classification of the missionaries as ministers during the > period of their service served to reduce the number of men eligible for > service and thus made appellees' induction more likely." The Court > reversed an injunction, relying upon a Supreme Court summary affirmance in > another case, *Boyd v.* *Clark *393 U.S. 316 (1969), where "The > plaintiffs asserted that by reason of the number of men student deferments > they were more likely to be inducted." *Imus*, 474 F.2d at 1009. The > classification in Imus was "on behalf of all Selective Service Registrants > in this State of Utah"-- so Imus thought Utahns were harmed more. > > > Were the Plaintiffs just wrong in Imus? It would seem odd for a case to > be appealed if everyone knew it was over n+1 instead of b. > > (I realize this is a question of fact; If the Plaintiffs in Imus were > wrong, I withdraw my line of reasoning here.) > > Michael > > > On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 1:27 PM, Douglas Laycock <dlayc...@virginia.edu>wrote: > >> The draft pool was effectively local, as you envision it, through the >> Civil War. Each county was given a quota to fill. I think it was >> nationalized for World War I, but I don’t really know. >> >> >> >> It was certainly nationalized by the time of Vietnam. Local boards >> administered the classification system, but all those classified I-A went >> into a national pool from which draftees were selected. It was called the >> Selective Service System, and your draft letter began, “Greetings! You have >> been selected . . .” >> >> >> >> So for every person granted conscientious objector status, your odds of >> being drafted went from n over however many million in the denominator to n >> + 1 over that denominator. Considered at that stage, the increase was >> infinitesimal. Somewhere there was a guy who got drafted who otherwise >> would not have been, but it was impossible to identify that person. >> >> >> >> >> >> Douglas Laycock >> >> Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law >> >> University of Virginia Law School >> >> 580 Massie Road >> >> Charlottesville, VA 22903 >> >> 434-243-8546 >> >> >> >> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto: >> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Michael Worley >> *Sent:* Monday, December 02, 2013 12:48 PM >> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >> *Subject:* Re: The Establishment Clause, burden on others, the employer >> mandate, and the draft >> >> >> >> >> Maybe I misunderstand how the draft worked (I am quite young), but it >> would seem to me that a local draft board would not be much bigger than an >> insurance plan in size (indeed, for Hobby Lobby, the draft board would seem >> smaller), and thus, Gedicks' and Van Tassel's claim that "a person’s >> decision making calculus," would not be affected seems incorrect in the >> sense that identifiability of who is burdened (and thus, the ability of a >> person to make such changes in response to a objector)is just as strong in >> the draft case, if not stronger. >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 10:18 AM, Micah Schwartzman <mj...@virginia.edu> >> wrote: >> >> Eugene's suggestion that the religious exemption from the contraception >> mandate be analogized to the draft protester cases is anticipated by >> Gedicks and Van Tassell in their article, RFRA Exemptions from the >> Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion ( >> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2328516). >> >> >> >> Gedicks and Van Tassel argue that the burden of the exemption is not >> material because it would not affect the decision-making of non-pacificists >> in considering whether to participate in the draft. That is because the >> burden is minor and remote -- for any individual, a small number of >> exemptions amounts to a minor increase in the probability of being selected >> for the draft. >> >> >> >> Whethers Gedicks and Van Tassel are right, there is at least the >> difference that the burden of the religious exemption from the >> contraception mandate, like the burden in Caldor, falls clearly and >> specifically on identifiable individuals. >> >> >> >> It is a separate question whether broadening the exemption to include >> non-religious objectors would cure a possible constitutional defect under >> the Establishment Clause. If the reason for broadening the exemption is a >> based on a sham purpose -- that is, if it is broadened only for the purpose >> of saving an otherwise unconstitutional exemption, rather than to >> accommodate non-religious objectors (as in *Seeger*) -- I wonder whether >> that is (or should be?) permissible. It could be framed as a form of >> constitutional avoidance, but, given the history, it might also look like >> an impermissible purpose. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as >> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are >> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or >> wrongly) forward the messages to others. >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Michael Worley >> >> BYU Law School, Class of 2014 >> >> _______________________________________________ >> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu >> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see >> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw >> >> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as >> private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are >> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or >> wrongly) forward the messages to others. >> > > > > -- > Michael Worley > BYU Law School, Class of 2014 > -- Michael Worley BYU Law School, Class of 2014
_______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
