[CTRL] Taliban Withdrawal Was Strategy, Not Rout
-Caveat Lector- http://www.stratfor.com/home/032330.htm Taliban Withdrawal Was Strategy, Not Rout 2330 GMT, 03 Summary In less than a week, Taliban fighters have been swept from most of northern Afghanistan, including the key cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kunduz, Taloqan, Bamiyan, Jalalabad and the capital Kabul. How did a force that only two months ago controlled most of Afghanistan get swept from the battlefield so quickly, and is the battle over? Evidence suggests it has only just begun. Analysis Northern Alliance troops moved into Kabul on Nov. 13, less than a week after launching an offensive that has swept the Taliban from most of northern Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance now controls the key cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kunduz and Taloqan, all located astride vital supply routes into neighboring countries. Popular uprisings have reportedly ousted the Taliban from Bamiyan and Jalalabad, and there are even reports of anti-Taliban Pushtun forces marching on Kandahar. On the surface it appears a lightning offensive by the Northern Alliance -- supported by U.S. aerial bombardment -- has shattered the Taliban army in a matter of days. But has the Taliban been defeated? An examination of the Taliban withdrawal suggests the group has intentionally surrendered territory in the interest of adopting tactics more amenable to its strengths. If the United States and its allies misread the Taliban withdrawal as a rout, they could quickly find themselves locked in a nasty guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Worse, that war is likely to spread beyond Afghanistan's borders, as the core of Taliban and al Qaeda forces in that country seek to secure their supply lines and capitalize on their strengths and their opponents' weaknesses. In order to evaluate whether the Taliban withdrawal from northern Afghanistan was the routing of a defeated force or a strategic maneuver, we must first look at the evidence on the ground. Perhaps the key feature of the withdrawal is that it has come almost without a fight. Neither the U.S. bombardment nor the Northern Alliance offensive adequately explains this. The Taliban has a hardened army with many veterans of the war against the Soviet Union. Taliban forces were renowned for their dogged combat, stunning the Northern Alliance in previous battles by advancing undeterred through minefields. Before Sept. 11, the Taliban controlled some 95 percent of Afghanistan and appeared poised to mop up the remnants of the opposition. In the weeks before Mazar-e-Sharif fell, the Taliban soundly repelled a series of Northern Alliance attacks on the city, and even the Northern Alliance admitted they had not had time to prepare for a serious offensive. In most cases, the Taliban's retreat was premeditated and orderly. The fighting that occurred was a rear-guard action, often carried out by foreign troops. Pakistani volunteers were left behind in Mazar-e-Sharif, and Arab troops reportedly fought a vicious rear-guard action in Kabul. The Taliban troops deployed armor to cover their withdrawal from Kabul, which occurred at night in order to limit U.S. air strikes and preclude premature Northern Alliance assaults. The speed of the Northern Alliance's advance was not surprising. Rapid advances are the norm in Afghanistan. The Taliban swept through the country as quickly when the group first emerged in 1994 and 1995. Russia's initial invasion of Afghanistan took only a few weeks. Population density explains much of this phenomenon. Afghanistan has about 41 people per square kilometer -- less than a third the density of neighboring Pakistan -- and this does not take refugees into account. Rugged terrain means that much of Afghanistan is nearly uninhabited or is settled in small villages. It is easy to sweep through this territory; there is little to get in the way. But there is a catch. Ethnic divisions, limited resources and logistical difficulties have constrained the size of the armies that fought over Afghanistan. At their peak, the Soviets had only about 90,000 troops in the country, and the Taliban and Northern Alliance armies were far smaller. Small armies and vast distances make frontal warfare difficult and dangerous. Armies cannot afford to spare the troops necessary to garrison the land they have overrun if they are to maintain a viable army at the front. This leads to thin front lines, with troops concentrated at key nodes and with little reserve behind them. Once a front breaks or withdraws, an opposing force can make tremendous advances. Anyone who has played the board game Risk will recognize this. Incidentally, this goes some way to explain the brutality of the Taliban occupation. Because the Taliban forces could not afford to spare the troops to garrison land they had overrun, they needed to utterly subjugate those areas to preclude an uprising behind their lines. One final factor explains the large numbers of defections among the Taliban forces. Afghanistan is
[CTRL] Taliban Withdrawal Was Strategy, Not Rout
-Caveat Lector- As always, . . . - This analysis comes courtesy of Stratfor. The original is at: http://www.stratfor.com/home/032330.htm Taliban Withdrawal Was Strategy, Not Rout 2330 GMT, 03 Summary In less than a week, Taliban fighters have been swept from most of northern Afghanistan, including the key cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kunduz, Taloqan, Bamiyan, Jalalabad and the capital Kabul. How did a force that only two months ago controlled most of Afghanistan get swept from the battlefield so quickly, and is the battle over? Evidence suggests it has only just begun. Analysis Northern Alliance troops moved into Kabul on Nov. 13, less than a week after launching an offensive that has swept the Taliban from most of northern Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance now controls the key cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kunduz and Taloqan, all located astride vital supply routes into neighboring countries. Popular uprisings have reportedly ousted the Taliban from Bamiyan and Jalalabad, and there are even reports of anti-Taliban Pushtun forces marching on Kandahar. On the surface it appears a lightning offensive by the Northern Alliance -- supported by U.S. aerial bombardment -- has shattered the Taliban army in a matter of days. But has the Taliban been defeated? An examination of the Taliban withdrawal suggests the group has intentionally surrendered territory in the interest of adopting tactics more amenable to its strengths. If the United States and its allies misread the Taliban withdrawal as a rout, they could quickly find themselves locked in a nasty guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Worse, that war is likely to spread beyond Afghanistan's borders, as the core of Taliban and al Qaeda forces in that country seek to secure their supply lines and capitalize on their strengths and their opponents' weaknesses. In order to evaluate whether the Taliban withdrawal from northern Afghanistan was the routing of a defeated force or a strategic maneuver, we must first look at the evidence on the ground. Perhaps the key feature of the withdrawal is that it has come almost without a fight. Neither the U.S. bombardment nor the Northern Alliance offensive adequately explains this. The Taliban has a hardened army with many veterans of the war against the Soviet Union. Taliban forces were renowned for their dogged combat, stunning the Northern Alliance in previous battles by advancing undeterred through minefields. Before Sept. 11, the Taliban controlled some 95 percent of Afghanistan and appeared poised to mop up the remnants of the opposition. In the weeks before Mazar-e-Sharif fell, the Taliban soundly repelled a series of Northern Alliance attacks on the city, and even the Northern Alliance admitted they had not had time to prepare for a serious offensive. In most cases, the Taliban's retreat was premeditated and orderly. The fighting that occurred was a rear-guard action, often carried out by foreign troops. Pakistani volunteers were left behind in Mazar-e-Sharif, and Arab troops reportedly fought a vicious rear-guard action in Kabul. The Taliban troops deployed armor to cover their withdrawal from Kabul, which occurred at night in order to limit U.S. air strikes and preclude premature Northern Alliance assaults. The speed of the Northern Alliance's advance was not surprising. Rapid advances are the norm in Afghanistan. The Taliban swept through the country as quickly when the group first emerged in 1994 and 1995. Russia's initial invasion of Afghanistan took only a few weeks. Population density explains much of this phenomenon. Afghanistan has about 41 people per square kilometer -- less than a third the density of neighboring Pakistan -- and this does not take refugees into account. Rugged terrain means that much of Afghanistan is nearly uninhabited or is settled in small villages. It is easy to sweep through this territory; there is little to get in the way. But there is a catch. Ethnic divisions, limited resources and logistical difficulties have constrained the size of the armies that fought over Afghanistan. At their peak, the Soviets had only about 90,000 troops in the country, and the Taliban and Northern Alliance armies were far smaller. Small armies and vast distances make frontal warfare difficult and dangerous. Armies cannot afford to spare the troops necessary to garrison the land they have overrun if they are to maintain a viable army at the front. This leads to thin front lines, with troops concentrated at key nodes and with little reserve behind them. Once a front breaks or withdraws, an opposing force can make tremendous advances. Anyone who has played the board game Risk will recognize this. Incidentally, this goes some way to explain the brutality of the Taliban occupation. Because the Taliban forces could not afford to spare the troops to garrison land they had overrun, they needed to utterly subjugate those areas to preclude an uprising behind their lines. One final
Re: [CTRL] Taliban Withdrawal Was Strategy, Not Rout
-Caveat Lector- --- Ric Carter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: -Caveat Lector- http://www.stratfor.com/home/032330.htm Taliban Withdrawal Was Strategy, Not Rout 2330 GMT, 03 yeah...israel pulls out of palestine, having stuck the dagger in like they wanted, and it is time for the taliban to run for the hills...no more reason for a smoke screen they will be paid well and all that construction that is going to be done...well, remember how bin laden got rich? aside from dabbling in diamonds? = ~ As I've often told Ginsberg, you can't blame the President for the state of the country, it's always the poets' fault. You can't expect politicians to come up with a vision, they don't have it in them. Poets have to come up with the vision and they have to turn it on so it sparks and catches hold. KEN KESEY (1935 - 2001) http://www.sinkers.org/news_earth.html __ Do You Yahoo!? Find the one for you at Yahoo! Personals http://personals.yahoo.com A HREF=http://www.ctrl.org/;www.ctrl.org/A DECLARATION DISCLAIMER == CTRL is a discussion informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substancenot soap-boxingplease! These are sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'with its many half-truths, mis- directions and outright fraudsis used politically by different groups with major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought. That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply. Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector. Archives Available at: http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html A HREF=http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html;Archives of [EMAIL PROTECTED]/A http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/ A HREF=http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/;ctrl/A To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Om
