Cash, Credit -- or Prints?

2004-10-11 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB109744462285841431,00.html

The Wall Street Journal


 October 11, 2004


Cash, Credit -- or Prints?
Fingerprints May Replace
 Money, Passwords and Keys;
 One Downside: Gummi Fakes

By WILLIAM M. BULKELEY
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
October 11, 2004; Page B1


Fingerprints aren't just for criminals anymore. Increasingly, they are for
customers.

Fingerprint identification is being used to speed up checkouts at Piggly
Wiggly supermarkets in South Carolina, and to open storage lockers at the
Statue of Liberty. Fingerprints are also being used as password substitutes
in cellphones and laptop computers, and in place of combinations to open up
safes.

But these aren't the fingerprints of yore, in which the person placed his
hand on an ink pad, then on paper. Instead, the user sets his hand on a
computerized device topped with a plate of glass, and an optical reader and
special software and chips identify the ridges and valleys of the
fingertips.

Fingerprint technology seems to be reaching critical mass and is spreading
faster than other widely promoted biometric identification methods, such
as eyeball scanning, handprint-geometry reading and facial recognition.
Interest in these and other new security systems was heightened by the
September 2001 terror attacks.

Fingerprints will be dominant for the foreseeable future, says Don
McKeon, the product manager for biometric security at International
Business Machines Corp.

One reason fingerprint-security is spreading is that technological advances
are bringing the cost down. Microsoft Corp. recently introduced a
stand-alone fingerprint reader for $54, and a keyboard and a mouse with
fingerprint readers. Last week, IBM said it would start selling laptop
computers with fingerprint readers built in. These products reduce the need
for personal-computer users to remember passwords.

A customer uses a fingerprint reader to pay at a Piggly Wiggly store,
cutting his checkout time.



Earlier this year, American Power Conversion Corp., a Rhode Island company
that makes backup computer batteries, started selling a fingerprint reader
for PCs with a street price of $45 -- less than half the price of
competitors at the time. American Power says it has sold tens of thousands
of the devices since.

Korea's LG Electronics Inc. has introduced a cellphone with a silicon chip
at its base that requires the owner's finger to be swiped across its
surface before the phone can be used. This summer, NTT DoCoMo Inc. started
selling a similar phone reader that is being used on Japanese trains as an
electronic wallet to pay fares or to activate withdrawals from on-board
cash machines.

Proponents have never had trouble explaining the benefits of fingerprints
as payment-and-password alternatives: Each person has a unique set, and
their use is established in the legal system as an authoritative means of
identification. But some people are uneasy about registering their
fingerprints because of the association with criminality and the potential
that such a universal identifier linked to all personal information would
reduce privacy.

Moreover, numerous businesses and governments have tested fingerprint
systems in the past only to rip them out when the hype failed to match
reality. That's partly because the optical readers have had problems with
certain people's fingers. Elderly people with dry skin, children who
pressed down too hard, even women with smaller fingers -- including many
Asians -- were often rejected as unreadable.

Security experts also have successfully fooled some systems by making
plaster molds of fingers and then creating fake fingers by filling the
molds with Silly-Putty-type plasticizers or gelatin similar to that used in
candy Gummi Bears.

But advocates say the rate of false rejections of legitimate users has been
greatly reduced by improved software. I'd say 99% of people can register
their fingers, says Brad Hill, who installed fingerprint-controlled lockers
at his souvenir store at the Statue of Liberty this summer when the
National Park Service forbade tourists from entering the statue while
carrying packages. Mr. Hill was worried that tourists would lose locker
keys when security screeners forced them to empty their pockets.

Some makers of readers also say their technology can solve the fake-finger
problem by taking readings from below the surface skin layer. Or they
suggest combining four-digit ID codes with fingerprint scanning to
virtually eliminate false readings.

Makers of fingerprint readers acknowledge the privacy concerns. But they
maintain that the threat of personal invasion is minimized because most
systems don't store the actual print, but instead use it to generate a
unique series of numbers that can't be reverse-engineered to re-create the
print. And public willingness to submit to fingerprint readers has soared
since the 2001 terrorist attacks, as the need for security overcomes
worries about 

Congress Close to Establishing Rules for Driver's Licenses

2004-10-12 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://nytimes.com/2004/10/11/politics/11identity.html?pagewanted=printposition=

The New York Times

October 11, 2004

Congress Close to Establishing Rules for Driver's Licenses
By MATTHEW L. WALD

ASHINGTON, Oct. 10 - Following a recommendation of the Sept. 11 commission,
the House and Senate are moving toward setting rules for the states that
would standardize the documentation required to obtain a driver's license,
and the data the license would have to contain.

 Critics say the plan would create a national identification card. But
advocates say it would make it harder for terrorists to operate, as well as
reduce the highway death toll by helping states identify applicants whose
licenses had been revoked in other states.

The Senate version of the intelligence bill includes an amendment, passed
by unanimous consent on Oct. 1, that would let the secretary of homeland
security decide what documents a state would have to require before issuing
a driver's license, and would also specify the data that the license would
have to include for it to meet federal standards. The secretary could
require the license to include fingerprints or eye prints. The provision
would allow the Homeland Security Department to require use of the license,
or an equivalent card issued by motor vehicle bureaus to nondrivers for
identification purposes, for access to planes, trains and other modes of
transportation.

The bill does not give the department the authority to force the states to
meet the federal standards, but it would create enormous pressure on them
to do so. After a transition period, the department could decide to accept
only licenses issued under the rules as identification at airports.

 The House's version of the intelligence bill, passed Friday, would require
the states to keep all driver's license information in a linked database,
for quick access. It also calls for an integrated network of screening
points that includes the nation's border security system, transportation
system and critical infrastructure facilities that the secretary determines
need to be protected against terrorist attack.

 The two versions will go to a House-Senate conference committee.

 Some civil liberties advocates say they are horrified by the proposal.

I think it means we're going to end up with a police state, essentially,
by allowing the secretary of homeland security to designate the sensitive
areas and allowing this integrating screening system, said Marv Johnson,
the legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union. If the
requirement to show the identification card can be applied to any mode of
transportation, he said, that could eventually include subways or highways,
and the result would be to require you to have some national ID card,
essentially, in order to go from point A to point B.

James C. Plummer Jr., a policy analyst at Consumer Alert, a nonprofit
organization based here, said, You're looking at a system of internal
passports, basically.

But a Senate aide who was involved in drafting the bipartisan language of
the amendment said that in choosing where to establish a checkpoint, the
provision does not give the secretary of homeland security any new
authority.

The aide, who asked not to be identified because of his involvement in
drafting the measure, said it would not create a national identification
card but would standardize a form of identification routinely issued by
states.

 Representative Candice S. Miller, the Michigan Republican who drafted the
license section of the House measure, said, I don't think this is anything
that should cause anyone concern.

Of the 50 states, 48 are members of interstate compacts that exchange
information on moving violations, so that a driver from, say, Maryland, who
picks up a speeding ticket in Florida will accumulate points in his home
state. But Michigan and Wisconsin are not members of a compact. Ms. Miller
said one purpose of the provision she wrote was to fix that problem.

 A spokesman for the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrations,
which represents the state officials who issue driver's licenses, said
linking the databases and strengthening control over who could get a
license was long overdue. The American public should be outraged to know
that departments of motor vehicles nationwide lack the capability to do the
jobs we've asked them to do, said the spokesman, Jason King.

In both houses, the legislation is geared to respond to numerous
recommendations made by the Sept. 11 commission. For years before the
terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, law enforcement officials, especially
those concerned with identity theft, argued that the states should have
more rigorous standards for issuing driver's licenses. But the commission
pointed out that fraud in identification documents is no longer just a
problem of theft.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/

Airline ID requirement faces legal challenge

2004-10-13 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/surveillance/2004-10-10-privacy_x.htm

USA Today



Airline ID requirement faces legal challenge
By Richard Willing, USA TODAY
At a time when Americans have come to expect tight security for air travel,
it might seem to be an odd question: Does requiring airline passengers to
show identification before they board domestic flights amount to an
unreasonable search under the Constitution?

John Gilmore is challenging the federal domestic airline ID requirement,
saying it violates his right to travel in the USA anonymously.
File photo

Yes, says John Gilmore, a computer whiz who made a fortune as an early
employee of Sun Microsystems. His challenge of the federal ID requirement,
which soon could get a hearing before a U.S. appeals court in San
Francisco, is one of the latest court battles to test the balance between
security concerns and civil liberties.

 At issue is Gilmore's claim that checking the IDs of passengers on
domestic flights violates his right to travel throughout the USA
anonymously, without the government monitoring him.

 Lawyers involved in the case say it apparently is the first such challenge
to the federal rules that require airline passengers to provide
identification. In a similar case, two peace activists are suing the U.S.
government to determine how their names came to be placed on a federal
no-fly list. Rebecca Gordon and Janet Adams were not allowed to board a
San Francisco to Boston flight in August 2002 after they were told that
their names were on a secret FBI list of potential security threats,
their court filing says.

I believe I have a right to travel in my own country without presenting
what amounts to an internal passport, Gilmore, 49, said in an interview.
I have a right to be anonymous, (to not) be tracked by my government for
no good reason.

Gilmore said he has no problem with security checks that focus on
passengers' luggage. He says he also does not object to having to present a
passport to board flights to other countries.

 Some privacy groups say Gilmore has a point. But others who support the ID
requirement have cast the San Francisco resident as being out of touch with
the realities of air travel since the Sept. 11 attacks.

Kent Scheidegger, counsel for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, a
conservative group in Sacramento, says the ID requirement is good policy
and eminently constitutional.

The Fourth Amendment forbids not searches that you don't like, it forbids
unreasonable searches, he says. Nothing could be more reasonable at this
time than to know who you're flying with.

 The Justice Department is fighting Gilmore's claim. Acting on the
department's motion, a U.S. district court judge in San Francisco dismissed
the suit last March. Gilmore has appealed; a hearing before the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals is likely to be scheduled after briefs are filed next
month.

In court papers, the Justice Department has not defended the ID policy, or
even acknowledged it exists. It has said national security law requires
that this aspect of the case be argued in a courtroom closed to the public,
including Gilmore. The appeals court denied the government's secrecy
request Sept. 20, and the government has asked the court to reconsider.

 Rules on the Transportation Security Administration's Web site say
passengers 18 and older need one form of government-issued photo
identification or two forms of non-photo identification to board domestic
flights.

 Airlines adopted such a policy on their own after terrorists bombed an
international flight over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988. The bomb
that killed all 270 passengers on the jet was said to have been placed in a
passenger's luggage by a terrorist who got into a restricted area. The
airlines say checking IDs against luggage and passenger information is a
way to deny terrorists access to flights.

The TSA, formed two years ago in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, checks
IDs to verify passenger identities and to check them against watch lists
of known or suspected terrorists.

Gilmore's suit says the requirement amounts to an unreasonable search, a
burden on the right to travel and a form of self-incrimination because it
singles out anonymous travelers for searching.

Gilmore said the ID requirement does little to ensure security. Ordinary
citizens may show correct identification, but do we really think that
someone who is willing to commit a terrorist act won't also be willing to
present false identification?

Gilmore's suit was filed in 2002, after he was denied seats on two flights
at the airport in Oakland. It was his first domestic flight since the 9/11
attacks. Before then, Gilmore said, he was permitted to board flights after
presenting a Federal Aviation Administration document that said showing IDs
was optional.

In 1982, Gilmore, a computer programmer, was the first person hired by the
founders of what became Sun Microsystems. He retired eight years ago with
what his 

Tor 0.0.9pre3 is out (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED])

2004-10-19 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2004 12:45:03 +0200
From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Tor 0.0.9pre3 is out (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED])
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4i
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

From: Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Tor 0.0.9pre3 is out
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 2004 06:36:18 -0400
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Along with the bugfixes from 0.0.8.1, plus more bugfixes, this release
makes the dirservers file obsolete (finally) in favor of config option
lines to specify the location and fingerprint of each dirserver you
want to trust. We also now support the use of an http proxy for fetching
directories.

tarball:   http://freehaven.net/tor/dist/tor-0.0.9pre3.tar.gz
signature: http://freehaven.net/tor/dist/tor-0.0.9pre3.tar.gz.asc
(use -dPr tor-0_0_9pre3 if you want to check out from cvs)

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.8.1:
- Better torrc example lines for dirbindaddress and orbindaddress.
- Improved bounds checking on parsed ints (e.g. config options and
  the ones we find in directories.)
- Better handling of size_t vs int, so we're more robust on 64
  bit platforms.
- Fix the rest of the bug where a newly started OR would appear
  as unverified even after we've added his fingerprint and hupped
  the dirserver.
- Fix a bug from 0.0.7: when read() failed on a stream, we would
  close it without sending back an end. So 'connection refused'
  would simply be ignored and the user would get no response.

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.9pre2:
- Serving the cached-on-disk directory to people is bad. We now
  provide no directory until we've fetched a fresh one.
- Workaround for bug on windows where cached-directories get crlf
  corruption.
- Make get_default_conf_file() work on older windows too.
- If we write a *:* exit policy line in the descriptor, don't write
  any more exit policy lines.

  o Features:
- Use only 0.0.9pre1 and later servers for resolve cells.
- Make the dirservers file obsolete.
  - Include a dir-signing-key token in directories to tell the
parsing entity which key is being used to sign.
  - Remove the built-in bulky default dirservers string.
  - New config option Dirserver %s:%d [fingerprint], which can be
repeated as many times as needed. If no dirservers specified,
default to moria1,moria2,tor26.
- Make moria2 advertise a dirport of 80, so people behind firewalls
  will be able to get a directory.
- Http proxy support
  - Dirservers translate requests for http://%s:%d/x to /x
  - You can specify HttpProxy %s[:%d] and all dir fetches will
be routed through this host.
  - Clients ask for /tor/x rather than /x for new enough dirservers.
This way we can one day coexist peacefully with apache.
  - Clients specify a Host: %s%d http header, to be compatible
with more proxies, and so running squid on an exit node can work.

--

--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[ISN] 2-Fingerprint Border ID System Called Inadequate

2004-10-21 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Tue, 19 Oct 2004 21:40:22 -0500 (CDT)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ISN] 2-Fingerprint Border ID System Called Inadequate
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: InfoSec News isn.attrition.org
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43276-2004Oct18.html

By Robert O'Harrow and Jr. Scott Higham
Washington Post Staff Writers
October 19, 2004

Terrorists who alter their fingerprints have about an even chance of
slipping past U.S. border watch-list checks because the government is
using a two-fingerprint system instead of one that relies on all 10
prints, a lawmaker said in a letter he made public yesterday to
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge.

Rep. Jim Turner (D-Tex.) wrote that a study by researchers at Stanford
University concluded the two-finger system is no more than 53 percent
effective in matching fingerprints with poor image quality against the
government's biometric terrorist watch-list. Turner said the system
falls far short of keeping the country secure.

It's going to be a coin toss as to whether we can identify
terrorists, Turner, the ranking member of the House Select Committee
on Homeland Security, said in an interview yesterday. It's a 50-50
chance, and that's not good enough.

Turner's Oct. 15 letter comes as government officials supervising the
burgeoning border security system, known as US-VISIT, have been
touting their use of fingerprints for identifying people crossing the
border and checking them against watch lists of suspected terrorists.

The US-VISIT program aims to create a virtual border using computer
networks, databases, fingerprints and other biometric identifiers. The
program requires foreign visitors to register their names before
traveling to the United States and have their fingerprints checked
when they arrive and depart. Officials estimate the system could cost
up to $10 billion and take a decade to build.

The border security program is relying on technology first developed
for a program at the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
called IDENT. Government officials have known for years that IDENT did
not work well with the identification system used by the Justice
Department, a 10-fingerprint system called the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System. That system is known for producing
good results, even with poor-quality fingerprint images, Turner's
letter said.

But homeland security officials have told Congress they decided to use
the IDENT system for the first phase of US-VISIT as a way to quickly
improve security at the borders, and move to a 10-fingerprint system
later. It was a logistical issue we had to deal with, said Robert A.
Mocny, deputy director of US-VISIT. It will get better. . . . It's a
matter of what we can do right now.

Turner's letter said the Department of Homeland Security ignored
numerous warnings from the government's top biometric scientists
that the two-fingerprint system could not accurately perform watch
list searches and the ten-fingerprint system was far preferable.

The letter quotes Stanford researcher Lawrence M. Wein, who said his
study found that at best, with a software fix, the two-finger system
would properly identify only about three of four people. Two weeks
ago, Wein told the Homeland Security Committee that the implications
of our findings are disturbing.

Turner accused homeland security officials of failing to be more
forthcoming about the limitations of their approach. Turner asked
Ridge to direct homeland security officials to preserve all documents
and electronic communications relating to their decision on
fingerprints.

I understand your desire to deploy biometric screening at our borders
as quickly as possible, Turner said in his letter. But more than
three years after the 9/11 attacks, we have invested more than $700
million in an entry-exit system that cannot reliably do what the
Department so often said it would: Use a biometric watch-list to keep
known terrorists out of the country.

A spokesman for the Republican-controlled Homeland Security Committee,
Ken Johnson, said the release of Turner's letter was driven by
election-year politics. Johnson acknowledged that there are some
concerns with the current system, but he said US-VISIT continues to
evolve. In a perfect world, where money is not an issue, and people
wouldn't mind spending countless hours or days at the border, the
10-fingerprint system would be preferable. But that's not reality,
Johnson said. They're playing politics with some very sensitive
issues.




_
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded 

[ISN] Worldwide Phishing Attacks May Stem from Few Sources

2004-10-21 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Wed, 20 Oct 2004 01:41:32 -0500 (CDT)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ISN] Worldwide Phishing Attacks May Stem from Few Sources
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: InfoSec News isn.attrition.org
List-Archive: http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn
List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1679953,00.asp

By Dennis Fisher
October 19, 2004

Research from an e-mail security provider suggests that a handful of
people are responsible for the vast majority of the phishing attacks
on the Internet and the perpetrators are using a rotating series of
zombie networks to launch them.

Researchers at CipherTrust Inc. analyzed more than four million
e-mails collected from the company's customers during the first two
weeks of October and found that nearly a third of all of the zombie
machines sending the phishing messages are based in the United States.
That's twice as many as the 16 percent that are found in South Korea.

However, these findings do not mean that these attacks are originating
from inside these countries. The global nature of the Internet allows
attackers anywhere in the world to compromise machines in any
location. In fact, many experts believe that the majority of phishers
are in some way connected to organized crime groups in Russia or
Eastern Europe and that most such attacks begin there.

The most surprising conclusion of the research is that the attackers
sending out the phishing messages are using zombie networks of only
about 1,000 PCs.

That's a pretty small bot network for the volume of stuff that these
guys are doing, said Dmitri Alperovitch, the research engineer at
Atlanta-based CipherTrust Inc. who conducted the study. But the trick
is that they rotate to a different set of compromised machines each
day. They don't keep going to the same ones each time.

Crackers for years have been accumulating large networks of machines
compromised with small programs that give them the ability to control
the PCs remotely. They routinely sell or trade access to the networks
to others in the cracker underground and the PCs typically are used
either for launching DDoS (distributed denial of service attacks).

But as authorities began cracking down on spammers in recent years,
the spammers have begun relying on these networks to send out their
messages, too. Now, phishers have gotten into the game.

Alperovitch said that there are fewer than five operators in control
of the zombie networks that he identified in his research. And, even
though they're generating thousands of fraudulent e-mails every day,
their output was still a tiny fraction.less than one percent--of the
four million messages CipherTrust examined.

Phishers seem to be concentrating their efforts on a few high-profile
targets, as well. In the sample CipherTrust looked at, 54 percent of
the phishing messages used CitiGroup's Citibank name to entice
recipients. Another 13 percent use Citigroup Global Markets Inc.'s
Smith Barney's brand and eBay Inc. is the victim in about four percent
of the scams.



_
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Are new passports [an] identity-theft risk?

2004-10-21 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://worldnetdaily.com/news/printer-friendly.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41030

WorldNetDaily

Thursday, October 21, 2004

YOUR PAPERS, PLEASE Š
Are new passports
 identity-theft risk?
Privacy advocates warn data chips can be 'seen' by anyone with reader
Posted: October 21, 2004
5:00 p.m. Eastern


 While the U.S. State Department prepares to switch over to passports that
include embedded data chips, privacy experts worry the new technology will
open Americans to identity theft and fraud.

 New passports will be fitted with chips using RFID, or radio frequency
identification, technology. Reader devices at borders and customs
checkpoints will be able to read the information stored on the chip,
including the person's name, address and digital photo.

 Kelly Shannon is a spokesperson for the State Department.

 She told Wired News: The reason we are doing this is that it simply makes
passports more secure. It's yet another layer beyond the security features
we currently use to ensure the bearer is the person who was issued the
passport originally.

 RFID technology has been used for tracking everything from store inventory
to family members visiting an amusement park. It is also used in the
Digital Angel human implant that recently was approved by the FDA for
storing medical information.

 Wired reports civil libertarians and some technologists say the passport
chips are actually a boon to identity thieves, stalkers and commercial data
collectors, since anyone with the proper reader can download a person's
biographical information and photo from several feet away.

 Even if they wanted to store this info in a chip, why have a chip that
can be read remotely? Barry Steinhardt, who directs the American Civil
Liberty Union's Technology and Liberty program, asked Wired. Why not
require the passport be brought in contact with a reader so that the
passport holder would know it had been captured? Americans in the know will
be wrapping their passports in aluminum foil.

 Last week, the government contracted with four companies to develop the
chips and readers for the program. The report stated diplomats and State
Department employees will be issued the new passports as early as January,
while others applying for new passports will receive the new version
starting in the spring.

 Electronic Frontier Foundation attorney Lee Tien told Wired RFID chips in
passports are a privacy horror and would be even if the data were
encrypted, which it isn't.

 If 180 countries have access to the technology for reading this thing,
whether or not it is encrypted, from a security standpoint, that is a very
leaky system, Tien said. Strictly from a technology standpoint, any
reader system, even with security, that was so widely deployed and
accessible to so many people worldwide will be subject to some very
interesting compromises.

 An engineer and RFID expert with Intel claims there is little danger of
unauthorized people reading the new passports. Roy Want told the newssite:
It is actually quite hard to read RFID at a distance, saying a person's
keys, bag and body interfere with the radio waves.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Patriot Act redux?

2004-10-23 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.com.com/2102-1071_3-5414087.html?tag=st.util.print



 Patriot Act redux?
 By Declan McCullagh
 http://news.com.com/Patriot+Act+redux/2010-1071_3-5414087.html

 Story last modified October 18, 2004, 4:00 AM PDT



With Election Day fast approaching, it was only a matter of time before the
usual congressional shenanigans that typically punctuate the political
season.

 This time, politicians appear to have seized on what could be called the
Patriot Act strategy, drafting antiterrorism legislation in secret and then
ramming it through the Senate and House of Representatives with minimal
debate. Then it's back to the home districts to boast how they protected
voters from the bad guys.

 The vehicles chosen for this strategy are two bills described as being
inspired by the 9/11 Commission's report, a politically potent text that's
become a best-selling book. The Senate and House have approved their own
versions of the legislation, and negotiators are now meeting privately to
decide on the final draft.

 Early indications are not promising. While portions of the massive
legislation are no doubt praiseworthy, other important sections--especially
those envisioning stuffing more information into government
databases--deserve special scrutiny from privacy hawks.

 Both the House and Senate bills coerce state governments into creating
what critics are calling a national ID card.
 Because the House version is nearly three times as long, its authors had
more room to promote private agendas.

 One section anticipates storing the lifetime travel history of each
foreign national or United States citizen into a database for the
convenience of government officials. It mentions passports, but there's
nothing that would preclude recording the details of trips that Americans
take inside the United States.

 President Bush would be required to create a secure information sharing
network to exchange data among law enforcement, military and spy agencies.
Aside from a bland assurance that civil liberties will be protected,
there are zero details on what databases will be vacuumed in or what
oversight will take place.

 A second network would be created by the first person to get the new job
of national intelligence director. That network must provide immediate
access to information in databases of federal law enforcement agencies and
the intelligence community that is necessary to identify terrorists.

 It hardly needs to be said that snaring terrorists is what our government
should be doing. But it's not clear that the House bill is a step in the
right direction.

 Jim Dempsey, executive director of the Center for Democracy and
Technology, hopes that the aides negotiating the final bill end up adopting
the Senate language instead. It also would create an information-sharing
network--while requiring that Congress receive semiannual reports on how
the network is being used.

  There are dozens if not hundreds of government programs under way to do
just that (already), Dempsey warns. They are fragmented; they are
overlapping. They are occurring outside of any framework of oversight.

 Still, the Senate bill is no prize. A last-minute amendment added by Sen.
John McCain, R-Ariz., would require the Department of Homeland Security to
create an integrated screening system inside the United States.

 McCain envisions erecting physical checkpoints, dubbed screening points,
near subways, airports, bus stations, train stations, federal buildings,
telephone companies, Internet hubs and any other critical infrastructure
facility deemed vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Secretary Tom Ridge would
appear to be authorized to issue new federal IDs--with biometric
identifiers--that Americans could be required to show at checkpoints.

 Both the House and Senate bills coerce state governments into creating
what critics are calling a national ID card. Under the proposals, federal
agencies will accept only licenses and state ID cards that comply with
specific to-be-established standards--a requirement that would affect
anyone who wants to get a U.S. passport, obtain Social Security benefits,
or even wander into a federal courthouse.

 That's why Jim Harper, director of information policy studies at the Cato
Institute, is no fan of either bill. They say that if we just put
appropriate rules and restrictions in place, everything will be fine,
Harper said. But of course those rules and restrictions will drop away
over the years or if there are new terrorist attacks. They say, 'Of course
lion-taming is safe. They're our friends.' But then one day the lion grabs
you by the neck and drags you off the stage.

 A few other courageous Washingtonians have raised similar concerns. Rep.
Ron Paul, R-Texas, warned last week that the House bill will not make
America safer (but will definitely) make us less free. And 25 former
senior officials from the FBI, CIA and military have sent a letter to
Congress indicating that the 9/11 Commission's 

Re: Financial identity is *dangerous*? (was re: Fake companies, real money)

2004-10-28 Thread R.A. Hettinga
At 10:41 PM +0200 10/23/04, Eugen Leitl wrote:
No, that's going to be the mobile phone.

Certainly getting to be like Chaum's ideal crypto device. You own it, it
has its own I/O, and it never leaves your sight.

Cheers,
RAH

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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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RE: Financial identity is *dangerous*? (was re: Fake companies, real money)

2004-10-28 Thread R.A. Hettinga
At 9:30 AM -0400 10/25/04, Trei, Peter wrote:
If we're going to insist on dedicated, trusted, physical
devices for these bearer bonds, then how is this different
than what Chaum proposed over 15 years ago?

I don't think that face to face will be necessary. It just means keeping
control of your keys, etc. You can stash bearer-bonds on the net in m-of-n
storage, where nobody knows what's what, paid by the bit, etc.

If you just add a requirment for face to face transactions,
then I already have one of these - its called a wallet
containing cash.

Certainly bits are smaller. See above, though.

Cheers,
RAH


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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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E-Vote Vendors Hand Over Software

2004-10-28 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,65490,00.html

Wired News

E-Vote Vendors Hand Over Software 
By Kim Zetter?

Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,65490,00.html

03:00 PM Oct. 26, 2004 PT

In an effort to increase the integrity of next week's presidential
election, five voting machine makers agreed for the first time to submit
their software to the National Software Reference Library for safekeeping,
federal officials said on Tuesday.

 The stored software will serve as a comparison tool for election officials
should they need to determine whether anyone tampered with programs
installed on voting equipment.


 The National Software Reference Library is part of an election security
initiative launched by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, a new
federal entity that Congress created after the Florida 2000 election
problems. The EAC is the first federal entity established to improve the
integrity and efficiency of elections.

 DeForest Soaries, chairman of the EAC, in June requested software from the
largest voting companies, which provide 90 percent of the software to be
used in computerized voting machines on Tuesday. The EAC will eventually
ask all voting companies, even those that produce counting software for
punch card machines, to submit their software.

 Soaries called the library a major step and praised the vendors for their
willingness to increase the transparency of elections.

 Their acceptance of our request to submit their software begins the
process that assures the country that we will have (a) higher level of
security and therefore confidence in e-voting than we have ever had
before, Soaries said in a press conference.

 The National Institute of Standards and Technology -- the agency that sets
official measurements and defines standards for all kinds of commercial
products -- will maintain the voting software library. NIST already manages
a library of other types of software, like the Windows 2000 operating
system, to help law enforcement investigate crimes involving computers.
Doug White, the library's project leader, said NIST stores applications on
CDs in a room that is similar to a criminal investigator's evidence locker,
which means the software can be used as evidence in a court.

 Counties and states will eventually be able to use the library to verify
that they are using a certified version of software. This is good news to
Scott Konopasek, the registrar of voters for San Bernardino County in
California. In September, after California certified a new version of
software for his county's voting system, the vendor, Sequoia Voting
Systems, sent Konopasek the software to load on his machines. But when
Konopasek asked the state to verify that the software the vendor gave him
was unchanged from the version the state certified, state officials told
him they had no means to verify it and that Konopasek would have to trust
the vendor.

 Vendor trust was precisely the measure of verification the state was using
last November when it discovered that Diebold Election Systems had
installed uncertified software on machines in 17 California counties
without telling the state.

 NIST's voting software library was established too late this year to
examine software that has already been loaded onto locked voting machines,
so election officials won't be able to verify that they have unchanged,
certified software before Tuesday's election.

 But if questions about the veracity of a voting system arise after the
election, computer forensic experts will be able to compare the software
used on machines with the software in the NIST library to see if the
software was altered. They can do this by comparing hash files, which are
digital fingerprints that identify the integrity of software. The hash is a
mathematical sum derived from the software code. If someone changes the
software, the mathematical sum changes as well.

 This gives us one more mechanism for assuring voters that their votes
have been recorded and reported correctly and haven't been tampered with,
Konopasek said. There's no one single thing that election officials will
ever be able to do to convince everyone. But the more we can add to our
inventory of audits and controls, the more we can establish confidence of
voters -- not just the technically savvy voters, but all voters.

 Soaries acknowledged that the library alone can't secure elections and
voting systems but can only work in concert with other procedures. And the
EAC still has to work out several issues related to the library, such as
who will be responsible for checking hashes before an election if county
election officials don't have someone knowledgeable on staff to do so. EAC
has to determine how best to handle patches, or last-minute fixes and
upgrades to machines. Currently, it will be up to the county and vendor to
decide whether to resubmit that software to the library before an election.
And the EAC has to establish a policy for dealing with 

Deadline extended to November 5th - Fourth Annual PKI RD Workshop

2004-10-28 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


From: Carl Ellison [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Deadline extended to November 5th - Fourth Annual PKI RD Workshop
Date: Tue, 26 Oct 2004 21:00:01 -0700
Thread-Index: AcS72W7c3/cyBY4hSTyGnbNT4eKDuQ==
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

The deadline for paper submissions to the Fourth Annual PKI RD Workshop:
Multiple Paths to Trust and has been extended until 5:00 PM Pacific time
on Friday November 5th.

http://middleware.internet2.edu/pki05/http://middleware.internet2.edu/pki05/

This year, the workshop has a particular interest in how emergent trust
mechanisms will interact with each other mechanisms at the technical,
policy and user levels.

Clifford Neuman

Program Committee Chair



--- end forwarded text


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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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New 32-bit SIM Chip from STMicroelectronics

2004-10-28 Thread R.A. Hettinga

The core includes dedicated DES (Data Encryption Standard) instructions
for Secret Key cryptography, and a fast Multiply and Accumulate
instruction for Public Key (RSA) and Elliptic Curve cryptography, plus a
CRC (Cyclic Redundency Check) instruction. A firmware cryptographic
subroutine library is located in a secure ROM area to save designers the
need to code first-layer functions.


http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2004/Oct/1087666.htm

Technology Marketing Corporation
TMCNet



[October 27, 2004]

New 32-bit SIM Chip from STMicroelectronics Will Benefit Mobile Phone
Multimedia Services
 GENEVA, Oct. 27 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- STMicroelectronics has announced
a new smartcard MCU in its ST22 range -- based on the SmartJ(TM)
Java-accelerated RISC architecture -- which integrates 256-kbytes of EEPROM
memory with a high performance CPU to support the demands of multimedia
applications on the latest mobile phones.


 With sales of multimedia-equipped handsets booming, mobile communications
operators supporting 3G (Third Generation) and 2.5G mobile phones need
(U)SIM cards (Universal Subscriber Identity Modules) that have sufficient
memory capacity to store Multimedia Messaging System (MMS) data, video, and
photographic images, coupled with the capability to transfer and use this
data efficiently to provide advanced phonebooks and audio-visual services.
2.5G is an intermediate level of service that uses an enhanced
second-generation technology to provide some of the 3G features over GPRS
(General Packet Radio Service).
 The ST22N256 is perfectly in line with the growing demand for secure
high-performance chips with high-speed interfaces and a large memory
capacity, for use in 2.5 and 3G SIMs, said Reza Kazerounian, General
Manager of ST's Smart Card ICs Division. ST already offers the largest
range of secure 32-bit processors for smartcard systems, and will remain at
the forefront of smartcard silicon suppliers as 3G takes off.
 The SmartJ CPU core at the heart of ST22 Family -- which the new ST22N256
now combines with 256-kbytes of EEPROM -- is a 32-bit RISC-architecture
core developed specifically to provide very fast execution of Java, the
programming language commonly used for small applications, or applets,
downloaded to mobile phones. The ST22 augments its own highly efficient
native RISC instruction set with a hardware decoder that directly converts
Java bytecodes into native microcode instructions, thereby eliminating the
overhead and lower performance of processors based on Java emulation. The
result is not only very fast Java execution but also reduced power
consumption.
 An essential component of all GSM (Global System for Mobile
Communications) mobile phones, the SIM card stores critical subscriber
authentication information; private data such as personal phone
directories, messages, audio, and images; and the operating system and
operator's multimedia environment. With the quantity and size of users' MMS
messages increasing, operators will now be able to provide increased
storage for subscriber data without impacting user friendliness, due to the
exceptional performance of the ST22N256's SmartJ processor, and its
communication through a fast Asynchronous Serial Interface (ASI) which
enables 440-kbit/s communication speeds with mobile equipment, in line with
the fastest deployments of ISO 7816 in the GSM world. Two additional serial
I/O ports are also provided.
 The Java-accelerated CPU ensures that the ST22N256 not only provides the
memory needed for today's multimedia services (M-services), but also the
processing power to exploit it. The core, with 24-bit linear memory
addressing, is complemented by 368-kbytes of on-chip ROM, 16-kbytes of RAM,
and a set of standard peripherals and custom plug-in circuits. Logical and
physical security mechanisms are fully integrated into the silicon,
including a hardware Memory Protection Unit for application firewalling and
peripheral access control, and a protected Context Stack. The core includes
dedicated DES (Data Encryption Standard) instructions for Secret Key
cryptography, and a fast Multiply and Accumulate instruction for Public Key
(RSA) and Elliptic Curve cryptography, plus a CRC (Cyclic Redundency Check)
instruction. A firmware cryptographic subroutine library is located in a
secure ROM area to save designers the need to code first-layer functions.
 The ST22 product platform is supported by a comprehensive Integrated
Development Environment, which allows coding, compilation, and debugging
using a common interface. It provides a code-generation chain that includes
a C/C++ compiler, a native and JavaCard assembler and a linker, plus a
SmartJ instruction set simulator, C/C++ source level debugger, and hardware
emulation tools. Operating System developers currently working with the
128-kbyte ST22L128 will be able to benefit from the design continuity
offered by the ST22N256, as well as its immediate availability and
compliance with the fastest 

Europe opts for biometric passports

2004-10-28 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.com.com/2102-1012_3-5429679.html?tag=st.util.print

CNET News

 Europe opts for biometric pasports
 By Lars Pasveer
 http://news.com.com/Europe+opts+for+biometric+pasports/2100-1012_3-5429679.html


 Story last modified October 27, 2004, 5:56 PM PDT


Ministers for European Union member states agreed on Tuesday to adopt
biometric passports.

The first biometric passports are set to arrive in 18 months and initially
will record the facial characteristics of the bearer.

 In three years, European travelers will also have to provide a fingerprint
for the passport. The facial and fingerprint data will be stored on an
embedded chip, along with a digital copy of the bearer's photo.

 The decision, made at a meeting of interior ministers in Luxembourg, is
not yet final. Austria, Finland and the Netherlands have voiced minor
concerns about the proposal, but they will probably not turn out to be
insurmountable obstacles.

 The European push for biometrics is heavily influenced by a United States
policy change for passports for people from visa waiver countries after
the Sept. 11 attacks. U.S. plans to introduce a biometric passport
requirement by this fall for these countries were widely seen as
unrealistic. However, by Oct. 26 next year, all visitors from these
countries will have to provide a machine-readable passport with biometric
data.

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44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Financial identity is *dangerous*? (was re: Fake companies, real money)

2004-11-01 Thread R.A. Hettinga
At 9:29 AM -0700 10/28/04, James A. Donald wrote:
Is there a phone that is programmable enough to store secrets
on and sign and decrypt stuff?

I think we're getting there. We're going to need a, heh, killer ap, for it,
of course.

:-)

Cheers,
RAH

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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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[ISN] Secret Service busts online organized crime ring

2004-11-01 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Fri, 29 Oct 2004 03:31:38 -0500 (CDT)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ISN] Secret Service busts online organized crime ring
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: InfoSec News isn.attrition.org
List-Archive: http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn
List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Subscribe: http://www.attrition.org/mailman/listinfo/isn,
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,97017,00.html

By Dan Verton
OCTOBER 28, 2004
COMPUTERWORLD

In what it called an Information Age undercover investigation, the
U.S. Secret Service today announced that it has arrested 28 people
from eight U.S. states and six countries allegedly involved in a
global organized cybercrime ring.

Charges filed against the suspects include identity theft, computer
fraud, credit card fraud and conspiracy.

The investigation, code-named Operation Firewall, resulted in what the
Secret Service described as a significant disruption of organized
criminal activity online that was targeting the financial
infrastructure of the U.S. The suspects are alleged to have
collectively trafficked in at least 1.7 million stolen credit card
numbers.

Financial institutions have estimated their losses associated with the
suspects targeted by the investigation to be more than $4.3 million.

Led by the Secret Service Newark Field Office, investigators from
nearly 30 domestic and foreign Secret Service offices and their global
law enforcement counterparts have prevented potentially hundreds of
millions of dollars in loss to the financial and hi-tech communities,
Secret Service Director W. Ralph Basham said in a statement. These
suspects targeted the personal and financial information of ordinary
citizens, as well as the confidential and proprietary information of
companies engaged in e-commerce.

Operation Firewall began in July 2003 and quickly evolved into a
transnational investigation of global credit card fraud and online
identity theft. The underground criminal groups have been identified
as Shadowcrew, Carderplanet and Darkprofits. The organizations
operated Web sites used to traffic counterfeit credit cards and false
identification information and documents. The groups allegedly used
the sites to share information on how to commit fraud and sold the
stolen information and the tools needed to commit such crimes.

International law enforcement organizations that took part in the
investigation and arrests included the U.K.'s National Hi-Tech Crimes
Unit, the Vancouver Police Department's Financial Crimes Section, the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Europol.

Officials in Bulgaria, Belarus, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands and
Ukraine also were involved.



_
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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Trio try for better mobile security

2004-11-01 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.vnunet.com/print/1159101


vnunet.com

 Trio try for better mobile security

The Trusted Mobile Platform from Intel, IBM and NTT DoCoMo aims to make
mobiles a better bet for secure networking
Daniel Robinson, IT Week 01 Nov 2004

Intel, IBM and mobile communications company NTT DoCoMo last week announced
a set of security specifications for mobile client devices. They said the
aim is to create a secure architecture for future wireless data services.

The Trusted Mobile Platform specification, available via the link below,
defines a set of hardware and software components plus communication
protocols that can be used to build devices with various levels of
security. It is intended to be an open standard, according to NTT DoCoMo
chief executive Takanori Utano.

The specification defines three classes of trusted mobile device (TMD),
ranging from handsets with no hardware security features to those that
include a trusted platform module (TPM) to handle cryptography functions
and hardware-enforced separation between trusted and untrusted applications
and their data. It also defines a set of protocols that allow a TMD to
communicate with other platforms more securely

The partnership brings together Intel's expertise in silicon and wireless
devices, IBM's experience of business security and NTT DoCoMo's knowledge
of security in wireless networks, the companies said.

This collaboration enhances handheld architectures to provide the trusted
capabilities vital for widespread adoption of mobile commerce and
enterprise usage, said Intel vice-president Sean Maloney.

Chip designer ARM already includes technology called TrustZone in its
latest processor cores to provide separation between secure and non-secure
code. Although Intel uses ARM technology in its XScale mobile chips, the
company has not disclosed whether the Trusted Mobile Platform supports
technologies such as TrustZone.

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44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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Corporate governance goals impossible - RSA

2004-11-06 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/04/rsa_redux/print.html

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register » Business » Management »

 Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/04/rsa_redux/

Corporate governance goals impossible - RSA
By John Leyden (john.leyden at theregister.co.uk)
Published Thursday 4th November 2004 16:43 GMT

Companies are struggling to cope with tighter corporate governance regimes,
which might even work against the goal of achieving improved IT security
they are partly designed to promote. The need to comply with requirements
such as data protection, Sarbanes-Oxley, Basel II and other corporate
governance reforms is tying up IT managers in red tape, according to a
banking security expert. Recent legislation is having a negative impact on
risk management, said Michael Colao, director of Information Management at
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein.

In some cases, the law has made IT managers legally responsible for
adherence to corporate governance rules. Colao says that this may not
necessarily be a good thing. CIOs are now relying on convoluted processes
rather than using sound business judgement based on years of experience. A
process is easier to defend in court than personal judgement. This means
that in many cases unnecessarily cautious decisions are being taken because
the CIO is focusing on their own personal liability, rather than what is
best for the business, he said.?

Different implementations of the European Data Protection Directive in
different countries are creating a headache for multinational firms,
according to Colao. This legislation was brought in as part of the EU
common market and was supposed to provide clarity and harmony across
Europe. Because each country implements legislation in very different ways,
the result is a very fragmented and disjointed approach which causes all
sorts of problems, particularly for global organisations, he said.

Colao made his comments at the Axis Action Forum, a meeting of IT directors
sponsored by RSA Security, in Barcelona this week. RSA Security said
differences in European legislation highlighted by Colao were a real
problem for its clients.

Tim Pickard, strategic marketing director at RSA Security EMEA, said: The
nature of implementation of EU directives in member states means that it is
almost impossible for today's global CIO to be fully compliant and is
therefore likely to be breaking the law in at least one member state.

Business managers becoming fed up with FUD

In a separate study, more than a third of the 30 delegates to the Axis
Action Forum admitted that their Board had never asked for an update on
security or implications of security breaches. The finding suggests
widespread boardroom indifference to security issues despite the high
profile security has been given in the media and by numerous industry
initiatives.

Firms only take security seriously in the aftermath of attacks, according
to one delegate. Part of the reason could be that business managers are
becoming inured to alarmist security pitches. Simon Linsley, head of
consultancy and development, Philips said: For years we have had to go to
the Board with messages that create the Fear of God. We can no longer rely
on these doom and gloom messages - we have to go to the Board with
solutions that add value to the business.

The Axis Action Forum attended by more than 30 CIOs, IT directors and heads
of security from a range of medium to large businesses. ®

Related stories

UK corporate governance bill to cost millions
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/08/companies_bill_it_costs/)
Hackers cost UK.biz billions
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/28/dti_security_survey/)
IT voices drowned in corporate governance rush
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/22/it_in_corporate_governance/)
Big.biz struggles against security threats
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/10/27/netsec_security_survey/)

© Copyright 2004

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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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When A Pencil And Paper Makes Sense

2004-11-06 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.forbes.com/2004/11/05/cx_ah_1105tentech_print.html

Forbes



Ten O'Clock Tech
When A Pencil And Paper Makes Sense
Arik Hesseldahl,   11.05.04, 10:00 AM ET

Thank goodness, it's over. Sometime around 4:30 A.M. Wednesday I went to
bed, not the least bit uncertain that George W. Bush had been re-elected.

 But the one thing during this election cycle about which I have been
uncertain is electronic voting. Florida in 2000 was a mess, and in
reaction, some states and counties have turned to newfangled electronic
voting machines, thinking that computer technology is the answer to a
voting system that has started to creak under pressure.

 It seems that despite much worry about a repeat of Florida in other
states, voting has gone pretty smoothly. Electronic voting methods are
getting high marks. Of the 27,500 voting problems reported to the Verified
Voting Project, a San Francisco-based group that monitored the election for
voting problems, less than 6% of the issues reported stemmed from
electronic voting machines.

 Election officials in states like Nevada, Georgia and Hawaii gave
electronic voting systems a try. There were some problems: a memory card on
an electronic voting machine in Florida failed; five machines in Reno,
Nev., malfunctioned, causing lines to back up.

 Overall voter turnout was high. The Committee for the Study of the
American Electorate, a nonprofit, nonpartisan outfit based in Washington,
D.C., estimated that 120.2 million people, or 59.6% of those eligible to
vote, cast ballots in this election, which would be an improvement of 5%
and 15 million people, compared with the 2000 elections, and would make
2004's turnout the highest since 1968.

 Still, that's not as high as voter participation in my home state of
Oregon, where 1.7 million people, or nearly 82% of those eligible, voted.

 In Oregon, voters cast their votes from home rather than going to a
polling place. They submit their ballots by mail. The state abolished
polling places in 1998 and has been voting entirely by mail ever since.

 Voters get their ballots roughly two weeks before election day. This year
some were delayed because of an unexpectedly high number of voter
registrations. Ballots must be received by county elections offices by 8
P.M. on the day of the election. Drop boxes are located throughout the
state, as well.

 Voting should indeed take time and effort. It's undoubtedly important. But
I like Oregon's common-sense approach. Voting from the comfort of your own
home eliminates the inherent disincentive that comes from having to stand
on a long line, for example.

 It's pretty simple. Oregon voters fill out their ballots using a pencil,
just like those standardized tests everyone took in high school. If they
want to write in a candidate, the ballot allows for that, too.

 I thought of this as I stood for about 45 minutes in a long, cold line at
6:30 A.M. to vote in my neighborhood in New York's Upper East Side.
Throughout the day I heard reports from around the country of people who
had to stand in line for as long as eight hours so they could vote, and I
wondered how many others just threw up their hands in frustration because
they had someplace else to be.

 The mail-in ballot also gives the voter a little time to consider his or
her choice. Too often, voters will enter a voting booth knowing a few of
the people they intend to vote for, but read about some ballot initiative
or amendment for the first time. Rather than having to make a snap decision
in the voting booth, having a ballot handy at home can give voters time to
educate themselves and make a more informed decision.

 Sometimes, the best solution isn't a computer at all, but a good
old-fashioned pencil and paper.

 Click here for more Ten O'Clock Tech Columns




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RE: Your source code, for sale

2004-11-06 Thread R.A. Hettinga
At 10:18 AM -0800 11/5/04, Hal Finney wrote:
Yes, I'm looking at ideas like this for ecash gambling, but you have
a who-goes-first problem.

Whenever we talk about financial applications, where the assets
represented by one bearer certificate are exchanged for those
represented by another, what's really happening is a redeem-reissue
process anyway. Since it's the underwriters' reputations you're
trusting anyway, we've always assumed that there would be
communication between the underwriters in order to execute, clear,
and settle the trade all at once.

For streaming stuff, we figured that since we were streaming cash for
streaming bits, like movies, or content of some kind, you'd just do
tit for tat, one stream (cash, probably signed probabalistically
tested coins in the last iteration that we called Nicko-mint :-))
against another, the movie, song, etc being streamed. There's the
missing last 5 minutes problem, but I think that, in recursive
auction-settled cash market for digital goods like this (Eric Hughes'
institutional 'pirate' scheme, the 'silk road' stuff, whatever), that
there will always be another source to buy what's left from, once the
intellectual property issues solve themselves because of the auction
process.

For things that aren't useful except in their entirety, like code, or
executables, (or storing money :-)), I've always been a fan of the
Mojo/BitTorrent stuff, where you hash the file into bits, ala m-of-n
Shamir secret splitting, and store/buy them from lots of places at
once.

Cheers,
RAH


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Machine Error Gives Bush Extra Ohio Votes

2004-11-06 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://apnews.myway.com/article/20041105/D865R1DO0.html


Machine Error Gives Bush Extra Ohio Votes
 Email this Story

Nov 5, 11:56 AM (ET)
 


 COLUMBUS, Ohio (AP) - An error with an electronic voting system gave
President Bush 3,893 extra votes in suburban Columbus, elections officials
said.

 Franklin County's unofficial results had Bush receiving 4,258 votes to
Democrat John Kerry's 260 votes in a precinct in Gahanna. Records show only
638 voters cast ballots in that precinct.

 Bush actually received 365 votes in the precinct, Matthew Damschroder,
director of the Franklin County Board of Elections, told The Columbus
Dispatch.

 State and county election officials did not immediately respond to
requests by The Associated Press for more details about the voting system
and its vendor, and whether the error, if repeated elsewhere in Ohio, could
have affected the outcome.

Bush won the state by more than 136,000 votes, according to unofficial
results, and Kerry conceded the election on Wednesday after acknowledging
that 155,000 provisional ballots yet to be counted in Ohio would not change
the result.

 The Secretary of State's Office said Friday it could not revise Bush's
total until the county reported the error.

 The Ohio glitch is among a handful of computer troubles that have emerged
since Tuesday's elections.

 In one North Carolina county, more than 4,500 votes were lost because
officials mistakenly believed a computer that stored ballots electronically
could hold more data than it did. And in San Francisco, a malfunction with
custom voting software could delay efforts to declare the winners of four
races for county supervisor.

 In the Ohio precinct in question, the votes are recorded onto a cartridge.
On one of the three machines at that precinct, a malfunction occurred in
the recording process, Damschroder said. He could not explain how the
malfunction occurred.
(AP) Voters waited up to three hours to cast ballots after one of two
voting machines failed to work at...
Full Image
Damschroder said people who had seen poll results on the election board's
Web site called to point out the discrepancy. The error would have been
discovered when the official count for the election is performed later this
month, he said.

 The reader also recorded zero votes in a county commissioner race on the
machine.

 Workers checked the cartridge against memory banks in the voting machine
and each showed that 115 people voted for Bush on that machine. With the
other machines, the total for Bush in the precinct added up to 365 votes.

 Meanwhile, in San Francisco, a glitch occurred with software designed for
the city's new ranked-choice voting, in which voters list their top three
choices for municipal offices. If no candidate gets a majority of
first-place votes outright, voters' second and third-place preferences are
then distributed among candidates who weren't eliminated in the first round.

 When the San Francisco Department of Elections tried a test run on
Wednesday of the program that does the redistribution, some of the votes
didn't get counted and skewed the results, director John Arntz said.

 All the information is there, Arntz said. It's just not arriving the
way it was supposed to.

 A technician from the Omaha, Neb. company that designed the software,
Election Systems  Software Inc., was working to diagnose and fix the
problem.

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Broward machines count backward

2004-11-06 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/politics/content/news/epaper/2004/11/05/a29a_BROWVOTE_1105.html


Palm Beach Post

Broward machines count backward

 By Eliot Kleinberg

Palm Beach Post Staff Writer

Friday, November 05, 2004


FORT LAUDERDALE - It had to happen. Things were just going too smoothly.

Early Thursday, as Broward County elections officials wrapped up after a
long day of canvassing votes, something unusual caught their eye. Tallies
should go up as more votes are counted. That's simple math. But in some
races, the numbers had gone . . . down.


Officials found the software used in Broward can handle only 32,000 votes
per precinct. After that, the system starts counting backward.

Why a voting system would be designed to count backward was a mystery to
Broward County Mayor Ilene Lieberman. She was on the phone late Wednesday
with Omaha-based Elections Systems and Software.

Bad numbers showed up only in running tallies through the day, not the
final one. Final tallies were reached by cross-checking machine totals, and
officials are confident they are accurate.

The glitch affected only the 97,434 absentee ballots, Broward Elections
Supervisor Brenda Snipes said. All were placed in their own precincts and
optical scanners totaled votes, which were then fed to a main computer.

That's where the counting problems surfaced. They affected only votes for
constitutional amendments 4 through 8, because they were on the only page
that was exactly the same on all county absentee ballots. The same software
is used in Martin and Miami-Dade counties; Palm Beach and St. Lucie
counties use different companies.

The problem cropped up in the 2002 election. Lieberman said ESS told her
it had sent software upgrades to the Florida Secretary of State's office,
but that the office kept rejecting the software. The state said that's not
true. Broward elections officials said they had thought the problem was
fixed.

Secretary of State spokeswoman Jenny Nash said all counties using this
system had been told that such problems would occur if a precinct is set up
in a way that would allow votes to get above 32,000. She said Broward
should have split the absentee ballots into four separate precincts to
avoid that and that a Broward elections employee since has admitted to not
doing that.

But Lieberman said later, No election employee has come to the canvassing
board and made the statements that Jenny Nash said occurred.

Late Thursday, ESS issued a statement reiterating that it learned of the
problems in 2002 and said the software upgrades would be submitted to
Hood's office next year. The company was working with the counties it
serves to make sure ballots don't exceed capacity and said no other
counties reported similar problems.

While the county bears the ultimate responsibility for programming the
ballot and structuring the precincts, we . . . regret any confusion the
discrepancy in early vote totals has caused, the statement said.

After several calls to the company during the day were not returned, an
ESS spokeswoman said late Thursday she did not know whether ESS contacted
the secretary of state two years ago or whether the software is designed to
count backward.

While the problem surfaced two years ago, it was under a different Br oward
elections supervisor and a different secretary of state. Snipes said she
had not known about the 2002 snafu.

Later, Lieberman said, I am not passing judgments and I'm not pointing a
finger. But she said that if ESS is found to be at fault, actions might
include penalizing ESS or even defaulting on its contract.

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A Man of Many Words, David Shulman Dies at 91

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga

During World War II, he cracked Japanese secret codes for the Army, then
returned to puzzles.

He was a founder of the American Cryptogram Association, and in 1976
published An Annotated Bibliography of Cryptography, still used by
experts. He was a champion scrabble player, and wrote a scholarly article
about the game's lexicography.

Cheers,
RAH
--

http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/nyregion/07shulman.html?pagewanted=printposition=

The New York Times

November 7, 2004

A Man of Many Words, David Shulman Dies at 91
BY DOUGLAS MARTIN

David Shulman, a self-described Sherlock Holmes of Americanisms who dug
through obscure, often crumbling publications to hunt down the first use of
thousands of words, died on Oct. 30 at Victory Memorial Hospital in
Brooklyn. He was 91 and lived in Brooklyn.

His friend David Kahn announced the death.

 Jesse Sheidlower, editor at large of the Oxford English Dictionary, said
Mr. Shulman contributed uncountable early usages to the 20-volume lexicon.
All very good stuff, Mr. Sheidlower said.

What David did was read through the sort of things most people don't
read, he added, mentioning yellowing editions of The National Police
Gazette.

Mr. Sheidlower said only a few contributors were more prolific and fewer
still possessed Mr. Shulman's knack for sending usable material. His name
appeared in the front matter to O.E.D.'s epochal second edition, each of
the Addition Series volumes, and is currently on the Web.

Mr. Shulman avoided excessive modesty, letting it drop that he was at least
temporarily the last word on words that included The Great White Way,
Big Apple, doozy, hoochie-coochie. Gerald Cohen, professor of foreign
languages at the University of Missouri, Rolla, said Mr. Shulman did indeed
contribute to the understanding of all these words and many more.

He said Mr. Shulman's most pioneering effort concerned the term hot dog.
He found the word was college slang before it was a sausage, paving the way
for deeper investigation. A book on hot dog's glossarial provenance will
appear this year under the names of Mr. Shulman, Mr. Cohen and Barry Popick.

Dr. Cohen said Mr. Shulman obliterated a big impediment to finding the
origins of the word jazz by proving it was on a 1919 record, not the 1909
version of the same disk. (Other scholars traced first use of the term to
the baseball columns of Scoop Gleeson in the San Francisco Bulletin in
1913.)

 Mr. Cohen said that Mr. Shulman was first to challenge that shyster
derived from a lawyer named Scheuster. Others, particularly Roger Mohovich,
then traced the etymology to 1843-1844. Shyster turned out to be a
Yiddish corruption of a German vulgarism meaning a crooked lawyer.

 Mr. Shulman considered the New York Public Library on Fifth Avenue his
real home. He commuted by subway to its rare books room, to which he
donated valuable volumes.

David Shulman was the one reader I could count on seeing at the library
every day, Paul LeClerc, president of the library, said. We often spoke
about his work, and I never knew anyone who thrilled to bookish discoveries
as he did.

Every inch of Mr. Shulman, from his sneakers to his plastic bag crammed
with scrawled notes to his soiled baseball cap, suggested the classic New
York eccentric. He recorded his finds on index cards, sending them to the
O.E.D. when he got 100.

His obsessions included trying to prove that Steve Brodie jumped off the
Brooklyn Bridge on July 23, 1886, not faking it as many reports claimed. He
once wrote a sonnet, Washington Crossing the Delaware in which each line
is an anagram of the title.

 But in 70 years at the library, he allowed as how he had seen, well, odder
folks. There was the well-dressed chap who wandered about for years
carrying his hat and never touching a book. Or the man who tracked down
burial places of 60,000 New Jersey soldiers. Mr. Shulman finally asked why.

I might as well be plain with you, the man replied, according to an
interview with Mr. Shulman in The New York Times in 1990. I'm a nut.

David Shulman was born on Nov. 12, 1912, and grew up on the Lower East Side
speaking Yiddish, according to an interview in The Jerusalem Report in
1999. His first library was a branch in the Bronx.

After City College, he devised puzzles and puzzle contests for newspapers.
During World War II, he cracked Japanese secret codes for the Army, then
returned to puzzles.

He was a founder of the American Cryptogram Association, and in 1976
published An Annotated Bibliography of Cryptography, still used by
experts. He was a champion scrabble player, and wrote a scholarly article
about the game's lexicography.

After a heart attack in his early 80's, Mr. Shulman gave beloved
possessions to the New York Public Library. Gifts included a primer from
Colonial America, 20,000 century-old postcards and Bowery Boys novels the
library did not have. He earlier donated his cryptography collection,
including a book about secret writing from 1518.

His mentor at the 

Single Field Shapes Quantum Bits

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/11/rnb_110804.asp?trk=nl

Technology Review  

Single Field Shapes Quantum Bits

November 8, 2005

Quantum computers, which tap the properties of particles like atoms,
photons and electrons to carry out computations, could potentially use a
variety of schemes: individual photons controlled by optical networks,
clouds of atoms linked by laser beams, and electrons trapped in quantum
dots embedded in silicon chips.

 Due to the strange nature of quantum particles, quantum computers are
theoretically much faster than ordinary computers at solving certain large
problems, like cracking secret codes.

Chip-based quantum computers would have a distinct advantage - they could
leverage the manufacturing infrastructure of the semiconductor industry.
Controlling individual electrons, however, is extremely challenging.

Researchers have recently realized that it may be possible to control the
electrons in a quantum computer using a single magnetic field rather than
having to produce extremely small, precisely focused magnetic fields for
each electron.

Researchers from the University of Toronto and the University of Wisconsin
at Madison have advanced this idea with a scheme that allows individual
electrons to serve as the quantum bits that store and process computer
information. Electrons have two magnetic orientations, spin up and spin
down, which can represent the 1s and 0s of computing.

The researchers' scheme relies on the interactions of pairs of electrons.
Tiny electrodes positioned near quantum dots -- bits of semiconductor
material that can trap single electrons - can draw neighboring electrons
near enough that they exchange energy.

The researchers' scheme takes a pair of electrons through eleven
incremental steps that involve the electron interaction and a global
magnetic field to flip one of the bits from a 0 to a 1 or vice versa.

 The technique could be used practically in 10 to 20 years, according to
the researchers. The work appeared in the July 15, 2004 issue of Physical
Review Letters.

Technology Research News

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No mandate for e-voting, computer scientist says

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://gcn.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?client.id=gcndaily2story.id=27861

No mandate for e-voting, computer scientist says
11/09/04
By William Jackson,
GCN Staff

Despite wide use in last week's presidential election, direct-recording
electronic voting still is a faulty method of casting ballots, one computer
scientist says.
Paperless electronic-voting systems are completely unacceptable, said Dan
Wallach, assistant professor of computer science at Rice University.
Assurances about the machines' accuracy and reliability are not based on
verifiable data, Wallach said today at the Computer Security Institute's
annual conference in Washington.
Wallach was one of a team of computer scientists who in 2003 examined
source code for voting machines from Diebold Election Systems Inc. of North
Canton, Ohio, and reported numerous security flaws.
Cryptography implementation and access controls showed an astonishingly
naive design, he said. As far as we know, these flaws are still there
today.
Diebold has defended its technology and said the computer scientists
examined an outdated version of the code.
Wallach countered that without access to current code for any voting
machines, it's impossible to verify manufacturers' claims. The proprietary
nature of the code and a lack of government standards for voting technology
also make certification of the hardware and software meaningless, he said.
The IT Association of America hailed the Nov. 2 election as a validation of
direct-recording technology. But Wallach said sporadic problems with the
systems have been reported, and a thorough analysis of Election Day
procedures and results is under way.
Plus, a paper ballot that can be recounted is essential to a reliable
system, he said.
Probably the best voting system we have today is the optical scan system,
with a precinct-based scanner, Wallach said. It is very simple, it is
accurate, and it is auditable.
He suggested that a hybrid voting system that produces a verifiable paper
ballot would be as reliable as optical systems and would offer convenience
and accessibility for disabled voters.
A number of states, including California and Nevada, have laws or
legislation pending to require that voting machines produce paper ballots.
Wallach said technical standards that demand transparent certification
processes would go a long way toward increasing voting reliability.
I think the Common Criteria would be a good place to start, he said,
referring to the set of internationally recognized standards for evaluating
security technology, either against vendor claims or against a set of needs
specified by a user.

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Calif. settles electronic voting suit against Diebold for $2.6M

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2004/11/10/financial1831EST0118.DTL

Ths San Francisco Chronicle

Calif. settles electronic voting suit against Diebold for $2.6M

RACHEL KONRAD, AP Technology Writer

Wednesday, November 10, 2004

(11-10) 15:31 PST SAN FRANCISCO (AP) --

 California Attorney General Bill Lockyer announced Wednesday a $2.6
million settlement with Diebold Inc., resolving a lawsuit alleging that the
company sold the state and several counties shoddy voting equipment.

 Although critics characterized the settlement as a slap on the wrist,
Diebold also agreed to pay an undisclosed sum to partially reimburse
Alameda, San Diego and other counties for the cost of paper backup ballots,
ink and other supplies in last week's election. California's secretary of
state banned the use of one type of Diebold machine in May, after problems
with the machines disenfranchised an unknown number of voters in the March
primary.

 Faulty equipment forced at least 6,000 of 316,000 voters in Alameda
County, just east of San Francisco, to use backup paper ballots instead of
the paperless voting terminals. In San Diego County, a power surge resulted
in hundreds of touch-screens that wouldn't start when the polls opened,
forcing election officials to turn voters away from the polls.

 According to the settlement, the North Canton, Ohio-based company must
also upgrade ballot tabulation software that Los Angeles County and others
used Nov. 2. Diebold must also strengthen the security of its paperless
voting machines and computer servers and promise never to connect voting
systems to outside networks.

 There is no more fundamental right in our democracy than the right to
vote and have your vote counted, Lockyer said in a statement. In making
false claims about its equipment, Diebold treated that right, and the
taxpayers who bought its machines, cavalierly. This settlement holds
Diebold accountable and helps ensure the future quality and security of its
voting systems.

 The tentative settlement could be approved as soon as Dec. 10.

 The original lawsuit was filed a year ago by Seattle-based electronic
voting critic Bev Harris and Sacramento-based activist Jim March, who
characterized the $2.6 million settlement as peanuts.

 March, a whistle blower who filed suit on behalf of California taxpayers,
could receive as much as $75,000 because of the settlement. But he said the
terms don't require Diebold to overhaul its election servers -- which have
had problems in Washington's King County and elsewhere -- to guard them
from hackers, software bugs or other failures.

 The former computer system administrator was also upset that the state
announced the deal so quickly. Several activist groups, computer scientists
and federal researchers are analyzing Nov. 2 election data, looking for
evidence of vote rigging or unintentional miscounts in hundreds of counties
nationwide that used touch-screen terminals. Results are expected by early
December.

 This settlement will shut down a major avenue of investigation before
evidence starts trickling in, March said. It's very premature.

 A Diebold executive said the settlement would allow the company to spend
more money on improving software and avoid the distraction and cost of
prolonged litigation. Diebold earnings plunged 5 cents per share in the
third quarter because of the California litigation, which could cost an
additional 1 cent per share in the current quarter.

 Diebold shares closed Wednesday at $53.20, up 1.22 percent from Tuesday in
trading on the New York Stock Exchange.

 We've worked closely with California officials to come to an agreement
that allows us to continue to move forward, Diebold senior vice president
Thomas W. Swidarski said in a statement. While we believe Diebold has
strong responses to the claims raised in the suit, we are primarily
interested in building an effective and trusting relationship with
California election officials.


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E-Mail Authentication Will Not End Spam, Panelists Say

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A41460-2004Nov10?language=printer

The Washington Post

washingtonpost.com
E-Mail Authentication Will Not End Spam, Panelists Say


By Jonathan Krim
 Washington Post Staff Writer
 Thursday, November 11, 2004; Page E01

 For consumers and businesses increasingly shaken by the growing onslaught
of unwanted e-mail and the computer viruses and other nefarious hacking
spam can bring, any hope for quick relief was soundly dashed yesterday
during a government-hosted gathering of technology experts.

Several executives and academics speaking at a forum sponsored by the
Federal Trade Commission said criminals are already steps ahead of a major
initiative by e-mail providers to counter those problems by creating a
system to verify senders of e-mail.

 In theory, such an authentication system would make it harder for spammers
to disguise their identities and locations in an attempt to avoid being
shut down or prosecuted.

 But a majority of spam is launched by zombies, or infected personal
computers that are controlled by remote spammers. E-mail from a zombie
looks as if it is coming from a legitimate source -- because it is. The
owner of that source is simply unaware that his or her computer has been
commandeered.

We'll be lucky if we solve 50 percent of the problem with e-mail
authentication, said Pavni Diwanji, chairman of MailFrontier Inc., a
Silicon Valley provider of e-mail security systems.

 By some estimates, the problem is rapidly becoming a crisis. In the first
half of this year, an average of 30,000 computers a day were turned into
zombies, according to the computer security firm Symantec Corp. In addition
to serving up unwanted or fraudulent messages, spam is used to deliver
viruses and other malicious software code that can allow hackers to capture
private data such as credit card or bank account numbers from personal
computers.

Hackers and spammers also have been able to exploit a lack of awareness
among many computer users, tricking them into providing their passwords or
account information in response to e-mails that appear to be coming from
legitimate financial institutions or retailers, a tactic known as phishing.

 The information is then rapidly sold on a black market heavily populated
by elements of organized crime in Eastern Europe, Asia and elsewhere.

 As incidents of the resulting identity fraud mount, we're losing consumer
confidence in this medium, said R. David Lewis, vice president of Digital
Impact Inc., which provides bulk e-mail marketing services to large
companies.

 Lewis and others said that if the public reaches a tipping point at which
Internet commerce is no longer trusted, the economic consequences will be
severe.

Despite the authentication effort's shortcomings, none of yesterday's
speakers suggested abandoning it, because it is seen as an essential
building block for other solutions.

 But the forum demonstrated in stark terms the depth and complexity of the
problem.

Any e-mail authentication system, for example, would check that the block
of Internet addresses assigned to an e-mail provider includes the specific
numeric address of a sender of a piece of e-mail.

Thus, a red flag would go up if a message seeming to come from
[EMAIL PROTECTED] is actually not coming from a computer that uses the
xyz-123.net mail service.

 But Scott Chasin, chief technology officer of e-mail security firm MX
Logic Inc., said the underlying Internet system that houses the necessary
data is insecure and can be tricked by hackers. Chasin said the problem has
been known for 10 years, but industry and Internet standard-setters have
been unable or unwilling to fix the problem by encrypting the data.

 Getting agreement on an authentication system has been similarly difficult
and is partly why the FTC held the summit.

 The major e-mail providers, America Online Inc., Microsoft Corp., Yahoo
Inc. and EarthLink Inc., are still testing and pushing various plans. The
Internet group assigned to endorse a standard disbanded recently, unable to
resolve discord and uncertainty over whether licensing rights asserted by
Microsoft would cut out a broad swath of organizations that use so-called
open-source software.

 Chasin and other panelists also said the basic operating systems that
power computers -- the most dominant of which is Microsoft Windows --
remain too vulnerable to hackers.

He said a worm was recently discovered that lodges itself in Windows files
and goes to work when a computer user tries to access the Web site of his
or her bank. The malicious code automatically redirects the Web browser to
a fake page that looks like the real thing.

In this scenario, the user has not been duped by a fake phishing e-mail.
Instead, the vulnerability in the operating system has allowed the code to
redirect the user's browser to a phony page where a hacker can capture the
user's name and password.

Still, panelists insisted authentication is a vital first step. 

Banks brace for cashpoint attack

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/11/banks_prepare_for_atm_cyber_crime/print.html

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register » Security » Network Security »

 Original URL:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/11/banks_prepare_for_atm_cyber_crime/

Banks brace for cashpoint attack
By Kevin Poulsen, SecurityFocus (klp at securityfocus.com)
Published Thursday 11th November 2004 10:42 GMT

An international group of law enforcement and financial industry
associations hopes to prevent a new type of bank robbery before it gets off
the ground: cyber attacks against automated teller machines.

This fall the Global ATM Security Alliance (GASA) published what it says
are the first international cyber security guidelines specifically tailored
to cash machines. Experts see new dangers as legacy ATMs running OS/2 give
way to modern terminals built on Microsoft Windows.


The recommendations presented in this manual are essentially designed to
provide a common sense approach to ... the rapidly changing threat model
that the introduction to the ATM channel of the Windows XP and other common
use operating systems, as well as the TCP/IP network protocol suite, has
created, said the manual's author, Ian Simpson, in a statement.

The move comes one year after the Nachi worm compromised
(http://www.securityfocus.com/news/7517) Windows-based automated teller
machines at two financial institutions, in the only acknowledged case of
malicious code penetrating ATMs. The cash machines, made by Diebold, were
built on Windows XP Embedded, which suffered from the RPC DCOM security
hole Nachi exploited.

In response to the incident, Diebold began shipping new Windows-based ATMs
preinstalled with host-based firewall software, and offered to add the
program for existing customers.

Though ATMs typically sit on private networks or VPNs, supposedly-isolated
networks often have undocumented connections to the Internet, or can fall
to a piece of malicious code inadvertently carried beyond the firewall on a
laptop computer. Last year's Slammer worm indirectly shut down some 13,000
Bank of America ATMs by infecting database servers on the same network, and
spewing so much traffic that the cash machines couldn't processes customer
transactions.

The goal of the ATM cyber security best practices document, which has not
been made public, and a related white paper developed by GASA, is to be
proactive in fighting what might be the next wave of ATM crime - namely
cyber attacks, said Mike Lee, founding coordinator of the group, in a
statement.

GASA's members include fraud prevention agencies, financial industry
associations, the US Secret Service, Visa and MasterCard, and some ATM
networks and manufacturers, including Diebold and NCR.


Related stories

ATMs in peril from computer worms?
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/10/20/atm_viral_peril/)
The ATM keypad as security portcullis
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/21/atm_keypad_security/)
Ukrainian teen fights the Rise of the Machines
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/10/13/girl_terminates_atm/)


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Gov't Orders Air Passenger Data for Test

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=storycid=519u=/ap/20041112/ap_on_re_us/passenger_screening_1printer=1

Yahoo!


Gov't Orders Air Passenger Data for Test



 Fri Nov 12, 2:35 PM ET

By LESLIE MILLER, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON -  The government on Friday ordered airlines to turn over
personal information about passengers who flew within the United States in
June in order to test a new system for identifying potential terrorists.

  


 The system, dubbed Secure Flight, will compare passenger data with names
on two government watch lists, a no fly list comprised of people who are
known or suspected to be terrorists, and a list of people who require more
scrutiny before boarding planes.

 Secure Flight represents a significant step in securing domestic air
travel and safeguarding national security information, namely, the
watchlists, the Transportation Security Administration said in a notice
announcing the order.

 Currently, the federal government shares parts of the list with airlines,
which are responsible for making sure suspected terrorists don't get on
planes. People within the commercial aviation industry say the lists have
the names of more than 100,000 people on them.

 The order follows a 30-day period during which the public was allowed to
comment on the Secure Flight proposal. About 500 people commented on the
plan; the overwhelming majority opposed it, saying it would invade their
privacy and infringe on their civil liberties.

 An airline industry representative said the carriers, which support the
plan, are studying the order.

-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Want to surf net? Show I-card

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.hindustantimes.com/onlineCDA/PFVersion.jsp?article=http://10.81.141.122/news/181_1104972,0006.htm

: HindustanTimes.com

Prove identity to surf net in Bangalore

Press Trust of India
Bangalore, November 15



Advertisement


Internet surfers in over 50,000 cyber cafés across Karnataka now need to
show an identity proof before browsing the web. With an aim to prevent
misuse of the Internet by criminals, the state government has made it
mandatory for all such cafes to have a record of net users, failing which
the police can impound their licenses.

We are introducing this law to check anti-social elements and
anti-national activities. Internet is a great medium for communication, but
people can also carry out a lot of such (illegal) activities through it,
state IT secretary K.N. Shankaralinge Gowda told here.

According to the new norms, a surfer needs to display his/her identity card
at the cyber café or be photographed by a web camera by the attendant
before logging on.  
Printed From
-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[ISN] Japanese Government Bans Security Researcher's Speech

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2004 04:48:20 -0600 (CST)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ISN] Japanese Government Bans Security Researcher's Speech
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: InfoSec News isn.attrition.org
List-Archive: http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn
List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Subscribe: http://www.attrition.org/mailman/listinfo/isn,
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.ejovi.net/archives/2004/11/japanese_govern.html

November 12, 2004

[JUKI net is Japan's national ID system. Ejovi performed a security
audit of the system for Nagano Prefecture one year ago]

Its been a long day. I am greatly disappointed that Soumushou, the
Japanese government that maintains JUKI net, prevented me from
speaking today at the PacSec security conference. Soumushou prevented
my talk by threatening the Japanese event who currently are seeking
contracts from the government

The Japanese government gave me two options.

1) Do not talk
2) Drastically change your slides to say what they want me to.

When I offered to not use slides at all and give my own opinion they
told me that I would not be permitted to speak AT ALL. It is obvious
to me that they did not have an issue with my slides or presentation.
They were afraid that I would draw attention to problems in JUKI net.
Soumushou thinks that they can hide from the issues. They think that
if they keep people from speaking about the issues, it will go away. I
thought I would be immune from such Japanese government pressures
however I underestimated Soumushou's ability to manipulate those
around me.

Soumushou's reason for forbidding me to speak was this Since we are
endorsing the convention we have to right to tell you not to speak if
this is the case, the Japanese government needs only sponsor or
endorse ANY event in which they don't agree with and force the
organizers to change the content. If this is the case Japan will never
make any progress towards a safer environment.

What is most upsetting to me is the fact that I HAD NO PLANS TO
CRITIZE the Japanese government. My talk was going to be extremely
fair and balanced addressing the issues raised by both sides. In fact
I invited Soumushou to meet with me directly so that I can address any
issues they may have. I told them this on the telephone and by email.
Instead they choose to pressure the Japanese representatives of the
conference. They never attempted to talk with me directly. Why is
this?

If they had issues with something I may say why not ask me about it?
Why pressure a company they relies on government contracts? Is this
fair? The purpose of my talk was to present both sides of JUKI net
security systems. I have no vested interest in seeing it fail or in
seeing it succeed. I only wanted to recommend how best to make it
safer, how best to improve the system. But Soumushou believed that my
recommendations on how to improve its security alone would mean that
JUKI net has problems and they refused to admit this. I'm sorry to
tell them but it does have security problems. The good news is that
the technical issues can be easily resolved. However the greatest
problem with JUKI net is not technical but Soumushou's inability to
even acknowledge that they exist! How can a system become secure if
the Japanese government are not willing to listen to someone who
points out issues.

Today was a sad day for Japan and a frustrating day for me.



_
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[Osint] DHS Now Has Non-Disclosure Agreement For *Un*classified Info

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


To: Bruce Tefft [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Thread-Index: AcTLBDc4vJyL80TwSZuIiwn1AOddIQACB0Zg
From: Bruce Tefft [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Mailing-List: list [EMAIL PROTECTED]; contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2004 07:13:19 -0500
Subject: [osint] A NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT FOR UNCLASSIFIED INFO]
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]



 A NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT FOR UNCLASSIFIED INFO

 In a momentous expansion of the apparatus of government secrecy, the
 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is requiring employees and
 others to sign legally binding non-disclosure agreements as a
 condition of access to certain categories of unclassified information.

 Up to now, non-disclosure agreements have only been used by
 government agencies to regulate access to classified information. In
 fact, they are one of the defining features of the national security
 classification system, along with security clearances and the need
 to know principle. As far as Secrecy News could determine, such
 classification-like controls have never before been systematically
 imposed on access to unclassified information.

 But now at DHS a non-disclosure agreement must be executed in order
 to gain access to any one of a panoply of new and existing categories
 of unclassified information, including:

 For Official Use Only (FOUO); Official Use Only (OUO); Sensitive
 Homeland Security Information (SHSI); Limited Official Use (LOU); Law
 Enforcement Sensitive (LES); Safeguarding Information (SGI);
 Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI); and any other
 identifier used by other government agencies to categorize
 information as sensitive but unclassified.

 The proliferation of controls on unclassified information signifies a
 massive increase in government secrecy, particularly since the number
 of officials who are authorized to designate information in one of
 these categories dwarfs the number of officials who can create
 classified information.

 And while the classification system operates according to certain
 well-defined rules and limitations, including procedures for review
 and challenge of classification decisions, the same is not true of
 the sensitive but unclassified domain. Furthermore, there is
 nothing like the Information Security Oversight Office to monitor and
 oversee the restriction of unclassified information.

 (Some types of sensitive but unclassified information are not
 specifically protected by statute and can still be successfully
 requested under the Freedom of Information Act. But with Justice
 Department encouragement, agencies take an expansive view of the
 scope of the Act's exemptions and access is increasingly uncertain.)

 The DHS non-disclosure agreement is apparently the first such
 document crafted in the Bush Administration. It represents a new high
 water mark in the rising tide of official secrecy.

 A copy of DHS Form 11000-6, Non-Disclosure Agreement for Sensitive
 But Unclassified Information, dated August 2004, was obtained by
 Secrecy News and is posted here:

 http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs-nda.pdf








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-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga 

Certicom First to Earn FIPS 186-2 Validation for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109STORY=/www/story/11-15-2004/0002456260EDATE=

Certicom First to Earn FIPS 186-2 Validation for Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm
 
  Validation of ECC-based algorithm another step in
 ECC standardization and widespread adoption

MISSISSAUGA, ON, Nov. 15 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ - Certicom Corp.
(TSX: CIC), the authority for strong, efficient cryptography, today announced
that its implementation for the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(EassociateCDSA) has earned the Federal Information Processing Standards
(FIPS) 186-2
validation certification No. 1 - making it the first company to receive the
designation for an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) -based algorithm.
This validation is particularly valuable for original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) and software vendors who sell to government
organizations. By using Certicom's ECDSA implementation in their products,
they meet FIPS requirements without undergoing the time-consuming and costly
testing process. ECDSA is used to build in digital signature functionality and
is a faster alternative to legacy algorithms.
For the cryptography community, and in particular proponents of ECC, the
testing of ECC as part of the FIPS validation process is a significant step in
the adoption of this public key cryptosystem. Considered a benchmark for
security in government, a FIPS validation assures users that a given
technology has passed rigorous testing by an accredited third party lab as set
out by the National Institute of Standards for Technology (NIST) and can be
used to secure sensitive information. Typically, it drives wide-scale adoption
in government and in commercial sectors, particularly in the financial and
healthcare sectors that recognize the significance of FIPS validation. This
milestone in ECC's evolution follows last year's announcement from the
National Security Agency (NSA) that ECC is a 'crucial technology'. Both events
are part of the U.S. Government's crypto modernization program.
A major hurdle to widespread adoption of any security technology is
standardization. We witnessed that 25 years ago with the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) and now are seeing it play out with Advanced Encryption
Standards (AES), the successor to DES, said Scott Vanstone, founder and
executive vice-president, strategic technology at Certicom. As a
complementary cryptosystem to AES, we can expect the same for ECC. By testing
ECC-based algorithms in the FIPS certification process, NIST added a level of
assurance that says they've done the due diligence on it and now organizations
can be very comfortable adopting it.
ECC is a computationally efficient form of cryptography that offers
equivalent security to other competing technologies but with much smaller key
sizes. This results in faster computations, lower power consumption, as well
as memory and bandwidth savings, thereby making it ideal for today's
resource-constrained environments.
Certicom is considered a pioneer in ECC research and implementations,
backed by 20 years of experience. The company developed the industry's first
toolkit to include ECC, which has since been adopted by over 300
organizations. Tomorrow it will host the Certicom ECC Conference 2004, the
first-ever conference that brings together Elliptic Curve Cryptography
researchers, industry experts and users. During the two-day conference,
participants from North America, Europe and Asia will discuss the evolution of
ECC and share best implementation practices and insights for future
applications.

About Certicom
Certicom Corp. (TSX:CIC) is the authority for strong, efficient
cryptography required by software vendors and device manufacturers to embed
security in their products. Adopted by the US Government's National Security
Agency (NSA), Certicom technologies for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
provide the most security per bit of any known public key scheme, making it
ideal for constrained environments. Certicom products and services are
currently licensed to more than 300 customers including Motorola, Oracle,
Research In Motion, Terayon, Texas Instruments and Unisys. Founded in 1985,
Certicom is headquartered in Mississauga, ON, Canada, with offices in Ottawa,
ON; Reston, VA; San Mateo, CA; and London, England. Visit
http://www.certicom.com .

Certicom, Certicom Security Architecture, Certicom CodeSign, Security
Builder, Security Builder Middleware, Security Builder API, Security Builder
Crypto, Security Builder SSL, Security Builder PKI, and Security Builder GSE
are trademarks or registered trademarks of Certicom Corp. Intel is registered
trademarks of Intel Corporation or its subsidiaries in the United States and
other countries. All other companies and products listed herein are trademarks
or registered trademarks of their respective holders.

Except for historical information contained 

[ISN] BlackBerry prickles Department of Defence spooks

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Tue, 16 Nov 2004 07:34:56 -0600 (CST)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [ISN] BlackBerry prickles Department of Defence spooks
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Id: InfoSec News isn.attrition.org
List-Archive: http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/isn
List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
List-Subscribe: http://www.attrition.org/mailman/listinfo/isn,
mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/11/15/1100384480556.html

By Rob O'Neill
November 16, 2004
Next

Department of Defence communications spooks are restricting the use of
wireless BlackBerry devices in government over concerns about the
security of confidential and restricted information.

The Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), the nation's high-tech
electronic eavesdropper, says the popular devices must not be used to
transmit confidential or secret information or connect to systems that
process it.

Agencies may use BlackBerry devices with systems that handle
unclassified, x-in-confidence (excluding cabinet-in-confidence) and
restricted information.

Telstra, one of several providers of BlackBerry services, insists the
systems are secure.

They are used by a lot of customers that require high levels of
security in the financial services industry, and even the CIA and the
Pentagon, a Telstra spokesman says.

Paul Osmond, Asia-Pacific regional director of BlackBerry developer
Research In Motion, is thrilled the Government has decided the
Department of Defence can use the device, because 18 months ago they
were prohibited.

Their restrictions are fairly common when you look at a first
go-around, Osmond says. They are similar to those the US defence
forces put out when they first used it.

The DSD will review the guidelines in February when it is expected RIM
and ISPs will seek to have their say.

The hand-held BlackBerry device, which allows access to corporate
email, including attachments, from almost any location, has become the
new must-have corporate accessory in the US and is receiving strong
support here.

But the swarm of new mobile computing devices poses security
challenges to government and private organisations. They are keen to
have the functionality but worry about privacy and access.

Other consumer devices have also generated alarm. A British security
firm's survey revealed Apple's iPod, which has large portable storage
capacity and can be plugged into most PCs, is considered a threat.

Sometimes such concerns can seem overblown, as in 1999 when the Furby,
a computerised toy, was banned from US National Security Agency
premises because it could be used as a recorder.



_
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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'Virtual Debit Card' Aims To Combat Online Fraud

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110056759053675009,00.html

The Wall Street Journal


 November 16, 2004

 MONEY


'Virtual Debit Card' Aims
 To Combat Online Fraud

By JENNIFER SARANOW
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
November 16, 2004; Page D2


Consumers typically have been wary of using bank cards online. One bank's
solution is to get rid of the cards.

In an effort to ease customers' concerns about fraud and identity theft
when shopping online, PNC Bank has launched a new checking account with a
virtual debit card. In addition to a regular debit card that can be used
at automated teller machines and in stores, the Digital Checking account
comes with an eSpend card. The card is basically a piece of paper with an
account number, expiration date and verification code for making purchases
online, over the phone and by mail order. Customers can set a daily limit
for their eSpend card (say $1,000) and once that amount is spent,
additional purchases won't be approved.

PNC Bank, a unit of PNC Financial Services Group Inc., Pittsburgh, hopes
the eSpend card will attract people who want to make purchases online with
their debit card but are uncomfortable doing so for fear of making their
bank account vulnerable to fraud.

If an unauthorized person obtains a customer's eSpend number, only the
specified daily limit could be taken out of a customer's bank account. If
this occurs, PNC says customers aren't liable for the charges. Purchases
made with the eSpend card show up separately on bank statements. The
account, which is aimed at online-banking customers, also comes with
identity-theft reimbursement insurance, a debit card rewards program and no
fee for using non-PNC ATMs. The account has a monthly $11 service fee
unless customers opt for direct deposit of paychecks or government checks
such as Social Security, and pay at least three bills online.

The eSpend card comes as debit cards are quickly overtaking cash and checks
as preferred methods of payment. According to a report from the American
Bankers Association and Boston-based Dove Consulting, 31% of in-store
purchases were made with a debit card last year, up from 21% in 1999.

Consumers typically have been wary of using debit cards online because,
unlike credit cards, they are directly tied to bank accounts. But online
use of debit cards is starting to grow. In the first quarter of this year,
Visa debit cards were used for 46% of online purchases, up from 43% a year
earlier, according to Visa International.

Analysts are skeptical about how excited consumers will be about PNC's new
card. I think it's an interesting idea but if you look at consumer usage,
consumers are using their debit cards online today in increasing numbers,
so it's unclear how much of a demand there would be for a card with that
unique application, says Tony Hayes, a Dove analyst.

Other banks have long offered similar credit-card products as a way to
encourage purchases on the Internet and reduce the amount of fraud they are
liable for. In June of 2002, for example, Citigroup Inc.'s Citibank
launched free, downloadable software that allows credit-card customers to
obtain a new disposable account number each time they make a purchase
online. A downside: Such virtual account numbers can't be used when a
credit card must be shown at pickup.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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The Beginning of the Crypto Era

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.eweek.com/print_article2/0,2533,a=139274,00.asp

EWeek



The Beginning of the Crypto Era
November 15, 2004

 By   Larry Seltzer
 In a move that was totally expected, if a little early, Yahoo has
announced that it will put its money where its mouth is and start checking
Yahoo Mail with its DomainKeys system.


The company had told me that it would do so by the end of the year, but I
suppose it had had this last week, during the FTC e-mail authentication
summit, as an internal deadline. Earthlink also announced that it will test
DomainKeys on its system.

DomainKeys is important. It is the main implementation of the second of the
two most credible approaches to SMTP authentication, specifically the use
of cryptographic signatures to authenticate messages against the domains
from which they were sent. The other approach-to check against the IP
addresses of the servers in those domains-also moved forward recently with
the second version of the Sender ID spec.

Don't assume that the DomainKeys implementation is the final form. There is
an IETF group called ietf-mailsig working in preliminary stages to
standardize the crypto approach to SMTP authentication and they might want
to make some changes to the approach used by Yahoo. And I expect Yahoo to
be open to such suggestions.

In fact, Yahoo's openness to reasonable suggestions and unobjectionable
licenses is a big reason to be optimistic about widespread adoption of it.
Indeed, while Yahoo has intellectual property claims on its developments in
DomainKeys, the company isn't being a jerk about it, like some other
coMpanieS in this business that shall remain naMeleSs.
There are some interesting questions about DomainKeys and Yahoo's handling
of it. The first has to do with performance. My own first impression of
cryptography as a solution was that the added performance burden on MTAs
(message transfer agents, better known as mail servers) would be great and
that many companies would have to upgrade their hardware to run a
DomainKeys-enabled server with decent performance. In a recent eSeminar in
which I participated, Richi Jennings of Ferris Research echoed this view.

But while it's still too early to tell, there's reason to believe the
performance issue is not as serious as first impressions would indicate.
I've spoken to Sendmail, the leading MTA company in the world, about it.
Nobody, except Yahoo, has more hands-on experience actually testing and
coding DomainKeys than Sendmail. Sendmail thinks the added performance
burden, entirely CPU-based, is on the order of 15 percent to 20 percent.
This isn't nothing, but MTAs aren't typically CPU-constrained-they are
network- and perhaps disk-constrained-so there could easily be spare CPU
capacity in the typical MTA (unless it's running Exchange Server or Notes,
in which case it's CPU-starved).

Next Page:  Why no SPF implementation?

The other question I have about Yahoo is why it has refused to implement
SPF. Sender Policy Framework is the uncontroversial part of Sender ID, the
part that checks the message envelope.

 Many people still argue that SPF is all we really need. But no serious
people believe this, least of all SPF's author Meng Weng Wong, who is a
principal author and sponsor of the Sender ID spec and also a fan of
DomainKeys. All SPF really stops is bounce messages, also known as Joe
Jobs. It's an important part of the solution, but it's far from an
adequate one.

But it is an easy one, and there's no good technical reason why Yahoo
should resist it. All the other major mail providers, to my knowledge, are
implementing SPF as part of their experimentation. The answer for Yahoo is
probably something as stupid as not wanting people to get the misimpression
that they are hedging on DomainKeys. I asked the company about this several
weeks ago, and it weaseled out of a direct answer. Most dissatisfying.

The Yahoo announcement focuses on phishing, probably because it's topical.
Spam has become a major annoyance, but phishing is scary. And SPF does
nothing to address phishing. This is why Microsoft developed Caller ID, the
header portion of Sender ID.

I should also take a moment to wag my finger at those who continue to
express concern at how spammers are adopting SPF and other authentication
standards in order to get around them. I don't know if they're walking into
a trap or if they're just experimenting, but it won't do them any good. The
more spammers authenticate, the easier they will make themselves to block.
For insights on security coverage around the Web, check out eWEEK.com
Security Center Editor Larry Seltzer's Weblog.

Remember, authentication systems are not complete anti-spam systems. They
just identify who is sending the mail, not why they are sending it. This
whole approach requires the coordinated use of reputation systems that will
use the authenticated address to tell you whether a sender is trustworthy.
In such a scenario, an authenticated spammer becomes easy to block.

The 

Crypto-Tax: Re: India to tax / levy license fees on ISPs that offer VPNs

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2004 05:47:53 +0530
From: Suresh Ramasubramanian [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Deepak Jain [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: NANOG [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: India to tax / levy license fees on ISPs that offer VPNs
Organization: Outblaze Limited - http://www.outblaze.com
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6i
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Deepak Jain [16/11/04 18:15 -0500]:

 I guess it depends on how you define a VPN over just a private network.
 Is an SSH tunnel a VPN? What about an encrypting SOCKS proxy?


This tax is aimed at a few Indian ISPs that are making lots of money
selling managed IP-VPN services.. the incumbent telco seems to think all the
money going there would be better spent by companies if they bought copper /
fiber from it, and so the DoT (http://www.dot.gov.in) - lots of telco types
there who wouldn't know a vpn from a hole in the ground - decided to level
the playing field

Just for laughs, here's the DoT press release on this:

srs

http://www.dot.gov.in/pressnote10nov04ISP.doc

142/04
www.pib.nic.in


PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
**


ISP LICENSING CONDITIONS  AMENDED TO PERMIT VPN SERVICES


New Delhi,  Kartika 19, 1926
November 10, 2004

The Department of Telecommunications today decided to extend the scope of
the Licence conditions of Internet Service Providers (ISP) ,thereby
allowing them to provide managed Virtual Private Network services to
corporates and individuals.

In accordance with the decision, the ISP licences (both -Licence without
Internet Telephony and with Internet Telephony) will have an enabling
provision for VPN services by ISPs under specified terms  conditions. The
annual licence fee will be at 8% of the Gross Revenue generated under the
licence. There will be one time non-refundable entry fee of Rs. 10, 2 and 1
crore for Category A, B , and C ISPs respectively

ISP-with VPN licencee will be permitted to lay optical fibre cable or
use radio links for provision of the services under their licence in its
Service Area.  Further, ISPs shall be free to enter into mutually agreed
commercial agreement with infrastructure service providers for sharing of
infrastructure.  The ISPs shall not engage in reselling bandwidth directly
or indirectly.  The above decision will help as many 388 ISP Licensees,
more particularly 61 all India (Category A) ISP Licensees, to offer VPN
services to their customers, thus adding to their revenue stream from
Internet Access Services.

VPN is a service where a customer perceives to have been provided with a
private network which actually is configured over a shared public network.
Benefits of VPN include secure communication over public network and
guaranteed quality of service.  A High Level DoT Committee had examined
the matter and had observed that while on one hand such VPN services were
not under the scope of the present ISP licences, on the other hand it
would be desirable to permit ISPs to provide such services in the present
day liberalized telecom environment in the country.  The services which
are technologically possible should be allowed while at the same time
ensuring level playing field to all the service providers.  Such VPN
services which provide a platform for utilization of bandwidth in a very
cost effective and efficient manner are emerging services internationally.
This facility is necessary for the corporate world in meeting their
growing communication needs of inter-office connectivity to send/transfer
data securely and such services are widely available in telecom sector
globally.

RM/AMA 101104 ISP Licencing Conditions

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Just Another Chip in the (Privacy) Wall

2004-11-18 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/11/wo_kushner111804.asp?p=0

Technology Review


Just Another Chip in the (Privacy) Wall
 An electronic database implanted under the skin can assure speedy and
proper medical care-but is it worth it?



By David Kushner
November 18, 2004





You can almost see the ads now: Imagine a bright future with a chip in your
arm!




Went to the supermarket, but left the wallet at home? No problem! Flex your
bicep and the smiling cashier passes a scanner over your arm.
Voila-identification chip recognized! Problem solved. Your credit is good
with us!

Passed out during a sunrise jaunt on the top of Haleakala Mountain in Maui?
Fret not! The hospital down below is on the case. Arm please. Scanner! The
readout on the computer is fine. Just a little altitude sickness.

Key to the safety deposit box weighing you down? Chuck it! Next time you're
in the bank, give the teller a friendly wave-and watch the doors open to
greet you!

After decades as the stuff of sci-fi novels and anime movies, the age of
chipped humans is finally a reality. Last month, following two years of
review, the Food and Drug Administration approved the use of an implantable
chip for medical applications. Each Verichip is the size of a grain of rice
and contains a unique, 16-digit radio frequency ID. Linked to a database,
that ID tag can call up a variety of information-from medical records to
financial information.

 Not surprisingly, the technology is causing its share of controversy.
Civil liberties groups are calling this the end of privacy. Religious
groups are calling it the number of the beast. Down on the shores of Delray
Beach, FL, Applied Digital-the company behind the Verichip-calls it a
goldmine.

 Like a lot of new technologies, the Verichip happened rather by accident.
Fifteen years ago, a company called Digital Angel developed implantable
identification chips for the purpose of tracking companion pets and cattle.
But the idea was nothing to moo at. Last year, 800,000 animal chips were
sold in the United States for $55 to $70 apiece-30 percent more than in
2002.

 If the chips could identify animals, why not a human being? This thought
occurred to Richard Seelig, a surgeon in New Jersey, shortly after the
attacks of September 11, 2001. Seelig watched with horror as New York City
firemen scrawled their social security numbers in black ink on the
forearms-just in case they were to be burned beyond recognition in the
inferno. Familiar with Digital Angel's work, Seelig voluntarily implanted
himself with a radio frequency identification chip. And the race to bring
it to the rest of the world was on.



According to Angela Fulcher, spokesperson for Applied Digital, the human
chip works in essentially the same manner as the animal chips. The chip is
contained inside a cylindrical transponder, a glass tube 11 millimeters in
length and 2.1 millimeters in diameter. Along with the chip is an antenna
coil, which picks up and transmits the identification number to a scanner.
The Pocket Reader, an existing handheld scanner created by Applied Digital,
reads the radio frequency ID number when it's passed over the skin within a
space of three or four inches.

Unlike the animal version, the human chip is coated with Biobond-a porous
polypropylene sheathe that connects to surrounding tissues. The chip is
implanted, via a proprietary Verichip inserter, in a fleshy area such as
the bicep. Based on our experience at with microchips and animals,
Fulcher says, we see the lifespan at being 10 years.

 Although newly approved by the FDA, Verichips are already in use outside
the United States. In total, an estimated 1,000 people have been implanted
thus far. In Mexico, Rafael Macedo de la Concha, the country's attorney
general, was implanted with a chip to provide secure access to government
documents. In Barcelona, a beach club is injecting partiers with ID chips
in lieu of hand stamps.

 Despite the announcement of the FDA approval, however, such frivolous
implants may soon be second guessed. Organizations have criticized Applied
Digital for not adequately disclosing the FDA's finding of Verichip's
risks. A group called the Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion
and Numbering, or Caspian, obtained a letter from the FDA to Applied
Digital dated October 12, and posted it on the Web. The letter cites
several potential risks to health associated with the device, including
adverse tissue reaction, migration of the implanted transponder,
electromagnetic interference, electrical hazards, and incompatibility with
magnetic resonance imaging.

 In addition to medical concerns, privacy advocates lament the potential
abuses of implantable IDs. The outcry stems from the proliferation of radio
frequency identification in products and badges. The San Francisco Public
Library is trying to put ID chips in all of its books. In Virginia, the
Department of Motor Vehicles is considering putting chips on every driver's
license. 

Microchip passport critics say ID theft possible

2004-11-22 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-11-22-hitech-passport_x.htm

USA Today



Microchip passport critics say ID theft possible
The Associated Press
The United States hasn't issued any microchip-equipped passports yet, but
as the Department of State tests different prototypes, the international
standards for the passports are under fire from privacy advocates who worry
the technology won't protect travelers from identity thieves.

 The American Civil Liberties union has raised alarms and even an executive
at one of the companies developing a prototype for the State Department
calls the international standards woefully inadequate.

 The international standards for electronic passports were set by the
U.N.-affiliated International Civil Aviation Organization, which has worked
on standards for machine-readable passports since 1968.

 On the latest passports, the agency has taken a 'keep it simple'
approach, which, unfortunately, really disregards a basic privacy approach
and leaves out the basic security methods we would have expected to have
been incorporated for the security of the documents, said Neville
Pattinson, an executive at Axalto North America, which is working on a
prototype U.S. electronic passport.

 As part of heightened security post-Sept. 11, all new U.S. passports
issued by the end of 2005 are expected to have a chip containing the
holders' name, birth date and issuing office, as well as a biometric
identifier - a photo of the holders' face. The photo is the international
standard for biometrics, but countries are free to add other biometrics,
such as fingerprints, for greater accuracy.

 Privacy advocates have complained about the security standards for the
passports, but Pattinson is the most prominent person involved in their
creation to express concern that they could become prey for identity
thieves if safeguards aren't standardized.

 A slide in a presentation he gives says, Don't lose the public's
confidence at the get go. Another asks, Who is up for a black eye?

 The international passport standards call for a very sophisticated smart
card device, that uses a chip and an antenna embedded in the passports'
covers, Pattinson said.

 Unlike cheaper and dumber RFID tags, the passport chips would be
microprocessors that could send one piece of information at a time in
answer to queries from a machine reader. They could also be equipped with
multiple layers of encryption for security.

 The international standards spell out ways the passports could incorporate
more protection from identity thieves, but they make those methods optional.

 Under the standards, information on the chip could be picked up by someone
who wires a briefcase with a reader, then swings it within inches of a
passports, Pattinson said. Over a greater distance, an interloper could
eavesdrop on border control devices reading the passports, he said.

 There's no security built into it, said Barry Steinhardt, director of
the technology and liberty program, at the American Civil Liberties Union.
This will enable identity theft and put Americans at some risk when they
travel internationally.

 One rudimentary way to protect electronic passports from identity thieves
is to wrap them in tinfoil, which blocks radio waves. A single size Doritos
bag would do the trick. Protecting border control agents' readers with a
metal shield would protect against eavesdropping.

 The International Civil Aviation Organization and State Department say
they're looking at more organized methods.

 The privacy issues have come up and they are being looked at, said Denis
Schagnon, a spokesman for ICAO. This is a process that is being
implemented over the next few years, it is not something that happens
overnight. One way to fight identity theft is already in the standards, he
said: The passports will have built-in encrypted authentication to let
electronic readers know they are original documents, not forgeries.

 The international standard is obviously a baseline, said Angela Aggeler,
spokesperson for the bureau of consular affairs at the State Department.
This is something we continue to develop and work on. (Privacy) is the
thing that is driving a lot of our considerations. Personal privacy issues
are of paramount consideration.

 Other countries are also making the switch to microchipped, biometric
passports, at U.S. request. Under the Patriot Act, visitors from 27
countries whose citizens don't need visas to visit the United States will
need electronic passports, too.

 The United States originally asked that visitors from those countries have
the electronic passports by this October. President Bush in August gave the
countries an extra year to issue them; they will be required by next
October.

 In testimony before a House committee, Secretary of State Colin Powell
said that other countries were finding the switch daunting, as was the
United States.

 The Government Printing Office is manufacturing test passports using chip
packages 

Nonce Stamp: SRI International Receives Security Technology Patent for Paper-based Transactions

2004-11-23 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_viewnewsId=20041123005187newsLang=en



 
 November 23, 2004 08:01 AM US Eastern Timezone

SRI International Receives Security Technology Patent for Paper-based
Transactions

  MENLO PARK, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Nov. 23, 2004--

 
 Nonce Stamp Offers Many Applications, Including Electronically
Downloaded Airline Tickets, Travelers Checks, Passports, Postage, Legal
Documents, and Event and Movie Tickets
  



 SRI International, a leading independent, nonprofit research institute
known for its pioneering innovations, today announced that it has been
issued a fundamental U.S. patent for its nonce stamp technology, which
can secure and authenticate paper documents against fraudulent creation and
use.

 U.S. Patent No. 6,820,201 covers SRI's information-based indicia
technology for securing and authenticating paper documents. The SRI
technology addresses the security issues inherent in today's popular
print-at-home documents, such as postage and movie tickets, which can be
readily counterfeited.

 The recently awarded patent and related pending SRI patents cover an
innovative use of a nonce (an element used to protect electronic
cryptography systems from being cracked) to protect paper-based documents.
The nonce is a unique number preprinted on a forgery-resistant material.
When the user wishes to print an article of value, such as a postage stamp,
the value of the nonce is combined with other information (e.g., the value
of the postage) and a digital certificate is created. The digital
certificate, in electronic or printed form, together with the nonce stamp,
provides cryptographically secure proof of the uniqueness and authenticity
of the certificate.

 The inventors are laboratory director Patrick D. Lincoln, Ph.D., and staff
scientist Natarajan Shankar, Ph.D., of SRI's Computer Science Laboratory.
Most paper currency and other documents that have monetary value include
security features to prevent fraud. SRI saw the need to also secure today's
popular print-at-home documents to eliminate forgery and counterfeiting,
said Dr. Lincoln. Nonce stamps are a way of creating unique physical
representations of digital certificates that are easily authenticated and
that cannot be forged.

 About SRI International

 Silicon Valley-based SRI International (www.sri.com) is one of the world's
leading independent research and technology development organizations.
Founded as Stanford Research Institute in 1946, SRI has been meeting the
strategic needs of clients for almost 60 years. The nonprofit research
institute performs contract research and development for government
agencies, commercial businesses and nonprofit foundations. In addition to
conducting contract RD, SRI licenses its technologies, forms strategic
partnerships and creates spin-off companies.
 Contacts
SRI International
Ellie Javadi, 650-859-4874
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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SSRN- Deworming the Internet by Douglas Barnes

2004-11-24 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=622364


SSRN



 Deworming the Internet

  

DOUGLAS BARNES
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law



Texas Law Review, Vol. 83, No. 1

Abstract: 
 Both law enforcement and markets for software standards have failed to
solve the problem of software that is vulnerable to infection by
network-transmitted worms. Consequently, regulatory attention should turn
to the publishers of worm-vulnerable software. Although ordinary tort
liability for software publishers may seem attractive, it would interact in
unpredictable ways with the winner-take-all nature of competition among
publishers of mass-market, internet-connected software. More tailored
solutions are called for, including mandatory bug bounties for those who
find potential vulnerabilities in software, minimum quality standards for
software, and, once the underlying market failure is remedied, liability
for end users who persist in using worm-vulnerable software.

Keywords: Worms, viruses, software, market failure, network externality,
negative externality, perverse incentives, tort liability, lemons
equilibrium, regulation

JEL Classifications: K29, K13, L86, 031

 

 Accepted Paper Series


 

Abstract has been viewed 392 times

 


Contact Information for  DOUGLAS  BARNES (Contact Author)

 Email address for DOUGLAS  BARNES
 University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
 727 East Dean Keeton Street
 Austin  , TX  78705
 United States
 512-689-1875 (Phone)



  
Suggested Citation
 Barnes, Douglas A, Deworming the Internet  .  Texas Law Review, Vol. 83,
No. 1 http://ssrn.com/abstract=622364


-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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DIY fingerprint idea thwarts ID thieves

2004-11-25 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/24/fingerprint_fights_id_theft/print.html

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT


 Original URL:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/24/fingerprint_fights_id_theft/

DIY fingerprint idea thwarts ID thieves
By John Leyden (john.leyden at theregister.co.uk)
Published Wednesday 24th November 2004 07:59 GMT

The Home Office is touting ID cards as a solution to ID theft in today's
Queen's Speech (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4034543.stm) but a
Yorkshire man has taken matters into his own hands. Jamie Jameson, a civil
servant from Scarborough in North Yorkshire, insists that credit can only
be extended in his name on production of a thumbprint.

Jameson hit on the idea of writing to the UK's three main credit reference
agencies - Equifax, Experian and Call Credit - and requesting that they put
a 'Notice of Correction' on his file stating that a print must be offered
with applications for loans or credit cards issued in his name. At the same
time he submitted his fingerprint.

This Notice of Correction of the first thing a prospective lender will see
when it calls up his records. Normally this facility provides a way for
individuals to explain why they have a county court judgement against their
name or other qualifications to their credit history. Jameson is using it
to do a cheap security check.

Although uncommon in the UK, thumbprints are often used as an audit
mechanism for people cashing cheques in US banks. A similar scheme was
trialled
(http://www.south-wales.police.uk/fe_news_w/news_details.asp?newsid=169) in
Wales. Jameson takes a little ink pad similar to that used in US banks
around with him all the time just in case he might need it.

If an application for credit is accepted without a thumbprint - against
Jameson's express instructions - then he will not be liable for losses. If
a would-be fraudster gives a false print on an application then it makes it
easier for them to be traced by the police. Lenders don't have to match
prints. Using prints just establishes an audit trail if anything goes
wrong, Jameson explained. It's not so much me proving who I am as
preventing someone else being me.

Jameson has been using the idea successfully for over a year. He concedes
that the scheme isn't foolproof and that it's possible to fake
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/05/16/gummi_bears_defeat_fingerprint_sensors/)
fingerprints (nothing's perfect, as he puts it). As far as Jameson knows
he's the only person who's using the technique in the UK. The scheme delays
the issuing of credit, which could be a problem with people who apply for
multiple accounts but this is a minor inconvenience for Jameson. This is
driven by the individual so there are no data protection issues. It's a
real deterrent to ID theft, he told El Reg. ®

-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Hacking tool 'draws FBI subpoenas'

2004-11-30 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/25/nmap_draws_fbi_subpoenas/print.html

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register » Security » Network Security »

 Original URL:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/25/nmap_draws_fbi_subpoenas/

Hacking tool 'draws FBI subpoenas'
By Kevin Poulsen, SecurityFocus (klp at securityfocus.com)
Published Thursday 25th November 2004 10:42 GMT

The author of the popular freeware hacking tool Nmap warned users this week
that FBI agents are increasingly seeking access to information from the
server logs of his download site, insecure.org.

I may be forced by law to comply with legal, properly served subpoenas,
wrote Fyodor, the 27-year-old Silicon Valley coder responsible for the
post scanning tool, in a mailing list message. At the same time, I'll try
to fight anything too broad... Protecting your privacy is important to me,
but Nmap users should be savvy enough to know that all of your network
activity leave traces.

Probably the most widely-used freeware hacking tool, Nmap is a
sophisticated port scanner that sends packets to a machine, or a network of
machines, in an attempt to discern what services are running and to make an
educated guess about the operating system. An Nmap port scan is a common
prelude to an intrusion attempt, and the tool is popular both with security
professionals performing penetration tests, and genuine intruders with
mischief in their hearts.

Last year Nmap crept into popular culture when the movie the Matrix
Reloaded depicted Carrie-Anne Moss's leather-clad superhacker Trinity
performing an Nmap portscan
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/05/16/matrix_sequel_has_hacker_cred/) on
a power grid computer prior to hacking in.

But success comes with a price, and on Tuesday Fyodor felt the need to
broach the sobering topic of FBI subpoenas with his users. He advised his
most privacy conscious users to use proxy servers or other techniques when
downloading the latest version of Nmap if they want to ensure their
anonymity.

In a telephone interview, Fyodor said the disclaimer wasn't prompted by any
particular incident, and that he'd received less than half-a-dozen
subpoenas this year. It's not a huge number, but I hadn't received any
before 2004, and so it's a striking new issue, he said.

None of the subpoenas produced anything, Fyodor says, either because they
sought old information that had already been deleted from his logs, or
because the subpoenas were improperly served. In every case the request has
been narrowly crafted, usually directed at finding out who visited the site
(http://www.insecure.org/) in a very short window of time, such as a five
minute period. They have not made any broad requests like, 'Give me anyone
who's visited insecure.org for a certain day,' he says.

Fyodor theorizes the FBI is investigating cases in which an intruder
downloaded Nmap directly onto a compromised machine. They assume that she
might have obtained that URL by visiting the Nmap download page from her
home computer, he wrote.

He confesses mixed feelings over the issue. The side of me that questions
authority is skeptical of these subpoenas, he told SecurityFocus. The
other side says, this may be a very serious crime committed ... and if I
were the victim of such a crime I would probably want people to cooperate

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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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MyKad too hi-tech to forge

2004-11-30 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2004/11/27/nation/9513530sec=nation

The Star Online  News
Saturday November 27, 2004

MyKad too hi-tech to forge


BY JANE RITIKOS

KUALA LUMPUR: The National Registration Department has detected about 10
cases of forged MyKad issued to illegal immigrants in the country since it
was introduced in 2001. 

 However, the chips in the cards were not forged ones. 

 Its director-general Datuk Wan Ibrahim Wan Ahmad said those caught with
the fake cards were Indonesians and Bangladeshis, who claimed they had paid
about RM200 for the card.  

 The fake cards looked like genuine ones except that the forgers could not
duplicate the smart chip imbedded in MyKad.  

 The physical appearance of the card looks real but the chip, a vital
component of the card, is functionless and cannot be used for transactions.
 

 This is because the features of the MyKad chip are so high-tech that they
cannot be duplicated. Even if they could make a forged chip it has no data
that is linked to our database, he said.  

 Wan Ibrahim also said the chip in the fake MyKad was not readable.  

 We don't believe the chip can ever be forged. The information in our chip
has data and biometric features, he said.  

 The MyKad chip stores information of the cardholders including their
identity cards, driving licences, passports and health data. 

 Wan Ibrahim said there were also those caught with fake MyKad which had
their laminated sheet tampered with to alter the physical details and
picture.  

 When these cards are read, the identity of the bearer is that of someone
else. These included those who were checked at the Immigration checkpoints
at the airport. At a glance the cards looked real, he added.  


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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
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I'm sorry, I haven't a clue

2004-11-30 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,5072953-103390,00.html

  Guardian |

 Comment
I'm sorry, I haven't a clue

However cracked they may be, our fascination for codes remains
Mark Lawson
Saturday November 27, 2004

The Guardian
The discovery of a code at Shugborough Hall, in Staffordshire -
O.U.O.S.V.A.V.V - that may disclose the location of the holy grail has
been widely compared to Dan Brown's super-selling novel The Da Vinci Code.

This Shugborough cryptograph - on which old Bletchley Park codebreakers
have been working - is seen as life imitating art, but the relationship
between popular fiction and reality is more often the reverse. Novels sell
well because they reflect our times: art imitating life, if often in heavy
disguise.

The biggest-selling novels of the 70s - Jaws and The Godfather - concerned
shadowy forces, fish and criminal, beneath the surface of society. We can
now see that these tales reflected the menaces to the American way from the
cold war, Vietnam and Watergate. Similarly, the millions drawn in Britain
at the same period to the animal epic Watership Down were drawn by a
sentimental regret that our traditional way of life was being swamped by
modernity.

So, if bestselling books contain hidden messages about our times, then The
Da Vinci Code, having cryptography as both content and method, may be the
ultimate popular fiction. We can guess that the reason Brown's book has
sold in such quantities is that we live surrounded by codes and puzzles
that we fear may be broken (such as our computer and digital
communications), or that we fear will not be (Osama bin Laden's
instructions to his followers, the big wedding in America that turned out
to be 9/11).

It's the same instinct - of fear and fascination with encryption - that
leads people to read both The Da Vinci Code and the newspaper stories about
a supposed clue to the holy grail. And, coincidentally, a new non-fiction
book reveals that one of the world's most famous figures believes that a
secret code gives meaning to his life. The Pope in Winter, by John
Cornwell, discusses John Paul II's conviction that his attempted
assassination in 1981 had been predicted by an apparition of Christ's
mother speaking to Portuguese children in 1917.

But the lesson of both the Shugborough puzzle and the Pope's divine code is
that predictive cryptography - as distinct from practical code-breaking,
such as the Enigma work at Bletchley - works better in fiction than fact.

The problem for code-breakers is that they are often forced to assume that
a setter sophisticated with letters or numbers would be sloppy with grammar
and spelling. Hence, notoriously, Nostradamus, credited by some fans with
predicting the rise of a German tyrant called Hister, must be assumed to
have had massive predictive powers but limited dictionary skills.

So it is with Shugborough's O.U.O.S.V.A.V.V sequence. Cryptologists suggest
that the letters can be made to say the Hebrew phrase Why Feather Curve
or, in Latin, Best wife, best sister, widower most loving vows
virtuously. But both interpretations feel like the kind of sentence you
end up with after failing to solve a puzzle, rather than what you would
begin with in setting one - a code consists of language to be broken, but
it's not clear why it would be rooted in broken English.

A similar application of linguistic imprecision to an art that should be
precise is the Pope's assumption of the Third Secret of Fatima. This final
dictation given to the Portuguese children by their shimmering vision was
sealed by the Vatican for many decades, leading to much prediction that it
contained the date of the end of the world. There were rumours of popes
fainting when they took the envelope out of their library.

At the turn of the millennium, John Paul II decided to break the code. He
revealed that the long-suppressed message foresaw that a man in white
would fall to the ground. He was convinced that these words anticipated
his shooting in Rome.

In fact, as Cornwell's book points out, you have to arm-lock the prophecy
to get this reading. The seer in Portugal predicted that the white-clad man
would be killed by a group of soldiers who fired bullets and arrows at
him. Numerous civilians would also die in the attack. This raises the
Nostradamus problem: why would someone with the ability to tell the story
of the future be shown such a corrupted narrative?

The need for codebreakers to ignore the bits that don't fit is why such
puzzles are most satisfying in novels where, unusually, both the cipher and
the solution are provided by the same mind and therefore must match. The
prophecies of Nostradamus have always sold well, but The Da Vinci Code is
Nostradamus without the bits that have proved to be embarrassingly wrong.

Those who believe that the road to the holy grail leads from a stone at
Lord Lichfield's family home should crack this code: T1BEM. The M, if it
helps, is minute.

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ACLU concerned that microchip passports won't be encrypted

2004-11-30 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.indystar.com/articles/5/197851-1715-P.html

The Indianapolis Star

ACLU concerned that microchip passports won't be encrypted

Associated Press
November 27, 2004
  


WASHINGTON -- The Bush administration opposes security measures for new
microchip-equipped passports that privacy advocates contend are needed to
prevent identity theft, government snooping or a terrorist attack,
according to State Department documents released Friday.

The passports would emit radio waves that could be read electronically from
as far away as 30 feet, according to the American Civil Liberties Union,
which obtained the documents under a Freedom of Information Act request.

The ability to remotely read personal data raises the possibility that
passport holders would be vulnerable to identity theft, the ACLU said. It
also would allow government agents to find out covertly who was attending a
political meeting or make it easier for terrorists to target Americans
traveling abroad, the ACLU said.

Frank Moss of the State Department said the United States wants to ensure
the safety and security of Americans traveling abroad. But encrypting the
data might make it more difficult for other countries to read the
passports, Moss said.

All new U.S. passports issued by the end of 2005 are expected to have a
chip containing the owner's name, birth date, issuing office and a
biometric identifier -- a photo of the owner's face.
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44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Some Secret: Open House, Open Bar

2004-11-30 Thread R.A. Hettinga
Must have passed some kinda big supplemental.

Cheers,
RAH
---

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A8583-2004Nov23?language=printer

The Washington Post

washingtonpost.com
Round-Trip or One-Way Tickets?


By Al Kamen

 Wednesday, November 24, 2004; Page A19

Some Secret: Open House, Open Bar



Remember a while back when it came out that intelligence agencies such as
the National Security Agency -- the supersecret spy crowd -- did not have
the resources to keep up with the flood of intercepts to be able to
translate terrorists' chatter on a timely basis?

This naturally caused a big fuss, and Congress pledged big bucks to get the
spooks up to speed. Seems to have worked out fine, judging from an invite
we got to attend an open house Dec. 7 at the National Cryptologic Museum
behind the Shell station at Fort Meade.

Lots of fine finger food to be had, including a brie encrote with brown
sugar and pecans, some Swiss cheese and chablis stuffed mushroom caps, a
bit of roast turkey with cranberry mayo and mini pumpkin cheesecakes.

Our very fine invite with the NSA gold-embossed seal notes Open bar.

Must have passed some kinda big supplemental.

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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Quantum memory for light

2004-12-05 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.physorg.com/news2227.html

PhysOrg

 Nano and Quantum Physics Technology Applied Physics Space and Earth
science Electronic Devices Striking Research and Developments

Quantum memory for light

December 03, 2004


Realization of quantum memory for light allows the extension of quantum
communication far beyond 100 km

In the macroscopic classical world, it is possible to copy information from
one device into another. We do this everyday, when, for example, we copy
files in a computer or we tape a conversation. In the microscopic world,
however, it is not possible to copy the quantum information from one system
into another one. It can only be transferred, without leaving any trace on
the original one. The manipulation and transfer of quantum information is,
in fact, a very active field of research in physics and informatics, since
it is the basis of all the protocols and algorithms in the fields of
quantum communication and computation, which may revolutionize the world of
information. In the work published in Nature, November 25, 2004, scientists
from the Max Planck Institute for Quantum Optics in Garching and the Niels
Bohr Institute in Copenhagen have proposed a scheme to transfer the quantum
state of a pulse of light onto a set of atoms and have demonstrated it
experimentally.
--
 Image: Experimental set-up: Atomic memory unit consisting of two caesium
cells inside magnetic shields 1 and 2. The path of the recorded and
read-out light pulses is shown with arrows. (Max Planck Institute of
Quantum Optics / Niels Bohr Institute Copenhagen)
-
In the experiment, a pulse of light is prepared in a certain quantum state
whose properties (polarization) are randomly chosen. Then, the light is
sent through a set of atoms which are contained in a small transparent box
(an atomic cell) at room temperature. In the cell, the light and atoms
interact with each other, giving rise to an entangled state in which the
two systems remain correlated. After abandoning the atomic sample, the
pulse of light is detected. Due to the fact that the light and atoms are
entangled, the process of measurement on the light affects the quantum
state of the atoms in such a way that they acquire the original properties
of the light. In this way, the state of polarization of the photons is
transferred into the polarization state of the atoms. This action at a
distance, in which by performing a measurement on a system it affects the
state of another system which is at a different location is one of the most
intriguing manifestations of Quantum Mechanics, and is the basis of
applications such as quantum cryptography or phenomena like teleportation.

In order to check that the transfer of polarization has indeed taken place,
the researcher measured the polarization of the atoms at the beginning of
the experiment and compared it with the original state of polarization of
the light. In the experiment, these two polarizations coincided up to a 70%
of the time. The main reason for the imperfections where the due to
spontaneous emission, a process in which the atoms absorb the photons but
then emit them in a different direction such that they do not go towards
the photo-detector.

A question that the authors of the paper had to carefully analyze was to
what extent 70% percent of coincidence is enough to claim that the process
was successful. Or, in other words, could they obtain the same result by
measuring the state of polarization of the photons and then preparing the
state of the atoms accordingly? The answer is no. Due to the basic
properties of quantum mechanics, the state of polarization of a laser pulse
cannot be fully detected. Due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, it
is impossible to measure the full polarization exactly. In fact, as some of
the authors together with K. Hammerer and M. Wolf (from the Max Planck
Institute of Quantum Optics) have recently shown, the best one can do using
this latter method would be 50%. This implies that the experiment indeed
has successfully demonstrated the transfer beyond what one could do without
creating the entangled state.

The current experiment paves the way for new experiments in which the
information contained in light can be mapped onto atomic clusters and then
back into the light again. In this way, one could not only store the state
of light in an atomic clusters, but also retrieve it. This process will be
necessary if we want to build quantum repeaters, that is, devices which
will allow the extension of quantum communication far beyond the distances
(of the order of 100 km) which are achieved nowadays.
 Original work:

B. Julsgaard, J. Sherson, J.I. Cirac, J. Fiurásek, und E.S. Polzik
Experimental demonstration of quantum memory for light
Nature 432, 482 (2004)

Source: Max Planck Institute


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... 

Certicom Extends Security Platform, Enabling Developers to Address Government Market

2004-12-06 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=109STORY=/www/story/12-06-2004/0002584252EDATE=

Certicom Extends Security Platform, Enabling Developers to Address
Government Market
 
Certicom Security Architecture for Government provides integrated suite
of security toolkits that ensure critical FIPS 140-2 and ECC compliance

MISSISSAUGA, ON, Dec. 6 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ - Certicom Corp.
(TSX: CIC), the authority for strong, efficient cryptography, has extended
its Certicom Security Architecture(TM), enabling developers to embed a
FIPS 140-2-validated cryptographic module into their products and be
eligible for sale into the federal government market. The Certicom Security
Architecture also provides developers with an efficient way to enhance new
and existing applications with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and meet
the field-of-use guidelines set out by the National Security Agency (NSA)
to protect mission-critical national security information.
The adoption of ECC within the U.S. federal government is proceeding
rapidly, and Certicom is taking a leadership role in enabling agencies and
government contractors to integrate the strongest security technology into
their products. The comprehensive Certicom Security Architecture provides a
bridge between legacy crypto systems and ECC, and gives developers the
flexibility to standardize code among different security environments and
platforms - maximizing code re-use and portability. This flexibility also
means developers will not need to redesign their solutions to meet future
government crypto requirements.
Hardware and software developers are increasingly realizing that
compliance with regulatory requirements for security is a pressing concern,
said Dr. Jerry Krasner, vice president and chief analyst at Embedded Market
Forecasters (http://www.embeddedforecast.com ), the premier market
intelligence and
advisory firm in the embedded technology industry. A cost-effective approach
is to use a tool that ensures compliance with FIPS 140-2 requirements and
eliminates the potentially costly step of third-party FIPS validation of a
device or application.
Strong security is a key requirement across all networked applications
and devices. The Certicom Security Architecture allows developers who may have
little security expertise to add FIPS 140-2 validated security to their
solutions while avoiding the time and expense of the FIPS 140-2 validation
process. A common application programming interface (API) unifies Certicom's
proven developer toolkits to create a plug-and-play security architecture that
includes higher level protocol functionality that can operate in FIPS mode,
such as SSL and PKI.
Certicom Security Architecture for Government makes it easy for OEMs,
ISVs and integrators to sell products into the government sector that meet
strict government security requirements, including FIPS 140-2 and ECC, said
Roy Pereira, vice-president, marketing and product management at Certicom.
The National Security Agency is committed to making elliptic curve
cryptography the most widely used public-key cryptosystem for securing U.S.
government information. Certicom is committed to providing the technology and
tools to make that possible.

The Security Builder developer toolkits integrated into the Certicom
Security Architecture for Government include:
-  Security Builder(R) GSE(TM), a FIPS 140-2-validated cryptographic
   toolkit;
-  Security Builder(R) NSE(TM), a cryptographic toolkit for national
   security information;
-  Security Builder(R) Crypto(TM), a cross-platform cryptographic
   toolkit;
-  Security Builder(R) PKI(TM), a digital certificate management toolkit;
-  Security Builder(R) SSL(TM), a complete Secure Sockets Layer toolkit;
   and
-  Security Builder(R) IPSec(TM), a client-side virtual private network
   toolkit.

Certicom Security Architecture for Government is available immediately,
except for Security Builder NSE which is available in Q1 2005. For more
information, visit http://www.certicom.com/gov .

About Certicom
Certicom Corp. (TSX:CIC) is the authority for strong, efficient
cryptography required by software vendors and device manufacturers to embed
security into their products. Adopted by the U.S. government's National
Security Agency (NSA), Certicom technologies for Elliptic Curve Cryptography
(ECC) provide the most security per bit of any known public-key scheme, making
it ideal for resource-constrained environments. Certicom products and services
are currently licensed to more than 300 customers including Motorola, Oracle,
Research In Motion, Terayon, Texas Instruments and Unisys. Founded in 1985,
Certicom is headquartered in Mississauga, ON, Canada, with offices in Ottawa,
ON; Reston, VA; San Mateo, CA; and London, England. Visit
http://www.certicom.com .

Certicom, Certicom Security Architecture, Certicom CodeSign, 

Australian snooping laws pass lower house

2004-12-09 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://australianit.news.com.au/common/print/0,7208,11636719%5E15319%5E%5Enbv%5E15306,00.html

Australian IT

Snooping laws pass lower house

DECEMBER 09, 2004

POLICE will be able to access stored voice mail, email and mobile phone
text messages under new laws passed by federal parliament today.

The laws recognise voice mail, email and SMS messages should fall outside
telecommunication interception laws originally designed to stop law
enforcement agencies from intercepting phone calls.

 Police and other law enforcement officers will still need a search warrant
or a right of access to communications or storage equipment to access voice
mail, email and SMS under the changes.

 These amendments make it easier for our law enforcement and regulatory
agencies to access stored communications that could provide evidence of
criminal activity, Attorney-General Philip Ruddock said.

 They will also assist in securing information systems by allowing network
administrators to review stored communications for viruses and other
inappropriate content.

 Labor referred the proposed law to a Senate committee three times before
agreeing to it today.

 Opposition homeland security spokesman Robert McClelland said there needed
to be a distinction between stored messages and live telephone
conversations.

 There have been concerns expressed about privacy and there always has
been a distinction between an eavesdropper and the reader of other people's
correspondence, he said.

 But written documents have always been susceptible to legal process, to
warrants.

 Everyone that creates a document does so knowing that that document can
be read by others and can be subject to legal process.

 I don't think anything turns on the fact the document is written on a
computer and sent by email as opposed to being written in long hand and
popped in the letter box.

 The laws are a temporary measure and will cease to have effect after 12
months when a review of the measures will be undertaken.

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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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New Global Directory of OpenPGP Keys

2004-12-09 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2004 18:48:09 +0100
From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: New Global Directory of OpenPGP Keys
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4i
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/12/09/1446203
Posted by: michael, on 2004-12-09 15:50:00

   from the how-may-i-direct-your-call dept.
   Gemini writes The [1]PGP company just announced a new type of
   [2]keyserver for all your OpenPGP keys. This server verifies (via
   mailback verification, like mailing lists) that the email address on
   the key actually reaches someone. Dead keys age off the server, and
   you can even remove keys if you forget the passphrase. In a classy
   move, they've included support for those parts of the OpenPGP standard
   that PGP doesn't use, but [3]GnuPG does.

   [4]Click Here

References

   1. http://www.pgp.com/downloads/beta/globaldirectory/index.html
   2. http://keyserver-beta.pgp.com/
   3. http://www.gnupg.org/
   4.
http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=5671alloc_id=12342site_id=1request_id=2385427o
p=clickpage=%2farticle%2epl

- End forwarded message -
--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

--- end forwarded text


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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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Toshiba shows practical quantum cryptography

2004-12-13 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/print/?TYPE=storyAT=39181033-39020357t-1013c

Toshiba shows practical quantum cryptography
Rupert Goodwins
ZDNet UK
December 13, 2004, 18:15 GMT

Toshiba Research Europe demonstrated last week what it claims is the
world's first reliable automated quantum cryptography system and run it
continuously for over a week.

 The system, which relies on single photons to transmit an untappable key
over standard optical fibres, is capable of delivering thousands of keys a
second and can be effective over distances of more than 100km.

 Although no price or launch date has been set yet, Toshiba is already in
talks with a number of telcos and end users in preparation for
commercialisation of the technology -- which offers the possibility of
significantly more secure networking.

 We're talking to a number of potential end users at the minute, Dr
Andrew Shields, group leader of Toshiba's Cambridge-based Quantum
Information Group told ZDNet UK. We're planning to do some trials in the
City of London next year, and are targeting users in the financial sector.
We've also had some interest from telcos, including MCI with whom we've
been running the installed fibre tests.

 The system works by transmitting a long stream of photons modulated to
represent ones and zeros, most of which are lost along the way. These
photons can be modulated in one of two ways through two different kinds of
polarisation, but according to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle it is
impossible to know both the kind of polarisation and the data represented
by the photon. The receiver has to assume one to get the other, which it
will frequently get wrong.

 The receiver picks up and attempts to decode a few out of those that make
it, and reports back to the sender which ones it received and decoded thus
making up a key that both ends know. Any interceptor can't know what the
value of those photons is, because by reading them in transit it will
destroy them, and it can't replace them after reading them because it can
never know their exact details.

 Although Toshiba has been developing special hardware to create and
analyse single photon transactions by quantum dots -- effectively
artificial atoms integrated with control circuitry -- the current
cryptographic equipment uses standard parts, including Peltier-effect
cooled detectors operating at very low noise levels. The next generation of
equipment is expected to use this new technology.

 Toshiba is also looking at ways to increase the range of the systems
beyond the limitations of a single fibre -- because a photon can't be
intercepted and retransmitted, it's not possible for the technology to
incorporate repeaters to overcome the losses in multiple segments. However,
says Shields, there is a possibility that repeaters may be created using
quantum teleportation -- a new and still experimental effect where the
quantum state of a particle can be transmitted across distances without it
needing to be fully measured.

 Toshiba Research Europe Ltd is part of the European SECOQC project, which
is working towards the development of a global network for secure
communication using quantum technology.


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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs

2004-12-15 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/15/cryptography_research/print.html

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register » Internet and Law » Digital Rights/Digital Wrongs »


Cryptography Research wants piracy speed bump on HD DVDs
By Faultline (peter at rethinkresearch.biz)
Published Wednesday 15th December 2004 11:49 GMT

Analysis Just about a year from today, if not sooner, if we believe the
outpourings of both the DVD Forum and the Blu-Ray Disc Association, we will
be able to go out to the shops and buy blue laser, high definition, high
density DVDs in two completely different designs. We will also be able to
buy the players and recorders by then, as well as studio content from
virtually every major studio in the world, on one or the other system.

If you believe the hype, DVD manufacturers will likely have to buy in two
types of DVD manufacturing equipment. Households will have to buy two DVD
players. Consumers will have to buy one PC with one type of high density
DVD player and buy another separate player to read the other format of disk.
We neither believe the hype, nor understand the argument between the two
formats. Surely a single format is better for everyone, but it appears not.
Every round of format wars that have gone on since the original VHS Betamax
wars, has been split, and the result a draw, and it looks like this one
will be too.

In the end the devices are likely to be virtually identical. The Sony-
Panasonic-Philips camp that inspired the Blu-ray version may have slightly
more capacity on their discs, that's the official view right now, but it
might change. They also have devices out right now and have had them for
over a year, but they are very expensive, up at around $2,000 and are not
the volume versions that will be able to play pre-recorded material.
Eventually these devices will be about 10 per cent more than DVD players
are now.

The DVD Forum backed Toshiba and NEC technology may be slightly cheaper for
studios to manufacture, but then again we only have the word of Toshiba on
that, and most DVD producers seem set on supporting both.

The disks need to play on PCs, as well as DVDs and games consoles, and it
is unlikely that anyone is going to shoot themselves in the foot by making
a disc that is incompatible with any of these devices.

So Microsoft's VC 9 codec has to be supported, as does the prevalent MPEG2
and H.264 codecs, and nobody is planning to argue the toss about the
quality of sound from Dolby. So there is a chance that all of the software
on top of these disks is going to be identical.

In the end all of the Blu-ray manufacturers are still in the DVD Forum, and
given that the Blu-ray leaders make about 90 per cent of the worlds DVD
players and that half of the studios have backed the DVD Forum standard,
their players may well end up playing both formats. The early consumers may
well be asking What's the difference a year from now having little clue
as to how different the two technologies are, under the hood.

But what if they each choose a different way to protect the content on
their disks? How much danger would that put the two groups in?

The Content Scrambling System of the DVD has come in for a lot of criticism
over the years, as piracy has become relatively rampant. It was designed
more or less as a speed bump to put off anyone other than the professional
pirate. But then along came the internet, and it has become possible for
anyone to download CSS circumvention or to read up, on various websites,
how to go about it. The speed bump has been somewhat flattened and it needs
reinforcement in the next technology.

So it falls to these same companies to build something for the studios that
will be rather harder and more persuasive, to act as a hurdle against
piracy for these new DVDs. In fact an organization called Advanced Access
Content System (AACS), formed back in July by such notables as IBM, Intel,
Microsoft, Panasonic, Sony, Toshiba, Disney and Warner Brothers has come
together in order to create a decent speed bump against piracy that should
last at least for the next decade, a decade during which broadband lines
improve to the point where it will be child's play to download even a high
definition movie.

The definition of what is required has been very clear from the studios.
They want a system that has the ability for the security logic to be
renewed and which should also have some form of forensic marking in order
to help track pirates.

At the heart of this protection system will be the safety of the revenue of
all the major studios, which now get way in excess of 50 per cent of any
given film's revenues from DVD sales.

Faultline talked over such a system with its authors this week, who are
optimistic about its bid to become the new, but more sophisticated CSS for
the next generation DVD disk.

Cryptographic Research's senior security architect, who also mockingly
refers to himself as chief anti-pirate is Carter Laren, and Cryptography

Digipass Starts to Make a Mark

2004-12-22 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110348908376704197,00.html

The Wall Street Journal

  December 20, 2004

Digipass Starts to Make a Mark
Vasco Enhances Online Security
 As Web Banks Gain Popularity

By STEVE DE BONVOISIN
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
December 20, 2004


BRUSSELS -- Life-insurance salesman Renaud Bruneels, 34 years old, says he
doesn't have time to take care of life's little administrative issues by
visiting a bank during regular business hours.

The Belgian has solved the problem by becoming one of 12 million users
world-wide of Vasco Data Security International Inc.'s Digipass. The
pocket-size gadget, which looks like a calculator, lets him use a single
password to pay everything from garbage fees to phone bills over the
Internet.

INSIDE TECH

1
See complete coverage2 of Europe's technology sector, from cellphones to
software.

It gives me the level of security I need to ... do all my banking
transactions, Mr. Bruneels says.

Vasco, which is based in Brussels and Chicago, is riding an uptick in
online banking -- particularly in Europe, which has moved ahead of the
U.S.; the company believes that the U.S. market will take off within the
next two years, as banks roll out the service to retail customers.

Digipass can be used to access anything online, from bank accounts to
secure servers to a corporate intranet. Given a username and password, it
issues a one-time code to be used for purchases or transactions on the Web.
Because the code only works once, hackers who infiltrate a computer can't
use it again. The added level of security sets the Digipass system apart
from other online transactions via mobile handsets or laptop computers.

Vasco was founded in 1997 by Digipass inventor Jan Valcke, a Belgian, and
Ken Hunt, an American who ran an online-authentication software company.
But after the Internet bubble burst in 2000, customers hesitated to invest
in Internet banking security.

Digipass came out a little too early ... when the big focus was on viruses
and not on identity theft, said Edward Ching, technology analyst at Rodman
 Renshaw in New York.

The stock fell from a high of $25 (¤18.81) in February 2000 to under $1 in
early 2003, forcing Vasco to delist from Nasdaq's National Market and move
on to the SmallCap Market.

In 2002, Mr. Hunt took over as chief executive. Vasco switched to just in
time production, and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars training
resellers to tackle the corporate-access market.

In November, the company posted its third consecutive quarterly sales
increase. Vasco forecasts 2004 sales will rise between 23% and 25% from
$22.87 million in 2003, and on Thursday Vasco said it expects 2005 sales to
grow 35% to 45% with gross margins in the range of 60% to 65%.

On Friday, Vasco shares fell eight cents to $6.40 in 4 p.m. Nasdaq Stock
Market trading.

Vasco still faces stiff competition. It has only about $10 million in cash,
putting it at a disadvantage against U.S. rival RSA Security Inc., when
chasing big contracts. In September, RSA signed a landmark deal with Time
Warner Inc.'s America Online service to provide authentication for users
signing into their online e-mail accounts.

We don't have the brand recognition we deserve, says Mr. Hunt, who admits
Vasco wasn't even invited to bid on the Time Warner contract. As a result,
the company has increased its presence in trade shows together with
partners such as Novell Inc. and Lucent Technologies Inc., and is bringing
prospective and current clients together in workshops to help them solve
operational problems.

More than 100 million households world-wide now bank online, and that
number is expected to triple to 300 million or more households by the end
of the decade. Europe has taken the lead. About 37% of all Internet users
on the Continent bank online, as opposed to 17% in the U.S., according to
reports from research firms Gartner and Forrester Research. The number of
Europeans carrying out financial transactions on the Net is expected to
rise to 130 million by 2007, compared with 67 million Americans.

Banks are Digipass's main customers. Digipass is the most secure system
available and the one which offers the greatest mobility, said Liliane
Tackaert, spokeswoman for Belgo-Dutch banking giant Fortis NV. About
775,000 of the bank's clients in Belgium and Luxembourg use the service.

Rabobank, of the Netherlands, Europe's biggest online bank in terms of
online customers, has more than two million Digipasses in use.

Vasco hopes it will become a lead supplier for the new European EMV payment
card next year. Developed jointly by Europay International, MasterCard Inc.
and Visa International, the card requires a PIN number in addition to a
usual signature when buying goods in a shop, as well as a one-time code --
such as the one generated by Digipass -- to buy goods online or over the
phone. In addition to Vasco, Xiring, of Suresnes, France, and U.S.-based
ActivCard Corp., Fremont, California, are in the 

Re: International meet on cryptology in Chennai

2004-12-22 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Comment: DomainKeys? See http://antispam.yahoo.com/domainkeys
Date: Tue, 21 Dec 2004 00:08:49 -0800 (PST)
From: Sarad AV [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: International meet on cryptology in Chennai
To: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


--- R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



They call it IndoCrypt
http://www-rocq.inria.fr/codes/indocrypt2004/

Sarad.



__
Do you Yahoo!?
Meet the all-new My Yahoo! - Try it today!
http://my.yahoo.com


--- end forwarded text


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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Border Patrol hails new ID system

2004-12-22 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041220-103705-9177r

The Washington Times
 www.washingtontimes.com

Border Patrol hails new ID system
By Jerry Seper
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published December 21, 2004
Border Patrol agents assigned to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
identified and arrested 23,502 persons with criminal records nationwide
through a new biometric integrated fingerprint system during a three-month
period beginning in September, CBP officials said yesterday.
 Most of those arrested were foreign nationals.
 This 21st-century biometric identification technology is a critical
law-enforcement tool for our CBP Border Patrol agents, said CBP
Commissioner Robert C. Bonner. It allows CBP Border Patrol agents to
quickly identify criminals by working faster, smarter and employing
technology to better secure the nation.
 Mr. Bonner has described the new system as absolutely critical to
CBP's priority mission of keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of
the country, adding that it gives the agents the ability to identify those
with criminal backgrounds we could never have identified before.
 The program, known as the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS), is a biometric identification technology
enabling Border Patrol agents to search CBP's Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT) and the FBI's criminal fingerprint database
simultaneously, CBP spokesman Mario Villarreal said.
 It allows Border Patrol agents to rapidly identify people with
outstanding warrants and criminal histories by electronically comparing a
live-scanned 10-fingerprint entry against a comprehensive national database
of previously captured fingerprints, he said.
 The IAFIS/IDENT system went on line this year at all 148 Border Patrol
station throughout the country. It began as a pilot project in San Diego,
where it was employed at the Border Patrol's Brown Field, Calif., station,
and at the Calexico, Calif., port of entry.
 During the three-month period this year, the agents identified and
detained 84 homicide suspects, 37 kidnapping suspects, 151 sexual assault
suspects, 212 robbery suspects, 1,238 suspects for assaults of other types,
and 2,630 suspects implicated in dangerous narcotics-related charges.
 CBP is the unified border agency within the Department of Homeland
Security charged with the management, control and protection of the
nation's borders at and between the ports of entry. CBP is charged with
keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing
hundreds of U.S. laws.

-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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A Force Field in Flat Gray to Protect a Wireless Network

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/23/technology/circuits/23pain.html?pagewanted=printposition=

The New York Times

December 23, 2004

A Force Field in Flat Gray to Protect a Wireless Network
 Adam Baer


s wireless networks have proliferated, computer security companies have
come up with increasingly complex defenses against hackers: password
protection, encryption, biometrics. Insulating the interior of a house,
apartment or office from radio-wave interference is a simpler concept that
has yet to become a popular consumer strategy, but a new product called
DefendAir from Force Field Wireless could change that.

Available online at forcefieldwireless.com, the product is a latex house
paint that has been laced with copper and aluminum fibers that form an
electromagnetic shield, blocking most radio waves and protecting wireless
networks. Priced at $69 a gallon and available only in flat gray (it can be
used as a primer), one coat shields Wi-Fi, WiMax and Bluetooth networks
operating at frequencies from 100 megahertz to 2.4 gigahertz.

 Two or three coats will achieve the paint's maximum level of protection,
good for networks operating at up to five gigahertz. Force Field Wireless
also sells a paint additive ($34 for a 32-ounce container, enough to treat
a gallon of paint) and $39 window-shield films.

 Harold Wray, a Force Field Wireless spokesman, said the paint must be
carefully applied. Radio waves find leaks, he said.

 It should be applied selectively, he said, because it might hinder the
performance of radios, televisions and cellphones. Our main goal is to
shield your wireless radio waves from hackers and outside interference, he
said. Plus, today, many people watch cable television. Adam Baer

Copyrigh
-- 
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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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U.S. passport privacy: Over and out?

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2004/12/22/news/passport.html

 



U.S. passport privacy: Over and out?

By Hiawatha Bray The Boston Globe
 Thursday, December 23, 2004


 It's December 2005 and you're all set for Christmas in Vienna. You have
your most fashionable cold-weather gear, right down to Canada's national
red maple leaf embroidered on your jacket and backpack, to conceal your
American citizenship from hostile denizens of Europe.

 But your secret isn't really safe. As you stroll through the terminal, you
pass a nondescript man with a briefcase. The briefcase contains a powerful
radio scanner, and simply by walking past, you've identified yourself as an
American. Without laying a finger on you, the man has electronically
skimmed the data in your passport.

 Science fiction? The American Civil Liberties Union doesn't think so.
Neither does Bruce Schneier, software engineer and author of multiple books
on computer security, nor Katherine Albrecht, a privacy activist in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. They are all worried about a State Department
plan to put radio identification tags in all future U.S. passports,
beginning next year.

 That way, American passport data can be read merely by waving it past a
radio detector. But whose radio detector? That's what worries many people.

 Somebody can identify you as an American citizen from across the street
because of the passport in your back pocket, said Albrecht, founder of a
Web site concerned with the matter, spychips.com. You're a walking target.

 Nonsense, replies a State Department spokeswoman, Kelly Shannon. We're
going to prevent the unauthorized skimming of the data, Shannon said.

 The U.S. government thinks the new passports will be harder to forge and
easier to verify than the current model, without causing undue risk of
identity theft.

 It is all part of the continuing debate over radio frequency
identification systems, also known as RFID. Tags that let people zoom
through a highway toll booth contain an RFID chip. Many American pets have
them embedded under their skin and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
has approved doing the same for people, to provide reliable medical
information to emergency room doctors.

 But privacy advocates like Albrecht contend that government agencies and
big corporations want to embed RFID chips into virtually every product,
giving them the ability to track almost every move that people make.

 The RFID chips contain a tiny bit of information that is transmitted via
radio when the chip comes within range of a reading device. The chip could
broadcast a simple code number, or it could contain a lot more information,
like a traveler's name, nationality and digital photograph. This is what
the chips planned for future U.S. passports will do, part of a plan to make
the passport system more secure.

 But according to government documents released by the civil liberties
union, early versions of the system allowed detection of personal data by a
snoop 30 feet, or 9 meters, away. Shannon, of the State Department,
dismissed this research, saying the equipment needed to capture the data
was too complex and heavy to be used undercover.

 That is not much comfort to Schneier, the computer security expert.
Technology only gets better, he said. It never gets worse.

 Schneier figures that would-be spies and snoops will find ways to pick up
signals from the passport chips.

 The chips might be made more secure by encrypting the data they contain.
That way, it would be useless even if intercepted. But the State Department
opposes that idea, because immigration officials in many poor countries
cannot afford the necessary decryption gear.

 Encryption limits the global interoperability of the passport, said Shannon.

 Why use a radio-based identity system at all? Smart chips, like those
found in some credit cards, are plentiful and cheap, and they don't
broadcast. You slide them through a chip reader that instantly scoops up
the data.

 But the International Civil Aviation Organization, which sets global
standards for passports, has decided on the use of a noncontact
technology - another way of saying radio-based identification.

 So will Americans be stuck with high-tech passports that beam their
personal data to all comers? Not necessarily. Turns out there's a simple
fix: a passport cover made of aluminum foil. It would form what engineers
call a Faraday cage, after Michael Faraday, the 19th-century British
physicist who discovered the characteristics of electromagnetic waves.

 Wrap an RFID chip inside a Faraday cage, and the electromagnetic waves
from the chip reader can't get in and activate the chip.

 The State Department says it may use the principle to give travelers an
added sense of security. No, there won't be rolls of aluminum foil included
with every passport. Instead, the passport cover may include a network of
wires woven into the fabric. Fold the passport shut, and there's your
Faraday 

Banks Test ID Device for Online Security

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga
Okay. So AOL and Banks are *selling* RSA keys???

Could someone explain this to me?

No. Really. I'm serious...

Cheers,
RAH



http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/24/technology/24online.html?oref=loginpagewanted=printposition=

The New York Times

December 24, 2004

Banks Test ID Device for Online Security
 By JENNIFER A. KINGSON


or years, banks gave away toasters to people who opened checking accounts;
soon they may be distributing a more modern kind of appliance.

Responding to an increase in Internet fraud, some banks and brokerage firms
plan to begin issuing small devices that would help their customers prove
their identities when they log on to online banking, brokerage and
bill-payment programs.

 E*Trade Financial intends to introduce such a product in the first few
months of 2005. And  U.S. Bancorp says it will test a system, though it has
not given a timetable.

The devices, which are hand-held and small enough to attach to a keychain,
are expected to cost customers roughly $10. They display a six-digit number
that changes once a minute; people seeking access to their accounts would
type in that number as well as a user name and password. The devices are
freestanding; they do not plug into a computer.

Some banks, like  Wachovia of Charlotte, N.C., and  Commerce Bancshares of
Kansas City, Mo., already use these hardware tokens to identify employees
and corporate customers, and say they are evaluating the technology for
retail banking use. Others, like Fidelity Investments and  Bank of America,
are researching the matter.

Every single major bank is considering it, said James Van Dyke, principal
and founder of Javelin Strategy and Research of Pleasanton, Calif., which
advises financial services companies on payments and technology issues.

 Although there are drawbacks in terms of cost and convenience - as well as
questions about what would happen if a customer lost the device or it were
stolen - there is growing pressure from bank regulators to add safeguards
of this type to online financial services. In a report last week, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which insures bank deposits, said
that existing authentication systems were not secure enough and that an
extra layer of security should be added to the sign-in process.

The financial services industry's current reliance on passwords for remote
access to banking applications offers an insufficient level of security,
the F.D.I.C.'s report said. Two-factor authentication, which typically
includes a memorized password and a hardware security device, has the
potential to eliminate, or significantly reduce, account hijacking, it
said.

To be sure, there are many ways to add the kind of security that the agency
is seeking, and any number of technology vendors eager to supply products.
The F.D.I.C. evaluated some possible alternatives, including smart cards,
which are plastic cards with embedded microprocessor chips; biometrics,
which identify people by their fingerprints, voice or physical
characteristics; and shared secrets, in which a customer is asked a
question that, in theory, only he or she could answer.

But the system that has so far taken root in the market is the one that
relies on number-changing hardware tokens, which have the shape and feel of
the plastic security devices that people click to unlock their cars.

Several large banks in Europe and Australia - including Credit Suisse,  ABN
Amro and Rabobank - already issue these tokens to customers, sometimes
making them bear the cost of the device. In the United States in September,
America Online introduced a program, AOL Passcode, that lets subscribers
buy the keychain device for $9.95 and use it for authentication purposes,
at a subscriber fee of $1.95 to $4.95 a month, depending on the number of
screen names linked to it.

Proponents of these devices are aware that they present other problems.
Financial companies are concerned about making online banking less
convenient and about adding fees for the hardware token. Customers with
accounts at several institutions may wind up with an unwieldy number of
tokens or swamp call centers with questions about the new systems.

Several foreign banks have made the tokens mandatory for online customers.
E*Trade, which is expected to be the first United States financial
institution to introduce the program for retail customers, will make it
optional and charge for the device.

Joshua S. Levine, chief technology officer at E*Trade, said the technology
seemed to provide the comfort that most people want. And when you have
your money at stake, he said, you really want to feel comfortable.

E*Trade has been testing its program for the last two months, giving the
devices free to 200 interested customers. So far, the tests have attracted
customers with high incomes who conduct many transactions and tend to be
knowledgeable about technology, Mr. Levine said. Based on the feedback
these customers have been giving us, he added, we feel it 

AOL Help : About AOL® PassCode

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://help.channels.aol.com/article.adp?catId=6sCId=415sSCId=4090articleId=217623
Have questions? Search AOL Help articles and tutorials:



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Products and Services   AOL® PassCode

 About AOL® PassCode

After purchasing and receiving your AOL® PassCode, go to AOL Keyword:
PassCode and this screen appears, allowing you to secure your screen name
to your AOL PassCode. On this screen you can also release your screen name
from AOL PassCode, change service plans and order additional AOL PassCodes.

Account Status

This area lists your current AOL PassCode service plan, including the
secured and unsecured screen names within the plan. If the maximum number
of screen names in your service plan are secured to your AOL PassCode, the
Manage Service Plan button will appear.

View PassCode Account Activity

Displays a screen listing a summary of your AOL PassCode account activity,
such as the date you purchased your subscription, ordered AOL PassCode
devices and details such as the price plan ordered and the quantity of AOL
PassCodes ordered.

Secure Screen Name

To help protect your screen name with AOL PassCode, you need to secure your
screen name to your specific AOL PassCode device. Each AOL PassCode has a
unique serial number engraved on its back. By associating your screen name
with a specific AOL PassCode serial number, the AOL service will know which
six-digit number needs to be entered at each sign-on, helping to protect
your screen name from unauthorized access.

To secure a screen name to your AOL PassCode
1.  Sign on to the AOL® service with the screen name you want to
secure to your AOL PassCode.
2.  Go to AOL Keyword: PassCode.
3.  Click Secure Screen Name.
4.  Type the eight-digit serial number engraved on the back of your
AOL PassCode.
5.  Type the six-digit number displayed on the front of your AOL
PassCode.
6.  Click Save. A confirmation screen appears. This change takes
effect immediately and will be enforced the next time you sign on to the
AOL service. Whenever you sign on to the AOL service using the screen name
that you secured to AOL PassCode, you will be required to enter the
six-digit number on the front of your AOL PassCode.

Release Screen Name

When the screen name you signed on to the AOL service with has already been
secured to your AOL PassCode, the Secure Screen Name button changes to
Release Screen Name.

If you no longer want to use AOL PassCode, you must release your screen
name from your AOL PassCode so that you will no longer need to enter a
six-digit code when you sign on to any AOL service.

To release your screen name from your AOL PassCode
1.  Sign on to the AOL service with the screen name you want to
release from your AOL PassCode.
2.  Go to AOL Keyword: PassCode.
3.  Click Release Screen Name. The Secure Screen Name button changes
to Release Screen Name when that particular screen name is secured to AOL
PassCode.
4.  Enter the answer to your account security question. For more
information, see What is an Account Security Question.
5.  Type the eight-digit serial number engraved on the back of your
AOL PassCode.
6.  Type the six-digit number displayed on the front of your AOL
PassCode.
7.  Click Save. This change takes effect immediately, and removes 
the
AOL PassCode protection for subsequent sign-ons.

Manage Service Plan

Displays a screen with AOL PassCode service plan options, allowing you to
change your current service plan.

Order more PassCodes

Displays a screen allowing you to order additional AOL PassCodes.



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44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Scientists close to network that defies hackers

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.ft.com/cms/s/a0dcf3f0-5874-11d9-9940-0e2511c8.html

The Financial Times



Scientists close to network that defies hackers
By Clive Cookson, Science Editor
Published: December 28 2004 02:00 | Last updated: December 28 2004 02:00
Scientists have taken what they say is a big step towards an intrinsically
secure computer network which banks and other institutions could use to
transmit data without risk of hacking.

Toshiba Research Europe is one of several laboratories around the world
racing to commercialise quantum cryptography, a technology that uses
quantum mechanics to generate unbreakable codes. The Cambridge-based
company says it has produced the first system robust enough to run
uninterruptedly for long periods without human intervention.

The Toshiba researchers have tested the system with MCI, the international
telecommunications company, and plan next year to carry out trials with
financial institutions in London.

Secure digital communication uses long prime numbers as keys to encode data
at one end and decode at the other. Inquantum cryptography, individual
photons - light particles - transmit the secret keys down optical fibres.
Each photon carries a digital bit of information, depending on its
polarisation. To outwit hackers, the keys are changed many times a second.

The extreme delicacy of these quantum bits is both the strength and
weakness of quantum cryptography. On the positive side, a hacker cannot
eavesdrop on the data transmission without changing it and alerting sender
and receiver to the breach of security. But the system is easily disturbed
by tiny fluctuations such as temperature changes in the transmission
apparatus or movements in the optical fibres.

Previous quantum cryptography transmissions have lasted only for minutes
and required continual adjustment by experts, says Andrew Shields, head of
Toshiba's quantum information group. His laboratory managed to extend the
running time to a week's entirely automated and uninterrupted session.

The Cambridge researchers stabilised the system and reduced the error rate
by sending a bright guardian pulse of light down the fibres immediately
after each information-carrying photon.

Mr Shields said: The technology is now sufficiently mature to be used in
real-world situations and we are currently discussing applications with
interested parties. In the first instance we expect quantum cryptography to
be used in companies' private networks - for example, to provide secure
traffic in a link between two sites within a metropolitan area.

Besides Japanese-owned Toshiba, large electronics companies competing to
commercialise quantum cryptography include NEC of Japan and Hewlett-Packard
of the US. There are also two start-ups, Magiq Technologies of the US and
ID Quantique of Switzerland, with first generation quantum cryptography
products on the market, although sales have not been large.
-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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The story of Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen--from the KGB's point of view.

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=110006088

OpinionJournal

WSJ Online


BOOKSHELF

The Man Who Stole the Secrets
The story of Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen--from the KGB's point of view.

BY EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN
Thursday, December 30, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST

Recently a number of former CIA officers received an invitation from the
Spy Museum in Washington to attend a luncheon for former KGB Col. Victor
Cherkashin. The event, as the invitation said, would afford a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to dine and dish with an extraordinary
spymaster. In the heyday of the Cold War, such an offer, delivered with
slightly more discretion, might have been the prelude to a KGB recruitment
operation. Now it's merely the notice for a book party celebrating yet
another memoir by a former KGB officer recounting how the KGB duped the CIA.

 In this case, there is a great deal to tell. Victor Cherkashin served in
the KGB from 1952, when Stalin was still in power, until the Soviet Union
disintegrated in 1991. During most of that time his mission was to organize
KGB operations aimed at undermining the integrity, confidence and morale of
the CIA. He seems to have been good at his job. His big opportunity came
when he was the deputy KGB chief at the Soviet Embassy in Washington
between 1979 and 1985.

 Those years were the height of a ferocious spy war within the Cold War. In
Spy Handler, Mr. Cherkashin describes in detail how he helped convert two
American counterintelligence officers--one well-placed in the CIA's Soviet
Russia Division, the other in the FBI--into moles. Their names are
notorious now, but over the course of a decade Aldrich Ames and Robert
Hanssen operated with anonymous stealth, compromising most of the CIA's and
FBI's espionage efforts in the Soviet Union.

 But that wasn't the end of Mr. Cherkashin's glory. Returning to Moscow, he
helped run dangle operations in which KGB-controlled diplomats feigned a
willingness to be recruited by their American counterparts, only to hand
over disinformation when they were finally recruited. Thus when the CIA
came around to investigating why its agents were being compromised in
Russia, the KGB sent the CIA a disinformation agent, for example, to paint
false tracks away from its moles. This agent--Mr. X--offered to betray
the Soviet Union for $5,000. When the CIA snapped up the bait, Mr. X
pointed it to its own secret communication center in Warrenton, Va.,
falsely claiming that the KGB was electronically intercepting data from its
computers. The purpose, of course, was to divert the agency away from the
mole, who continued betraying CIA secrets for eight more years.
 Told from the KGB's vantage point, Mr. Cherkashin's story provides a
gripping account of its successes in the spy war. He shows Mr. Hanssen to
have been an easily managed and highly productive penetration who
operated via the unusual tradecraft of dead drops, leaving material at
designated locations where it could be transferred without spy and handler
ever meeting. (Indeed, the KGB never knew Mr. Hanssen's identity.) Mr.
Ames, for his part, was a more complex case, since he had come under
suspicion and the KGB had to concern itself with throwing the CIA off his
trail. That America's counterespionage apparatus allowed both men to
operate as long as they did is a testament to its complacency as much as to
the KGB's cleverness.

 And indeed, Mr. Cherkashin skillfully torments his former adversary, the
CIA, by attributing a large part of the KGB's success to the incompetence
of the CIA leadership, or its madness. He asserts, in particular, that the
CIA had been all but paralyzed by the paranoia of James Jesus Angleton,
the CIA's longtime counterintelligence chief, who suspected that the KGB
had planted a mole in the CIA's Soviet Russia division.

 Mr. Cherkashin is right that Mr. Angleton's concern retarded, if not
paralyzed, CIA operations in Russia. After all, if the CIA was indeed
vulnerable to KGB penetration, as Mr. Angleton believed, it had to assume
that its agents in Russia would be compromised and used for disinformation.
This suspicion would recommend a certain caution or tentativeness, to say
the least. Mr. Cherkashin's taunt about Mr. Angleton's paranoia echoed
what was said by Mr. Angleton's critics in the CIA, who resented his
influence, believing that polygraph tests and other security measures
immunized the CIA against such long-term penetration.

 But of course Mr. Angleton was right, too. On Feb. 21, 1994, Mr. Ames, the
CIA officer who had served in the Soviet Russia division, was arrested by
the FBI. He confessed that he had been a KGB mole for almost a decade and
had provided the KGB with secrets that compromised more than 100 CIA
operations in Russia. Mr. Hanssen was caught seven years later.

 Since Mr. Cherkashin had managed the recruitment of Mr. Ames and helped
with that of Mr. Hanssen, his accusation that Mr. Angleton was paranoid for
suspecting the possibility of a mole has the 

eBay Dumps Passport, Microsoft Calls It Quits

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.techweb.com/article/printableArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=IUVVYXUECEG4MQSNDBGCKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleID=56800077site_section=700029


 eBay Dumps Passport, Microsoft Calls It Quits
 By TechWeb News
 December 30, 2004 (12:51 PM EST)
 URL:  http://www.techweb.com/wire/ebiz/56800077

Another Online auction site eBay announced Wednesday that it will soon drop
support for Microsoft's Passport for log-in to the site and discontinuing
alerts sent via Microsoft's .Net alerts. Microsoft responded by saying that
it will stop marketing Passport to sites outside its own stable.

 As of late January, eBay will no longer display the Passport button on
sign-in pages nor allow users to log in using their Passport accounts.
Instead, members must log-in directly through eBay.

 Likewise, eBay's dumping .Net alerts, which means that eBay customers who
want to receive alerts -- for such things as auction closings, outbids, and
auction wins -- will have to make other arrangements. The free-of-charge
eBay Toolbar, for instance, can be used to set up alerts going to the
desktop, while alerts to phones, PDAs, or pagers can be created from the
user's My eBay page.

 eBay was one of the first to jump on the Passport bandwagon in 2001, but
is only the latest site to leap off. Job search site Monster.com, for
instance, dropped Passport in October.

 Microsoft has decided to stop marketing its sign-on service to other Web
sites, the Los Angeles Times confirmed Thursday. The pull-back, which had
been long predicted by various analysts, follows a stormy life for
Passport, which among other things, suffered a pair of security breakdowns
in the summer of 2003 that could have led to hackers stealing users' IDs.

 Microsoft also pulled its  online directory of sites using Passport --
perhaps because the list would have been depressingly short -- stating in
the online notice that We have discontinued our Site Directory, but you'll
know when you can use your Passport to make sign-in easier. Just look for
the .NET Passport Sign In button!

 Passport will continue to be the sign-on service for various Microsoft
properties, including the Hotmail e-mail service and MSN.com.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Korean Online Banks Will Be Liable for 'Hacking' Damages in 2006

2005-01-04 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Fri, 31 Dec 2004 04:30:34 -0600 (CST)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: isn@attrition.org
Subject: [ISN] Online Banks Will Be Liable for 'Hacking' Damages in 2006
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200412/200412300030.html

Park Jong-se
Dec. 30, 2004

Starting from 2006, financial institutions will be held responsible
for any damage consumers may suffer at the hands of hackers or from
malfunctioning computer systems while engaging in financial
transactions on the Internet.

The government adopted a financial e-transaction bill during a vice
ministerial meeting Thursday. The bill will be discussed at a Cabinet
meeting scheduled for Jan. 4 before being submitted to the National
Assembly.

According to the bill, if consumers incur damages or loss while
engaging in e-banking because of an incident caused by a third factor,
such as a case of hacking or computer system meltdowns, financial
institutions or e-banking service providers will be liable.

An exception that grants financial institutions immunity is also
included in the bill. If consumers cause a problem deliberately or by
their own mistakes, they will be held accountable.

The bill states that consumers' identification number, secret code and
certified document, all of which are essential prerequisites for
e-banking, should be issued only when consumers apply for them and
after their identity has been confirmed. It also mandates that
transaction records should be kept.



_
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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New computerized passport raises safety concerns

2005-01-05 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.sanluisobispo.com/mld/sanluisobispo/business/technology/10556269.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp

Posted on Mon, Jan. 03, 2005

New computerized passport raises safety concerns

By Kristi Heim
Seattle Times

When traveling abroad these days, most Americans probably wouldn't want the
contents of their passports to be secretly read by strangers.

But when a new high-tech passport system goes into effect as early as next
spring, that's exactly what critics say could happen.

Before the end of the year, the first U.S. biometric passport will be
issued with a tiny computer chip and antenna embedded inside it. The chip
will contain a digital image of the person's face, along with other
information such as name, birth date and birthplace. The data on the chip
can be picked up wirelessly using a radio signal.

When the traveler enters the United States, border-control officials will
snap a digital photo of the person, scan the data from the passport and run
a facial-recognition software program to compare the two images.

The system is designed to prevent forged passports by making sure the
original passport holder and the person standing at the immigration counter
are one and the same.

The problem, security and privacy experts say, is that the technical
standard chosen for the system leaves passport data unprotected.

The technology allows data on the chip to be read remotely using radio
frequency identification or RFID.

That means the passport does not have to be opened or even come in contact
with a scanning device. Its contents can be read remotely -- some estimates
claim as far away as 30 feet -- without the passport holder knowing
anything about it.

Privacy advocates and the American Civil Liberties Union have sharply
criticized the proposed system, saying it effectively creates `a global
infrastructure of surveillance.`

`The U.S.-backed standard means that all the information on American
passports can be read by anyone with an RFID reader, whether they are an
identity thief, a terrorist trying to spot the Americans in a room or a
government agent looking to vacuum up the identities of everyone at a
political rally, gun show or mosque,` said Laura Murphy, director of the
ACLU's Washington, D.C., legislative office.

The ACLU also questioned the use of facial-recognition technology, which
can be used to track people but is not foolproof when it comes to matching
identity.

The U.S. government is already requiring 27 foreign countries to include
biometrics in their passports in order for their citizens to continue to
travel to the United States without a visa. The mandate was passed in 2002
as part of an effort to tighten border security after the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks.

Most of those countries, including the United Kingdom, have had trouble
implementing the system and requested the deadline be postponed. Congress
voted during the summer to extend the deadline one year to October 2005.

Now the State Department plans to expand that program to include U.S.
passports, which were not part of the original legislation.

But it may only be a matter of time before countries required by the United
States to issue biometric passports demand the same kind of passports from
American visitors.

By the end of 2005, according to the plan, all American passports produced
domestically will be biometric passports.

The new technology is set to go into diplomatic and official passports
first, and move to all new and renewed regular passports around the middle
of next year, said Kelly Shannon, spokeswoman in the State Department's
Bureau of Consular Affairs.

The standard being used for U.S. passports was developed by the
International Civil Aviation Organization, a United Nations-affiliated
group based in Montreal.

As the standard was being decided this year, privacy and security experts
argued it should include features to protect the data, such as encryption
or the addition of a printed bar code inside the passport to `unlock` the
data.

Such features would let passport holders know who was reading their data
and when. But the State Department so far has rejected proposals for
encryption and other security measures.

Department officials said encryption would hinder interoperability of the
system among the different countries using it and slow down already tedious
border crossings.

It should function like RFID technology that monitors the flow of cars from
a distance through automatic toll roads, for example.

Security expert Bruce Schneier, founder and chief technical officer of
Counterpane Internet Security, said encryption would not solve security
problems for the passport system.

Instead, he recommends a system that requires direct contact with the chip.

`The owner of the passport has to acquiesce to give the data to somebody,`
Schneier said.

If the passport has to touch the reader or be opened before it can be read,
there is less chance for secret `skimming` of personal data. That is a

[ISN] SSL VPNs Will Grow 54% A Year, Become Defacto Access Standard: Report

2005-01-07 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Fri, 7 Jan 2005 06:41:49 -0600 (CST)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: isn@attrition.org
Subject: [ISN] SSL VPNs Will Grow 54% A Year,
Become Defacto Access Standard: Report
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=NIOHIDQYVVDQSQSNDBESKHA?articleID=56900844

By Matthew Friedman
Networking Pipeline
Jan. 5, 2005

Spending on Secure Sockets Layer Virtual Private Networks (SSL VPN)
will grow at a 53% compound annual growth rate, and SSL VPNs will
surpass traditional IPsec VPNs as the de-facto remote access security
standard by 2008, according to a new report from Forrester Research.

In SSL VPNs Poised for Significant Growth, Forrester associate
analyst Robert Whiteley says companies are attracted by the
technology's application-level simplicity. Unlike IPsec VPNs, which
require special client software to access the network, SSL VPN
supports a wide range of devices, from desktop computers to PDAs, and
applications, while offering network administrators greater
granularity of user information and providing better endpoint
security.

According to the report, some 44% of American businesses have deployed
SSL VPNs, spending $97 million on the technology last year alone.
Despite the impressive adoption rate for a technology that has been in
the business mainstream for less than a year, Forrester expects SSL
VPN deployments to continue to take off, with the market growing at a
53% compound annual growth rate to $1.2 billion in 2004.

SSL VPNs are already well-entrenched in the financial and business
services industries and in the public sector. Driven by the need to
ensure endpoint security for online services, the financial services
industry can boast a 56% penetration rate, with business services just
behind at 51%. In both cases, Whiteley predicts a compound annual
growth of 34% to 2010 which, though impressive, pales beside the
expected SSL VPN growth in late-adopting industries.

Indeed, Whiteley writes that retail and manufacturing are poised to
leap into SSL VPN with gusto over the next few years. Retail and
wholesale allocates 7.8% of its IT spend to security — more than even
financial services, he notes. This vertical shows the most SSL VPN
potential because of its eye toward security, relatively little
penetration to date, and the need for large, distributed deployments —
resulting in 82% annual market growth through 2010.

Though only 29% of manufacturers are currently invested in SSL VPNs,
Whitely expects that to change dramatically through 2010, predicting a
phenomenal 94% compound annual growth rate. IPSec was a poor fit for
this vertical's needs, Whiteley observes, but the application-layer
flexibility of SSL VPNs should spur rapid adoption. Manufacturing
companies typically don't provide employees with corporate-managed
laptops, he writes. Thus, SSL VPNs allows a 'bring-your-own
computer' model where manufacturing companies still control security
and user policy but don't have to incur the cost of unnecessary IT
infrastructure.



_
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable -
http://www.osvdb.org/

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[fc-announce] FC05 registration to open next week

2005-01-07 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/11.1.0.040913
From: Stuart E. Schechter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [fc-announce] FC05 registration to open next week
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Fri, 07 Jan 2005 11:00:54 -0500

   Registration for Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2005 will open
early next week.  My apologies for the delays and thanks for your patience.

   In the meantime, please do make sure that you've made all your other
travel arrangements (flight/hotel/car rental).  For more information, see
   http://fc05.ifca.ai/travel.html

   Please don't hesitate to get in touch if there's any further information
that I can provide you.

   Best regards

   Stuart Schechter
   General Chair
   Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2005


___
fc-announce mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://mail.ifca.ai/mailman/listinfo/fc-announce

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Atom demo fixes quantum errors

2005-01-07 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.alwayson-network.com/comments.php?id=7746_0_6_0_C

Always On 


Atom demo fixes quantum errors

 TRN

NewsTeam | TRN [] | POSTED: 01.07.05 @09:47

Although quantum computers promise fantastic speed for certain types of
very large problems, the logical components of quantum computers -- quantum
bits -- are quite fragile, which makes for a large number of errors that
must be corrected.

 Researchers from the National Institute of Standards and Technology have
demonstrated a way to correct errors in qubits of beryllium ions held in an
electromagnetic trap. The ions represent a 1 or 0 of computer information
in their spin, which can be pictured as the counterclockwise or clockwise
spin of a top.

 One way to carry out quantum computing is to take advantage of a weird
trait of quantum particles -- they can become entangled, or linked, so that
properties like spin remain in lockstep.


The researchers' prototype uses lasers to control the qubits' states and
electrodes to move them together, which allows them to be entangled. The
researchers set a primary qubit to a particular state and entangled it with
two other qubits. They deliberately induced an error and then disentangled
the qubits by separating them.

 They measured the other two qubits to determine how the primary qubit
needed to be corrected.

 Quantum error correction schemes have been well explored theoretically,
but the researchers' experiment was the first demonstration of a repeatable
error-correction procedure and the first using trapped ions, which are a
promising candidate for practical quantum computers.

 Practical quantum computing is a decade or more away. The method could be
used in quantum communications applications like quantum cryptography
within a few years, according to the researchers. The work appeared in the
December 2, 2004 issue of Nature.

-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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TSA: Tests going well for Secure Flight

2005-01-08 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TRAVEL/01/07/passenger.screening.ap/index.html

CNN


TSA: Tests going well for Secure Flight

Friday, January 7, 2005 Posted: 11:21 AM EST (1621 GMT)


WASHINGTON (AP) -- The government has begun testing a computerized
screening system that compares airline passengers' names with those on
terrorist watch lists, a Transportation Security Administration official
said Thursday.

Called Secure Flight, it's meant to replace a plan that never got to the
testing stage because of criticism that it gave the government access to
too much personal information.

Testing of Secure Flight began November 30. No announcement was made; TSA
spokesman Justin Oberman disclosed its status when asked by The Associated
Press.

The testing has not turned up any suspected terrorists. Oberman said the
agency expects to wrap up the first phase of testing in a month.

The technology is working, doing exactly what we wanted it to do, he said.

The TSA is testing data on passengers who flew domestic flights on U.S.
airlines in June. The airlines, concerned about upsetting passengers, had
refused to turn over the information, but the TSA issued a security
directive ordering them to do so.

About 1.9 million passengers travel by air daily, and part of the test will
see if the government's system can handle that much information.

The government has sought to improve its process for making sure terrorists
don't get on planes since the September 11 hijackers exposed holes in the
system. Airlines now simply match passenger names against government watch
lists of people considered threats.

Federal authorities don't disclose criteria for placing people on the
lists, how many names are listed or any identities. In a number of
well-publicized incidents, people with names similar to those on the lists
were stopped from boarding planes. Among them was Sen. Edward M. Kennedy,
D-Massachusetts.

Marcia Hofmann, attorney for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a
Washington-based advocacy group, said many problems remain with the Secure
Flight program.

The redress process is still a question mark, Hofmann said. The ability
of individuals to access and correct information that is being used to make
determinations about them is still at issue.

Oberman said the agency is working on a way for passengers to appeal if
they think they've been wrongly identified as terrorists.

Under Secure Flight, the airlines would electronically transmit to the
government passenger names as well as other identifying information. The
government would then match that information with the terrorist watch
lists; names on those lists are supposed to include biographical
information.

The passenger information that's being tested is known as passenger name
records, or PNR. It can include credit card numbers, travel itineraries,
addresses, telephone numbers and meal requests.

Oberman said further testing will show whether the system can handle a
surge of information during busy air travel periods. Name-matching software
will also be fine-tuned, he said.

The TSA says Secure Flight differs from the previous plan because it does
not compare personal data with commercial databases. Privacy advocates were
concerned that doing so would allow the government to accumulate vast
amounts of sensitive information about people who weren't suspected of
breaking the law.

The agency said, however, it will test the passenger information on a very
limited basis against commercial data to see if that could reduce the
number of people who are confused with names on watch lists.

Before that happens, though, the Government Accountability Office must
report to Congress on the TSA's plan to test the commercial data. That's
expected by the end of March.

Oberman said he expects testing will be completed by then. However, it's
unclear when Secure Flight will be implemented.


-- 
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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Effort to Speed Airport Security Is Going Private

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110549106703823542,00.html

The Wall Street Journal

  January 12, 2005

Effort to Speed
 Airport Security
 Is Going Private
Move Aims to Expand Program
 That Preregisters People
 Who Travel Frequently

By AMY SCHATZ
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
January 12, 2005; Page D1


The Homeland Security Department, under pressure to jump-start a program
allowing select preregistered travelers to speed through airport security,
is turning to the private sector for help.

The Registered Traveler program gives frequent air passengers access to
special security lines, provided they first voluntarily undergo criminal
and terrorist background checks. In exchange, they get a biometric
identification card -- containing a fingerprint and other personal data --
and access to the shorter lines. The program has generally received
favorable reviews from volunteers and the three-month trial has been
extended indefinitely.

There is just one problem: The pilot program, currently administered by the
department's Transportation Security Administration, is offered at only
five airports for just 10,000 volunteers. This means that Registered
Travelers can use their cards only at their home airports and nowhere else.
TSA's pace at expanding the test into a national program has, so far, been
the biggest complaint.

The slow introduction has prompted interest from some businesses, who
believe that travelers would be willing to pay to participate in the
program. Interested entrepreneurs include Steven Brill, who started
American Lawyer magazine and Court TV and, after writing a book on Sept.
11, decided to get into the homeland-security business.

In a plan set to be unveiled in coming weeks, TSA officials will lay out
some details of a privately operated Registered Traveler pilot program at
Orlando International Airport. The success of the pilot, expected to begin
by the end of March, could determine the future of the Registered Traveler
program and be a model for expanding it nationally.

Mr. Brill and others have been pushing for TSA to privatize the program,
saying that businesses are better equipped than the government to market
and expand it, especially because some travelers have indicated that they
would pay annual fees -- as much as $100 -- for faster screening.

TSA officials agree, believing that passengers, not taxpayers, should fund
Registered Traveler, because it is likely to be used by business people
rather than leisure travelers. Homeland Security officials are eager to see
it move forward. TSA has had some false starts in other initiatives, and it
has taken knocks for long lines and intrusive pat-down searches.

But privacy advocates, who have already voiced concern about the
government-run pilot programs, are even more worried now that TSA is
turning to the private sector.

EXPRESS LINE How expedited security works in five pilot programs:

Who's eligible: 10,000 frequent- flier club members; enrollment closed

What they provide: Fingerprint, iris scan, personal data

What they get: Biometric ID card

What they have to do at airport: Open laptop, remove keys, coins.

What they don't have to do: Join leisure travelers for random screening.

They complain that Homeland Security officials routinely publish privacy
guidelines too vague to give the public a real understanding of how
personal data are handled. A privatized system could exacerbate the
problem, says Marcia Hoffman, staff counsel of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, a Washington nonprofit organization.

TSA sees private-sector involvement as a route to faster growth. We're
trying to encourage as much private sector participation as possible, says
Justin Oberman, a TSA official in charge of both Registered Traveler and
its more controversial sister-project, Secure Flight, a computerized
prescreening system that will replace a system currently run by the
airlines.

Plans to run the privatized pilot in Orlando were publicly disclosed in
October, when AirTran Airways, a unit of Orlando-based AirTran Holdings
Inc., said it would participate in the program. But efforts between TSA and
the airport to reach terms on the pilot have dragged on.

One reason: TSA officials haven't decided whether to compile a master list
of Registered Travelers, which could be used to check passengers at all
participating airports, or allow private companies to maintain passenger
data in a universal format easily accessed by competitors.

The Orlando airport hasn't yet chosen a vendor to run its test, although
airport officials say they are in talks with Mr. Brill's New York-based
company, Verified Identity Pass Inc. Verified Identity would essentially
assume marketing responsibilities while its partners -- possibly including
Lockheed Martin Corp. -- would install scanners, process applications and
manufacture ID cards. TSA screeners, who are government employees, would
continue to staff the security lines.

Orlando 

Sun creates worlds smallest SSL Web server

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.cbronline.com/article_news.asp?guid=38DE2210-C6D9-4A59-B84F-98588FA24962
- Computer Business Review

Sun creates world's smallest SSL Web server

 
Sun Microsystems Inc has created what can truly be called a microsystem.
The tiny server, nicknamed Sizzle (from Slim SSL), is the size and shape
of a quarter. It was created by Sun's engineers as a proof-of-concept
machine for embedded applications and will be presented at the Pervasive
Computing and Communications show in March.

14 Jan 2005, 10:47 GMT -
 Sizzle is a wireless Web server and is based on an 8-bit microprocessor
designed by Crossbow Technology Inc. The server has 8Kb of main memory,
which implements a stripped-down operating system plus a Web server and an
SSL server. Crossbow has created its own operating system, called TinyOS,
for these remote computers, often referred to as motes.

The mote that Sun is using in Sizzle is called the MICA2DOT, and it is
powered by a three-volt button battery, like the kind in your motherboard
to keep your BIOS settings alive. It is unclear if Sun is using TinyOS or a
stripped-down version of Solaris or Linux to create its micro Web server.

Sun is adding 128Kb of flash memory to the mote, and it is implementing a
version of SSL based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) that Sun says
makes public key cryptography suitable on a very tiny machine with
extremely limited capabilities.

Sizzle can complete an SSL handshake in under four seconds, and can do it
in under two seconds with sessions that are reused; the Web server can
transfer about 450 bytes per second. While you may not be able to run Yahoo
on it, you can build vast arrays of sensors with ad hoc networking, which
is what motes are for.


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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Hanging the Pirates

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0131/096_print.html

Forbes



Security
Hanging the Pirates
01.31.05



Paul Kocher has a way to save Hollywood from illegal copying.

Over the past few months top brass from Hollywood and Japan's consumer
electronics giants have been hashing out their futures in hotel meeting
rooms in Tokyo and Los Angeles. Topic A is the politically charged debate
over the standard for the new high-definition DVDs, which the film industry
hopes will swell the current $24 billion DVD market, as hi-def becomes the
norm. Most of the players want to get something decided on within a year.

But, as big as the stakes are in those discussions, the movie studios are
even more keen on the outcome of the talks on the 39th floor of Toshiba's
Tokyo headquarters.



By the Numbers

Price of Piracy

Illegal file-sharing hits music far harder than film--for now.

 $21 billion n DVD sales in U.S. in 2004, a 200% increase since 2000.

 $12 billion CD sales in U.S., a 17% decline since 2000.

 $3 billion Amount movie studios lose to piracy each year.

 $4 billion Amount music publishers lose to piracy each year.

 Sources: Adams Media Research; RIAA; MPAA.
 There, a select security committee representing both hardware and film
makers has an extremely rare opportunity to stop digital piracy from doing
to movies what it did to music. Napster and its ilk have helped knock 17%
off of record label sales in the past three years. With DVD's basic
encryption already cracked and one-quarter of American homes now capable of
broadband-speed downloads, it's inevitable that one day the latest Harry
Potter film will be swapped as easily as U2's new hit.

This is the number one priority at the highest levels, says Thomas
Lesinski, president of Paramount Home Entertainment. The studios want to
have more control over protecting our content.

One of the most important people involved in that discussion is Paul
Kocher, the 31-year-old president of Cryptography Research, a tiny San
Francisco consulting and licensing firm that brought in $6 million last
year. Kocher is soft-spoken, young and obscure, but his credibility in the
encryption business is sterling. Eight years ago, fresh out of Stanford,
Kocher cowrote Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), the protocol that secures the
vast majority of commerce on the Internet.

What Kocher is pushing is the concept of renewable security. Any attempt to
erect a one-time, rigid barrier between thieves and content, he says, is
useless, including the current method pushed through by the Japanese
consumer electronics companies. With very few exceptions, all the major
security systems being used by the studios today are either broken and
can't be fixed, or they're not deployed widely enough to be worth hacking,
says Kocher.

Under the existing Content Scrambling System, electronics makers install
the exact same encryption code into nearly every DVD player. But that was
broken by European hackers in 1999 and the trick disseminated widely on the
Internet. Even the least sophisticated user can now download a program that
easily copies protected movies.

Kocher's alternative is to allow for constant change. His system, called
self-protecting digital content, places the security on the disc instead of
in the player. A software recipe running into the millions of steps is
burned onto every new movie disc. Each DVD player would contain a small
chip costing only a few extra cents that would follow the recipe
faithfully. If the DVD player decides the disc is secure, it will decode it
and play the movie. But each film could have a different recipe. So if a
pirate breaks the code on Spider-Man 2, he wouldn't necessarily be able to
break the code on Elf. The studios would always be one step ahead of the
thieves; at the very least it would take pirates more time to break each
film. Not a big deal: Studios make most of their money from DVDs in the
first three months, anyway.

A lot of security systems are hard and brittle, says Robert Baldwin, head
of the security firm Plus Five Consulting. Paul's is more like a willow
tree. It bends and recovers.

No studio executive contacted would comment on Kocher's scheme on the
record, but it looks likely to be the backbone of any eventual security
standard. A group including IBM, Toshiba, Time Warner and Microsoft is also
angling to get a complementary encryption scheme called AACS into every
future player. It will likely be written to work with Kocher's idea.

Consumer electronics firms, which dictated the last encryption format,
never had much to lose from security leaks. Film executives like the fact
that Kocher's scheme gives them a stronger hand. Now they will be able to
decide how much security they want on each disc and when it needs to be
updated.

Kocher, son of a physics professor at Oregon State University in Corvallis,
says he learned about computing because he stayed home a lot, too lazy to
bike the two miles into town. He initially wanted to be a 

Webpay system open to voucher fraud

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/17/webpay_voucher_fraud/print.html

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register » Security » Network Security »

 Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/17/webpay_voucher_fraud/

Webpay system open to voucher fraud
By Jan Libbenga (libbenga at yahoo.com)
Published Monday 17th January 2005 16:46 GMT

Webpay International AG, the market leading payment system for digital
content and services in Europe, doesn't offer a flawless micro payment
service, at least in the Netherlands, according to Dutch consumer watchdog
tv show Kassa and computer weekly Computer Idee. It is relatively easy to
manipulate user data required for the Dutch MSN music download site (TV
item in Dutch over here
(http://cgi.omroep.nl/cgi-bin/streams?/tv/vara/kassa/bb.laatste.asf?start=00:16:24end=00:26:13)
).

The payments for that site are handled by Webpay under its original name
Firstgate. Firstgate users can buy online vouchers and decide which songs
they want to purchase later. Kassa and Computer Idee discovered that these
vouchers can be easily purchased by filling in someone else's name and bank
details. Users can even add money to their prepaid account, again using
details from other users. None of this information is verified by
Firstgate. Even though upgrading the account requires a pin code, it isn't
necessary to enter the code straight away. The song or album to be
purchased can be downloaded immediately.

Firstgate, which offers the same service for cable operator Chello, doesn't
deny that this kind of fraud is possible, but stresses that that fraudsters
can be traced and will be prosecuted. However, the company wasn't too
thrilled with the publicity and originally threatened to sue broadcaster
VARA.

Webpay International licenses its micropayment clickbuy service also to
British Telecom, and to Swisscom, which launched Swisscom clickbuy in Q4
2004.

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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Word and Excel have RC4 flaw, claim

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theinquirer.net/print.aspx?article=20790print=1


Word and Excel have RC4 flaw, claim

Cryptic cross words

By:  Nick Farrell  Wednesday 19 January 2005, 07:50

SECURITY EXPERT Bruce Schneier claims that Microsoft's Word and Excel
security protection systems have amateurish flaws which makes them easy to
break.

 On his blog here, the writer of 'Applied Cryptography' said that VoleWare
breaks one of the most important rules of stream ciphers. That is that you
don't use the same keystream to encrypt two different documents.

 If someone does, you can break the encryption by XORing the two
ciphertext streams together. The keystream drops out, and you end up with
plaintext XORed with plaintext -- and you can easily recover the two
plaintexts using letter frequency analysis and other basic techniques, he
said.

 Word and Excel both use this amateur crypto mistake Apparently Microsoft
made the same mistake in 1999 with RC4 in WinNT Syskey. Five years later,
Microsoft has the same flaw in other products, Schneier claims. µ


  


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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Schneier on Security: Microsoft RC4 Flaw

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/01/microsoft_rc4_f.html

 

Bruce Schneier
  

Schneier on Security

A weblog covering security and security technology.


January 18, 2005

Microsoft RC4 Flaw

One of the most important rules of stream ciphers is to never use the same
keystream to encrypt two different documents. If someone does, you can
break the encryption by XORing the two ciphertext streams together. The
keystream drops out, and you end up with plaintext XORed with plaintext --
and you can easily recover the two plaintexts using letter frequency
analysis and other basic techniques.

It's an amateur crypto mistake. The easy way to prevent this attack is to
use a unique initialization vector (IV) in addition to the key whenever you
encrypt a document.

Microsoft uses the RC4 stream cipher in both Word and Excel. And they make
this mistake. Hongjun Wu has details (link is a PDF).
In this report, we point out a serious security flaw in Microsoft Word and
Excel. The stream cipher RC4 [9] with key length up to 128 bits is used in
Microsoft Word and Excel to protect the documents. But when an encrypted
document gets modified and saved, the initialization vector remains the
same and thus the same keystream generated from RC4 is applied to encrypt
the different versions of that document. The consequence is disastrous
since a lot of information of the document could be recovered easily.

This isn't new. Microsoft made the same mistake in 1999 with RC4 in WinNT
Syskey. Five years later, Microsoft has the same flaw in other products.

Posted on January 18, 2005 at 09:00 AM


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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Consumer-Electronics Firms Join To Develop Antipiracy Software

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110609171910929502,00.html

The Wall Street Journal

  January 19, 2005

Consumer-Electronics Firms Join
 To Develop Antipiracy Software

By DON CLARK
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
January 19, 2005; Page D5


Some of the biggest consumer-electronics companies are jointly developing
new technology to control how consumers use digital content in the home.

The companies -- Sony Corp., Samsung Electronics Co., Philips Electronics
NV and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., maker of Panasonic-brand
products -- today are announcing what they are calling the Marlin Joint
Development Association. The group, which includes a Silicon Valley company
called Intertrust Technologies Corp., plans to develop standard
specifications for software that can prevent digital movies and music from
being improperly copied. It also intends to enforce rules about how such
content can be played and shared.

Fears of piracy have discouraged content owners from allowing some
high-definition video and other digital programming from being distributed
in the home. Makers of devices such as digital recorders and DVD players,
meanwhile, are worried about adopting incompatible antipiracy technologies,
which could mean a protected movie or song might play on one gadget but not
another.

Such technology is known by the acronym DRM, for digital rights management.
Microsoft Corp. has been trying to get hardware makers to use its
proprietary DRM software. Other companies, such as Apple Computer Inc.,
have developed such technology for their own products. A confusing array of
joint DRM projects have also popped up, addressing specific problems such
as video on a new-generation of disks that are expected to succeed DVDs.

What makes Marlin different, backers say, is mainly that it is emanating
from some of the biggest brands in consumer electronics. The CE industry
has been pretty quiet, said Talal Shamoon, Intertrust's chief executive.
Now, they are detonating their DRM, he said.

But Michael McGuire, an analyst at Gartner Inc., noted that the new effort
has yet to show it will win support from content holders, such as movie
studios. The proliferation of DRM efforts also could confuse consumers. If
I'm a user, I'm wondering, is this going to make things more complicated
for me? Mr. McGuire said.

Some of Marlin's current members also are likely to consider multiple DRM
options. Sony, for example, said it is too early to say whether it will
favor Marlin over its proprietary DRM technologies. We are actively
evaluating opportunities to use Marlin, said Mack Araki, a Sony spokesman.
But I can't comment on specific plans today.

Marlin comes on the heels of an earlier joint effort, called the Coral
Consortium, that had some common members with Marlin. Coral, however, was
designed to let different DRM programs work together, rather than establish
a specific piece of software as a standard for hardware companies to adopt,
Mr. Shamoon said. Both efforts were partly based on technology developed by
Intertrust, a company that was jointly purchased in 2003 by Sony, Philips
and other investors.

Success of earlier such efforts has been mixed. While DRM systems usually
make piracy more difficult, hackers have successfully cracked some
high-profile protection schemes, including FairPlay, the copy-protection
software Apple uses for music it sells through its iTunes Music Store.


-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Tor 0.0.9.3 is out (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED])

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2005 10:01:46 +0100
From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Tor 0.0.9.3 is out (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED])
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4i
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

From: Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Tor 0.0.9.3 is out
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2005 01:54:42 -0500
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Tor 0.0.9.3 improves cpu usage, works better when the network was recently
offline and you try to use Tor, and makes hidden services less unbearable.

http://tor.eff.org/download.html

  o Bugfixes on 0.0.9:
- Backport the cpu use fixes from main branch, so busy servers won't
  need as much processor time.
- Work better when we go offline and then come back, or when we
  run Tor at boot before the network is up. We do this by
  optimistically trying to fetch a new directory whenever an
  application request comes in and we think we're offline -- the
  human is hopefully a good measure of when the network is back.
- Backport some minimal hidserv bugfixes: keep rend circuits open as
  long as you keep using them; actually publish hidserv descriptors
  shortly after they change, rather than waiting 20-40 minutes.
- Enable Mac startup script by default.
- Fix duplicate dns_cancel_pending_resolve reported by Giorgos Pallas.
- When you update AllowUnverifiedNodes or FirewallPorts via the
  controller's setconf feature, we were always appending, never
  resetting.
- When you update HiddenServiceDir via setconf, it was screwing up
  the order of reading the lines, making it fail.
- Do not rewrite a cached directory back to the cache; otherwise we
  will think it is recent and not fetch a newer one on startup.
- Workaround for webservers that lie about Content-Encoding: Tor
  now tries to autodetect compressed directories and compression
  itself. This lets us Proxypass dir fetches through apache.

--

--
Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a
__
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net

[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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PET 2005 Submission deadline approaching (7 Feb) and PET Award (21 Feb)

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


To: sec-lists: ;, anonymity researchers: ;,
David Martin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2005 15:05:55 +
From: George Danezis [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: PET 2005 Submission deadline approaching (7 Feb) and PET Award (21
 Feb)
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Dear Colleagues,

The submission deadline for the Privacy Enhancing Technologies workshop (PET
2005) is on the 7th February 2005. The latest CfP is appended.

We also solicit nominations for the Award for Outstanding Research in Privacy
Enhancing Technologies by February 21. For more information about suggesting
a paper for the award:
http://petworkshop.org/award/

Yours,

George Danezis

5th Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Dubrovnik, CroatiaMay 30 - June 1, 2005

C A L L   F O R   P A P E R S

http://petworkshop.org/2005/

Important Dates:
Paper submission: February 7, 2005
Notification of acceptance: April 4, 2005
Camera-ready copy for preproceedings: May 6, 2005
Camera-ready copy for proceedings: July 1, 2005

Award for Outstanding Research in Privacy Enhancing Technologies
Nomination period: March 4, 2004 through March 7, 2005
Nomination instructions: http://petworkshop.org/award/

---

Privacy and anonymity are increasingly important in the online world.
Corporations, governments, and other organizations are realizing and
exploiting their power to track users and their behavior, and restrict
the ability to publish or retrieve documents. Approaches to
protecting individuals, groups, but also companies and governments
from such profiling and censorship include decentralization,
encryption, distributed trust, and automated policy disclosure.

This 5th workshop addresses the design and realization of such privacy
and anti-censorship services for the Internet and other communication
networks by bringing together anonymity and privacy experts from
around the world to discuss recent advances and new perspectives.

The workshop seeks submissions from academia and industry presenting
novel research on all theoretical and practical aspects of privacy
technologies, as well as experimental studies of fielded systems.  We
encourage submissions from other communities such as law and business
that present their perspectives on technological issues.  As in past
years, we will publish proceedings after the workshop in the Springer
Lecture Notes in Computer Science series.

Suggested topics include but are not restricted to:

* Anonymous communications and publishing systems
* Censorship resistance
* Pseudonyms, identity management, linkability, and reputation
* Data protection technologies
* Location privacy
* Policy, law, and human rights relating to privacy
* Privacy and anonymity in peer-to-peer architectures
* Economics of privacy
* Fielded systems and techniques for enhancing privacy in existing systems
* Protocols that preserve anonymity/privacy
* Privacy-enhanced access control or authentication/certification
* Privacy threat models
* Models for anonymity and unobservability
* Attacks on anonymity systems
* Traffic analysis
* Profiling and data mining
* Privacy vulnerabilities and their impact on phishing and identity theft
* Deployment models for privacy infrastructures
* Novel relations of payment mechanisms and anonymity
* Usability issues and user interfaces for PETs
* Reliability, robustness and abuse prevention in privacy systems

Stipends to attend the workshop will be made available, on the basis
of need, to cover travel expenses, hotel, or conference fees.  You do
not need to submit a technical paper and you do not need to be a
student to apply for a stipend.  For more information, see
http://petworkshop.org/2005/stipends.html

General Chair:
Damir Gojmerac ([EMAIL PROTECTED]), Fina Corporation, Croatia

Program Chairs:
George Danezis ([EMAIL PROTECTED]), University of Cambridge, UK
David Martin ([EMAIL PROTECTED]), University of Massachusetts at Lowell, USA

Program Committee:

Martin Abadi, University of California at Santa Cruz, USA
Alessandro Acquisti, Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Caspar Bowden, Microsoft EMEA, UK
Jean Camp, Indiana University at Bloomington, USA
Richard Clayton, University of Cambridge, UK
Lorrie Cranor, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Roger Dingledine, The Free Haven Project, USA
Hannes Federrath, University of Regensburg, Germany
Ian Goldberg, Zero Knowledge Systems, Canada
Philippe Golle, Palo Alto Research Center, USA
Marit Hansen, Independent Centre for Privacy Protection Schleswig-Holstein,
  Germany
Markus Jakobsson, Indiana University at Bloomington, USA
Dogan Kesdogan, Rheinisch-Westfaelische Technische Hochschule Aachen, Germany
Brian Levine, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA
Andreas Pfitzmann, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
Matthias Schunter, IBM Zurich Research Lab, Switzerland
Andrei Serjantov, The Free 

Sleuthing Spyware--And Its Corporate Sponsors

2005-01-26 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.forbes.com/2005/01/19/cx_pp_0120spyedelman_print.html

Forbes



Software
Sleuthing Spyware--And Its Corporate Sponsors
Penelope Patsuris,   01.19.05, 5:34 PM ET

 Benjamin Edelman became a spyware expert before most of us had any idea
what was even clogging our computers.

 He's currently a candidate for a doctorate in economics at Harvard
University and a Harvard Law student, but his work is hardly academic.
Edelman, 24, has built a cottage industry documenting the nefarious ways of
the spyware and adware industries, which he contends are one and the same.
His extensive Web site is packed with the kind of hard
evidence--screenshots and videos--that's required to combat the deception
he says has been employed by companies like Claria, 180solutions, WhenU and
DirectRevenue to make a buck.

 Each of these companies denies any wrongdoing, except DirectRevenue, whose
spokesman had no comment. Many of Edelman's opponents say his accusations
are self-serving, since he has at times worked for companies suing adware
outfits.

 Edelman has lots of litigation experience despite his young age, having
consulted for and testified on behalf of organizations like the ACLU, the
National Association of Broadcasters and the National Football League. In
2002 he testified on behalf of a group of media outfits, including The New
York Times Co. (nyse:  NYT -  news  -  people  ), The Washington Post's
(nyse:  WPO -  news  -  people  ) interactive unit and Dow Jones (nyse:  DJ
-  news  -  people  ), in their lawsuit against adware outfit Gator--now
named Claria. The suit claimed, among other things, that Gator's pop-up ads
were unlawfully obscuring the media companies' own online content. The suit
was settled under confidential terms in February 2003.

 Edelman doesn't just take on the makers of spyware--he outs the big-name
companies that support them. In June 2004, he posted a list of WhenU
advertisers, including J.P. Morgan Chase (nyse:  JPM -  news  -  people  ),
Verizon Communications (nyse: VZ -  news  -  people  ), Merck (nyse:  MRK -
news  -  people  ) and T-Mobile.

 Advertisers react to the finger-pointing with varying degrees of concern.
Verizon says that it no longer uses WhenU, while a spokesman for T-Mobile
says that he hasn't received any complaints about the WhenU ads and that
WhenU is opt-in and it can be removed easily. Repeated calls to Merck and
J.P. Morgan Chase were not returned.

 Edelman's Web page also accuses WhenU of transmitting the browsing
activity of its users back to the company, a practice that he says WhenU's
privacy policy specifically promises not to engage in. He also writes that
WhenU has spammed search giant Google (nasdaq:  GOOG -  news  -  people  ).

 WhenU President Avi Naider says Edelman is wrong. In the past Mr. Edelman
has made statements about WhenU that drew incorrect conclusions about WhenU
and were legally inappropriate, says Naider. We take our privacy
protection very seriously.

 He adds that WhenU's privacy policy has been audited by Microsoft's
(nasdaq:  MSFT -  news  -  people  ) former chief privacy officer, Richard
Purcell, who is chairman of TRUSTe, a nonprofit online-privacy organization.

 Perhaps what's most interesting on Edelman's Web site is a video dated
Nov. 18, 2004, which depicts roughly 25 different adware programs,
including 180solutions, that download via security holes onto his browser.
Todd Sawicki, 180's director of marketing, says that his company is taking
various steps to prevent this kind of thing from happening, but that
unfortunately, where there is money, the bad guys will follow.

 Edelman's biggest beef with Claria: Their license fails to prominently
disclose the fact that they are collecting and storing information about
what users do online, he says. But when you read the Claria installer, it
never tells you, 'We collect information.' Instead it says, 'We show you
ads that are based on where you visit.' 

 Claria Chief Marketing Officer Scott Eagle says the company's updated user
agreement clarifies that point, but admits that the update isn't presented
to many users that get Claria when they download free software like Kazaa.
Indeed, Claria said in an S-1 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission--since withdrawn--that it gets most of its users via Kazaa.

 Still, Eagle questions Edelman's motives, saying he's worked for companies
that are suing Claria. (Edelman did work for Teleflora, which has a case
against Claria, but he no longer does.)

 Edelman counters, My clients don't hire me to help them with litigation
against Claria because I'm a big fan.

 The Harvard student also takes Claria advertisers to task, posting a
screen shot of a British ad for Dell (nasdaq:  DELL -  news  -  people  )
that appeared on his PC via Claria when he was browsing IBM's  (nyse:  IBM
-  news  -  people  ) Web site. Edelman notes the irony that Dell has been
quite vocal about the burden that the spyware boom has placed on its own

Diebold completes e-voting printer prototype

2005-01-31 Thread R.A. Hettinga
Wherein Dieblod remembers, hey, presto, they're a cash-register company
after all...

Cheers,
RAH
---


http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/evoting/2005-01-28-diebold-printout_x.htm

USA Today




Diebold completes e-voting printer prototype


NORTH CANTON, Ohio (AP) - Diebold said Thursday it has completed a
prototype printer designed for use with touch-screen electronic voting
machines, allowing voters to print, review and verify ballot selections.

 Voter verified paper receipts are something new, said David Bear, a
spokesman for subsidiary Diebold Election Systems in McKinney, Texas.

 No other type of voting provides a receipt for voters. But some states
are asking for it, so we needed to develop a product that meets standards
for functionality, he said.

 Voters can view their selections, but will not be able to remove the
printout. The voter's printed selections would be placed into a secure
enclosure, stored and numbered with a security tag. The printer weighs less
than three pounds.

 The printer will be submitted to independent testing authorities to ensure
that it meets federal standards as a prerequisite to certification in
states, Bear said.

 The printer would be an optional component to any new or existing Diebold
AccuVote TSx touch-screen voting machine. Bear said a per-unit cost and a
time frame for possible sale are not yet determined.

-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[ISN] REVIEW: Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Wenbo Mao

2005-02-01 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Tue, 1 Feb 2005 03:05:23 -0600 (CST)
From: InfoSec News [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: isn@attrition.org
Subject: [ISN] REVIEW: Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Wenbo Mao
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Forwarded from: Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon  Hannah
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

BKMDNCRP.RVW   20041207

Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice, Wenbo Mao, 2004,
0-13-066943-1, U$54.99/C$82.99
%A   Wenbo Mao
%C   One Lake St., Upper Saddle River, NJ   07458
%D   2004
%G   0-13-066943-1
%I   Prentice Hall
%O   U$54.99/C$82.99 +1-201-236-7139 fax: +1-201-236-7131
%O  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesinterne
  http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesinte-21
%O   http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesin03-20
%O   tl s rl 1 tc 3 ta 3 tv 0 wq 1
%P   707 p.
%T   Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice

A Short Description of the Book states that it is intended to
address the issue of whether various crypto algorithms are
practical, as opposed to just theoretically strong.  This seems odd,
since no algorithm is ready for implementation as such: it must be
made part of a full system, and most problems with cryptography come
in the implementation.  The preface doesn't make things much clearer:
it reiterates a fit-for-application mantra, but doesn't say clearly,
at any point, why existing algorithms are not appropriate for use.
The preface also suggests that this book is for advanced study in
cryptography, although it states that security engineers and
administrators, with special responsibility for developing or
implementing cryptography, are also in the target audience.

Part one is an introduction, consisting of two chapters.  Chapter one
outlines the idea of the first protocol of the book: a fair coin
toss over the telephone, grounding the book firmly in the camp of
cryptography for the purpose of secure communications.  The remainder
of the chapter points out all the requirements to make such an
unbiased selector work, acting as a kind of sales pitch or come on
to make you want to read the rest of the book.  The promotion is
slightly flawed by the fact that there is very little practical detail
in the material (it takes a lot of work on the part of the reader to
figure out that, yes, this system might work), excessive verbiage, and
poor explanations.  The stated objectives of the chapter, given at
the end, say that you should have a fundamental understanding of
cryptography: this is true only in the most limited sense.  Chapter
two slowly builds a kind of pseudo-Kerberos system.

Part two covers mathematical foundations.  Chapter three deals with
probability and information theory, four with Turing Machines and the
notion of computational complexity, five with the algebraic
foundations behind the use of prime numbers and elliptic curves for
cryptography, and various number theory topics are touched on in
chapter six.

Part three addresses basic cryptographic techniques.  Chapter seven
deals with basic symmetric encryption techniques, touching on
substitution and transposition, as well as reviewing the operations of
DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard).
The insistence on converting all operations, and giving all
explanations, in symbolic logic does not seem to have any utility,
does not provide any clarity, and makes the material much more
difficult than it could be.  Asymmetric techniques, and attacks
against them, are outlined in chapter eight.  Finding individual bits
of the message, a process examined in chapter nine, can, over time,
result in an attack on the message or key as a whole.  Chapter ten
looks at data integrity, hashes, and digital signatures.

Part four deals with authentication.  Chapter eleven reviews various
conceptual protocols, pointing out (for example) that there is a
serious problem of key storage for challenge/response systems.  A
variety of real applications are considered in chapter twelve, and
warnings issued about each.  Issues of authentication specific to
asymmetric systems are covered in chapter thirteen.

Part five looks at formal approaches to the establishment of security.
There is more asymmetric cryptographic theory in chapter fourteen.
Chapter fifteen examines a number of provably secure asymmetric
cryptosystems, while sixteen does the same for digital signatures.
Formal methods of authentication protocol analysis are given in
chapter seventeen.

Part six discusses abstract cryptographic protocols.  Chapter eighteen
reviews a number of zero knowledge protocols, which provide the basis
for authentication where the principals are not previously known to
each other.  The coin flipping protocol, initiated in chapter one, is
revisited in chapter nineteen.  Chapter twenty wraps up with a summary
of the author's intentions for the book.

The book is certainly for advanced study, but it is hardly suitable
for security 

World-Renowned Cryptographer Arjen Lenstra Joins Bell Labs

2005-02-02 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.mysan.de/international/article32397.html

mysan.de/international -


World-Renowned Cryptographer Arjen Lenstra Joins Bell Labs


 Adds Valuable Talent to Lucent Technologies#039; Network Security Research

 MURRAY HILL, N.J., Feb. 1 /PRNewswire-FirstCall/ -- Lucent Technologies
(NYSE:LU) today announced that Arjen Lenstra, a world-renowned expert in
evaluating, designing and developing the cryptographic algorithms and
protocols that protect sensitive information as it is communicated
electronically, has joined Bell Labs#039; Computing Sciences Research
Center.
Prior to joining Bell Labs, Lenstra was vice president of Information
Security Services at Citigroup. Lenstra specializes in the security of
systems that are widely used in e-commerce applications, such as key size
selection, an important factor in how electronic transactions are secured,
and the evaluation of cryptosystems such as RSA and ElGamal, encryption
systems used in e-commerce protocols.
quot;Arjen is a significant addition to an already world-class group of
researchers at Bell Labs who are developing the algorithms, architectures
and systems necessary to ensure the security and reliability of
networks,quot; said Jeff Jaffe, president, Bell Labs Research and Advanced
Technologies. quot;His expertise will have a profound impact not just on
Lucent#039;s business, but on the business of our customers as well.
We#039;re thrilled to have him on board.quot;
Lenstra focuses on how academic cryptologic research and computational
number theory impact practical security applications and practices. This is
important because the vast majority of the crypto work happening today in
research labs and universities around the world, while important and
useful, is often too costly for practical implementation. Lenstra believes
that bridging the gap between what#039;s theoretically possible and
what#039;s practical is a major research challenge; it is the area he will
concentrate on at Bell Labs.
quot;I joined Bell Labs because I wanted to go back to designing
algorithms and tackling hard problems in computational number theory in a
way that will make a difference to people outside of academia,quot; said
Lenstra. quot;What I found compelling about the Labs was that everyone I
spoke with here knew exactly how the research they were doing helped the
company or its customers in some meaningful way.quot;
quot;Arjen#039;s network security expertise will further enhance Bell
Labs#039; capability in this critical area and will enable Lucent to
continue improving the security of the solutions we offer to our
customers,quot; said Linda Bramblett, director of Lucent Worldwide
Services#039; Security Practice. quot;We are pleased that Arjen
recognized the company#039;s commitment to stay at the forefront of
developing the next generation of security solutions and services, and that
he will be part of the Bell Labs team helping us do just that.quot;
One recent example of Lenstra#039;s expertise came after a recent
cryptography conference where it was shown that some widely used hash
functions -- cryptographic quot;fingerprintsquot; used in network
protocols in such industries as banking to create secure digital signatures
-- are weaker than expected, leaving online transactions potentially
vulnerable to attack. Lenstra assessed these theories and demonstrated that
their real-life impact was minimal. This kind of analysis helps
Lucent#039;s customers avoid needless spending by evaluating the actual
risk of developments advertised as quot;cryptographic disastersquot; to
assess whether they have any significant real- life impact.
Lenstra#039;s formal training is in computational number theory, a field
concerned with finding and implementing efficient computer algorithms for
solving various problems rooted in number theory. Lenstra was a key
contributor to the team that successfully factored RSA-155, a 512-bit
number, which at the time was the default key size used to secure
e-commerce transactions on the Internet. This was a significant
accomplishment because the RSA public-key cryptosystem relies on the
inability to factor such a number, and Lenstra#039;s team was able to do
so in less than seven months, suggesting this approach was not as secure as
had been believed.
Lenstra invented a number of widely used algorithms, cryptographic systems
and software packages including FreeLIP, software used for efficient
development and implementation of cryptographic protocols. In addition,
Lenstra co-authored the influential paper quot;Selecting Cryptographic Key
Sizes,quot; which offered guidelines for determining key sizes for
cryptosystems based on a set of explicitly formulated hypotheses and data
points about the cryptosystems.
Lenstra has a bachelor#039;s degree in mathematics and physics, a
master#039;s degree in mathematics, and a doctorate in mathematics and
computer science from the University of Amsterdam. He has spent his career
working, teaching or consulting 

FSTC Announces Availability of FSTC Counter-Phishing Project Whitepaper and Supporting Documents

2005-02-02 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


Date: Tue, 01 Feb 2005 14:38:24 -0500
From: Zachary Tumin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: FSTC Announces Availability of FSTC Counter-Phishing Project
 Whitepaper and Supporting Documents
To: 'Members' members@ls.fstc.org
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Thread-Index: AcUIlZgU2CHR/ELITdGfx45tInzmrg==

To: All FSTC Members and Friends
From:   Zach Tumin, Executive Director

I am pleased to announce the availability of FSTC's Understanding and
Countering the Phishing Threat, the summary whitepaper of findings and
recommendations of the FSTC Counter-Phishing Project. The whitepaper
contains valuable data, published here for the first time, including FSTC's
Phishing Attack Life Cycle and FSTC's Taxonomy of Phishing Attacks. This
and all other project deliverables are located at

http://fstc.org/projects/counter-phishing-phase-1/

In addition to the whitepaper, the following deliverables are being made
available on the site, as follows:

TO ALL: Results Summary: FSTC Counter-Phishing Solutions Survey: An
overview of the 60+ solutions currently offered on the marketplace, broken
down by where they map against the FSTC Phishing Attack Life Cycle

TO ALL: Vocabulary of Phishing Terms: A glossary of terms used throughout
the project. The project team used these to speak the same language when
talking about the problem and potential solutions, whether internally, or
with vendors, or with customers

TO FSTC MEMBERS ONLY: Results Summarized By Solution: identifies solutions
by company and product name as they map against the different phases of the
FSTC Phishing Attack Life Cycle

TO FSTC MEMBERS ONLY: Directory of Survey Respondents: contact information
for each company/solution provider that responded to the survey

FOR PURCHASE: Cost/Impact Spreadsheet Tool: a tool that provides a means
to estimate the direct and indirect costs/impacts of phishing to a financial
institution

FSTC extends its gratitude to its member organizations for their efforts and
contributions in completing this important industry research, and to the
project's talented management team for helping our members realize their
goals.




To subscribe or unsubscribe from this elist use the subscription
manager: http://ls.fstc.org/subscriber

--- end forwarded text


-- 
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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs

2005-02-02 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110727370814142368,00.html

The Wall Street Journal

  February 1, 2005 11:04 a.m. EST

Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs

By GARY MCWILLIAMS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
February 1, 2005 11:04 a.m.


HOUSTON -- Dell Inc. today is expected to add its support to an industry
effort to beef up desktop and notebook PC security by installing a
dedicated chip that adds security and privacy-specific features, according
to people familiar with its plans.

Dell will disclose plans to add the security features known as the Trusted
Computing Module on all its personal computers. Its support comes in the
wake of similar endorsements by PC industry giants Advanced Micro Devices
Inc., Hewlett-Packard Co., Intel Corp. and International Business Machines
Corp. The technology has been promoted by an industry organization called
the Trusted Computing Group.

The company is also expected to unveil new network PCs.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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MSN Belgium to use eID cards for online checking

2005-02-02 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/01/msn_belgium_id_cards/print.html

The Register


 Biting the hand that feeds IT

The Register » Internet and Law » Digital Rights/Digital Wrongs »

 Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/01/msn_belgium_id_cards/

MSN Belgium to use eID cards for online checking
By Jan Libbenga (libbenga at yahoo.com)
Published Tuesday 1st February 2005 14:34 GMT

Microsoft will integrate the Belgian eID Card with MSN Messenger.
Microsoft's Bill Gates and Belgian State Secretary for e-government Peter
Vanvelthoven announced the alliance today in Brussels. We're working to
ensure that our technologies support e-ID, to help make online transactions
and communications more secure, Gates said. eID stands for Electronic
Identity Card. The card contains an electronic chip and gradually will
replace the existing ID card system in Belgium. By end-2005, over 3 million
eID cards will be distributed in the country.

Microsoft believes that combined with the eID Card MSN Messenger chatrooms
will be much safer. Users would have a trustworthy way of identifying
themselves online. The Belgian Federal Computer Crime Unit (FCCU) could
even refuse young children access to certain chatrooms based on their
electronic identity.

We're not sure yet when we will be able to deliver this integration, Bill
Gates said. But developers here in Belgium and the US have proven the
concept and are working already on the actual solution.

-- 
-
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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Peppercoin Small Payments Processing Suite Available to First Data Channels

2005-02-02 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/050202/new005_1.html

Yahoo! Finance


Press Release
Source: Peppercoin

Peppercoin Small Payments Processing Suite Available to First Data Channels
Wednesday February 2, 9:03 am ET

Small Transaction Suite Certified for Sale Through Processor's Merchant
Acquiring Partners

WALTHAM, Mass., Feb. 2 /PRNewswire/ -- Peppercoin, a payments company that
enables profitable, new business models for low-priced digital content and
physical goods, today announced its Small Transaction Suite is authorized
for sale by First Data's merchant acquiring partners, to satisfy the small
payment needs of the 3.5 million merchant clients they serve.

Peppercoin offers merchants a hosted small-payment service, based on credit
and debit card usage, which enables merchants to optimize revenue and
profitability. Peppercoin is the only small-payment vendor that addresses
the digital, mobile and physical point-of-sale (POS) markets.

Our agreement with First Data Merchant Services validates Peppercoin's
ability to deliver a desired and profitable small payment solution to the
financial services market, as well as the growing need for small payment
credit and debit card payments solutions, said Mark Friedman, president of
Peppercoin. FDMS will enable a small payment business model that enhances
merchant and acquirer revenue with one complete payment application.

Significant Market Opportunity:

Consumers are demonstrating a clear and growing preference to use their
credit and debit cards for all sizes and types of purchases. In a 2004
study, Ipsos-Insight estimated that roughly 37.5 million US consumers would
choose to use their credit and debit cards for transactions below $5.

Each year, more than 354 billion cash transactions occur in the U.S. for
less than $5 at the physical point-of-sale, representing $1.32 trillion in
aggregate revenue. Leading markets include vending ($18 billion), parking
($10 billion), coin-op ($6 billion) and quick-serve-restaurants ($110
billion).

The online and mobile small payment opportunities are substantial as well;
fueled by music, games, video, publishing and services. TowerGroup
estimates the digital micropayments opportunity reached more than $3
billion in 2004. And a September 2004 Ipsos-Insight study revealed that, in
just one year, the number of US consumers who have made small online
purchases grew 250%, from 4 million to 14 million.

About Peppercoin, Inc.

Peppercoin enables profitable new business models for low-priced digital
content and physical goods. Peppercoin's small payment products help
merchants, banks, and other payments companies build market adoption
quickly through a flexible, consumer-friendly approach. Peppercoin
integrates easily with existing business models and systems to accelerate
revenues and increase profits while dramatically lowering transaction and
customer service costs. For more information visit
http://www.peppercoin.com.
All trademarks are the property of their respective owners.

Contact:   Mark McClennan or Scott Love
   Schwartz Communications
   781-684-0770
   [EMAIL PROTECTED]




 Source: Peppercoin

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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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NIST moves to stronger hashing

2005-02-07 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.fcw.com/print.asp

Federal Computer Week




Monday, February 7, 2005


NIST moves to stronger hashing


 BY  Florence Olsen
 Published on Feb. 7, 2005


Federal agencies have been put on notice that National Institute of
Standards and Technology officials plan to phase out a widely used
cryptographic hash function known as SHA-1 in favor of larger and stronger
hash functions such as SHA-256 and SHA-512.

 The change will affect many federal cryptographic functions that
incorporate hashes, particularly digital signatures, said William Burr,
manager of NIST's security technology group, which advises federal agencies
on electronic security standards.

There's really no emergency here, Burr said. But you should be planning
how you're going to transition - whether you're a vendor or a user - so
that you can do better cryptography by the next decade.

Hashing is used to prevent tampering with electronic messages. A hash is a
numerical code generated from a string of text when a message is sent. The
receiving system checks it against a hash it creates from the same text,
and if they match, the message was sent intact.

Speaking at a recent meeting of the federal Public Key Infrastructure
Technical Working Group at NIST, Burr said some critics have questioned the
security of the government-developed SHA-1 after some researchers managed
to break a variant of the SHA-1 hash function last year.

But Burr said no complete implementation of the SHA-1 function has been
successfully attacked. SHA-1 is not broken, he said, and there is not
much reason to suspect that it will be soon. But advances in computer
processing capability make it prudent to phase out SHA-1 by 2010, he said.

 Burr said other widely used hash functions such as MD5 are vulnerable to
attack and their use should be discontinued. If by some chance you are
still using MD5 in certificates or for digital signatures, you should
stop, he said.

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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Quantum crypto firm charts way to mainstream

2005-02-07 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.zdnet.com/2102-1009_22-5564288.html?tag=printthis

Quantum crypto firm charts way to mainstream

 By Michael Kanellos
 URL: http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-5564288.html
Magiq Technologies is creating a new line of products this year that it
says could help make quantum encryption--theoretically impossible to
crack--more palatable to mainstream customers.

The New York-based company said it has signed a deal with Cavium Networks,
under which Cavium's network security chips will be included inside Magiq's
servers and networking boards.

 Magiq and Cavium will also create reference designs for networking boards
and cards, with all of the necessary silicon to create a quantum encryption
system. These will be marketed to networking gear makers, which, Magiq
hopes, will include the boards inside future boxes.

 We have operability tests going on with major vendors, said Andy
Hammond, vice president of marketing at Magiq. Our goal in life is to
increase the adoption rate of this technology.

 By the fall, Magiq expects to be able to provide functioning beta, or
test, products that include its quantum encryption boards. Volume sales to
manufacturers are scheduled to begin in 2006.

 Quantum encryption involves sending data by way of photons, the smallest
unit of light. The photons are polarized, or oriented, in different
directions. Eavesdroppers cause detectable changes in the orientation,
which in turn prevents them from getting secret information, as dictated by
Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, which says you can't observe something
without changing it. For added measure, the data is encrypted before
sending.

 There is no cracking it. This is like the apple falling down, said
Audrius Berzanskis, Magiq's vice president of security engineering, meaning
that it was like one of Sir Isaac Newton's natural laws.

 This doesn't mean quantum encryption systems are unconditionally
foolproof, he added. Hypothetically, radio transmitters or some other
technology could intercept signals before they are sent. Still, these are
computer architecture issues: Unlike traditional encryption systems,
applying brute-force calculations to a message encrypted using quantum
methods will not eventually yield its contents to an unauthorized party.

 However, quantum encryption systems are pricey. The two-box system Magiq
sells goes for $70,000. Academic institutions and government agencies have
been the primary customers, the company said.

 Whether demand will go mainstream is still a matter of debate. Nearly
foolproof encryption has its obvious attractions. Various security experts
have stated, however, that the strength of today's cryptography is the
least of the security world's worries.

 Security is a chain; it's only as strong as the weakest link. Currently
encryption is the strongest link we have. Everything else is worse:
software, networks, people. There's absolutely no value in taking the
strongest link and making it even stronger, Bruce Schneier, chief
technology officer at Counterpane Internet Security, wrote in an e-mail to
CNET News.com on quantum cryptography in general.

 It's like putting a huge stake in the ground and hoping the enemy runs
right into it, he noted.

 Speed also has been a problem for quantum encryption. The deal with Cavium
will ideally boost the performance of the Magiq products and lower the
costs by standardizing some of the engineering. Cavium's chips, for
instance, will assume encryption tasks now performed in software. Reference
designs also allow potential customers to skirt some independent design
tasks.


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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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MD5 comes in for further criticism

2005-02-07 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.techworld.com/storage/news/index.cfm?NewsID=3081Page=1pagePos=11

Techworld.com


07 February 2005
More experts warn of CAS arrays risks
MD5 comes in for further criticism


By Lucas Mearian, Computerworld (US)

More security experts are warning against the use of the flawed hashing
algorithm, MD5, for digital signatures on content addressed storage (CAS)
systems.

Last August, a Chinese researcher, Xiaoyun Wang, unveiled detailsof the
flaw. Other security experts are now chipping in.

 An official at the National Institute of Standards and Technology said IT
managers have good reason to be concerned about security flaws in MD5.
It's pretty well known right now that it's just not up to what you need,
said Elaine Barker, head of NIST's computer security division. Barker said
NIST has no plans to certify or recommend the MD5 algorithm for government
use.

The warnings come as more vendors unveil CAS systems to meet the need for
disk-based backup of fixed data such as e-mail and medical images. Experts
say that under specific circumstances, hackers could create files
containing malicious data that could cause data loss or the dissemination
of bad data.

Of the four major vendors of CAS storage, two of them - EMC and Archivas -
use the MD5 algorithm. The other two, Permabit and Avamar Technologies do
not. Archivas said it provides the option of using another method of
indexing, called the Secure Hash Algorithm-1.

Users of EMC and Archivas systems say they aren't concerned about the warnings.

I believe that the possibility of a (problem) is so unlikely that it does
not bother me, said John Halamka, CIO at Boston-based CareGroup, a
hospital management company. Thus far, we've been working with (the)
Centera (array) for more than a year without a single issue.

Curt Tilmes, a systems engineer at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, has
been beta-testing an Archivas Cluster CAS system for archiving satellite
data about the earth's atmosphere for more than a year.

He said he feels it's secure because it's on a private network with
firewalls. I suppose it wouldn't hurt [to use a more secure algorithm],
but for my application, it wouldn't have an effect, Tilmes said.

Meanwhile, Sun's long-awaited CAS system, code-named Honeycomb, won't use
the MD5 algorithm because of security concerns, said Chris Woods, chief
technology officer for Sun's storage practice. Woods would not say which
algorithm the company will use to index stored objects.

It really is time for [the industry] to stop using MD5, said Dan
Kaminsky, a security consultant at Avaya. MD5 has been a deprecated
hashing algorithm for almost a decade. The industry has clung to the
algorithm, partially out of inertia, partially out of scarcity of computer
power.

In a report last month, Kaminsky pointed out that an attack could be used
to create two files with the same MD5 hash, one with safe data and one
with malicious data. If both files were saved to the same system, a
so-called collision could result, leading to data loss or the dissemination
of bad data, he said.

Mike Kilian, CTO at EMC's Centera division, contended that MD5 flaws don't
apply to Centera arrays because once a piece of content is stored, a
company can't change it.

Centera from almost Day 1 has had multiple addressing schemes available to
applications, Kilian said.

Kaminsky disagreed. Cryptography tends to be a 'garbage algorithm in,
garbage security out' discipline, he said. Let's say they were appending
custom metadata to the end of their files. Conceivably, the attack would
not care, as once two files have the same hash, you can append the same
[identical] metadata to both of them and they'll still possess the same
hash.

Archivas officials noted that its CAS device does not use the MD5 hash key
to name the file in the archive, the way EMC's product does.

-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[fc-announce] Transportation, Taxes, and Conference Events

2005-02-07 Thread R.A. Hettinga

--- begin forwarded text


User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/11.1.0.040913
From: Stuart E. Schechter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [fc-announce] Transportation, Taxes, and Conference Events
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 07 Feb 2005 15:12:11 -0500


  IMPORTANT NOTES FOR THOSE ATTENDING FC05

Transportation
==

   We would like to accommodate attendees with discounted transportation to
and from the airport.  Please fill out the following survey if you would
like to arrange for discounted transportation or give your opinion on
conference activities.  We need your answers this week.

   http://www.zoomerang.com/survey.zgi?p=WEB2244SFRHAFQ

Dominica departure tax
==
  Please note that there is a departure tax of approximately EC$50/US$22
payable at the airport on you way out of Dominica.  You'll be reminded of
the exact figure at the conference.

New York Times article
==
   Dominica was recently featured in Saturday's New York times.  (Ignore the
red herring of their reference to the Dominican Republic early in the
article.)  It's a great read to get yourself in the mood for your upcoming
trip.
   http://nytimes.com/2005/02/06/travel/06dominica.html?pagewanted=all

[Learn to] Scuba dive
=
   Please contact me at [EMAIL PROTECTED] if you are interested in
a discover-scuba social on Tuesday or Wednesday afternoon, if you are
interested in getting a full open water certification on Dominica, or if you
are already certified and want to dive with other attendees.

Registration

   With three weeks to go before the conference registration has already
exceeded our totals from last year by more than 10%.  We're glad to see
you're as excited as we are and we're looking forward to a great conference.

   Best regards

   Stuart Schechter
   General Chair
   Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2005


___
fc-announce mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://mail.ifca.ai/mailman/listinfo/fc-announce

--- end forwarded text


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Identity thieves can lurk at Wi-Fi spots

2005-02-08 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-02-06-evil-twin-usat_x.htm

USA Today



Identity thieves can lurk at Wi-Fi spots
 By Jon Swartz, USA TODAY
SAN FRANCISCO - Coffee shop Web surfers beware: An evil twin may be lurking
near your favorite wireless hotspot.

Thieves are using wireless devices to impersonate legitimate Internet
access points to steal credit card numbers and other personal information,
security experts warn.

So-called evil-twin attacks don't require technical expertise. Anyone armed
with a wireless laptop and software widely available on the Internet can
broadcast a radio signal that overpowers the hot spot.
  How to avoid an 'evil twin'?? Install personal firewall and security
patches. Use hot spots for Web surfing only. Enter passwords only into Web
sites that include an SSL key at bottom right. Turn off or remove wireless
card if you are not using a hot spot. Avoid hot spots where it's difficult
to tell who's connected, such as at hotels and airport clubs. If hot spot
is not working properly, assume password is compromised. Change password
and report incident to hot spot provider. Do not use insecure applications
such as e-mail instant messaging while at hot spots.

 Source: AirDefense Then, masquerading as the real thing, they view the
activities of wireless users within several hundred feet of the hot spot.

It could be someone sitting next to you on a plane or in a parking lot
across the street from a coffee shop, says Jon Green, director of
technical marketing at Aruba Wireless Networks, which makes
radio-wave-scanning equipment that detects and shuts down bogus hot spots.

Wireless networks are wide open, says Steve Lewack, director of
technology services for Columbus Regional Medical Center in Columbus, Ga.

The facility uses software and sensors to monitor 480 wireless devices used
by medical personnel at 110 access points. Last month, it stopped about 120
attempts to steal financial information from medical personnel and patients
- double the number of incidents from a few months earlier.

The recent surge in evil-twin attacks parallels phishing scams - fraudulent
e-mail messages designed to trick consumers into divulging personal
information. Though the problem is in its infancy, it has caught the
attention of some businesses heavily dependent on wireless communications.

But most consumers aren't aware of the threat, security expert Green says.

Wi-Fi, or wireless Internet, sends Web pages via radio waves. Hot spots are
an area within range of a Wi-Fi antenna.

As the technology has grown - there are now about 20,000 hot spots in the
USA, up from 12,000 a year ago - so too have security concerns. Anil
Khatod, CEO of AirDefense, a maker of software and sensors, estimates
break-ins number in the hundreds each month in the USA.

Companies employing hundreds of people with wireless laptops are especially
vulnerable to evil-twin scams. When a worker's information is filched, it
can expose a corporate network.

It presents a serious, hidden danger to Web users, says Phil Nobles, a
wireless-security expert at Cranfield University in England who has
researched the threat. It's hard to nab the perpetrator, and the victim
has no idea what happened.

-- 
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R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Group Aims to Make Internet Phone Service Secure

2005-02-09 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110790485798349353,00.html

The Wall Street Journal

  February 9, 2005

 TELECOMMUNICATIONS


Group Aims to Make
 Internet Phone Service Secure
Alliance of Tech Companies Looks for Ways
 To Head Off Attacks by Hackers, Viruses

By RIVA RICHMOND
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
February 9, 2005; Page D4


A group of more than 20 technology companies and computer-security
organizations has gone on the offensive to protect the burgeoning Internet
telephone service from hackers, viruses and other security problems.

The VOIP Security Alliance, which was announced earlier this week, will
focus on uncovering security problems and promoting ways to reduce the risk
of attack for voice over Internet protocol, or VOIP, technology.

The group, known as VOIPSA, includes companies such as 3Com Corp., Alcatel
SA, Avaya Inc., Siemens AG, Symantec Corp. and Ernst  Young LLP. Other
members include the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a
federal government agency; the SANS Institute, a research organization for
network administrators and computer-security professionals; and several
universities.

The group's goal is to help make VOIP as secure and reliable as traditional
telephone service. VOIP breaks voice into digital information and moves it
over the Internet. That can make phone service much cheaper, but it also
opens the door to the kind of security woes that have come to plague the
Internet.

VOIP enthusiasts worry that security and privacy problems could hamper
adoption of the technology.

VOIP has a lot of great value propositions, but in order for it to be
successful, it has to be secured and offer service quality that's on par
with the current phone system, said David Endler, chairman of the alliance
and an executive at TippingPoint, a security company that recently was
acquired by 3Com. VOIPSA is a first step in doing that.

Internet telephone service is expected to be rolled out rapidly to
consumers and business customers, starting this year. Mr. Endler said many
network operators don't realize they need to alter their security
strategies when they add Internet phone service. For instance, traditional
firewalls cannot police VOIP traffic, he said, and so networks will need to
be upgraded with newer security technologies.

There's little understanding of what security problems VOIP might introduce
and what kind of defensive measures need to be taken. VOIPSA intends to
improve that situation by sponsoring research, uncovering vulnerabilities,
disseminating information about threats and security measures, and
providing open-source tools to test network-security levels.

Because VOIP will be dependent on the Internet, there's little hope that
security troubles can be avoided, said Alan Paller, director of research at
the SANS Institute, though early action by technology makers to address
problems is positive and welcome. It's not a lightweight problem, he
said. How well would you do with no phone? If Internet attacks can
disrupt phone service, you radically expand the number of victims, he
said.

VOIP networks really inherit the same cyber-security threats that data
networks are today prone to, but those threats take greater severity in
some cases, Mr. Endler said.

For instance, a life-or-death emergency call to 911 might not get through
if a network is crippled by a hacker attack. Worse, a broad assault on the
phone system could become a national security crisis that causes economic
damage.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Hold the Phone, VOIP Isn't Safe

2005-02-09 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,66512,00.html

Wired News


Hold the Phone, VOIP Isn't Safe 
By Elizabeth Biddlecombe?

Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,66512,00.html

02:00 AM Feb. 07, 2005 PT

In recognition of the fact that new technologies are just as valuable to
wrongdoers as to those in the right, a new industry group has formed to
look at the security threats inherent in voice over internet protocol.

 The VOIP Security Alliance, or VOIPSA, launches on Monday. So far, 22
entities, including security experts, researchers, operators and equipment
vendors, have signed up. They range from equipment vendor Siemens and phone
company Qwest to research organization The SANS Institute.


 They aim to counteract a range of potential security risks in the practice
of sending voice as data packets, as well as educate users as they buy and
use VOIP equipment. An e-mail mailing list and working groups will enable
discussion and collaboration on VOIP testing tools.

 VOIP services have attracted few specific attacks so far, largely because
the relatively small number of VOIP users doesn't make them a worthwhile
target. (A report from Point Topic in December counted 5 million VOIP users
worldwide.)

 But security researchers have found vulnerabilities in the various
protocols used to enable VOIP. For instance, CERT has issued alerts
regarding multiple weaknesses with SIP (session initiation protocol) and
with H.323.

 Over the past year, experts have repeatedly warned that VOIP abuse is
inevitable. The National Institute of Standards and Technology put out a
report last month urging federal agencies and businesses to consider the
complex security issues often overlooked when considering a move to VOIP.
NIST is a member of VOIPSA.

 It is really just a matter of time before it is as widespread as e-mail
spam, said Michael Osterman, president of Osterman Research.

 Spammers have already embraced spim (spam over instant messaging), say
the experts. Dr. Paul Judge, chief technology officer at
messaging-protection company CipherTrust, says 10 percent of
instant-messaging traffic is spam, with just 10 to 15 percent of its
corporate clients using IM. It is where e-mail was two and a half years
ago, said Judge.

 To put that in perspective, according to another messaging-protection
company, FrontBridge Technologies, 17 percent of e-mail was spam in January
2002. It put that figure at 93 percent in November 2004.

 So the inference is that spit (spam over internet telephony) is just
around the corner. Certainly, the ability to send out telemarketing
voicemail messages with the same ease as blanket e-mails makes for
appealing economics.

 Aside from the annoyance this will cause, the strain on network resources
when millions of 100-KB voicemail messages are transmitted, compared with
5- or 10-KB e-mails, will be considerable.

 But the threat shouldn't be couched solely within the context of unlawful
marketing practices. Users might also see the audio equivalent of phishing,
in which criminals leave voicemails pretending to be from a bank, said
Osbourne Shaw, whose role as president of ICG, an electronic forensics
company, has led him to try buying some of the goods advertised in spam.

 In fact, according to David Endler, chairman of the VOIP Security Alliance
and director of digital vaccines at network-intrusion company TippingPoint,
there are many ways to attack a VOIP system. First, VOIP inherits the same
problems that affect IP networks themselves: Hackers can launch distributed
denial of service attacks, which congest the network with illegitimate
traffic. This prevents e-mails, file transfers, web-page requests and,
increasingly, voice calls from getting through. Voice traffic has its own
sensitivities, which mean the user experience can easily be degraded past
the point of usability.

 Furthermore, additional nodes of the network can be attacked with VOIP: IP
phones, broadband modems and network equipment, such as soft switches,
signaling gateways and media gateways.

 Endler paints a picture in which an attack on a VOIP service could mean
people would eavesdrop on conversations, interfere with audio streams, or
disconnect, reroute or even answer other people's phone calls. This is a
concern to the increasing number of call centers that put both their voice
and data traffic on a single IP network. It is even more of a concern for
911 call centers.

 But Louis Mamakos, chief technology officer at broadband telephony
provider Vonage, says he and his team spend a lot of time worrying about
security but the problems the company has seen so far have centered on
more pedestrian threats like identity theft.

 Vonage has not yet signed up for the VOIP Security Alliance, said Mamakos,
and employees already spend a lot of time working on security issues with
technology providers.

 I'm not sure if (VOIPSA) is a solution to a problem we don't have yet,
he said. We need to judge what the 

GNFC launches Indian Digital Certification services

2005-02-10 Thread R.A. Hettinga
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizer Company???

;-)

Cheers,
RAH
---


http://www.deepikaglobal.com/ENG5_sub.asp?newscode=92273catcode=ENG5subcatcode=


deepikaglobal.com - Business News Detail

Thursday, February 10, 2005  


 
Good Evening to you



Business News



GNFC launches nationwide Digital Certification services
Mumbai, Feb 9 (UNI) Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizer Company (GNFC)
promoted (n)Code Solutions today launched its nationwide services for
providing ''Digital certificates to individuals and organisations aimed at
boosting efforts for implementation of e-governance and e-commerce in the
country''.

Digital certificates can be explained as digital passports that help in
authentication of the bearer on the net, while maintaining privacy and
integrity of the net-based transactions. It is accorded the same value as
paper-based signatures of the physical world by the Indian IT Act 2000 and
each of these transactions help bring trust in the Internet-based
transactions.

Launching the services, Nasscom President Kiran Karnik said, ''The presence
of a large number of credible public sector organisation in this domain
will futher boost the efforts for implementation of e-governance in the
country.'' He said that the safety and security of net-based transactions
would enable to usher in higher levels of exellence at lower costs.

Having carved an enviable reputation for itself in managing large and
complex projects successfully, Mr Karnik said ''GNFC will duplicate its
success in this IT venture as well.'' A K Luke, Managing Director of GNFC
and another state-PSU Gujarat State Fertiliser Corporation, on this
occasion, said ''The (n)Code Solutions infrastructure, set up for the
purpose is at par with the best in the world.'' He said the GNFC was
committed to diversifications in the emerging fields of IT like e-security.
(n)Code Solutions has put in motion a nation-wide machinery to support
different market segments like banking and financial institutions, public
and private sector enterprises besides State and Central Government
organisations, he added.

He said the IT company of GNFC had simultaneously released a suite of
applications like (n)Procure, (n)Sign, (n)Form and (n)Pay that make use of
digital signatures to ensure safety and security in the virtual world in
various ways.

Mr Luke said these applications will address a wide spectrum of needs of
the internet-dependent business world, ranging from online procurement to
signing and sending web forms and enabling online payments to securing web
servers or VPN devices.

GNFC is a Rs 1800 crore fertiliser and chemicals company of the Gujarat
Government.


-- 
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Desire safety on Net? (n) code has the solution

2005-02-10 Thread R.A. Hettinga
I'm starting get the hang of this. I mean, fertilizer...crypto,
crypto...fertilizer: They're both *munitions*, right?

Right?

:-)

Cheers,
RAH


http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=117201#

Express India 

Desire safety on Net? (n) code has the solution

Express News Service

Ahmedabad, February 9:  ADDRESSING a wide spectrum of needs of the
Net-dependent business world ranging from online buying to signing and
sending web forms, (n) code solutions, promoted by IT branch of the Gujarat
Narmada Valley Fertilizer Company Limited, has launched its nationwide
services at NASSCOM, India Leadership Forum 2005.

 (n) code solutions has been recently licensed by the IT ministry as
certifying authority for providing digital signature certificates to
individuals and organisations.

Digital certificates can be explained as digital passports, which help in
authentication of the bearer on the Internet. This also helps maintain,
privacy and integrity of Net-based transactions. Digital signatures are
accorded the same value as paper-based signatures of the physical world by
the Indian IT Act 2000. Each of these functions help bring trust in
Net-based transactions.

 (n) code has simultaneously released a suite of applications like, (n)
procure, (n) sign, (n) form and (n) pay to make use of digital signatures
to ensure safety and security in the virtual world in various ways. (n)
code has also put in motion, nationwide machinery to support different
market segments like banking and financial institutions, public and private
sector enterprises and state and central government organisation.


-- 
-
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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
experience. -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Vegas casino bets on RFID

2005-02-10 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.com.com/2102-7355_3-5568288.html?tag=st.util.print



 Vegas casino bets on RFID

 By Alorie Gilbert


Casino mogul Steve Wynn has pulled out all the stops for his new $2.7
billion mega-resort in Las Vegas: an 18-hole championship golf course, a
private lake and mountain, and a bronze tower housing 2,700 plush guest
rooms.

 But when its doors open in April, the Wynn Las Vegas will have one unique
feature that few visitors are likely to notice--high-tech betting chips
designed to deter counterfeiting, card-counting and other bad behavior.

 The fancy new chips look just like regular ones, only they contain radio
devices that signal secret serial numbers. Special equipment linked to the
casino's computer systems and placed throughout the property will identify
legitimate chips and detect fakes, said Rick Doptis, vice president of
table games for the Wynn.
News.context

What's new:
 Betting chips are getting a high-tech RFID makeover designed to deter
counterfeiting and misbehavior at the tables.

Bottom line:Despite this, RFID technology is still relatively rare in
casinos--until that killer application arrives.

More stories on RFID

Security-wise, it will be huge for us, Doptis said.

 The technology behind these chips is known as radio frequency
identification, or RFID, and it's been used for years to track livestock,
enable employee security badges and pay tolls.

 The casino industry is just the latest to find new uses for RFID
technology. Retail chains, led by Wal-Mart Stores, are using it to monitor
merchandise. Libraries are incorporating it into book collections to speed
checkouts and re-shelving. The United States and other nations are
incorporating it into passports to catch counterfeits. One company even
offers to inject people with RFID chips linked to their medical records to
ensure they receive proper medical care.

 In casinos, RFID technology is still relatively rare and in search of a
killer application to spur adoption. Yet some tech-savvy casino executives
envision RFID transforming the way they operate table games, including
blackjack, craps and roulette, over the next four or five years.

 For one thing, there's the counterfeiting problem, on which there is scant
data. The Nevada Gaming Commission gets about a dozen complaints every year
related to counterfeit chips, said Keith Copher, the agency's chief of
enforcement. Last year, a casino in Reno quickly lost $26,000 in such a
scheme--one of the biggest hits reported to the commission in recent years.
And counterfeiting is on the rise at overseas casinos, Copher noted. The
RFID technology would let dealers or cashiers see when the value of the
chips in front of them don't match the scanners' tally.


 However, financial losses due to counterfeit chips are usually minor, and
few perpetrators get away with it, Copher said.

 Perhaps that's why the Wynn has found a dual purpose for the high-tech
chips: The casino is also using the chips to help account for the chips
they issue on credit to players, since managing credit risk is a huge part
of any big casino's operations.

 The Wynn plans to take note of the serial numbers of the chips they lend
and of the name of players who cash them in. If someone else returns the
chips, it could signal that the original player is using their credit line
with the casino to make loans to others--something casinos generally frown
upon.

 That sort of security doesn't come cheap: The Wynn is spending about $2
million on the chips. That's about double the price of regular chips, and
doesn't include addition equipment the Wynn will need to purchase, such as
RFID readers, computers and networking gear.

Eye in the sky
 The technology could also help casinos catch card players who sneak extra
betting chips onto the table after hands are dealt or players who count
cards. That's one reason the Hard Rock Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas plans
to switch on a new set of RFID-equipped betting chips and tables next month.

The casino is installing RFID readers and PCs at game tables. With antennas
placed under each player's place at the table, dealers can take a quick
inventory of chips that have been wagered at the push of a button. The PCs
display all the initial bets, deterring players from sneaking extra chips
into their pile after hands are dealt.

 Yet the benefits of RFID go beyond security. It may also help casinos
boost profits through savvier marketing.

 Vegas has a little bit of a wait-and-see attitude... They want to make
sure the product is bulletproof.
 --Tim Richards, vice-president of marketing, Progressive Gaming International

Take the Hard Rock Hotel. In addition to monitoring wagers, the casino
plans to use its new RFID system to rate players--monitor gamblers to
reward them with free rooms, meals and other perks based on how much and
how often they wager. As the technology advances, RFID could also help
track how well they play. The casinos generally reserve the most enticing
rewards 

House backs major shift to electronic IDs

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-5571898.html?tag=st.util.print

CNET News


 House backs major shift to electronic IDs

 By Declan McCullagh

 Story last modified Thu Feb 10 17:46:00 PST 2005



The U.S. House of Representatives approved on Thursday a sweeping set of
rules aimed at forcing states to issue all adults federally approved
electronic ID cards, including driver's licenses.

Under the rules, federal employees would reject licenses or identity cards
that don't comply, which could curb Americans' access to airplanes, trains,
national parks, federal courthouses and other areas controlled by the
federal government. The bill was approved by a 261-161 vote.

 The measure, called the Real ID Act, says that driver's licenses and other
ID cards must include a digital photograph, anticounterfeiting features and
undefined machine-readable technology, with defined minimum data elements
that could include a magnetic strip or RFID tag. The Department of Homeland
Security would be charged with drafting the details of the regulation.


 Republican politicians argued that the new rules were necessary to thwart
terrorists, saying that four of the Sept. 11, 2001, hijackers possessed
valid state-issued driver's licenses. When I get on an airplane and
someone shows ID, I'd like to be sure they are who they say they are, said
Rep. Tom Davis, a Virginia Republican, during a floor debate that started
Wednesday.

 States would be required to demand proof of the person's Social Security
number and confirm that number with the Social Security Administration.
They would also have to scan in documents showing the person's date of
birth and immigration status, and create a massive store so that the
(scanned) images can be retained in electronic storage in a transferable
format permanently.

 Another portion of the bill says that states would be required to link
their DMV databases if they wished to receive federal funds. Among the
information that must be shared: All data fields printed on drivers'
licenses and identification cards, and complete drivers' histories,
including motor vehicle violations, suspensions and points on licenses.

 The Bush administration threw its weight behind the Real ID Act, which has
been derided by some conservative and civil liberties groups as tantamount
to a national ID card. The White House said in a statement this week that
it strongly supports House passage of the bill.

 Thursday's vote mostly fell along party lines. About 95 percent of the
House Republicans voted for the bill, which had been prepared by the
judiciary committee chairman, F. James Sensenbrenner, a Wisconsin
Republican. More than three-fourths of the House Democrats opposed it.

 Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton, a Democrat from Washington, D.C., charged that
Republicans were becoming hypocrites by trampling on states' rights. I
thought the other side of the aisle extols federalism at all times, Norton
said. Yes, even in hard times, even when you're dealing with terrorism. So
what's happening now? Why are those who speak up for states whenever it
strikes their fancy doing this now?


 Civil libertarians and firearm rights groups condemned the bill before the
vote. The American Civil Liberties Union likened the new rules to a de
facto national ID card, saying that the measure would force states to
deny driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants and make DMV employees
act as agents of the federal immigration service.

 Because an ID is required to purchase a firearm from a dealer, Gun Owners
of America said the bill amounts to a bureaucratic back door to
implementation of a national ID card. The group warned that it would
empower the federal government to determine who can get a driver's
license--and under what conditions.

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... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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Break-In At SAIC Risks ID Theft

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17506-2005Feb11?language=printer

The Washington Post

washingtonpost.com
Break-In At SAIC Risks ID Theft
Computers Held Personal Data on Employee-Owners

 By Griff Witte
 Washington Post Staff Writer
 Saturday, February 12, 2005; Page E01

 Some of the nation's most influential former military and intelligence
officials have been informed in recent days that they are at risk of
identity theft after a break-in at a major government contractor netted
computers containing the Social Security numbers and other personal
information about tens of thousands of past and present company employees.

 The contractor, employee-owned Science Applications International Corp. of
San Diego, handles sensitive government contracts, including many in
information security. It has a reputation for hiring Washington's most
powerful figures when they leave the government, and its payroll has been
studded with former secretaries of defense, CIA directors and White House
counterterrorism advisers.

Those former officials -- along with the rest of a 45,000-person workforce
in which a significant percentage of employees hold government security
clearances -- were informed last week that their private information may
have been breached and they need to take steps to protect themselves from
fraud.

 David Kay, who was chief weapons inspector in Iraq after nearly a decade
as an executive at SAIC, said he has devoted more than a dozen hours to
shutting down accounts and safeguarding his finances. He said the
successful theft of personal data, by thieves who smashed windows to gain
access, does not speak well of a company that is devoted to keeping the
government's secrets secure.

I just find it unexplainable how anyone could be so casual with such vital
information. It's not like we're just now learning that identity theft is a
problem, said Kay, who lives in Northern Virginia.

 About 16,000 SAIC employees work in the Washington area.

Bobby Ray Inman, former deputy director of the CIA and a former director at
SAIC, agreed. It's worrisome, said Inman, who also received notification
of the theft last week. If the security is sloppy, it raises questions.

Ben Haddad, an SAIC spokesman, said yesterday that the Jan. 25 theft, which
the company announced last week, occurred in an administrative building
where no sensitive contracting work is performed. Haddad said the company
does not know whether the thieves targeted specific computers containing
employee information or if they were simply after hardware to sell for
cash. In either case, the company is taking no chances.

 We're taking this extremely seriously, Haddad said. It's certainly not
something that would reflect well on any company, let alone a company
that's involved in information security. But what can I say? We're doing
everything we can to get to the bottom of it.

Gary Hassen of the San Diego Police Department said there are, at the
moment, no leads.

 Haddad said surveillance cameras are in the building where the theft took
place, but he did not know whether they caught the perpetrators on tape. He
also did not know whether the information that was on the pilfered
computers had been encrypted.

 The stolen information included names, Social Security numbers, addresses,
telephone numbers and records of financial transactions. It was stored in a
database of past and present SAIC stockholders. SAIC is one of the nation's
largest employee-owned companies, with workers each receiving the option to
buy SAIC stock through an internal brokerage division known as Bull Inc.

 Haddad said the company has been trying through letters and e-mails to get
in touch with everyone who has held company stock within the past decade,
though he acknowledged that hasn't been easy since many have since left the
company.

 He said the company would take steps to ensure stockholder information is
better protected in the future, but he declined to be specific.

 The theft comes at a time when the company, which depends on the federal
government for more than 80 percent of its $7 billion annual revenue, is
already under scrutiny for its handling of several contracts.

 Last week on Capitol Hill, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III testified
that the company had botched an attempt to build software for the bureau's
new Virtual Case File system. The $170 million upgrade was supposed to
allow agents to sift through different cases electronically, but the FBI
has said the new system is so outdated that it will probably be scrapped.

 In San Antonio, SAIC is fighting the government over charges that the
company padded its cost estimates on a $24 million Air Force contract. The
case prompted the Air Force to issue an unusual alert to its contracting
officials late last year, warning them that the Department of Justice
believes that SAIC is continuing to submit defective cost or pricing data
in support of its pricing proposals.

 SAIC has defended its work for the 

Fighting Net crime with code / Surge in phishing e-mails to take spotlight at cryptography conference

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/02/14/BUG3NB9UTL1.DTLtype=printable

 
  www.sfgate.com  Return to regular view
Fighting Net crime with code
 Surge in phishing e-mails to take spotlight at cryptography conference
 - Carrie Kirby, Chronicle Staff Writer
 Monday, February 14, 2005

Every year, a bunch of cryptographers throw a big party, business mixer and
study session in the Bay Area.

 In their effort to make the world love the science of code making and
breaking as much as they do, they invoke dramatic historical uses of
cryptography: the etchings of the ancient Maya, the Navajo code talkers of
World War II.

 This time, the RSA Conference, opening today at Moscone Center in San
Francisco, has crime as its theme. The 11,000 attendees will hear the tale
of how federal agent Elizebeth Smith Friedman brought down a major ring of
rum runners by cracking their sophisticated codes.

 The timing couldn't be more apt. More people than ever are not just
shopping but conducting their finances online, with 45 percent of Americans
paying bills over the Internet in 2004, according to research group
Gartner. That's a 70 percent increase from 2003, a shift that is making the
Internet more attractive than ever to criminals.

 Crime on the Internet is probably the fastest-growing business there,
said Ken Silva, vice president of networking and information security at
VeriSign, the Mountain View company that secures Web sites and Internet
transactions.

 Phishing e-mails -- those little fraudulent notes asking you to confirm
your bank account number, credit card number, ATM password or locker
combination -- have been growing by 38 percent a month on average,
according to the industry's Anti-Phishing Working Group. Gartner warns that
phishing will erode the growth of e-commerce if nothing is done.

 The folks gathering at the Moscone Center this week are the ones who do
battle with all that, using -- you guessed it -- cryptography.

 They're software developers, marketers, academics, business leaders --
including conference speakers Bill Gates of Microsoft, John Chambers of
Cisco, Symantec's John Thompson and VeriSign's Stratton Sclavos -- and a
few current and former government officials, such as Amit Yoran, who
resigned in October after one year as the nation's top cyber security
official.

 Because phishing has shown the downside of using just a user name and
password to access an online bank account, a panel featuring Yoran and
other experts will look at safer ways for consumers to identify themselves
on the Internet.

 Another panel will address businesses' fear that adding more security
could make e-commerce and e-banking sites too cumbersome for consumers to
use.

 Another topic will be whether software companies should be held liable
when bugs in their products allow theft to happen and whether the
government should regulate software safety as the Federal Aviation
Administration regulates airline safety. Because most hackers and viruses
get into computers through holes in Microsoft's nearly ubiquitous Windows
software, Microsoft is always central in such discussions.

 But that is not a favorite topic for Microsoft leaders, and the preview
blurb for Gates' speech, scheduled for Tuesday morning, makes no mention of
that controversy. Instead, Gates is to discuss his perspective on the
state of security today, the importance of continued innovation, and
advances in Microsoft's platform, products and technologies designed to
better protect customers.

 The conference is run by Bedford, Mass., cryptography company RSA
Security, which also has an office in San Mateo.

 E-mail Carrie Kirby at [EMAIL PROTECTED]

 Page E - 2
URL:
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/02/14/BUG3NB9UTL1.DTL

 ©2005 San Francisco Chronicle | Feedback | FAQ



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NSA May Be 'Traffic Cop' for U.S. Networks

2005-02-16 Thread R.A. Hettinga
http://www.kansascity.com/mld/kansascity/news/politics/10898954.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp

Posted on Mon, Feb. 14, 2005

NSA May Be 'Traffic Cop' for U.S. Networks

TED BRIDIS
Associated Press

WASHINGTON - The Bush administration is considering making the National
Security Agency - famous for eavesdropping and code breaking - its traffic
cop for ambitious plans to share homeland security information across
government computer networks, a senior NSA official says.

Such a decision would expand NSA's responsibility to help defend the
complex network of data pipelines carrying warnings and other sensitive
information. It would also require significantly more money for the
ultra-secret spy agency.

The NSA's director for information assurance, Daniel G. Wolf, was expected
to outline his agency's potential role during a speech Wednesday at the RSA
technology conference in San Francisco. In an interview preceding his
speech, Wolf told The Associated Press that computer networks at U.S.
organizations are like medieval castles, each protected by different-size
walls and moats.

As the U.S. government moves increasingly to share sensitive security
information across agencies, weaknesses inside one department can become
opportunities for outsiders to penetrate the entire system, Wolf warned.
Attackers could steal sensitive information or deliberately spread false
information.

If someone isn't working on being a traffic cop, giving guidance on how
secure they need to be, a risk that is taken by one castle is really shared
by other castles, Wolf said. Who's defining the standards? Who says how
high the walls should be?

The NSA already helps protect systems deemed vital to the nation's
security, such as those involved in intelligence, cryptography and weapons.
Wolf said the administration is considering whether to designate its
fledgling information-sharing efforts also under the NSA's purview.

The White House Office of Management and Budget currently directs efforts
by civilian agencies to secure their computer networks.

The NSA's information security programs are highly regarded among experts.
Bring it on. This clearly ought to be done, said Paul Kurtz, a former
White House cybersecurity adviser and head of the Washington-based Cyber
Security Industry Alliance, a trade group. This will raise the bar across
the federal government to a far more secure infrastructure.

Congress has directed the NSA and the Department of Homeland Security to
study the architecture and policies of computers for sharing sensitive
homeland security information.

In the latest blueprint for U.S. intelligence spending, lawmakers warned
that attackers always search for weak links and that connecting distant
systems will further increase the vulnerability of networks that
originally were developed to be susbstantially isolated from one another.

It's unclear how the NSA's efforts would affect private companies, which
own and operate many of the electrical, water, banking and other systems
vital to government. Wolf said the agency already works to secure such
systems important to military installations, but he denied that NSA would
have any new regulatory authority over private computers.

When we talk about being the traffic cop, we're not in charge of these
networks, Wolf said. We're not running these networks.

It also was unclear how much the effort might cost.

If you're going to have a network that everyone in government can get
into, that means some agencies are going to have to come up to meet new,
higher standards, and that's expensive, said James Lewis, director of
technology policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a
conservative think-tank.


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The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation http://www.ibuc.com/
44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA
... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity,
[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to
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