Burning in effigy and a generally applicable arson statute
Bellecourt v. City of Cleveland, 2003 WL 21101089 (Ohio App.), holds that burning someone in effigy at a public rally was protected speech, notwithstanding a generally applicable arson statute, when it seemed clear that the burning posed no danger ([T]he demonstration took place in a paved area cordoned off with metal barricades and surrounded by police officers as well as six fire fighters equipped with fire extinguishers. Moreover, the public was rerouted away from the area.). An interesting case, given the recurring (and still valid) point that Texas v. Johnson held not that flagburning was protected as such, but rather that it was protected against a law that singled out flagburning because of its message. Eugene
Re: More on recess appointments
I certainly agree with Sandy's descriptive claim that the Court is capable of deciding that Article II doesn't control here. But that's a separate question from the normative claim of whether the Court should so decide. That the Court may have decided the sovereign immunity cases in a way that's inconsistent with the text and the original meaning (if that is indeed so) doesn't mean that the Court ought to likewise set aside the text and the original meaning in this instance (and I know of no evidence that the text and the original meaning differ here). Moreover, as I understand the state sovereign immunity cases -- and I hasten to say that I'm not an expert on the history of the subject -- they are at least supported by a pretty long line of precedent going back to Hans v. Louisiana and in some measure before, and there is at least some contemporaneous evidence (for instance, a statement in the Federalist) that state sovereign immunity was meant to be preserved by the Constitution. That original meaning or traditional understanding may sometimes trump text is one thing; it doesn't follow, it seems to me, that pretty general structure should trump a pretty specific text and traditional understanding. It seems to me that this is especially so with regard to questions such as who appoints high government officials, even temporary ones. This seems to me to be the sort of question for which it's especially important to have a pretty definite answer. The text provides a fairly definite answer; the history cements it; it seems to me that we should stick with that, despite the plausible structural arguments against it. Recall, incidentally, that there's a plausible structural argument in favor of temporary appointments, too -- judicial vacancies can cause a pretty serious interference with federal business, and would have caused even more in the early Republic, where having judges from neighboring courts sit by designation would have been much more difficult. Eugene -Original Message- From: Levinson [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Saturday, June 14, 2003 11:58 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: More on recess appointments David Wagner writes: Recess appointees look anomalous from a constitution-maker's perspective, but the Constitution we actually have provides for them (Art. II. Sec. 2, paragraph 3). The reference here to vacancies presumably refers to the wide range of officers listed in paragraph 2. Is there a textual argument that paragraph 3 is inapplicable to Art. III judges? I don't think there's a textual argument available, but so what? There's certainly a strong structural argument and now a strong precedential argument, especially if one takes last week's case seriously. There is no more reason to read the Article II text as absolute than there is, say, to read the First Amendment or the Contract as absolute, whatever their grammar (why doesn't no law mean no law?). A court capable of deciding the recent bunch of structural federalism/no federal jurisdiction cases, in the teeth of the language of the 11th amendment, is certainly capable of deciding that Article II doesn't control with regard to something so important as preserving judicial independence and the appearance of same. That recess appointments go way back shouldn't count for this court. After all, it had no trouble saying that the Chisholm v. Georgia court simply engaged in an obvious misunderstanding of the Constitution (whatever the text) in upholding diversity juri! sdiction, so that, presumably, the 11th amendment was wholly unncessary (except to reverse the court's inexplicably stupid decision). sandy
Re: More on recess appointments
Sandy Levinson writes: Isn't it spectacularly likely, incidentally, that no one drafting the Constitution give a nano-second of thought to the possibility of recess appointments to the federal judiciary? Is this relevant (assuming it is true)? Why would this be that likely? The notion that there'd be a vacancy in a judicial office wouldn't be that strange, it seems to me. They obviously thought quite a bit about the judicial branch -- why wouldn't they think about vacancies there. Incidentally, does anyone know about whether there were notable judicial vacancies in the states in the years before the Framing, and how they were dealt with? Eugene
Re: Proposed dorm speech code at the University of Alabama
Two questions: (1) Say a city bans all billboards with offensive signs, if the billboards are visible from a private residence; and also bans all tenants, in privately owned housing (including private university housing) as well as publicly owned housing, from displaying offensive materials in their hallways, even when the housing owner would allow this. Would you say that's constitutional? Or does the protection of people in their homes (or perhaps around their homes, if one treats the student's home as just being his room, and not the common area that he shares with dozens of others) justify restrictions on offensive speech only when the government acts as proprietor of its own housing, and not when it acts as sovereign? (2) Even if some such restrictions are permissible, may the government impose viewpoint-based restrictions (e.g., no racist or sexist postings or no Confederate flags) and restrictions that are quite vague and that are thus open to viewpoint-based enforcement (e.g., no harassing postings)? Or would the government's power extend only to, say, content-neutral bans on all postings, or at least such bans that seem viewpoint-neutral (perhaps no profanity in postings)? Compare Frisby v. Schultz (upholding a content-neutral residential picketing ban justified by arguments such as those that Greg makes) with Carey v. Brown (striking down such a ban when it had a content-based exception for labor picketing). Eugene -Original Message- From: Sisk, Gregory C. [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2003 11:40 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Proposed dorm speech code at the University of Alabama Mark raises, I think, an important point about the legitimacy of different rules for different areas in a dormitory that I suggest can be recognized as valid even by those of us (and I include myself) who are something of free-speech absolutists in most other contexts. Many years ago when I (successfully) as a brand-new law professor had the temerity (in the view of some) to campaign against a proposed speech code at my former institution, I nonetheless became convinced that the countervailing interests of students living in a dormitory to avoid being confronted with offensive imagery in their own homes deserved positive consideration. While a student should be left largely unregulated in choosing what images or expressive materials to post inside the student's own room, the privacy and emotional security interests of other students emerge when expression that may offend is imposed upon a captive audience in the very place where persons retreat for rest and renewal. When a person ventures forth into the world at large, he or she cannot be protected from exposure to sights, sounds, etc. that the particular person may find displeasing. And when that displeasure is grounded in disagreement with the idea expressed, calling upon the government to suppress it is most troubling. Thus, for example, the common areas of the university, as with the public sidewalks of a street, should be free speech zones. In these areas, arguments about offense, emotional distress, etc. cannot justify governmental intervention. But even the hardiest of souls needs a place of retreat, to be refreshed, to be at home. And for many college students that place is the dormitory. In my view, a student going and from his or her room to the lavatory or to the elevator -- a journey that cannot be avoided -- should not have to suffer the emotional onslaught of offensive images. Just as I believe a community is justified in adopting different rules regarding street protests and marches for residential areas, I think a university justifiably can adopt a more protective approach to living quarters, requiring greater sensitivity to the concerns of neighbors, including adopting some restrictions for those elements of a dormitory that are immediately adjacent to the rooms in which students live. The difficulty is in defining what is and is not permitted, and applying that definition, in a manner that is as neutral as possible and leaves little discretion for overzealous administrators in enforcement.) Greg Sisk Gregory Sisk Professor of Law University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis) 1000 LaSalle Avenue Minneapolis, MN 55403-2005 651-962-4923 [EMAIL PROTECTED] -Original Message- From: Mark Tushnet [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2003 1:07 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Proposed dorm speech code at the University of Alabama It's worth noting that the policy remains in draft form. One might imagine different provisions for spaces interior to residents' rooms, and those exposed to the public such as the exteriors of doors. I think much would turn on precisely what the policy covers. But, I would think that there's no serious problem with pretty restrictive
Lawrence vs. Glucksberg
I'm certainly not going to mourn the demise of sodomy laws, which I've long thought were quite outrageous. But I'm wondering about the boundaries of the majority's logic, and in particular how it relates to the right to assisted suicide rejected in Glucksberg. Wouldn't a right to decide how to die be as important to one's dignity as [a] free person[] as the right to build sexual relationships? I realize that there are stronger arguments for why the government may properly burden or even prohibit the exercise of that right; but Glucksberg held that the right really isn't protected by anything more than a rational basis test, relying largely on the only traditional rights rationale that Lawrence seems to pretty decisively reject. Is this still sound post-Lawrence? Eugene
What did he think, and when did he think it?
So here's the question: Given that Justices are *supposed to* be swayed by good arguments in briefs, and by collegial interactions with their colleagues, and given that lots of people change their views in 12 years, how can examination of his opinion today give us an even remotely reliable guess about what he thought 12 years ago? After all, it's not uncommon for people to at first have a pretty general and not terribly well-examined view of an issue -- e.g., there is a right to privacy, albeit a very narrow one, which applies to things like contraception among married people -- and then on reflection, reading, and discussion conclude that their view was wrong -- constitutionally illegitimate, practically unworkable, or what have you. Now maybe that isn't what happened with Thomas; but how could we possibly, based on his decision today, get any meaningful enlightenment about whether it did or didn't happen? Eugene
General right to privacy
Justice Stewart said general right to privacy precisely to distinguish the right from a more limited constitutional privacy right: The Court says it is the right of privacy 'created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.' With all deference, I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever before decided by this Court. [FN7] FN7. Cases like Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, and Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480, relied upon in the concurring opinions today. dealt with true First Amendment rights of association and are wholly inapposite here. See also, e.g., NAACP v. State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697. . . . Moreover, a few paragraphs before Stewart mentioned some constitutional rights that might be seen as securing more limited constitutional privacy rights: As to the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, I can find nothing in any of them to invalidate this Connecticut law, even assuming that all those Amendments are fully applicable against the States. . . . So I understood Stewart as saying that there's no general right of privacy that goes beyond the privacy rights secured by the First Amendment right of anonymous association, the Third Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the privilege against self-incrimination. I would assume that Thomas is saying the same today, though of course that's only a guess. Eugene -Original Message- From: Mark S Kende [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2003 4:09 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Thomas on privacy The disagreement I have with Ilya's most post below is at two levels. First, I think Thomas' statement in Lawrence that there's no general right to privacy should not be read to mean Thomas thinks there is some more limited constitutional privacy right, as Ilya charitably suggests. That would not explain Thomas' reliance on Stewart in Griswold. Moreover, Thomas' textualist emphasis in Lawrence further supports my interpretation (he can't find the right in the Constitution -- the word privacy isn't there). Second, if Ilya's right that Thomas believes the Constitution protects privacy in marriage and in other traditional contexts (based on Thomas confirmation testimony), where does Thomas get these beliefs but from some kind of generalizable privacy principle? (which Thomas seems to be denying exists in Lawrence despite saying it existed at confirmation). As to Eugene's post that Thomas essentially may have developed different views over the last dozen years and that we shouldn't expect a Court nominee to have well honed perspectives on every issue, that doesn't make sense to me given the post-Bork timing of the Thomas hearing and other information that has come out about Thomas' views. Mark On Thu, 26 Jun 2003, Ilya Somin wrote: Thanks to Keith for finding the relevant quotes. In answer to Mark, I think that Thomas meant (both at the hearing and possibly in Lawrence) not that protection of privacy is dependent on OTHER fundamental rights, but rather than some types of privacy are themselves fundamental whereas others are not. IN particular, the comments quoted by Keith suggest that the fundamental ones may be 1) privacy in marital and family relationships, and 2) forms of privacy that are recognized by history and tradition. I'm not a big fan of this kind of vague approach myself, but it's not inherently inconsistent, and it certainly doesn't contradict Thomas' statements to the Senate. As to Thomas' statement that there is a right of privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, this is not the same thing as saying that there is a GENERAL right of privacy. If some forms of privacy are protected by the Amendment, it doesn't follow that all are. Ilya Somin On Thu, 26 Jun 2003, Keith E. Whittington wrote: At least according to a website selection (the accuracy of which I can't guarantee), Thomas responded to a Biden question about abortion and privacy by saying that My view is that there is a right to privacy in the Fourteenth Amendment, and elaborating when pressed about abortion rights particularly that The Supreme Court has made clear that the issue of marital privacy is protected. He reinforced that later in the exchange, noting I think -- and I think the Supreme Court's rulings in the privacy area support -- that the notion of family is one of the most personal and most private relationships that we have in our country. Later, Thomas suggested to Leahy that the approach that Justice Harlan took in Poe v. Ullman and reaffirmed again in Griswold in determining the right to privacy was the appropriate
Statutory rape laws
I appreciate Bryan's arguments in favor of gender neutrality here, but does he have any thoughts on the prosecution problem? If a state law prohibits, say, all sex with under-16-year-olds (with no Romeo/Juliet provision), how can this ever be enforced when two 15-year-olds are having sex? Presumably both will take the Fifth, and the likely witnesses -- often parents of one of the children -- won't want to testify or even call the police, given that their own child would be put at risk of prosecution. What to do? I suppose it might be possible to have some other rule, such as prosecuting the older one but not the younger one, even if the difference is a few months. Would that be the suggestion, and would it be effective? More broadly, assume that the danger to girls -- the physical danger of pregnancy, the less imbalanced physical danger of STDs (as I understand it, STDs are more easily spread from men to women rather than vice versa, but I may be wrong), and the empirical sense that girls are more likely to be reluctant participants than boys, and thus more likely to be emotionally hurt by relationships gone bad (as relationships often do) -- does appear greater than the danger to boys. If that's so, then would it be fair to prosecute the 15-year-old girl (and often not the 15-year-old boy, for the reasons I mention above, at least assuming the sex-neutral tiebreaker, such as age, cuts in favor of prosecuting the girl) under a statute that's aimed at protecting the girls themselves? I should say that my sympathies are with equal treatment without regard to sex here; and I should also say that I'm not wild about statutory rape laws with fixed age tests (as opposed to difference-between-the-ages tests). Still, the objections I mention above give me pause, so I was wondering if Bryan could dispel them. Eugene -Original Message- From: Bryan Wildenthal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 1:10 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Lawrence, Limon and SDP Review Stratification Attempting to respond only to the first paragraph of James Blumstein's very thoughtful posting (see below -- I don't have time to respond to the rest, which also raises very valuable points): Indeed, I started wondering about Michael M v Sup Ct after I sent my earlier posting about Lawrence and Limon, although Michael M and Limon raise somewhat distinct issues (Michael M: whether boy but not girl having sex with each other can be punished when of same ages; Limon: whether boy but not girl can be subjected to radically different punishments for having sex with a younger boy). Another possible ground to distinguish Michael M (which at any rate I think is blatantly inconsistent with both previous and later sex discrimination rulings), is that, as I recall, the key justification for treating boys and girls differently in consensual statutory rape, was that girls but not boys get pregnant, nature's (possible) punishment of the girl thus balancing out a governmental punishment applied only to the boy. That obviously doesn't apply to a same-sex encounter. And before someone suggests that the risk of HIV transmission might justify disfavoring age-differential gay sex as compared to equally age-differential straight sex, note that HIV (of course) can be and is also transmitted by straight sex, and indeed, I understand from recent news reports that the most rapidly growing risk group for HIV is now young women (especially minority women) who contract it in heterosexual encounters. Lest there be any confusion, I do not endorse either type of nature's punishment argument. Nor did the Michael M Court use such terminology. I am just paraphrasing with some intentional sarcasm and irony. Recalling the realpolitik voting line-ups on the Supreme Court, Michael M was a 5-4 decision with Justice Stewart in the majority and Blackmun concurring only in the judgment. O'Connor replaced Stewart later in 1981 and in 1982, wrote the 5-4 decision in Miss. U. of Women v Hogan, greatly strengthening (in practice, if not in theory) scrutiny of sex discrimination. Hogan is one of the cases that I find irreconcilable with Michael M, as are later cases, like JEB v Alabama (1994) (per Blackmun, J) and US v Virginia (1996). On the other hand, Nguyen v INS (2001) is another 5-4 setback for sex equality, again blatantly inconsistent with the others. Being an eternal optimist, I would just hope the Supremes eventually overrule Michael M (and Nguyen for that matter). I agree that as long as it remains on the books, the Kansas and other courts may find it a convenient excuse to uphold anti-gay Romeo and Juliet statutory rape laws. Bryan Wildenthal Thomas Jefferson School of Law -Original Message- From: Blumstein, James To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 7/12/03 12:27 PM Subject: Re: Lawrence, Limon and SDP Review Stratification I
Re: Statutory rape laws
the federal monetary incentives, however) The struggle I see coming is over age-of-consent, with a horrible subtext involving arguments that pedophilia and/or sexual abuse of the young is not harmful, etc. Best Lynne - Original Message - From: Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 2:23 PM Subject: Statutory rape laws I appreciate Bryan's arguments in favor of gender neutrality here, but does he have any thoughts on the prosecution problem? If a state law prohibits, say, all sex with under-16-year-olds (with no Romeo/Juliet provision), how can this ever be enforced when two 15-year-olds are having sex? Presumably both will take the Fifth, and the likely witnesses -- often parents of one of the children -- won't want to testify or even call the police, given that their own child would be put at risk of prosecution. What to do? I suppose it might be possible to have some other rule, such as prosecuting the older one but not the younger one, even if the difference is a few months. Would that be the suggestion, and would it be effective? More broadly, assume that the danger to girls -- the physical danger of pregnancy, the less imbalanced physical danger of STDs (as I understand it, STDs are more easily spread from men to women rather than vice versa, but I may be wrong), and the empirical sense that girls are more likely to be reluctant participants than boys, and thus more likely to be emotionally hurt by relationships gone bad (as relationships often do) -- does appear greater than the danger to boys. If that's so, then would it be fair to prosecute the 15-year-old girl (and often not the 15-year-old boy, for the reasons I mention above, at least assuming the sex-neutral tiebreaker, such as age, cuts in favor of prosecuting the girl) under a statute that's aimed at protecting the girls themselves? I should say that my sympathies are with equal treatment without regard to sex here; and I should also say that I'm not wild about statutory rape laws with fixed age tests (as opposed to difference-between-the-ages tests). Still, the objections I mention above give me pause, so I was wondering if Bryan could dispel them. Eugene -Original Message- From: Bryan Wildenthal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 1:10 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Lawrence, Limon and SDP Review Stratification Attempting to respond only to the first paragraph of James Blumstein's very thoughtful posting (see below -- I don't have time to respond to the rest, which also raises very valuable points): Indeed, I started wondering about Michael M v Sup Ct after I
Lawrence v. Texas and statutory rape
Question: Now that the Court has held that the Constitution secures a right to have sex with consenting adults, is it still constitutionally permissible for states to make statutory rape a strict liability offense as to age? After all, even child pornography prosecutions require some showing of scienter, see New York v. Ferber, since the theory is that otherwise the strict liability ban on unprotected conduct may also deter protected conduct. If I reasonably believed she was 18 is a defense in a child pornography case, why wouldn't it similarly be a defense in a statutory rape case? Eugene
Northern Illinois Law Review Symposium on Emerging Issues in Equ al Protection Jurisprudence
Title: Message -Original Message-From: Amy M. Miller [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 3:07 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Subject: could you publish this on con law list serv? CALL FOR PAPERS The Northern Illinois University College of Law announces its 13th annual Law Review Symposium, which will focus this year on "Emerging Issues in Equal Protection Jurisprudence." The Symposium will bring together legal scholars and practitioners to present the most recent understandings of how the legal systems of the United States address the critical social issue of equal protection. The Symposium's goal is to highlight the manner in which legal systems both fulfill their roles in responding to equal protection violations as well as fail to fulfill these roles. The Northern Illinois University Law Review is an academic legal journal devoted to discourse on legal issues of public concern. The summer 2004 issue will be devoted to papers submitted for the production of the 13th annual Symposium. Non-traditional journal articles, such as essays, letters, and booknotes will be considered for publication as well. The Law Review Symposium Editor announces a call for papers for this issue. Scholars and practitionersmay submit papers for publication only or for inclusion with the Symposium. The Symposium will be held in March 2004. Papers are due byDecember 1, 2003. For further information, please contact Amy Miller, Symposium Editor, at [EMAIL PROTECTED] or atNorthern Illinois University Law ReviewAttention: Symposium EditorSwen Parson HallDeKalb IL 60115or by calling (815) 753-0619. Amy M. Miller 1305 N. Annie Glidden, Apt. 613 DeKalb, IL 60115 815 - 762 - 1062, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Do you Yahoo!?Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software
University of Wisconsin / Milwaukee Political Science Department has opening in public law / judicial politics
Title: Message -Original Message-From: Sara C. Benesh [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2003 12:02 PMTo: [EMAIL PROTECTED] . . . The University of WisconsinMilwaukee Assistant Professor: Public Law/Judicial Politics The Department of Political Science, pending budgetary approval, invites applications for an anticipated tenure track position at the rank of Assistant Professor in public law/judicial politics with a starting date of August 2004. We seek a scholar engaged in significant research in any area of the subfield. Primary teaching responsibilities will be constitutional law and other courses in the law studies option of the political science major, including law and society and judicial process. We are open to a wide range of additional graduate and undergraduate teaching interests within and beyond public law including methodology. The teaching load is two courses per semester and the salary is competitive with peer institutions and commensurate with experience. A Ph.D. in political science and evidence of excellence in research and teaching is required. The application deadline is October 20, 2003. Please send your application, including a vita, three letters of reference, a brief writing sample, and summary evidence of teaching competence (by U.S. mail) to Professor Howard Handelman, Chair, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 413, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53201. UWMilwaukee is an affirmative action, equal employment opportunity employer. Sara C. Benesh Assistant Professor Director of Undergraduate Studies Department of Political Science P.O. Box 413 Milwaukee, WI 53201 414.229.6720 voice 414.229.5021 fax [EMAIL PROTECTED] email http://www.uwm.edu/~sbenesh web
Value of crime-advocating speech
My apologies for troubling all of you about this, but I'm looking for examples of an argument that runs more or less like this: Even speech that advocates crime can serve the search for truth / marketplace of ideas / democratic self-government. Such speech often carries with it legitimate critiques of the existing laws, as well as the illegitimate call for violating them. While the speech may persuade a few listeners to commit crimes, the very same speech may persuade many others to take peaceful steps to change the law. And though people could in theory make the same critiques without the calls for illegal action, in practice such self-censored speech wouldn't be as effective even in its legitimate critiques, because [listeners won't fully perceive the rage behind the speaker's argument / the criticisms won't seem as authentic / etc.]. I'm pretty sure I've heard this in various sources, but I can't seem to find them, and I thought someone on the list might be kind enough to help me out. I am *not* looking for other arguments about the benefits of such speech, e.g., the safety valve argument, the argument that only conflict with bad ideas can really sharpen our understanding of the good ideas, and so on. I'm focusing specifically on the dual-use product argument -- that the speech may persuade some people to act lawfully, even though it may persuade others to act lawlessly. Thanks in advance, Eugene
CONLAWPROF post -- possible virus attachment
A reader reports that the attachment to the post below contained a virus. I haven't checked this myself, but it's worth erring on the safe side: Please make sure you do not open that attachment. (Naturally, the quoted text below does not include the virus -- only the original message did.) As you may have noticed, the list isn't being moderated right now, which is why the attachment went through. Eugene -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2003 5:07 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Details Please see the attached file for details.
CONLAWPROF users: Please bookmark the instruction page
If you haven't done so already, PLEASE bookmark the page http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/conlawprof.htm http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/conlawprof.htm . That way, when you have technical problems with the list, or want to know how to resubscribe, or want to know how to tell colleagues to subscribe, you can just refer back to it, without needing to wait for a response from the list custodian. Thanks very much, Eugene
