sarutak commented on code in PR #58016: URL: https://github.com/apache/spark/pull/58016#discussion_r4320252845
########## launcher/src/test/java/org/apache/spark/launcher/FilteredObjectInputStreamSuite.java: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +/* + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package org.apache.spark.launcher; + +import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; +import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; +import java.io.File; +import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; +import java.io.ObjectStreamClass; + +import org.apache.spark.launcher.testpkg.SubpackageAllowed; +import org.apache.spark.launchermalicious.LauncherPrefixSpoof; +import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; +import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*; + +/** + * Tests for {@link FilteredObjectInputStream} - the SPARK-20922 allow-list + * guarding the launcher's local socket protocol. Covers the security-relevant + * {@code resolveClass} path that previously had zero direct tests. + */ +public class FilteredObjectInputStreamSuite extends BaseSuite { + + @Test + public void testAllowedJavaLangStringIsAccepted() throws Exception { Review Comment: `ObjectOutputStream` writes a `String` as `TC_STRING`, with no class descriptor, so `readObject()` returns it without ever calling `resolveClass`. This test therefore passes no matter what the allow-list says. I checked by temporarily changing `resolveClass` to reject every class: 7 of the 10 tests fail, and this one still passes (the other two that pass are the reject tests, as expected). The Integer test is the one that actually pins the `java.lang.` entry (it resolves `java.lang.Integer` and `java.lang.Number`). Could you either replace the payload with a class that does go through `resolveClass` (for example `Long` or `Boolean.TRUE`), or keep it but rename and comment it to say that a plain `String` bypasses `resolveClass`? The description lists `java.lang.String` among the allowed payloads, so it would need the same update. ########## launcher/src/test/java/org/apache/spark/launcher/FilteredObjectInputStreamSuite.java: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +/* + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package org.apache.spark.launcher; + +import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; +import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; +import java.io.File; +import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; +import java.io.ObjectStreamClass; + +import org.apache.spark.launcher.testpkg.SubpackageAllowed; +import org.apache.spark.launchermalicious.LauncherPrefixSpoof; +import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; +import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*; + +/** + * Tests for {@link FilteredObjectInputStream} - the SPARK-20922 allow-list + * guarding the launcher's local socket protocol. Covers the security-relevant + * {@code resolveClass} path that previously had zero direct tests. + */ +public class FilteredObjectInputStreamSuite extends BaseSuite { + + @Test + public void testAllowedJavaLangStringIsAccepted() throws Exception { + String original = "hello"; + Object deserialized = roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original, deserialized); + } + + @Test + public void testAllowedJavaLangIntegerIsAccepted() throws Exception { + Integer original = 42; + Object deserialized = roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original, deserialized); + } + + @Test + public void testAllowedLauncherMessageIsAccepted() throws Exception { + LauncherProtocol.Hello original = new LauncherProtocol.Hello("secret", "3.5.0"); + LauncherProtocol.Hello deserialized = + (LauncherProtocol.Hello) roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original.secret, deserialized.secret); + assertEquals(original.sparkVersion, deserialized.sparkVersion); + } + + @Test + public void testAllowedLauncherSetAppIdIsAccepted() throws Exception { + LauncherProtocol.SetAppId original = new LauncherProtocol.SetAppId("app-123"); + LauncherProtocol.SetAppId deserialized = + (LauncherProtocol.SetAppId) roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original.appId, deserialized.appId); + } + + // resolveClass rejects purely on desc.getName() failing both allowed-prefix checks, so a + // class in any unrelated package - HashMap, ArrayList, File, or anything else - takes the + // same path; one representative case is enough. See + // testDisallowedLauncherPrefixSpoofIsRejected below for the one genuinely different rejection + // path: a user-defined class spoofing the allow-listed prefix rather than an unrelated one. + @Test + public void testDisallowedJavaIoFileIsRejected() throws Exception { + File payload = new File("/tmp/evil"); + byte[] bytes = serialize(payload); + IllegalArgumentException thrown = assertThrows( + IllegalArgumentException.class, + () -> deserializeFiltered(bytes)); + assertTrue(thrown.getMessage().contains("Unexpected class in stream")); + assertTrue(thrown.getMessage().contains("java.io.File")); + } + + // ALLOWED_PACKAGES entries end in a literal dot, so a class merely sharing the + // "org.apache.spark.launcher" text without being in that package must still be + // rejected: LauncherPrefixSpoof (org.apache.spark.launchermalicious.LauncherPrefixSpoof) + // pins down that boundary, since startsWith("org.apache.spark.launcher.") is false + // once the character after the prefix is "M" rather than ".". A matching spoof of + // the "java.lang." prefix (e.g. java.langfoo.Bar) can't be tested the same way: the + // JVM refuses to define any class whose package starts with "java.", so no real + // Class backs that name. + @Test + public void testDisallowedLauncherPrefixSpoofIsRejected() throws Exception { + LauncherPrefixSpoof payload = new LauncherPrefixSpoof(); + byte[] bytes = serialize(payload); + IllegalArgumentException thrown = assertThrows( + IllegalArgumentException.class, + () -> deserializeFiltered(bytes)); + assertTrue(thrown.getMessage().contains("Unexpected class in stream")); + assertTrue(thrown.getMessage().contains( + "org.apache.spark.launchermalicious.LauncherPrefixSpoof")); + } + + // The three tests below document CURRENT resolveClass behavior for classes in + // java.lang.* subpackages (java.lang.reflect, java.lang.invoke, java.lang.ref). + // desc.getName().startsWith("java.lang.") matches these too, since a subpackage's + // fully-qualified name still starts with the literal string "java.lang." - not just + // the java.lang package itself. The original SPARK-20922 PR's stated intent was "just + // two packages" (an exact-package match), so this is a real gap between intent and + // implementation, not a design choice made in this PR; fixing resolveClass itself is + // intentionally out of scope here and tracked as a follow-up in SPARK-59544. + // + // None of Field, MethodHandle, or WeakReference are actually serializable (constructing + // them for a round-trip throws NotSerializableException), so this boundary can't be + // exercised the way the tests above are; resolveClass is called directly against a + // synthetic descriptor instead. That gap in reachability - not just missing tests - is + // why this went uncovered by LauncherServerSuite's indirect coverage for 9 years. Review Comment: These classes are not Serializable, but the boundary can still be exercised the same way as the tests above. A `Class` object is written as `TC_CLASS` followed by its class descriptor, so `roundTrip(java.lang.reflect.Field.class)` goes through `readObject()`, calls `resolveClass("java.lang.reflect.Field")`, and returns `Field.class`. The same works for `MethodHandle.class` and `WeakReference.class`; I checked all three locally on JDK 17. Serializable values in `java.lang` subpackages also round-trip today: for example, `roundTrip(java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)` resolves `java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy` and `java.lang.Enum`. So the over-admission is reachable through the real socket path, and the "gap in reachability ... for 9 years" sentence does not hold. A minor point: it is `writeObject`, not construction, that throws `NotSerializableException`. How about switching the three tests to a normal round trip, e.g. `assertEquals(java.lang.reflect.Field.class, roundTrip(java.lang.reflect.Field.class));`? That pins the over-admission through `readObject()`, which makes them a stronger target to flip in SPARK-59544. This second paragraph of the comment could then be dropped, `newFilteredStream()` and the `ObjectStreamClass` import would become unused, and the "instead of a synthetic descriptor" contrast in the comment above `testLauncherSubpackageIsCurrentlyAllowed` would need a small update. ########## launcher/src/test/java/org/apache/spark/launcher/FilteredObjectInputStreamSuite.java: ########## @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +/* + * Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more + * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with + * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. + * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 + * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with + * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at + * + * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 + * + * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software + * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, + * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. + * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and + * limitations under the License. + */ + +package org.apache.spark.launcher; + +import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; +import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; +import java.io.File; +import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; +import java.io.ObjectStreamClass; + +import org.apache.spark.launcher.testpkg.SubpackageAllowed; +import org.apache.spark.launchermalicious.LauncherPrefixSpoof; +import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test; +import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*; + +/** + * Tests for {@link FilteredObjectInputStream} - the SPARK-20922 allow-list + * guarding the launcher's local socket protocol. Covers the security-relevant + * {@code resolveClass} path that previously had zero direct tests. + */ +public class FilteredObjectInputStreamSuite extends BaseSuite { + + @Test + public void testAllowedJavaLangStringIsAccepted() throws Exception { + String original = "hello"; + Object deserialized = roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original, deserialized); + } + + @Test + public void testAllowedJavaLangIntegerIsAccepted() throws Exception { + Integer original = 42; + Object deserialized = roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original, deserialized); + } + + @Test + public void testAllowedLauncherMessageIsAccepted() throws Exception { + LauncherProtocol.Hello original = new LauncherProtocol.Hello("secret", "3.5.0"); + LauncherProtocol.Hello deserialized = + (LauncherProtocol.Hello) roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original.secret, deserialized.secret); + assertEquals(original.sparkVersion, deserialized.sparkVersion); + } + + @Test + public void testAllowedLauncherSetAppIdIsAccepted() throws Exception { + LauncherProtocol.SetAppId original = new LauncherProtocol.SetAppId("app-123"); + LauncherProtocol.SetAppId deserialized = + (LauncherProtocol.SetAppId) roundTrip(original); + assertEquals(original.appId, deserialized.appId); + } + + // resolveClass rejects purely on desc.getName() failing both allowed-prefix checks, so a + // class in any unrelated package - HashMap, ArrayList, File, or anything else - takes the + // same path; one representative case is enough. See + // testDisallowedLauncherPrefixSpoofIsRejected below for the one genuinely different rejection + // path: a user-defined class spoofing the allow-listed prefix rather than an unrelated one. + @Test + public void testDisallowedJavaIoFileIsRejected() throws Exception { + File payload = new File("/tmp/evil"); + byte[] bytes = serialize(payload); + IllegalArgumentException thrown = assertThrows( + IllegalArgumentException.class, + () -> deserializeFiltered(bytes)); + assertTrue(thrown.getMessage().contains("Unexpected class in stream")); + assertTrue(thrown.getMessage().contains("java.io.File")); + } + + // ALLOWED_PACKAGES entries end in a literal dot, so a class merely sharing the + // "org.apache.spark.launcher" text without being in that package must still be + // rejected: LauncherPrefixSpoof (org.apache.spark.launchermalicious.LauncherPrefixSpoof) + // pins down that boundary, since startsWith("org.apache.spark.launcher.") is false + // once the character after the prefix is "M" rather than ".". A matching spoof of Review Comment: Nit: the package is `launchermalicious` (lowercase, after the checkstyle fix), so the character after the prefix is "m" rather than "M". The uppercase came from my earlier `launcherMalicious` example, sorry about that. -- This is an automated message from the Apache Git Service. To respond to the message, please log on to GitHub and use the URL above to go to the specific comment. To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For queries about this service, please contact Infrastructure at: [email protected] --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [email protected] For additional commands, e-mail: [email protected]
