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Isn't Smashguard the same technology (in software) added to
the latest Microsoft .NET compiler and run time?
While protecting against one method of hijacking a system
(altering the function return address) - it really doesn't protect from
inserting your own code into a stream and then using an existing jump to jump to
your code - does it?
Nor does it protect from altering the system managed data
blocks?
That is to say - it only protects one form of a hijack
attack. Or am I missing something?
Mike Hines
Smashguard most recent CACM publication (Nov 05) is at
-
if you are interested.
The Smashguard Group web site is at -
I'm not affiliated with that group at Purdue - being on the
Admin side.
-----------------------------------
Michael S
Hines
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
There was a lady who went to
Purdue, I believe her name was Carla Brodley. She is a professor at Tufts
currently. One of her projects, I'm not sure whether it is ongoing or
historic, was surrounding hardware based stack protection. There wasn't any
protection against heap / pointer overflows and I don't know how it fares when
stack trampoline activities (which can be valid, but are rare outside of older
objective-c code).
I'm not sure if this is a similar solution to what Intel might
be pursuing. I believe the original "smashguard" work was based entirely on
Alpha chips.
cheers,
.mudge
On Dec 13, 2005, at 15:19, Michael S Hines wrote:
Doesn't a hardware 'feature' such as this lock
software into a two-state model
(user/priv)?
Who's to say that model is the best? Will that be the model of the
future?
Wouldn't a two-state software model that works be
more effective?
It's easier to change (patch) software than to
rewire hardware (figuratively speaking).
Just wondering...
Mike Hines
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Michael S Hines
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