Re: [cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 10:30 AM, Natanael wrote: > Does anybody here take quantum crypto seriously? Just wondering. I do not > see any benefit over classical methods. If one trusts the entire link and > knows it's not MitM'd in advance, what advantage if any does quantum key > distribution have over ordinary methods? And isn't it just as useless > otherwise as the ordinary methods? It's that time of the year again :) Maybe we can save ourselves the trouble (assuming there's really nothing new to add here, and I do think there isn't) and just say "read the archives". Nico PS: If you do read the archives you'll see I'm in the "QKD is a curiosity/novelty" camp. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution
It can detect passive snooping, not full MITM. - Sent from my tablet Den 18 sep 2012 18:17 skrev "Zack Weinberg" : > On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Natanael wrote: > > Does anybody here take quantum crypto seriously? Just wondering. I do not > > see any benefit over classical methods. If one trusts the entire link and > > knows it's not MitM'd in advance, what advantage if any does quantum key > > distribution have over ordinary methods? And isn't it just as useless > > otherwise as the ordinary methods? > > I've seen claims that quantum key agreement lets both parties detect a > man in the middle with no prior communication and no trusted third > party. If that's true it would obviously be huge. I don't know > enough about the topic to assess whether it's actually true. > > It seems obvious to me that you'd only use quantum crypto to set up > symmetric keys for a secure channel, just like you don't use RSA for > bulk encryption right now. > > zw > ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution
On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Natanael wrote: > Does anybody here take quantum crypto seriously? Just wondering. I do not > see any benefit over classical methods. If one trusts the entire link and > knows it's not MitM'd in advance, what advantage if any does quantum key > distribution have over ordinary methods? And isn't it just as useless > otherwise as the ordinary methods? I've seen claims that quantum key agreement lets both parties detect a man in the middle with no prior communication and no trusted third party. If that's true it would obviously be huge. I don't know enough about the topic to assess whether it's actually true. It seems obvious to me that you'd only use quantum crypto to set up symmetric keys for a secure channel, just like you don't use RSA for bulk encryption right now. zw ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution
Does anybody here take quantum crypto seriously? Just wondering. I do not see any benefit over classical methods. If one trusts the entire link and knows it's not MitM'd in advance, what advantage if any does quantum key distribution have over ordinary methods? And isn't it just as useless otherwise as the ordinary methods? - Sent from my tablet Den 18 sep 2012 17:20 skrev : > > http://www.qcrypt.net/docs/extended-abstracts/qcrypt2012_submission_12.pdf > > QCrypt, Singapore, 12 September 2012 > > Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution > > Sebastian Nauerth1, Florian Moll, Markus Rau1, Christian Fuchs, > Joachim Horwath and Harald Weinfurter1 > > The range of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is known to be > limited to a few hundreds of km due to the attenuation of the channel > and the finite signal to noise ratio of available detectors. Satellite > based systems, however, could provide efficient links for global > scale QKD. While both classical satellite downlinks and long range > terrestrial free-space QKD were shown successfully, a quantum key > exchange with a rapidly moving platform is still missing. Here we > report on the first experimental demonstration of a BB84 QKD > transmission from an airplane at a speed of 290 km/h to ground. Our > system uses attenuated laser pulses with a mean photon number of > mu=0.5 and polarization encoding. Over a distance of 20 km a stable > link was achieved for 10 min yielding a sifted key rate of 145 > bits/s with a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 4.8 %. > > ___ > cryptography mailing list > cryptography@randombit.net > http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography > ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
[cryptography] abstract: Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution
http://www.qcrypt.net/docs/extended-abstracts/qcrypt2012_submission_12.pdf QCrypt, Singapore, 12 September 2012 Air to Ground Quantum Key Distribution Sebastian Nauerth1, Florian Moll, Markus Rau1, Christian Fuchs, Joachim Horwath and Harald Weinfurter1 The range of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is known to be limited to a few hundreds of km due to the attenuation of the channel and the finite signal to noise ratio of available detectors. Satellite based systems, however, could provide efficient links for global scale QKD. While both classical satellite downlinks and long range terrestrial free-space QKD were shown successfully, a quantum key exchange with a rapidly moving platform is still missing. Here we report on the first experimental demonstration of a BB84 QKD transmission from an airplane at a speed of 290 km/h to ground. Our system uses attenuated laser pulses with a mean photon number of mu=0.5 and polarization encoding. Over a distance of 20 km a stable link was achieved for 10 min yielding a sifted key rate of 145 bits/s with a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 4.8 %. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] scrypt to IETF
On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 11:19:52PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: > Folks, scrypt has been mentioned on this mailing list a couple of times, > so I wanted to give a pointer to the following recent IETF draft: > > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-scrypt-kdf-00 > > As usual, review and feedback is appreciated. Are you looking for language issues (spelling and grammar, plenty of things to report), the implementations/detail, or the cryptography? Or all three? B. ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
Re: [cryptography] scrypt to IETF
Rob Kendrick writes: > On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 11:19:52PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote: >> Folks, scrypt has been mentioned on this mailing list a couple of times, >> so I wanted to give a pointer to the following recent IETF draft: >> >> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-scrypt-kdf-00 >> >> As usual, review and feedback is appreciated. > > Are you looking for language issues (spelling and grammar, plenty of > things to report), the implementations/detail, or the cryptography? Or > all three? Everything! English isn't my native tongue, so I'm sure there is plenty of room for improvement there (offlist please, to reduce noise). General comments on the cryptography/implementation side is probably more useful to discuss in public on this list (unless the list manager disagree of course). /Simon ___ cryptography mailing list cryptography@randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
