Why wouldn't the Congress ban coverage of abortions under a
single-payer system?
Jon
On 2014-07-01 22:22, Levinson, Sanford V wrote:
I do not understand why the complicity with evil rationale doesn't
apply to taxpayers ( like Thoreau). The argument against is either
that it would unduly burden the state to set up a c.o. system for tax
protesters or that it would invite strategic misrepresentation. Are
these sufficiently "compelling interests" to overcome undoubtedly
sincere (and correct) beliefs that one's taxes are supporting
oppression at home and around the world (as well as a lot of good
things). As Uwe Reindhart points out, the craziest American
exceptionalism is that workers are dependent on their employers for
medical insurance. Hobby Lobby is another good argument for
tax-financed single-payer coverage.
Sandy
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 30, 2014, at 11:48 PM, "Steven Jamar" <stevenja...@gmail.com
[13]> wrote:
The court accepts without inquiry the assertion that the complicity
with evil theory is the problem that leads to the substantial
burden. It merely accepts the claim that the adherents cannot comply
because of the complicity theory. It then bootstraps that there
would be costs of non-compliance.
At the core the court buys the argument that an attenuated
complicity can be the basis of a substantial burden.
Sent from Steve's iPhone
On Jul 1, 2014, at 12:20 AM, Arthur Spitzer <artspit...@gmail.com
[10]> wrote:
I'm puzzled by Steve Jamar's statement that yesterday's decision
"arguably requires all courts to simply accept the religious
adherent's claim that the burden is substantial." The majority
analyzed whether the burden was substantial and found it was
because the ACA would impose millions of dollars of financial
penalties on the plaintiffs if they did not comply. Slip op. at
32. I don't think the Court tells us whether a $100 fine would
have been a substantial burden. I'm curious what in the opinion
Steve points to in support of the proposition that courts may not
evaluate the substantiality of a burden, especially considering
that the Court did evaluate that question, as an empirical matter,
in this case.
Art Spitzer
WARNING: this message is subject to monitoring by the NSA.
On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 11:17 PM, Steven Jamar
<stevenja...@gmail.com [7]> wrote:
Brown eliminated the constitutional doctrine of separate but
equal -- in the Brown decision just for education, but it was
applied to all racial classifications. The 1964 Civil Rights Act
accomplished much more, of course, but the Brown decision
matters a lot.
So it is with numerous decisions. Hobby Lobby's acceptance of
the complicity with evil theory in this attenuated context and
its ruling that arguably requires all courts to simply accept
the religious adherent's claim that the burden is substantial,
could dramatically change the landscape of RFRA interpretation
federally and by example at the state level. These underlying
principles could also be restricted by later decisions or
expanded. It is a very troubling expansion of RFRA beyond what
was intended originally. But that is hardly unique to this bit
of legislation.
I think it is a very bad decision, but not even in the top ten.
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 [1]
Director of International Programs, Institute for Intellectual
Property and Social Justice http://iipsj.org [2]
Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 [3]
http://sdjlaw.org [4]
"For all men of good will May 17, 1954, came as a joyous
daybreak to end the long night of enforced segregation. . . . It
served to transform the fatigue of despair into the buoyancy of
hope."
Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1960 on Brown v. Board of Education
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Links:
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[1] http://crab.rutgers.edu/tel:202-806-8017
[2] http://iipsj.org
[3] http://crab.rutgers.edu/tel:202-806-8567
[4] http://sdjlaw.org
[5] mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
[6] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
[7] mailto:stevenja...@gmail.com
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[9] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
[10] mailto:artspit...@gmail.com
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[12] http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
[13] mailto:stevenja...@gmail.com
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