For much of this you could cross out router and write in host.
It all applies to many networking functions other that routers such as switches, firewalls, NFV functions etc.
I am not convinced that RTGWG is the right place for this, a good case could be made for OPSWG or somewhere in SEC.
Stewart On 30/10/2014 18:35, Uma Chunduri wrote:
If this is real, this is kind of byzantine attack and can be far more damaging than what's being listed in this document. Routing protocols security/Threat models generally discount this. Is there any proof of detection of this kind of backdoors in operator networks? -- Uma C. -----Original Message----- From: rtgwg [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Songhaibin (A) Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 8:41 PM To: [email protected] Subject: Router backdoor threat model Hi, We have submitted a draft on router backdoor threat model. The main target is the threat model at the beginning. It is a little limited to the device level instead of the routing system level. Some threats are common to other devices as well. We would like to know if there are people interested in this work or can give some constructive comments or input. Any related discussion in the list or with the authors is welcome : ) Here is the link for the draft. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-song-router-backdoor-00.txt Best Regards! -Haibin _______________________________________________ rtgwg mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg _______________________________________________ rtgwg mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg
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