For the record, my reform temple regularly held religious activities in the 
playground.  A playground is a very good place for making religious points for 
6 and 7 year olds.
________________________________
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2016 12:46 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits

               I suppose it’s possible, but it doesn’t seem that likely.  From 
what I’ve seen, the springy recycled-tire surface tends to be used by swing 
sets, monkey bars, slides, and the like – not the optimal place for an “’old 
time religion’ tent revival” or even an Easter Sunrise Service.  A soccer 
field, a baseball diamond, or tennis courts might be a better place, but I 
think they generally don’t use rubber surfaces (since that would throw off the 
play of the game).

               But in any event, if such a service is held on a resurfaced 
playground, the resurfacing would have done little to help the service; the 
service can be held on all kinds of surfaces.  Resurfacing is important when 
kids are running, climbing, and tumbling, not when they’re standing still.

               Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Paul Finkelman
Sent: Sunday, January 17, 2016 9:22 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
Subject: Re: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits

without getting too far into the details here; there are many times when 
religions hold outdoor services, most obviously and Easter Sunrise Service.  A 
playground might be just the place for that, or for an "old time religion" tent 
revival.


******************
Paul Finkelman
Ariel F. Sallows Visiting Professor of Human Rights Law
College of Law
University of Saskatchewan
15 Campus Drive
Saskatoon, SK  S7N 5A6
CANADA
paul.finkel...@yahoo.com<mailto:paul.finkel...@yahoo.com>
c) 518.605.0296
and
Senior Fellow
Democracy, Citizenship and Constitutionalism Program
University of Pennsylvania





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________________________________
From: "Volokh, Eugene" <vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>>
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2016 6:25 PM
Subject: RE: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits

               I’m not sure how upgrading the playground will make it 
materially more usable as space for worship and religious instruction.  Few 
institutions, I expect, want to do worship and religious instruction on 
playgrounds, rather than more familiar places.  But those that do probably 
don’t care about rubber vs. gravel surfaces when using a space for worship and 
religious instruction, which rarely involves tumbling and running around.  
Indeed, the improved surface is important for everyday playground physical 
safety, and not really important for the very rare worship/religious 
instruction on the playground.

And a building that’s more earthquake safe, or that has asbestos removed, or 
that has a security guard, or lacks dangerous mosquitoes outside, actually is 
slightly more attractive as space for worship and religious instruction:  Some 
people might be more willing to send their kids to a school or a church that’s 
earthquake-safe, asbestos-remediated, mosquito-free, or well-guarded than to a 
church or school that seems dangerous.  The effect won’t be vast, but again 
it’s not like the extra benefit of a rubberized surface for worship and 
religious instruction is vast, either.

Indeed, an earthquake-safe/asbestos-remediated/well-guarded/mosquito-free 
church or religious school building surely will be used for religious purposes, 
right?  One can imagine a religious school or preschool that doesn’t use its 
playground for religious purposes – indeed, I’d think that’s quite common – but 
a church or a school definitely would use the safer buildings for religious 
purposes.  Chip, under your proposal, wouldn’t a state therefore be equally 
free to say that “play in the joints” lets it deny all those safety grants 
(otherwise generally available to all other institutions) to religious 
institutions?

Eugene

Chip writes:

From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu
Sent: Saturday, January 16, 2016 12:14 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Subject: Re: Excluding religious institutions from public safety benefits

Neither Eugene's or Alan's questions invite quick or easy answers, but here's a 
start:

1.  Eugene's examples all involve health and safety. None can be diverted to 
religious use; all make religious use, and all other uses of the property, 
healthier or safer.  Compare Mitchell v. Helms -- in-kind aid to schools, 
public and private, in poor areas.  The aid included things like computers, 
books, AV equipment, etc.  Plurality said that neutral distributional criteria 
(public and private schools, no sectarian discrimination) is all you need.  
Dissent said divertibility of aid to religious use is fatal.  Controlling 
opinion, SOC-SB, said the Establishment Clause concern is actual diversion, not 
divertibility, so the program is OK because it contains adequate (and 
non-entangling) safeguards against religious use. That is the Establishment 
Clause right now.

Trinity Lutheran Church seems to me to fall between Eugene's examples and 
Mitchell.  The playground will be safer for play, but it will also be more 
useable as space for worship and religious instruction.  Improving the 
playground sufficiently would be (imperfectly) analogous to adding a new 
classroom to a religious school.  Divertible to religious use -- without 
safeguards, unconstitutional.  Missouri could reasonably conclude that a grant 
to churches and church schools for playground surfaces would require safeguards 
that would indeed entangle the church and the state (how do you enforce the 
restriction on religious instruction on the playground in a pre-school?)  So, 
whether or not the grant would ultimately violate the First Amendment, it would 
present a problem of direct government support for religious instruction, and 
Missouri wants to avoid that federal and state constitutional problem.  There's 
the play in the joints.  This is not how Missouri argued this case below, but 
it is how it should argue in the Supreme Court....


On Sat, Jan 16, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Volokh, Eugene 
<vol...@law.ucla.edu<mailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu>> wrote:
               Two quick question for list members about Trinity Lutheran, if I 
might.  Say that the government offered grants to schools and day care centers, 
on a largely nondiscretionary basis, for the following:

               1.  Removing potentially cancer-causing asbestos.

               2.  Retrofitting for earthquake safety.

               3.  Hiring security guards to prevent gang violence (and 
intercede in mass shootings and the like).

               4.  Eradicating mosquitos on the property that carry some 
dangerous virus (e.g., West Nile Virus).

(Assume all the grants came with the usual penalties for misuse of state funds, 
including criminal penalties for willful misuse.)  But say that the government 
expressly stated that religious institutions – and thus the children who go to 
those institutions – can’t benefit from such grants.

               If you think that the exclusion in Trinity Lutheran is 
constitutional, do you think all these exclusions would be, too?

               If you think that the exclusion in Trinity Lutheran is actually 
mandated by the First Amendment, do you think all these exclusions would be, 
too?

               Eugene

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--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular Government, Religious 
People" ( Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2014))
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg

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