Re: Median Voter and Sampling
In a message dated 8/28/02 3:35:39 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << Uh, how about the first income tax ever passed? It had super-majority support in amendment form! >> Congress passed the first federal income tax in 1861, without supermajority support. If you'd asked the average Northern voter in 1861 if he supported taxing the wealthiest northerners to pay for a war against the South, he might have said yes, but if you'd asked him if he supported a precedent which the government could then use to take a large share of his own income and force him to file returns revealing his activities to the federal government, I rather doubt that he would have said yes. David
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: > > Another MVT deviation: > > Personal bankrupcy law. I bet most voters would prefer more lenient > laws. They are already very lenient. There has been a lot of populist resistance to creditors' tentative efforts to lobby to mildly tighten them. -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] "I was so convinced that soon, very soon, by some extraordinary circumstance I should suddenly become the wealthiest and most distinguished person in the world that I lived in constant tremulous expectation of some magic good fortune befalling me. I was always expecting that *it was about to begin* and I on the point of attaining all that man could desire, and I was forever hurrying from place to place, believing that 'it' must be 'beginning' just where I happened not to be." Leo Tolstoy, *Youth*
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: > > Another MVT deviation: > > Marijuana decriminalization The failure to decriminalize? 75-80% against according to Gallup. And it hasn't really happened anywhere in the U.S. as far as I know, the medical marijuana loophole aside. Which is incidentally a popular loophole. -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] "I was so convinced that soon, very soon, by some extraordinary circumstance I should suddenly become the wealthiest and most distinguished person in the world that I lived in constant tremulous expectation of some magic good fortune befalling me. I was always expecting that *it was about to begin* and I on the point of attaining all that man could desire, and I was forever hurrying from place to place, believing that 'it' must be 'beginning' just where I happened not to be." Leo Tolstoy, *Youth*
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
Another MVT deviation: Personal bankrupcy law. I bet most voters would prefer more lenient laws. Fabio
Re: Median Voter vs. The Sub-optimal Equilibria
--- Eric Crampton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > But even if his expression reflects his stated value, he is still > > deriving > > utility from the good. Why does it matter the reason for the utility? > > Because of the divergence of private and social costs inherent in the > voting act. There will be individual costs that excede benefits, and benefits that excede costs, but I don't see why the total social cost would differ from the total private costs. The only voters that impose an externality are those who change the outcome, and they do compensate society. > So, massive social waste can be approved by > majority vote because of the relatively small expressive benefits attached > to voting for the inefficient program. Why is this regarded as a social waste, if it provides utility to the voters, even if that utility is from the expression? The total value stated by the voters excedes the total cost; where is the waste? > the argument regarding expressive voting is that that utility is > lower than the utility that could have been derived from alternate > use of the funds that were used to construct the statue. If someone states a value of $100 for a public good, why would the utility be less than than $100 spent for a private good? > Let's > say that each person gets $5 worth of expressive utility from voting for > statue construction. The average cost to each voter if the statue is > constructed is $50. And, each voter gets $3 worth of direct utility from > looking at the constructed statue. Then the total utility per voter is $8, while the cost is $50, and the statue is not obtained. With demand revelation, the statue is only bought if the total stated value is greater than the total cost. > Since no voter is decisive, each voter > votes for the statue constructionm in order to get the $5 in expressive > benefits. He does not "vote for" the statue. With demand revelation, he only states the maximum he would be willing to pay. In this case it is $8. What makes demand revelation superior than ordinary voting is that one states a value for the good rather than voting yes or no. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Median Voter vs. The Sub-optimal Equilibria
--- Eric Crampton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Why are we assuming that instituting the demand revealing process would > get us to uniform average-cost taxation? Is that not an integral part of the demand revealing process? To get one's net value, we need to know the cost he will pay, and that cost is the average cost. > For any such issues, it would be a rather safe bet to assume > that one's dollar vote wouldn't be decisive. I concede that. > [presuming] (3) the utility derived from expression and wining does > not count. > 3) Not true. Those benefits just have to be lower than social cost to get > an inefficient outcome. But if the tax payment includes all the social cost, and value is revealed in the willingness to pay the opportunity cost (sacrifice of resources), why would the benefits be lower than the social cost? The value of the item would include that due to expression. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
In a message dated 8/28/02 2:02:10 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: << Sure, there is a little of this. But again, I doubt this matters much. The Supreme Court held off New Deal legislation a little bit for a couple of years, but after 4 years it caved in completely. >> This must be one of the most inaccurately reported events in US history. The Supreme Court didn't "cave in" on New Deal legislation under pressure from FDR's toothless court-packing scheme. When FDR announced his scheme, prominent Democrat congressional leaders from the liberal wing of the party publicly denounced him; there was virtually no support in Congress from anyone for his scheme and no chance it would have created the new positions for him to fill. On the contrary, the Supreme Court voided early New Deal legislation because the Court saw the legislation as taking power from Congress and giving it to the president, thus tipping the balance of power in the federal government more to one of the two other branches, and thus potentially threatening the power of the Court itself. The later New Deal legislation scrupulously avoided such transfers of power, and the Supreme Court (same court) had no problem allowing a transfer of power from individuals to the federal government. Thus the Court acted to defend its own relative share of federal power in the early cases while quite consistently acting to expand the total sum of federal power in the later cases. David Levenstam
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
Another MVT deviation: Marijuana decriminalization Fabio
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: > Ok, how about the 94 congressional election? Seems that voter > preferences shifted little or not at all, but a bunch of > conservatives got voted into office. Of course, they moderated > after they got in, so maybe knee jerk MVT wins again but only > in the long run. There is much to say here. 1. It was an off-year election, and conservative voters were especially well-mobilized. So noticeably more conservative victors are what you should expect. 2. How is that the long-run? The radical changes did not happen. It's not like they happened and then got reversed. The main thing the 94 elections did was kill the unpopular liberal changes Clinton was hoping for. 3. Even in '94, I believe turnover was only about 10%. The media exaggerated the size of the landslide for dramatic effect. > > Sure, there is a little of this. But again, I doubt this matters much. > > The Supreme Court held off New Deal legislation a little bit for a > > couple of years, but after 4 years it caved in completely. > > Is that a good example? The nation was in a depression and the New > Deal was urgent. But also consider this: if you had polled people > in 1931, would they have demanded all the alphabet agencies? > I doubt New Deal was a response to the median voter, other than a > vague "do something!" Asking "what should be done?" is too general a question for most people to articulately answer. That doesn't mean they don't have policy preferences. It just takes more work to elicit them. I'm confident that if you asked 1931 voters "Should there be more/less/about the same amount of stock market regulation" you would have gotten a majority saying "more." The same goes for most of the other famous New Deal policies: helping labor unions, stopping deflation, helping farmers, regulating more, federal jobs programs, etc. > > politician match the median preference." Also true. In other words, > > you seem to be giving the MVT an extra line of defense. > > As this thread has evolved, I've come to realize that my beef > is not with MVT, but with applications. > > > My point, again, is that there are few such discrepancies! It's NOT > > easy to make a list of issues and find deviations. > > Ok - I'll take some guesses: > > Affirmative action Maybe. I think what most voters want is slightly milder AA with a different name. But even that may be too strong. Maybe voters want the impossible combination of no AA and no change in minority representation. The quasi-AA programs in CA and FL (guaranteeing admission to the best students in *each* high school) seem very popular. > Adoption policies (compliments of B.C.) Yes, I agree. > Pre-1996 Welfare policy Maybe. But don't forget that there had been some restraint under Reagan and Bush. And it's not like the 1996 change was radical. > The Somalia intervention (did any voters want that one?) Yes, I suspect. Voters wouldn't have wanted it if no one told them about it, but that doesn't mean they didn't want it to happen after it was underway. > Any increase ever in personal income taxes Uh, how about the first income tax ever passed? It had super-majority support in amendment form! But more seriously, this is one of the cases where the public wants the impossible: more spending, less taxes, no deficit. When income taxes rose, would the median voter have preferred the spending cuts or deficits that the absence of the tax increase would have required? I say no. Voters only want to cut small, symbolically unappealing budget lines, like foreign aid. They don't want to cut any big programs. > In New Jersey: > > The long time prohibition on self-serve gas stations As a former Jersey guy, albeit a counter-stereotypical one, I agree. Same goes for the Jersey toll roads. (Yes, non-NJ tax-payers have to pay to use them, but I doubt NJ voters adjust for that). > > Knee jerk use is appropriate in this case. The theoretical objections > > are weak, and the empirical evidence in favor is strong. > > Well, I'm not going to say the gov't passes policies left and right > without voter approval, but I'm not sure the "knee jerk" MVT allows for > lags in policies, or the many idiosyncrasies we observe. The MVT has one simple way to explain lags: Politicians share the preference of the median voter who *elected* them, not the *current* median preference. Of course, if they want to be re-elected, they need to appeal to the median voter of the *next* election too. And one factor that might influence future voters is responsiveness to current voters. Both of these factors mitigate the effect of lags. I'll grant that some lag remains, but no one has convinced me its a big effect. As for the idiocyncracies, I admit they exist. But they are much rarer than usually thought. > Fabio -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.c
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
> Elasticity and stickiness are different concepts. But in any case, > there is little evidence that policy preferences shift rapidly. When Ok, how about the 94 congressional election? Seems that voter preferences shifted little or not at all, but a bunch of conservatives got voted into office. Of course, they moderated after they got in, so maybe knee jerk MVT wins again but only in the long run. > Sure, there is a little of this. But again, I doubt this matters much. > The Supreme Court held off New Deal legislation a little bit for a > couple of years, but after 4 years it caved in completely. Is that a good example? The nation was in a depression and the New Deal was urgent. But also consider this: if you had polled people in 1931, would they have demanded all the alphabet agencies? I doubt New Deal was a response to the median voter, other than a vague "do something!" > politician match the median preference." Also true. In other words, > you seem to be giving the MVT an extra line of defense. As this thread has evolved, I've come to realize that my beef is not with MVT, but with applications. > My point, again, is that there are few such discrepancies! It's NOT > easy to make a list of issues and find deviations. Ok - I'll take some guesses: Affirmative action Adoption policies (compliments of B.C.) Pre-1996 Welfare policy The Somalia intervention (did any voters want that one?) Any increase ever in personal income taxes In New Jersey: The long time prohibition on self-serve gas stations > Knee jerk use is appropriate in this case. The theoretical objections > are weak, and the empirical evidence in favor is strong. Well, I'm not going to say the gov't passes policies left and right without voter approval, but I'm not sure the "knee jerk" MVT allows for lags in policies, or the many idiosyncrasies we observe. Fabio
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
Bryan Caplan wrote: > Elasticity and stickiness are different concepts. I should have said "*Low* elasticity and stickiness are different concepts." -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] "He wrote a letter, but did not post it because he felt that no one would have understood what he wanted to say, and besides it was not necessary that anyone but himself should understand it." Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks*
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
> there's > nothing "rational" about being ignorant towards a political system that > benefit others at the expence of oneself (or indeed benefit noone at > the expense of everyone). It is rational to avoid doing something when the material cost to oneself is greater than the material benefit, where "material" excludes psychic benfits due to helping others. The cost (including obtaining more knowledge about it) of a typical consumer to actively and substantially oppose subsidies to farmers, lawyers, unions, corporations, and politicans is typically high and the benfits almost all external. Daniel Klein has called this the "not worth knowing better" problem, which may be a clearer label. Fred Foldvary = [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Median Voter and Sampling
fabio guillermo rojas wrote: > I think that applications of MVT are very, very sloppy. Four > criticisms: > > 1. You seem to assume that policy responds quite well to public > opinion. You assume that if opinion shifts, policy will quickly follow. > I believe that policy is very "sticky" with respect to public > opinion. To make it econo-talk, I think policy is not very > elastic with respect to changes in the median voter. Elasticity and stickiness are different concepts. But in any case, there is little evidence that policy preferences shift rapidly. When they do markedly shift, we usually see that politicians change a lot by the next election. Very often the existing politician preemptively changes his position to avoid giving his opponents' the opportunity to attack him for being "out of touch." > 2. Institutions are designed to prevent policy from being overly > sensitive to public opinion. Ie, we don't have elections every > day. We create rules that allow policy makers to resist > every whim of opinion. Examples: rules for changing the constitution, > judicial dependence on precedents, etc. In a sense, institutions > play the role that contracts do in the labor market - set > practices over some time period (ie, you've bought labor > at price X and the employee can't leave just because the price > is now more than X). Sure, there is a little of this. But again, I doubt this matters much. The Supreme Court held off New Deal legislation a little bit for a couple of years, but after 4 years it caved in completely. In theory, I don't deny that this could matter. In practice, though, I see little evidence. Again, if you can't name the unpopular policies, what reason do we have to think that institutional constraints are binding? They mostly constrain us from doing stuff that the median voter doesn't want anyway. > 3. When people (ahem, Mr. B.C.) say "look - puzzle - people want > X but we get Y" - the poll that measures opinion is probably > a random sample of adults, or maybe voters. But as I've argued > before, this might not be the relevant group. Maybe it's > party activists, or party-rank and file. Policies may have > select audiences and there is no puzzle until you show that > the relevant audience does in fact strongly oppose a policy. Curiouser and curiouser. Re-read this point. Out of context, it sounds like a *defense* of the MVT! You seem to be saying "There is no puzzle for the MVT if the electorate is not the relevant group politicians must appeal to." Fine. I am saying that "There is no puzzle if existing politician match the median preference." Also true. In other words, you seem to be giving the MVT an extra line of defense. Since I don't think that's your intent, I need clarification. > 4. Cognitive limitations: I'm no expert, but my hunch is that > many people are only willing to get worked up over a small > # of issues - taxes, abortion, immigration, defense... and > the dedicated might add their favorites like gun control > or affirmative action. Therefore, it's no risk to screw > the voter on an issue as long as you don't do it on certain > big issues. Therefore it's easy to get a list of dozens > of issues and find a descrepancy - what's so puzzling about > that? My point, again, is that there are few such discrepancies! It's NOT easy to make a list of issues and find deviations. I will agree that it is safer for politicians to deviate from the MVT on small issues that few people care about. But this does not mean that big deviations on small issues are frequent. So far, there is still a scarcity of examples. It is also worth mentioning that under $1 B is spent on campaign contributions, suggesting that special interests haven't been able to buy much of value. Of course, if the median voter is *indifferent* on an issue, all observed policies satisfy the MVT. > So my beef isn't the MVT per se, but the knee jerk use of it. Knee jerk use is appropriate in this case. The theoretical objections are weak, and the empirical evidence in favor is strong. > Fabio -- Prof. Bryan Caplan Department of Economics George Mason University http://www.bcaplan.com [EMAIL PROTECTED] "He wrote a letter, but did not post it because he felt that no one would have understood what he wanted to say, and besides it was not necessary that anyone but himself should understand it." Leo Tolstoy, *The Cossacks*
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Re: Median Voter and Sampling
> But I do have a naive question: Is there a median > voter for each issue, so that if there n issues, there > can be up to n median voters? Or, is there only one > median voter who satisfies the vector median as I > described above? Can such a person be proven to > exist, sort of like a voter version of the Ham > Sandwich Theorem? > jsh Well, sure. It's just the proof of the regular MVT, but done with multiple integrals. F Ro
