Gary, While I've not yet seen your _Exploiting Software_ book, I use your _Building Secure Software_ as one of the texts for a graduate CS class in security (http://cs.franklin.edu/Syllabus/comp676/).
Unfortunately, I've not seen any copies of your book in any major bookstore in the Columbus, OH area, so appologies about my na´vety in this area, but I've not had a chance to peruse it. But I have one question regarding your "attack patterns"--and please don't take this as a challenge. My question is, what makes you and Hoglund's "attack patterns" so different from (say) the security patterns as described by Yoder and Barcalow or by Mark Schumacher? What makes "attack patterns" so different than the work done by the OASIS Web Application Security technical committee (charter at: http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/was/charter.php) that is chaired by Mark Curphey, Peter Michalek, and your Citadel colleague, David Raphael and had its roots in the OWASP ASAC work started several years ago. I'm not trying to accuse you of academic plaigarism, but am curious in how you see your "attack patterns" fitting together in the bigger picture along with the OASIS WAS work and the generic security patterns work of Yoder, Barcalow, Schumacher, and others? Or perhaps are they more like the CVE work maintained by Mitre? What are the differences? What is the overlap? Can you point to an online example of any documented attack pattern that you have in the book so we can see one or a few of them? Why should I want to use your attack patterns rather than one of these other efforts I've mentioned? Like I said, not only have I not _read_ your book, I've not even had a chance to thumb through it. I think it's good to try to catalogue such things, but I think it's going in the wrong direction when there is little industry consensus on exactly how to do this. Adding yet another classification scheme is not valuable unless we can understand exactly what the new scheme brings to the table and how it fits along side other similar attempts. Also, one last thing... not to nitpick, but it seems that your 48 attack patterns can be grouped into a few broader categories? Does your book do this as well? Thanks in advance for your response, -kevin wall --- Kevin W. Wall Qwest Information Technology, Inc. [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: 614.215.4788 "The reason you have people breaking into your software all over the place is because your software sucks..." -- Former whitehouse cybersecurity advisor, Richard Clarke, at eWeek Security Summit -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] on behalf of Gary McGraw Sent: Fri 11/12/2004 8:39 AM To: ljknews; Secure Coding Mailing List Subject: RE: [SC-L] How do we improve s/w developer awareness? One of the reasons that Greg Hoglund and I wrote Exploiting Software was to gain a basic underdstanding of what we call "attack patterns". The idea is to abstract away from platform and language considerations (at least some), and thus elevate the level of attack discussion. We identify and discuss 48 attack patterns in Exploiting Software. Each of them has a handful of associated examples from real exploits. I will paste in the complete list below. As you will see, we provided a start, but there is plenty of work here remaining to be done. Perhaps by talking about patterns of attack we can improve the signal to noise ratio in the exploit discussion department. gem Gary McGraw, Ph.D. CTO, Cigital http://www.cigital.com WE NEED PEOPLE! Make the Client Invisible Target Programs That Write to Privileged OS Resources Use a User-Supplied Configuration File to Run Commands That Elevate Privilege Make Use of Configuration File Search Paths Direct Access to Executable Files Embedding Scripts within Scripts Leverage Executable Code in Nonexecutable Files Argument Injection Command Delimiters Multiple Parsers and Double Escapes User-Supplied Variable Passed to File System Calls Postfix NULL Terminator Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash Relative Path Traversal Client-Controlled Environment Variables User-Supplied Global Variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth) Session ID, Resource ID, and Blind Trust Analog In-Band Switching Signals (aka "Blue Boxing") Attack Pattern Fragment: Manipulating Terminal Devices Simple Script Injection Embedding Script in Nonscript Elements XSS in HTTP Headers HTTP Query Strings User-Controlled Filename Passing Local Filenames to Functions That Expect a URL Meta-characters in E-mail Header File System Function Injection, Content Based Client-side Injection, Buffer Overflow Cause Web Server Misclassification Alternate Encoding the Leading Ghost Characters Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding Unicode Encoding UTF-8 Encoding URL Encoding Alternative IP Addresses Slashes and URL Encoding Combined Web Logs Overflow Binary Resource File Overflow Variables and Tags Overflow Symbolic Links MIME Conversion HTTP Cookies Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow Buffer Overflow with Environment Variables Buffer Overflow in an API Call Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities Parameter Expansion String Format Overflow in syslog()