On Thu, 30 Oct 2014, Uma Chunduri wrote:
If this is real, this is kind of byzantine attack and can be far more damaging
than what's being listed in this document.
Routing protocols security/Threat models generally discount this.
Is there any proof of detection of this kind of backdoors in operator networks?
http://www.infoworld.com/article/2608141/internet-privacy/snowden--the-nsa-planted-backdoors-in-cisco-products.html
This is a security question, I'm not sure the IETF is the best place to
document these issues, even though it affects products that are used to
implement IETF protocols. There is no doubt in my mind that there is a
problem with all kinds of products being potentially backdoored, I have
read enough papers on BIOS on motherboards, NICs etc being backdoored and
end up running malicious software that is virtually impossible to detect
and eradicate by an operator.
I don't know what to make of the document though, I think it depends on
what its intended audience is. If it's supposed to make people aware of
the potential problem, then it needs more facts and references to assure
people that the problems described are real (because some will say it's
not real until it's actually happened).
Another one where telecom functionality designed and implemented by
government request was used in another fashion is
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004%E2%80%9305>.
Here the LI function (which some government require to be invisible to the
normal operator) was used to spy on some phones. You can probably get more
detailed information internally from your colleagues about that one,
compared to what is publically available.
--
Mikael Abrahamsson email: [email protected]
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