For the record, my reform temple regularly held religious activities in the playground. A playground is a very good place for making religious points for 6 and 7 year olds. ________________________________ From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu] Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2016 12:46 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits
I suppose it’s possible, but it doesn’t seem that likely. From what I’ve seen, the springy recycled-tire surface tends to be used by swing sets, monkey bars, slides, and the like – not the optimal place for an “’old time religion’ tent revival” or even an Easter Sunrise Service. A soccer field, a baseball diamond, or tennis courts might be a better place, but I think they generally don’t use rubber surfaces (since that would throw off the play of the game). But in any event, if such a service is held on a resurfaced playground, the resurfacing would have done little to help the service; the service can be held on all kinds of surfaces. Resurfacing is important when kids are running, climbing, and tumbling, not when they’re standing still. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Paul Finkelman Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2016 9:22 AM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> Subject: Re: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits without getting too far into the details here; there are many times when religions hold outdoor services, most obviously and Easter Sunrise Service. A playground might be just the place for that, or for an "old time religion" tent revival. ****************** Paul Finkelman Ariel F. Sallows Visiting Professor of Human Rights Law College of Law University of Saskatchewan 15 Campus Drive Saskatoon, SK S7N 5A6 CANADA paul.finkel...@yahoo.com<mailto:paul.finkel...@yahoo.com> c) 518.605.0296 and Senior Fellow Democracy, Citizenship and Constitutionalism Program University of Pennsylvania Call Send SMS Call from mobile Add to Skype You'll need Skype CreditFree via Skype ________________________________ From: "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>> Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2016 6:25 PM Subject: RE: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits I’m not sure how upgrading the playground will make it materially more usable as space for worship and religious instruction. Few institutions, I expect, want to do worship and religious instruction on playgrounds, rather than more familiar places. But those that do probably don’t care about rubber vs. gravel surfaces when using a space for worship and religious instruction, which rarely involves tumbling and running around. Indeed, the improved surface is important for everyday playground physical safety, and not really important for the very rare worship/religious instruction on the playground. And a building that’s more earthquake safe, or that has asbestos removed, or that has a security guard, or lacks dangerous mosquitoes outside, actually is slightly more attractive as space for worship and religious instruction: Some people might be more willing to send their kids to a school or a church that’s earthquake-safe, asbestos-remediated, mosquito-free, or well-guarded than to a church or school that seems dangerous. The effect won’t be vast, but again it’s not like the extra benefit of a rubberized surface for worship and religious instruction is vast, either. Indeed, an earthquake-safe/asbestos-remediated/well-guarded/mosquito-free church or religious school building surely will be used for religious purposes, right? One can imagine a religious school or preschool that doesn’t use its playground for religious purposes – indeed, I’d think that’s quite common – but a church or a school definitely would use the safer buildings for religious purposes. Chip, under your proposal, wouldn’t a state therefore be equally free to say that “play in the joints” lets it deny all those safety grants (otherwise generally available to all other institutions) to religious institutions? Eugene Chip writes: From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2016 12:14 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>> Subject: Re: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits Neither Eugene's or Alan's questions invite quick or easy answers, but here's a start: 1. Eugene's examples all involve health and safety. None can be diverted to religious use; all make religious use, and all other uses of the property, healthier or safer. Compare Mitchell v. Helms -- in-kind aid to schools, public and private, in poor areas. The aid included things like computers, books, AV equipment, etc. Plurality said that neutral distributional criteria (public and private schools, no sectarian discrimination) is all you need. Dissent said divertibility of aid to religious use is fatal. Controlling opinion, SOC-SB, said the Establishment Clause concern is actual diversion, not divertibility, so the program is OK because it contains adequate (and non-entangling) safeguards against religious use. That is the Establishment Clause right now. Trinity Lutheran Church seems to me to fall between Eugene's examples and Mitchell. The playground will be safer for play, but it will also be more useable as space for worship and religious instruction. Improving the playground sufficiently would be (imperfectly) analogous to adding a new classroom to a religious school. Divertible to religious use -- without safeguards, unconstitutional. Missouri could reasonably conclude that a grant to churches and church schools for playground surfaces would require safeguards that would indeed entangle the church and the state (how do you enforce the restriction on religious instruction on the playground in a pre-school?) So, whether or not the grant would ultimately violate the First Amendment, it would present a problem of direct government support for religious instruction, and Missouri wants to avoid that federal and state constitutional problem. There's the play in the joints. This is not how Missouri argued this case below, but it is how it should argue in the Supreme Court.... On Sat, Jan 16, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Volokh, Eugene <vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote: Two quick question for list members about Trinity Lutheran, if I might. Say that the government offered grants to schools and day care centers, on a largely nondiscretionary basis, for the following: 1. Removing potentially cancer-causing asbestos. 2. Retrofitting for earthquake safety. 3. Hiring security guards to prevent gang violence (and intercede in mass shootings and the like). 4. Eradicating mosquitos on the property that carry some dangerous virus (e.g., West Nile Virus). (Assume all the grants came with the usual penalties for misuse of state funds, including criminal penalties for willful misuse.) But say that the government expressly stated that religious institutions – and thus the children who go to those institutions – can’t benefit from such grants. If you think that the exclusion in Trinity Lutheran is constitutional, do you think all these exclusions would be, too? If you think that the exclusion in Trinity Lutheran is actually mandated by the First Amendment, do you think all these exclusions would be, too? Eugene _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. -- Ira C. Lupu F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus George Washington University Law School 2000 H St., NW Washington, DC 20052 (202)994-7053 Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious People" ( Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2014)) My SSRN papers are here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.