Hi Mikael, The motivation is that router vendors (with global market) are more or less doubted with security concerns when doing international business. If we can give a clear potential threat model on how it works when committing a malicious eavesdropping or something else, and a guidance on how to avoid the problem or protect the communication, then it will help to mitigate those security concerns (I do not say fully, but more or less).
I do not see the facts of router backdoors, even in the event of PRISM, the backdoor is not from the vendor either. Best Regards! -Haibin > -----Original Message----- > From: rtgwg [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Mikael > Abrahamsson > Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 5:19 AM > To: Uma Chunduri > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: RE: Router backdoor threat model > > On Thu, 30 Oct 2014, Uma Chunduri wrote: > > > If this is real, this is kind of byzantine attack and can be far more > > damaging > than what's being listed in this document. > > Routing protocols security/Threat models generally discount this. > > > > Is there any proof of detection of this kind of backdoors in operator > > networks? > > http://www.infoworld.com/article/2608141/internet-privacy/snowden--the-nsa > -planted-backdoors-in-cisco-products.html > > This is a security question, I'm not sure the IETF is the best place to > document > these issues, even though it affects products that are used to implement IETF > protocols. There is no doubt in my mind that there is a problem with all > kinds of > products being potentially backdoored, I have read enough papers on BIOS on > motherboards, NICs etc being backdoored and end up running malicious > software that is virtually impossible to detect and eradicate by an operator. > > I don't know what to make of the document though, I think it depends on what > its intended audience is. If it's supposed to make people aware of the > potential > problem, then it needs more facts and references to assure people that the > problems described are real (because some will say it's not real until it's > actually happened). > > Another one where telecom functionality designed and implemented by > government request was used in another fashion is > <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004%E2%80%9305>. > Here the LI function (which some government require to be invisible to the > normal operator) was used to spy on some phones. You can probably get more > detailed information internally from your colleagues about that one, compared > to what is publically available. > > -- > Mikael Abrahamsson email: [email protected] > > _______________________________________________ > rtgwg mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg _______________________________________________ rtgwg mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/rtgwg
