Reasonable people can disagree about how to solve the bathroom issue. That 
provision is not why I called it an anti-gay bill. But the bill didn’t stop 
there. It also precludes Charlotte from prohibiting any other form of 
discrimination against gays. Gays and lesbians shall not be protected from 
discrimination in public accommodations in any place in North Carolina. Hard to 
describe that as other than an anti-gay bill.

Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Will Esser
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2016 2:44 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>; Paul 
Finkelman <paul.finkel...@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Doug,

With all due respect, I think characterizing the North Carolina bill as an 
"anti-gay law" is inaccurate.  As a Charlotte, NC resident, I've been in the 
thick of this debate for several years now.  The NC Legislature's hand was 
forced by the insistence of the City of Charlotte to pass a local regulation 
which would have allowed men to use women's bathrooms, and vice versa.  There 
was a strong outcry regarding privacy and concern over protecting children from 
individuals who would abuse the regulation, since, among other grounds, there 
would be no realistic way to enforce the ordinance to limit the application of 
the law to those who were truly transgendered.

A significant part of the problem was that the ordinance was local to just the 
City of Charlotte.  Thus, by way of example, other smaller municipalities (such 
as the Town of Matthews also located in Mecklenburg County) would have ended up 
with differing discrimination ordinances.  There was very little discussion or 
opposition to the Charlotte ordinance on the ground that it included sexual 
orientation in the non-discrimination regulation.  (I was involved in 
requesting that the City Attorney include an exemption limited to protecting 
religious objectors from penalties for declining to participate in wedding 
ceremonies they found religiously objectionable, but that request was denied).

The main reason the legislature ended up passing the bill was to override the 
ability of local municipalities like Charlotte to pass their own 
anti-discrimination ordinances, and to simply have a statewide 
anti-discrimination statute.  Of course, it's fair to debate whether the 
legislature should have included sexual orientation in the statewide 
non-discrimination statute that they passed, but that is a very different 
debate than summarily dismissing the statute as an "anti-gay law".  There were 
any number of NC municipalities that had sexual orientation in their 
non-discrimination ordinances for a long time, and the NC Legislature never 
took any steps to override those ordinances when they were passed.  If the 
Charlotte City Council had not included the transgender bathroom provision over 
massive public protest, the NC Legislature would never have felt the need to 
pass a uniform statewide anti-discrimination provision.

(For anyone interested in a helpful FAQ on what the bill does or does not do, 
you can find that here:
Myths vs Facts: What New York Times, Huffington Post and other media outlets 
aren't saying about common-sense privacy law | State of North Carolina: 
Governor Pat 
McCrory<http://governor.nc.gov/press-release/myths-vs-facts-what-new-york-times-huffington-post-and-other-media-outlets-arent>
 )

[cid:image001.jpg@01D189C9.F802A610]

[Text Box:]



Myths vs Facts: What New York Times, Huffington Post and other media outlet...
1. Does the new bill limit or prohibit private sector companies from adopting 
their own nondiscrimination polici...





Will

Will Esser --- Charlotte, North Carolina

________________________________
From: "Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)" 
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>>
To: Paul Finkelman <paul.finkel...@yahoo.com<mailto:paul.finkel...@yahoo.com>>; 
Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2016 10:29 AM
Subject: RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

The North Carolina bill is here:

http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2015E2/Bills/House/PDF/H2v4.pdf

It is not in any sense a religious freedom bill. None of its provisions are 
tied in any way to religious objections. It prohibits discrimination in public 
accommodations on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and 
biological sex, omitting sexual orientation and gender identity, and explicitly 
preempts any local ordinances on discrimination in public accommodations. It 
requires that multiple occupancy bathrooms and changing rooms be designated for 
a single biological sex, and requires that all persons use the rooms designated 
for their biological sex, without regard to the sex they identify with. It 
preempts all local ordinances regulating any aspect of compensation of 
employees.

None of these provisions depends in any way on conscientious objection or 
burdens on the exercise of religion. This is an anti-gay law, not a religious 
liberty law. This actually does what people have falsely accused state RFRAs of 
doing -- it prevents the enforcement of local laws on sexual orientation 
discrimination.

Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
________________________________
From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Paul Finkelman 
[paul.finkel...@yahoo.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 29, 2016 12:56 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia
Doug:



I defer to your knowledge of RFRA law.   So, tell me if this is wrong:  The 
proposed NC law will make it a crime for a man to use a public men's room even 
if he has full ID as a man; a social security number tied to him as a man, and 
is legally male where he lives; or a woman to use a woman's room.  The cases 
are not "out there" yet because the law has not been implemented.  Other parts 
of the proposed law would allow businesses to refuse to serve people on the 
basis of gender, gender presentation, or sexual preference.


Am I wrong about this reading of the law?


If I am not wrong, then the only issue is whether this law is being passed 
under a RFRA rubric.  If it is then you are right in saying that the cases are 
not there, but clearly the cases can and will be there.



If I am wrong about this, then I defer to your more skilled reading of the 
proposed NC law.


******************
Paul Finkelman
Ariel F. Sallows Visiting Professor of Human Rights Law
College of Law
University of Saskatchewan
15 Campus Drive
Saskatoon, SK  S7N 5A6
CANADA
paul.finkel...@yahoo.com
c) 518.605.0296
and
Senior Fellow
Democracy, Citizenship and Constitutionalism Program
University of Pennsylvania





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________________________________
From: "Laycock, H Douglas (hdl5c)" 
<hd...@virginia.edu<mailto:hd...@virginia.edu>>
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Sent: Monday, March 28, 2016 8:32 PM
Subject: RE: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

The cases of the sort Michael describes (and that Chris Lund has described in 
public work) are still out there; they still happen. And the cases Paul 
Finkelman imagines, in which state RFRAs justify all kinds of discrimination 
against gays, are not out there. They have not happened.

But gay rights and contraception are getting all the political and press 
attention. Both sides are to blame. Republican legislators who are only now 
getting around to enacting RFRAs didn't care about the generally small 
religious minorities in the cases that don't raise culture war issues. They and 
their predecessors weren't motivated to pass a RFRA back when all the other 
states were. They don't talk about those cases now, not because they aren't 
happening, but because they don't know about them and apparently wouldn't care 
if they knew. So they promise their base things about marriage equality that 
they can't possibly deliver. At the Republican debate in Houston, a reporter 
asked a long series of questions about religious liberty, and all he got from 
the candidates was gays and contraception. That's the only religious liberty 
issue they know about it.

And then the other side plays off this rhetoric, and imagines horror stories 
with no basis in experience, and some that are beyond imagining. Emergency med 
techs could refuse to treat gays! The Indiana RFRA "feels very much like a 
prelude to another Kristallnacht." Both real "arguments" that got reported in 
the press as though they were serious.

If anyone needs a narrative about why RFRAs are still needed, just consider the 
Kansas woman who died for her faith for lack of a state RFRA. She was Jehovah's 
Witness, She needed a bloodless liver transplant. It was available in Omaha. It 
was even cheaper than a Kansas transplant with blood transfusions. But Kansas 
Medicaid doesn't pay for out of state medical care. Neutral and generally 
applicable rule. Kansas argued that the state constitution should be 
interpreted to mean Smith. By the time she won that lawsuit on appeal, her 
medical condition had deteriorated to where she was no longer eligible for a 
transplant. Stinemetz v. Kansas Health Policy Authority, 252 P.3d 141 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2011).

Douglas Laycock
Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Virginia
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546

________________________________________

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
on behalf of Michael Peabody [mich...@californialaw.org]
Sent: Monday, March 28, 2016 7:01 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Arizona, Indiana . . . and now Georgia

Unfortunately, for many, the entire spectrum of "religious liberty" in
the United States appears to revolve around LGBT rights. That may, in
fact, be the case for religious "majorities" who are not otherwise
adversely affected by facially neutral state laws that infringe upon
their religious practices and who cry "persecution!" at the slightest
provocation.

But going back to the original Smith case where members of a native
American group were denied their unemployment benefits because of
peyote use, the people who could really benefit from state RFRAs
aren't just visible on the surface but are the minorities whose
situations need to be "teased out" from between the social cracks.

Certainly Antonin Scalia, lauded for his "conservative" credentials,
is often forgotten in his role of drafting the Smith decision in the
first place, although now it is the conservatives who are on the
losing end of the latest social/legal developments and who now claim
to be most in need of RFRA's protections. Nor is it lost that the
original proponents of RFRA often came from the left, and as Professor
Brownstein notes, the California RFRA was vetoed by a Republican in
1998.

RFRA exists for religious minorities such as a Sikh teacher in a
public school who wears religious garb as part of who she is, not to
proselytize. It is to protect an Orthodox Jewish person who is forced
by state law to take an exam on Saturday. And yes, it is to protect a
native American who may lose employment benefits because he uses
peyote as part of a religious ritual.

To understand the full value of RFRA, one must look to members of
religious minorities and observe when they are unintentionally
adversely affected by neutral laws. Then an effort must be made to
attempt to to try to accommodate them. These kinds of situations
normally won't make the headlines, but it is at the heart of why RFRA
matters.

Michael Peabody, Esq.
Editor
ReligiousLiberty.TV
http://www.religiousliberty.tv



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