Re: Command /usr/bin/mv wrong message in German

2024-03-31 Thread Russell Stuart

On 1/4/24 10:18, gregor herrmann wrote:

% dpkg -S $(which mv > coreutils: /usr/bin/mv


On bookworm:

$ dpkg -S $(which mv)
dpkg-query: no path found matching pattern /usr/bin/mv

This is caused by the /bin -> /usr/bin shift.

The reason I'm replying is after one, probably two decades this still
annoys me:

   $ dpkg -S /etc/profile
   dpkg-query: no path found matching pattern /etc/profile

It was put their by the Debian install, and I'm unlikely to change it.
Its fairly important security wise.  It would be nice if "dpkg -S" told
me base-files.deb installed it.  It would be nice if debsums told me if
it changed.  There are lots of files like this, such as /etc/environment
and /etc/hosts.  There are some directories like /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/
which should only have files claimed by some .deb.

To put it another way, Debian's audit trail of files managed / used by
the distro has never been great.  There was a modest proposal ages ago
(by aj I think) to improve this, but it was rejected.  To me it looks
more important now than it was then, and it was pretty important then.


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Re: A mail relay server for Debian Members is live

2022-07-17 Thread Russell Stuart

On 17/7/22 10:37, Ansgar wrote:

On Sun, 2022-07-17 at 10:29 +0200, Dominik George wrote:

tl;dr: DKIM-signed mail is verifiable, but only the headers; the body
can be tampered with;


This is just wrong. There is no reason to sign mails to ensure
authenticity if one can just change the body...


The goal of this isn't to provided end to end authentication.   It's to 
hold the domain in From: address accountable for the content the 
message.  Without DKIM the From: address can be easily forged, and any 
spammer can impersonate the From: address.


Despite what Dominick says the body is always included in the DKIM 
signature.  In fact the just about everything in the email can be 
covered by the signature.  In an ideal world you would cover everything, 
but in our world relaying SMTP servers regularly append stuff to bodies 
and mangle with headers (eg, spamassassin will shove stuff into the 
Subject:), and that breaks the signature.  DKIM "solved" this by 
allowing the sender to specify what headers in the message the signature 
covers.  You also get to specify a body length, so all characters after 
that length are ignored, thus "solving" the append problem.


rfc6376 does supply a recommended list of what to include in signature, 
but perhaps takes compatibility too far by allowing everything to be 
optional, bar the From: field.  No receiver would accept purely the 
From: field signed as that makes replay attacks trivial, so each 
receiver sets its own standards.  And yes, that's messy.


But in practice, what has to be signed to make it impractical for 
spammers to use existing signatures in replay attacks isn't much.  The 
From:, Date:, To:, Cc: is enough.  The fact that most email clients 
order your inbox by date means the Date: field will ensure an existing 
signature is only good for a few days before the spam appears too far 
down to be noticed.  So it all works out for it's intended purpose.


It's intended purpose isn't to replace gpg signed emails.  It can't 
really, as it's not signed by the sender, it's signed by the domain. 
That means a ISP can forge a signature from anybody using them.  That 
doesn't matter for DKIM, as it's intended purpose is to hold the ISP 
accountable for spam sent from it's domain.  That assumption is the ISP 
will police it's users.


Nonetheless, I personally use it as a form of authentication.  My wife 
once fell for a PayPal phishing attack that cost us well over $1,000 
from memory.  The curious thing is phishing the email had a valid DKIM 
signature from paypal.com.  I contacted them immediately and a full 
refund happened very quickly.  I'm pretty sure the refund would have 
happened anyway, but it was nice to have the DKIM signature on my side.


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Re: Firmware - what are we going to do about it?

2022-04-20 Thread Russell Stuart

On 19/4/22 10:27, Steve McIntyre wrote:

  5. We could split out the non-free firmware packages into a new
 non-free-firmware component in the archive, and allow a specific exception
 only to allow inclusion of those packages on our official media. We would
 then generate only one set of official media, including those non-free
 firmware packages.


The motivation here for splitting non-free firmware into a separate 
component is so we can install Debian on modern hardware.  That's a good 
reason, but I've always thought there was at least one other good reason.


It doesn't belong in Debian.

Unlike everything else, we usually don't have the source, which neuters 
many of the nice security properties inherent with open source.  We 
don't compile it, because even if we did have the source it's probably 
for a CPU & silicon we don't support.  Ergo reproducible builds are out 
of the question: it could literally contain, copy or do anything the 
hardware allows and none of us would be the wiser.  Peculiarly, we don't 
care about the licence, beyond being allowed to distribute it in the 
first place.


One of Debian's foundations is the DFSG but when it comes to this stuff, 
freedoms?  We don't even have the freedom to avoid it.  I'm genuinely 
surprised the project has managed to be in denial and pretend it had a 
choice for this long.


In short non-free packages we have the source for is one thing.  These 
binary opaque blobs are quite another.  They should be in a different 
component.  Non-free-firmware sounds far too innocent to me.  How about 
"not-debian", or "under-sufference".


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Re: Making Debian available

2021-01-16 Thread Russell Stuart

On 17/1/21 3:27 am, Russ Allbery wrote:

"Andrew M.A. Cater"  writes:
Wifi is the tough one: The companies that dominate laptop chipsets 
- Broadcom/Realtek/Qualcomm don't make it easy to find out which 
particular chipset it is. For USB Wifi connectors it's even harder 
- lots of Realtek chipsets in cheap dongles seem to require you to 
go and get a repository from git and build DKMS - RTL8812* springs 
to mind.


For the record, this is always the problem I have.  The last system I
installed didn't have an Ethernet port.  I think there was some way 
to make Ethernet work over USB, but I didn't have the right 
hardware.


To me, this is *the* problem. I always use netinst. Once the thing is
running editing /etc/apt isn't hard, so all netinst has to do is a base
image install. But, if I can't get the network up and see the disks I
can't install.

Seeing the disks is invariably caused by the kernel not recognising a
modern chipset, which means I must install with testing that has a
matching modern kernel. Working WiFi almost always requires firmware.
Testing doesn't produce netinst with non-free firmware and I'm normally
installing several of these things, so I have now become proficient in
rolling my own non-free netinst.

I guess it might be possible to make it harder to install Debian on a
new laptop, but rolling your own netinst sets a pretty high bar so you
would have to work at it. I occasionally get asked to install Debian,
and it's hard enough that I carry a USB with one of these netinst's on
me at all times, along with my GPG fingerprints.

So for me at least, the fix doesn't require putting all of non-free on
the install media. It just requires firmware-*. (Which brings me to
another whinge: why doesn't firmware-linux-nonfree include things like
firmware-iwlwifi so I don't have to go on a whumpus hunt for every
firmware package. Sigh.)

I happen to strongly agree with the sharp distinction between free and
non-free in the archive. But in this case, I think we should be carving
out an exception.

If you want a softener for those rigid ideals (I need one myself), try
this: these firmware blobs are peculiar. They don't run on the same CPU,
we talk to them with strictly open API's and protocols. In that way,
they aren't anything new. We already talk to and depend on megabytes of
nonfree software to get our laptop's booted, but we tolerate it because
it lives in ROM. We don't consider firmware in ROM to be part of Debian
even though it must be running for our Debian machines to run. It's true
the difference is these problematic firmware blobs do live in Debian
packages, but it's not because we package them in most of the usual
senses: we don't compile them, or modify them and no software packages
by Debian inspects their contents. For these firmware packages the
packaging system has been reduced to something that does a good
imitation of a copper wire: faithfully coping some bits from the
manufacturer to the hardware they made.

My suggestion is we could create a new section of the archive for
packages that places far stronger restrictions on what Debian is allowed
to do with the packages contents (to wit: be a conduit between two
external parties, and no nothing else), and in return we do tolerate it
on our install images.

We already tolerate something similar. fwupdate pulls down non-free
blobs onto our Debian boxes, and installs them so our Debian machines
can use the firmware therein. It's in free, and AFAICT no one has a
problem with that. This is a step beyond fwupdate of course, as the
firmware is coming from our servers rather than someone else's. But I
would have thought that would make the situation better, not worse. This
is software we can vet at our leisure, take down / revert if it turns
out it violates our sensibilities, like say discovering a new version
has critical CVE's.  Firmware coming from our own servers, signed by our
keys gives us far more say on what non-free software we allow on our
machines than fwupdate does now.


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Re: isc-dhcp-client sends DHCPDISCOVER *before* wpa_supplicant authenticates/associates/connects.

2020-07-12 Thread Russell Stuart
On Sat, 2020-07-11 at 22:12 -0400, The Wanderer wrote:
> I don't run either systemd or NetworkManager, and I'm not currently
> interested in changing either of those things, but I am interested in
> trying out an alternative to wpa_supplicant. Is there an appropriate
> similar procedure for such an environment, or would I have to
> experiment and play around trying to get things to work?

I don't use network manager, so I'm in a similar position.

From what I can see iwd lacks two features of wpa_supplicant.

Firstly, there doesn't seem to be a way to attach iwd to a particular
wireless interface.  Iwctl doesn't provide one, and I don't see any
other way to tell it.  Most people have just one wireless interface so
it may not be a huge issue but it is an impedance miss-match with
things like ifupdown that are focused on interfaces.  Maybe that's the
problem with network manager too.

Secondly, it doesn't support wpa_supplicant's priorities.  I use them a
fair bit.  For example, I tell wpa_supplicant to favour my phone WiFi
hotspot over others, so if I have a connectivity issue I can just turn
it on.  That said, I guess I could just use iwctl to manually connect
to the phone.


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Re: Heads up: persistent journal has been enabled in systemd

2020-02-04 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2020-02-04 at 18:10 -0800, Russ Allbery wrote:
> It does take a bit of retraining to use journalctl instead (and I'm
> personally not horribly fond of its UI, although that's probably
> because I'm using it wrong), but it's a lot better at effectively
> narrowing log messages to the things of interest once you get used to
> it.

journald has nits I mention below, but I was prepared to put up with
them and drop rsyslog until one day a server stopped in a nasty way and
journalctl refused to display what lead up to the crash because it's
binary logs were corrupt.  As far as I was concerned this made journald
unfit for use on production servers.  (rsyslog's logs also get 4k lumps
of nulls and other garbage in them in similar situations, but they
remain usable.)

That was a long time ago, and it may well be fixed now.  But if it
isn't IMO turning off rsyslog by default is a bad idea.  My view is the
main reason Debian exists is to serve as a reliable base for production
machines.  Debian Desktop is what I use on my personal machine and yes,
dropping rsyslog hardly matters there, but I wouldn't be using Debian
Desktop if I wasn't using Debian in production.   

Another journald anti-feature (which is probably an unfair attribution
as it is almost certainly a consequence of systemd's design), is a
manually started service doesn't print the reason it refused to start
to stderr.  Having to fire up journald and wade through it's crappy UI
to get something sysV used to put under my nose is a step backwards.

Finally, it may be I just don't know how to use it well, but looking
for a needle in a haystack of logs is slower with journalctl that it is
with grep, and not by a small margin.  Journald making the thing you
spend most time doing with logs slower doesn't help it in the
slightest.  But I don't spend a lot of time searching logs, so it
wouldn't stop me from dropping rsyslog.

Get rid of those problems, and dropping rsyslog becomes a no-brainer
for me.


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Re: [RFC] Proposal for new source format

2019-10-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Sun, 2019-10-27 at 20:29 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> If you modify the upstream source, then by definition you do not have
> reproducibility of the upstream source, and you're now talking about
> something else (review of the changes, which I called audit in my
> previous message).

I think I'm guilty of a poor choice of words.

> I have no idea how you got that from my previous messages, but you
> have misunderstood.

Excellent.

> This is exactly my objection to reducing everything to patches rather
> than using the power of Git to represent the history and structure of
> the changes made for Debian.

Personally I don't see the "power of git" adds much apart from history,
but really it doesn't matter for this discussion.

> am completely baffled by your belief that this is inherently easier
> to do with quilt than with Git.

I don't believe that.  I guess we are talking past each other.  Out of
curiosity do you do maintain the changsets manually in git, or use
something like gquilt?



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Re: [RFC] Proposal for new source format

2019-10-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2019-10-23 at 09:49 -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> Generating a reproducible source package given a particuar git commit
> is trivial.  All you have to do is use "git archive".  For example:

It is indeed.  Almost a tautology.  But it's not what I'm interested in
doing.  The focus is on showing the connection between upstream's
source and Debian, not on reproducing Debian's source.

Repeating my earlier example, I want to show whether openssl (insert
name of fully audited package here) in Debian is a bit for bit
reproduction of upstream's openssl.  It won't be, of course, so I want
the next best thing: an audit trailing explaining exactly why it's
different.

Harking back to the time we removed the randomness generator from
openssl, it's very nice to have a single patch say "it was removed
because it wasn't exercised in the tests.  upstream didn't respond to
requests for comment" rather than having it interspersed with the 650
odd other lines of other changes we carry with no explanation.


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Re: [RFC] Proposal for new source format

2019-10-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2019-10-22 at 20:21 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> I define reproducibility as generating the same Debian source package
> from a signed Git tag of my packaging repository plus, for non-native 
> packages, whatever release artifacts upstream considers canonical
> (which may be a signed tarball or may be a Git tag or may be
> something else entirely).

That is a great definition of reproducibility if all you are interested
in is the Debian version of the package.  It is not so great if you
want is the upstream version of the package - ie, it is important to
you that it behaves identically or at least diverges in accountable
ways.  In that case you want a clear audit trail from the upstream
source to the Debian binary.

On Tue, 2019-10-22 at 20:21 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> All of this business with patches and whatnot is an implementation
> detail.

If you are thinking of patches in terms of .dpatch files in
debian/patches then we both agree, as I don't consider the
representation to be particularly important.  It could be branches
stored in git for all I care, perhaps managed by a tool like gquilt. 

What is important to me is the source contain an audit trail or how
Debian got from the upstream source to the Debian package.  If I
understand your position correctly, your proposal boils down adding a
(single) branch to the upstream .git for the debian changes.  My
problem isn't with using git - it's with the word "single".  It isn't
even with you using a single branch, as perhaps that's appropriate for
the packages you maintain (which it would be if the only change is to
add a debian directory).  My problem is the implication that since it
good enough for you, it's good enough for every package.  It's not. 
When you are carrying a lot of changes it's bloody horrible.

Perhaps an illustration may help.  I used to be a consumer of RedHat
kernels. Back in the 2.6 days they carried 100's if not thousands of
individual patches for stuff they backported form Linux 3.0.  (I gather
they still do carry a lot of patches for their LTS releases.) When you
wanted to add your own modification there was invariably conflicts, and
without knowing what patches it conflicted with and why it was just
impossible.  Then Oracle released their "own" Linux distribution.  It
was a copy of RedHat, something Oracle didn't go out of its way to
acknowledge.  Effectively Oracle was garnishing for themselves part of
RedHat's revenue stream (support fees) using a rebadged RedHat product.
RedHat responded by doing effectively what you are suggesting.  They
replaced source rpm's audit trail of every change they made and why
with one humongous, uncommented patch.  Technically they were operating
in accordance with the layers reading of the GPL I guess - they were
distributing the source.  But it sure as hell wasn't in accordance with
a programmers definition of "source" (which is along the lines of
something you can edit), as porting a patch from a the .orig kernel to
RedHat's became damned near impossible.

A second illustration is the kernel development process itself.  One
huge patch is not considered acceptable.  They must be smaller, easily
understood, digestible patches.  The quilt source format encouraged
that format - to the point of having lintian checks for it.  Nowhere do
you propose a similar mechanism - or even acknowledge it's important.

On Tue, 2019-10-22 at 23:20 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Checking reproducibility only back to a set of patches does *not*
> provide a real guarantee of reproducibility, since a supply-chain
> attack could still have introduced malicious code in the patch 
> generation process.

You are damming the good because it's not perfect.  It's true there are
still ways of attacking the code, it merely renders those attacks
visible and attributable.  In fact rendering all changes visible and
attributable by insisting they are signed is *precisely* the mechanism
the kernel uses to defend itself both from malware attacks of the type
you envisage and when someone attempts to add copyrighted code that
opens the kernel to legal attack later.  Turns out a bit of sunlight is
a great disinfectant.

On Tue, 2019-10-22 at 23:20 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> like an argument for dropping all of the features that I want and 
> retaining only the feature that you want, when you can derive the 
> feature that you want (at some additional complexity cost, to be 
> sure) from the format that I'm arguing for.

I can see how you might think that.  The reality is a different.  At no
stage have I suggested you should be prevented from using git, or
indeed any other mechanism you desire.  I have said if you adopt a new
system like dgit please figure our a way of implementing one feature
the one you are replacing (quilt) - a way to audit changes.  But it has
been proposed that everybody be forced to drop whatever workflow they
might like in favour of dgit, and you look to be arguing in favour of
that idea.  If we 

Re: [RFC] Proposal for new source format

2019-10-22 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2019-10-22 at 20:21 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> This history has at least one commit per upload, although ideally 
> has the package maintainer's full revision history and upstream's 
> full revision history.

I understand you like the history.  A lot of people do.  But not
everyone values it, and I don't.  The only uses I've found for it are
git-bisect, reversing hasty deletes, and auditing who contributed what
which is a handy weapon in a court room copyright battle.  I can count
the number of times I've done all of those things in my life on one
hand.  Regular backups do those jobs almost as well, and I have to do
them anyway.

Source code control becomes a real time saver when you have a lot of
people working on the same source - I'd go so far as to say
indispensable for that case.  Such merging of histories needs a small
amount history to work with of course, and that makes that small amount
of history equally indispensable.  However the typical Debian Developer
scenario of the "lot of people" being you and upstream is a fairly
degenerate case, so their is understandably get some argument about
whether a heavyweight tool like git adds much.  If you like it that's
great - but others thinking it's not worth the bother is also great.  I
doubt anybody who just wants a one off copy of the source is going to
see much in the way of greatness.

On Tue, 2019-10-22 at 20:21 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> I don't agree with this definition of reproducibility.  You're
> defining reproducibility from inputs that I consider build artifacts,
> which to me is rather weird.

That's a perfectly understandable perspective from a Debian Developer. 
But lets take a different perspective, or a Debian user installing
audited-crypto-program-x. What you are dismissing as "artefacts" is
exactly the information the person installing this needs to assure
themselves the Debian version of audited-crypto-program-x is a
reasonably faithful reproduction of the original.  If the packaging is
done well it will be broken down into small changes, each with a
documented purpose.

(None of this is rocket science or new, we are fairly close to it now. 
One the reasons I am writing this is it would be if better - and
definitely not get worse at it.)

The point of defining the process of constructing the Debian source
representation as a "pure function" is to guarantee it faithfully
reflects the original source for and documented changes _only_ - not
some random crap living in stale state carried across from years ago.

From my perspective there are lots of ways a Debian developer could
store this stuff.  Quilt patches with their headers are one and they
work well enough from this perspective - but a Git repository with
branches representing those same changes works equally well, although
it would be nice if a git branch (as opposed to a commit) could have a
rant associated with it about why it is there akin to the quilt patch
header.  (I guess this would be trivial to add by insisting each branch
adds a description file to the debian/branches directory.)  The Debian
developer is free to use whatever representation works best for them,
so long as when I download it, I can easily see the debian version of
openssl contained a patch that changed random number its generator to
getpid(), along with the reason why.

AFAICT, dgit does not address this, at all.  It's written purely from
the perspective of the Debian developer.


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Re: [RFC] Proposal for new source format

2019-10-22 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2019-10-22 at 16:52 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> That seems excessively pessimistic.  What about Git makes you think
> it's impossible to create a reproducible source package?

Has it been done?  Given this point has been raised several times
before if it hasn't been done by now I think it's reasonable to assume
it's difficult, and thinking that it's so is not excessively
pessimistic.

I personally wonder how the mirrors are expected to handle .git
repositories.  That would increase the number of files they have to
handle by a couple of orders of magnitude.  What are the plans for
that?  Maybe you think that can handle it?  Maybe you plan to abandon
the mirror network in favour of something else like the CDN?  Maybe
you plan to remove the source from the mirrors?

Finally, there are more consumers of the source format than the Debian
packagers.  For example, I regularly download Debian source packages
just to figure why the hell something isn't working as I expect.  When
I do that, there are two things that are important to me:

1.  The download is as small as possible, and doesn't require a
specialised tool.  (Github and gitlab go to the trouble of 
providing just such as thing, which I think is evidence it's
needed.)  The current format is pretty good in this area.  At
a pinch you can get away without using deb-source to unpack it. 

2.  The point that has been raised here - reproducible builds of the
source package.  By that I mean a reproducible build should be
pure function that is given the upstream source package and some
data in the form of patches or whatever, and ends up with the
source and build instructions.  Being a pure function it always
produces the same outputs give the same inputs.

Unfortunately Debian doesn't always do a good job of this 
currently, albeit for good reasons - we can't distribute the 
upstream source package so DD's rebuild it, but they are allowed
to do so in any way they please.

Any source format that handled the issues above would get the thumbs up
from me.  (Interestingly despite the hairs it has in other areas the
rpm source format have always done well on those issues.) 
Unfortunately Bastian's proposal doesn't address them directly.


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Re: Init systems and docker

2019-10-11 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2019-10-11 at 19:25 -0400, Jose-Luis Rivas wrote:
> There's not much sense in using systemd inside a docker container, to
> be honest.

To put it another way, in the container world the init system belongs
outside of the container.

That is because the closest thing equivalent to a container is not a
box running Debian doing multiple things, it's a single process.  In
fact if you are Google it's actually simpler - it's a process whose
executable is a single statically linked file.  It pulls it's
configuration from something like etcd (something that lives in the
cloud), it uses the file system as an extension of it's RAM - temporary
storage that can be blown away when the process exits, if it needs
persistent storage comes in the form of a database it connects to using
TCP/IP.

It's utility doesn't arise because it's more powerful and flexible than
the environment Debian provides.  On the contrary, it is fare less
rich, and flexible than the environment Debian provides.  It's power
arises because reduces the dependencies to an absolute minimum.  It is
one file whose main configuration is the TCP endpoints its receives
commands from and sends results to, and TCP endpoints of services, log
storage and databases it depends on.  It's only dependency outside of
that list of endpoints is an amd64 machine with some amount of RAM and
CPU cycles and the Linux syscall API - something that can be replicated
1000's or millions of times automatically and on demand.

A major part of it's utility that unlike Debian dependencies (like say
a Web Server or a .so of the right version) that programmers tend to
assume is there or their program can break in weird and wonderful ways,
programmers tend to assume this one dependency, a TCP connection, is
unreliable and ephemeral.  So you can create these things and destroy
them to handle varying loads, and outages in any one data centre can be
handled by shifting the load to another one.  The consistency of
persistent data is not a problem because it's stored in a full ACID
database.

An init system of any sort in this is just unwanted complexity.  What
replaces the init system is something starts up these containers and
connects them together on an as needed basis. Kubernetes is one such
system, but there alternatives.  Docker Swarm is a much simpler thing
that creates something is closer to a Debian box (a collection of
containers running on one physical box).

In the most evolved container systems inside a container it's not just
the init system that's considered an anti-pattern, a distribution
Debian is also out of place.  None of the services Debian provides
(like packaging, dependencies, security upgraded) are helpful.  The
host box will have an OS - but it's just a support system for
Kubernetes and you don't really need an entire distribution just to run
one program.

However, that is the extreme edge.  It's where you have a team of
programmers creating a static app that includes all of the services it
needs, like a web server.  Us smaller guys will use pre-packaged
software provided by a distribution simply because we are familiar with
nginx or apache, and don't want to compile stuff to do off the shelf
functions.  The rest remains the same - a container is a single
process, configuration is primarily connecting TCP end points, things
are written to retry when a  TCP connection dies, security patches are
"installed" by rebuilding the container and restarting it, shells and
what not in containers are there merely to facilitate development,
debugging and fault analysis.

The most popular container distribution is I think Alpine Linux which
has an impressively small base install.  If Debian wanted to compete in
this area it would have to start by shrinking it's minbase install by a
factor or 10 or so.  Anybody arguing about what sort of init system
that install includes hasn't groked containers yet.  


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Accepted pam-python 1.0.7-1 (source amd64 all) into unstable

2019-09-22 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 20:25:13 +1000
Source: pam-python
Binary: libpam-python libpam-python-dbgsym libpam-python-doc
Architecture: source amd64 all
Version: 1.0.7-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: high
Maintainer: Russell Stuart 
Changed-By: Russell Stuart 
Description:
 libpam-python - Enables PAM modules to be written in Python
 libpam-python-doc - Documentation for the bindings provided by libpam-python
Changes:
 pam-python (1.0.7-1) unstable; urgency=high
 .
   * New upstream.
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Re: duplicate popularity-contest ID

2019-08-07 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2019-08-07 at 09:34 +0200, Marc Haber wrote:
> I am using Debian for two decades now, and I realized that necessity
> two days ago.

Ditto - except for me it was a few seconds ago.

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Re: Programs contain ads - acceptable for packaging for Debian?

2019-06-20 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2019-06-20 at 13:15 +0700, Bagas Sanjaya wrote:
> Suppose that an upstream has released a program which its license 
> conforms to DFSG (named ZZZ), but when I test it, ads placed by the 
> upstream appear (such as pop up ads). Since ads can affect user 
> experience of ZZZ, but at the same time the upstream get paid by ad 
> networks which he place the ads into ZZZ, would it acceptable to
> package ZZZ for Debian?

I don't know whether it's relevant to your question, but we already
have software in Debian that displays pop-up ads.  Zoneminder displays
a pop-up nag for donations.  You can turn it oft, but unless you delve
into raw SQL hackery of the underlying DB you will see it at least
once.

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Re: Preferred git branch structure when upstream moves from tarballs to git

2019-04-29 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2019-04-30 at 09:25 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
> I like this option because it still works well if we ever decide to
> fix a fundamental flaw in the Debian source package layout.

I suspect whether that's a fundamentally is a matter or personal taste.
 On this point my taste aligns with yours.

I've used both rpm source format and the Debian one, and IMO the rpm
one is mostly better.  The primary reason is the one you've mention
here: they maintain the separation between the source, rpm spec, and
build areas's far more cleanly than Debian does.  This makes some
common flaws one often flaws in Debian packages just disappear: like
cleaning up the source directory after a build.

Where the rpm format goes wrong is it then beaks that separation in the
actually .srpm format by putting the upstream source in and rpm bits in
one file, which is of course what Debian gets right.  Sigh.

On the positive side, rpm and deb seem to be gradually converging in a
sort of co-evolution.



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Accepted nagios4 4.3.4-3 (source amd64 all) into unstable

2019-02-11 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
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Format: 1.8
Date: Thu,  7 Feb 2019 19:35:53 +1000
Source: nagios4
Binary: nagios4-common nagios4-cgi nagios4 nagios4-core nagios4-dbg
Architecture: source amd64 all
Version: 4.3.4-3
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart 
Changed-By: Russell Stuart 
Description:
 nagios4- host/service/network monitoring and management system
 nagios4-cgi - cgi files for nagios4
 nagios4-common - support files for nagios4
 nagios4-core - host/service/network monitoring and management system core files
 nagios4-dbg - debugging symbols and debug stuff for nagios4
Closes: 902138 902216 905523 917160
Changes:
 nagios4 (4.3.4-3) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * Fix CVE-2018-18245 (closes: #902138)
   * Fix CVE-2018-13441, CVE-2018-13457, CVE-2018-13458 (closes: #917160)
   * Removed /etc/nagios4/htdigest.users purge (closes: #905523)
   * Fix unknown RPM_ARCH (closes: #902216)
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Accepted fdb 2.0.0-1 (source all) into unstable

2019-02-07 Thread Russell Stuart
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Format: 1.8
Date: Thu,  7 Feb 2019 20:43:34 +1000
Source: fdb
Binary: python-fdb python3-fdb python-fdb-doc
Architecture: source all
Version: 2.0.0-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart 
Changed-By: Russell Stuart 
Description:
 python-fdb - Python2 DB-API driver for Firebird
 python-fdb-doc - Python DB-API driver for Firebird documentation
 python3-fdb - Python3 DB-API driver for Firebird
Changes:
 fdb (2.0.0-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * New upstream version
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Re: Concerns to software freedom when packaging deep-learning based appications.

2018-07-12 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2018-07-12 at 18:15 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Compare neural networks: a user who uses a pre-trained neural network
> is subordinated to the people who prepared its training data and set
> up the training runs.

In Alpha-Zero's case (it is Alpha-Zero the original post was about)
there is no training data.  It learns by being run against itself. 
Intel purchased Mobileye (the system Tesla used to use, and maybe still
does) with largely the same intent.  The training data in that case is
labelled videos resembling dash cam footage.  Training the neural
network requires huge amounts of it, all of which was produced by
Mobileye by having human watch the video and label it. This was
expensive and eventually unsustainable.  Intel said they were going to
attempt to train the network with videos produced by game engines.  I
haven't seen much since the Intel purchased Mobileye however if they
succeed we are in the same situation - there is no training data.  In
both cases is is just computers teaching themselves.

The upshot is I don't think focusing on training data or the initial
weights is a good way to reason about what is happening here.   If Deep
Mind released the source code for Alpha-Zero anyone could in principle
reproduce their results if you define their result as I'm pretty sure
they do: produce an AI capable of beating any other AI on the planet at
a particular game.  The key words are "in principle" of course, because
the other two ingredients they used was 250 MW hour of power (a wild
guess on my part) and enough computers to be able to expend that in 3
days.

A better way to think about this is the AI they created is just another
chess (or Go or whatever) playing game, no different in principle to
chess games already in Debian.  However, it's move pruning/scoring
engine was created by a non human intelligence.  The programming
language that intelligence uses (the weights on a bunch of
interconnected polynomials) and the way it reasons (which is boils down
finding the minima of a high dimensional curve using newtons method to
slide down the slope) is not something human minds are built to cope
with.  But even though we can't understand them these weights are the
source, as if you give them to a similar AI it can change the program. 
In principle the DSFG is fulfilled if we don't discriminate again non-
human intelligences.

Apart from the "non-human" intelligence bit none of this is different
to what we _already_ accept into Debian.  It's very unlikely I could
have sensible contributions to the game engines of the best chess,
backgammon or Go programs Debian has now.  I have no doubt I could
understand the source, but it would take me weeks / months if not years
to understand the reasoning that went into their move scoring engines. 
The move scoring engine happens to be the exact thing Alpha-Zero's AI
(another thing I can't modify) replaces.   In the case of chess at
least they will have a database of end games they rely on, a database
generated by brute force simulations generated using quantities of CPU
cycles I simply could not afford to do.

Nonetheless, cost is an issue.  To quantify it I presume they will be
able to rent the hardware required from a cloud provider - possibly we
could do that even now.  But the raw cost of that 250 MW hour of power
is $30K, and I could easily imagine it doubling many times as it goes
through the supply chain so as another wild guess you are probably
looking at $1M to modify the program.  $1M is certainly not "free" in
any sense of the word, but then the reality no other Debian development
is free either.  All development requires computers and power which
someone has to pay for.  The difference is now is merely one of a few
added noughts, and those noughts exclude almost all of us from working
on the source.  But I'd be surprised if there isn't a Debian users out
there who *do* have the means to fiddle with these programs if they had
the weights and the source used to create them.  Which means anyone
could work on them if they had the means - but I don't have the means. 
*shrug*

Which is how I reach the opposite conclusion to Ian.  If Deep Mind
released Aplha-Zero source code under a suitable licence, plus some
example neural networks they generated with it (that happen to be bit
everyone uses) Debian rejecting the example networks as they "aren't
DFSG" free would be a mistake.  I view one of our roles as advancing
free software, all free software.  Rejecting some software because we
humans don't understand it doesn't match that goal.

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Re: concerns about Salsa

2018-06-09 Thread Russell Stuart
On Sat, 2018-06-09 at 13:52 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> As a service owner who has chosen to run the service out of git
> for other reasons, I don't really care.  But someone who wants to run
> the service from packages might have a different view.

In my very limited experience with containers they don't need
the host privileges that come with root.  The only reason containers
want root is to continue doing privilege separation (eg, prevent the
web from installing packages) in the way they've always done it.  For
example a fakeroot that persisted across reboots and somehow worked
with ldd / ld.so would be fine.  

It turns out if this is all you need its already available.  Some
container systems can already map root inside of the container to a
less privileged user outside of the container.  Docker for example [0].

And it is generally all you need. A container seems to reduce to:

- Program(s) that run in their own little ephemeral POSIX universe
  (ephemeral in the sense when it is stopped all internal state is
  lost, as if it was stored in RAM and the power was cycled) that
  has no connections with the outside world whatsoever, except:

- They listen to TCP/UCP ports inside the container.  But these are
  completely isolated from the outside world until the sysadmin
  connects an outside IP Address / port to them, and

- Stores data that should be persisted or perhaps just visible (eg
  logs) in a few well known directories, onto which the sysadmin can
  bind mount appropriate storage (the convention seems to be /data),
  and

- Has unfettered access to the network as a client. 

Root is either not required for these things or easily avoided.  For
example even though the external world connects to Salsa on port 80 and
it would require root privileges to listen on port 80, Salsa can listen
on port  inside the container and if the sysadmin wants it to serve
port 80, he maps some_ip_addr:80 to the container .

There are inefficiencies built into this system.  For example you may
end up with 100 containers all polling Debian for security updates and
installing them into ephemeral little worlds.  But these inefficiencies
don't seem like good reason to avoid using containers.

[0] 
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/userns-remap/#user-namespace-known-limitations

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Re: concerns about Salsa

2018-06-08 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2018-06-08 at 10:11 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
> In my experience the Wordpress upstream auto-upgrade system is
> typically faster than the Debian's handling of Wordpress.

I didn't realise Wordpress had an auto-upgrade system.  That put's in
the same league as the Browsers like Chrome and Firefox.  I'm
impressed.

However, it's not the same service that Debian offers.  Wordpress has
an auto upgrade system to the new version.  Debian has auto application
of security patches to an existing system.  To see the difference, try
googling "Wordpress upgrade breaks".  Or look at the howls of anguish
on this list directed up the upcoming Firefox ESR update for stable. 
Both are examples of what happens when you update to the latest version
rather than just applying security patches.

The ultimate measure is the number of systems a person can maintain
using one system over the other.  For the Debian way of doing things
there really isn't a limit, or more accurately other limits (like
hardware failures, and dealing with network and power outages) will hit
you first.  In Wordpress's case there is a background rate of plugin
and theme breakage which will eventually overwhelm you.

The difference between the two is pretty obvious to the person paying
the bills.  I suspect that is the real reason Debian, a project that
has no income to speak of, somehow manages to have all the
infrastructure it does - 60TB servers for snapshots, a mirror network
and CDN, LWN subscriptions, free venues for its conferences and I
suspect lots other things.  I don't know of another open source project
that gets even remotely close to this level of support.  It would be
downright peculiar, if it weren't for the fact that the value of the
service Debian provides can be judged by RedHat's turnover, which is
about $3 Billion/year.  For the firms throwing the occasional piece of
chump change Debian's way it must look like the bargain of the century.

> I also get the impression that the number of CVEs (let alone all
> security issues) is scaling faster than the amount of folks in Debian
> who are handling them.

Is there some public proxy measure for this?  For example, the number
of outstanding CVE's, or average days it takes for a CVE to get fixed?

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Re: concerns about Salsa

2018-06-07 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2018-06-07 at 18:14 +0200, Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
> Packages does not imply automation (lots of people maintain machines
> by logging into each one and running apt by hand and $EDITOR on their
> configuration files; I suspect this applies to the majority of
> desktops and laptops by people on this list), and git repositories do
> not imply not-automation.  Those are simply transport mechanisms for
> bits and the level of automation you use is not decided by git-vs-
> packages.

No, distros are not "just transport mechanisms".  In particular they
allow security patch upgrades to be automated by doing several things. 
On is automatically scanning for them and installing them which some
rare packages do provide (eg, browsers) and the second is supplying
back ported security patches which gives a good enough guarantee it
will be backward compatible that I let them through without testing.

I'll drive the point home with yesterdays (literally yesterdays)
headline: "Three months later, a mass exploit of powerful Web servers
continues".  The headline is referring to the 1000's of unpatched
Drupal servers out there, unpatched because patching required upgrading
to the latest version which is too hard.  Wordpress sites using the
Debian package with unattended upgrades installed would likely have
been patched before news of the exploit made the headlines.

In a nod to Salsa's team, they have taken the road you suggest and
automated everything they can with Ansible.  And yes, it's true the
burden of supplying these security back patches may fall on them, so
packaging it would not save them time.  But that's how it works for
DD's - we don't do this for our benefit, it's the rest of the world
that benefits.

> For debian.org hosts, the choice is primarily a matter of privilege
> separation: Service owners generally don't have root on the hosts,
> and so if they are to be able to update the service configuration,
> the service must run as a user they have access to or we need to
> build control planes with access controls which allow service owners
> to control their service.  DSA has root on the hosts and maintain
> those but  we don't run all our services, so we'd rather not be on
> the critical path for updating various services (which we'd need to
> be if those came from packages).

I accept that's doesn't leave the Salsa team with much choice, but it
still leaves me scratching my head.  Containers / VPS's / VM have been
a thing for years now.  They solve this separation problem in a way
that reduces the workload for everyone.

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Re: concerns about Salsa

2018-06-05 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2018-06-05 at 15:44 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Packages are great for software which you can just install and use
> without much fuss.  That is often true for mature software.  But for
> services which are less mature, and more complex, and which have more
> tentacles, the admin is likely to need to change things.  This makes
> using packages awkward.

I think it's better to express the trade off in terms of consequences.

- Using software packaged by a distro requires very little effort,
  which makes packaged software the ultimate sysadmin force
  multiplier.  I know sysadmin's who exploit it to the extent they
  maintain literally 1000's of working boxes.

- Taking a package straight from the developer gives you flexibility
  using software packaged simply can't provide or worse you can't use
  it at all because it's not packaged.  The downside is you become a
  nurse maid for the box it's installed on.  Nurse maid's are literally
  orders of magnitude less productive than one sysadmin maintaining an
  automated assembly line, so the end product had better be orders of
  magnitude more useful than the packaged version.

To better understand the understand the consequences, compare Wordpress
and Drupal.  Both get their share of security issues.  However only
Wordpress is packaged for Debian, so a developer who uses Wordpress on
a Debian box with unattended-upgrades installed some does not have to
spend much time worrying about patching security issues.  Reading
Drupal developers comments on the net after the recent Drupal exploits
gets you a common theme: "I've put together lots of customer sites and
now they all need upgrading from a variety of versions, but no one will
pay to do it and there is no way I have the time to do it myself."

That's the consequence of choosing the wrong model for the task at
hand.  I expect they would argue they had a hard requirement for some
Drupal feature, so the consequence of not using Drupal was the web site
didn't happen at all.   That's hard to swallow for a web site, but it's
not so hard for Salsa given the state of its dependencies in Debian.

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Accepted nagios4 4.3.4-2 (source amd64 all) into unstable, unstable

2018-05-30 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Mon,  9 Apr 2018 17:20:50 +1000
Source: nagios4
Binary: nagios4-common nagios4-cgi nagios4 nagios4-core nagios4-dbg
Architecture: source amd64 all
Version: 4.3.4-2
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart 
Changed-By: Russell Stuart 
Description:
 nagios4- host/service/network monitoring and management system
 nagios4-cgi - cgi files for nagios4
 nagios4-common - support files for nagios4
 nagios4-core - host/service/network monitoring and management system core files
 nagios4-dbg - debugging symbols and debug stuff for nagios4
Closes: 894696
Changes:
 nagios4 (4.3.4-2) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * Remove lookup of nagios_check_command from nagios4.init.  It
 doesn't exist in nagios4.
 .
   * ITP (closes: #894696)
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Bug#894696: ITP: nagios4 -- A host/service/network monitoring and management system

2018-04-03 Thread Russell Stuart
Package: wnpp
Severity: wishlist
Owner: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

* Package name: nagios4
  Version : 4.3.4
  Upstream Author : Ethan Galstad <nag...@nagios.org>
* URL : http://www.nagios.org/
* License : GPLv2
  Programming Lang: C
  Description : A host/service/network monitoring and management system

Nagios is a monitoring and management system for hosts, services and
networks.  This is a metapackage installing both the monitoring daemon
and the web interface.

Nagios' features include:

 *  Monitoring of network services (via TCP port, SMTP, POP3, HTTP, NNTP,
PING, etc.)
 *  Plugin interface to allow for user-developed service checks
 *  Contact notifications when problems occur and get resolved (via email,
pager, or user-defined method)
 *  Ability to define event handlers to be run during service or host events
(for proactive problem resolution)
 *  Web output (current status, notifications, problem history, log file, etc.)

nagios4 is the upstream replacement for nagios3.

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Re: What can Debian do to provide complex applications to its users?

2018-02-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2018-02-27 at 14:13 +0100, Didier 'OdyX' Raboud wrote:
> > - we could ship those applications not as .deb but as container
> >   and let them have their own lifecycle
> 
> tl;dr: a new package format is needed, with a new non-suite-specific 
> repository is needed to bring the Debian added-value to these
> ecosystems.

To me 'container' is the right solution.  The problem is Debian doesn't
support building light weight containers well.  In fact nobody does. 
Docker makes an attempt, but distributing static file system images
that have to get their security updates installed by replacing the
entire image is ick.

If I were do the entire thing over again, I would break Debian up into
a series of rings.  In the inner most ring is like the inner most ring of 
Linux.  It's filesystem(s) is readonly to all other rings.  In it sits the code 
for dpkg,  But dpkg wouldn't do much beyond pulling down packages and their 
security upgrades into a /debian directory, which would look rather like /pool 
on the mirrors now, but the .deb's and .dsc's would being directories rather 
than tar archives.

Other containers would run above this.  They create their /usr file
systems by linking into dpkg's /debian directory (which is readonly to
them).  Maintainer scripts would run when these are containers are
built.  This means dpkg is no longer running maintainer scripts, so
just like an Android application a malicious package is limited in the
harm it could cause and in particular uninstall would always work.
These containers would be notified when packages they are running have
security upgrades installed, so they can swap to the new versions at a
convenient time.  We still get to keep the "one copy of each library so
we only have to fix a vulnerability once" advantage Debian has now (and
other current solutions notably lack).

Anybody who has fiddled with containers will have no trouble filling in
the rest of the picture.  It gives us two things: much better security
and a faster way to build containers (because the unpacking step has
already been done).

I realise it sounds grandiose and far fetched, however it can be broken
down into small(ish) steps.  Step 1 would be having dpkg unpack
everything to the /debian directory (including the state it currently
stores under /var) rather than installing it in place, and just placing
links in /usr, /etc and so on.   (I'm am optimist in that I think you
could pull that off without too many things noticing.)  Step 2 would be
to isolate /debian, so the rest of the world sits in its own container
and run the maintainer scripts from within that container.  (I'm such a
optimist that even I think doing this wouldn't require many changes
beyond dpkg.)  The next steps would be moving each application into
it's own container.  They would be much harder, but I suspect once
you've done the refactoring to make dpkg maintained containers
possible, the thing would take on a life of it's own.

In this world, vdeb's are just packages that apt will only permit to be
installed in a container the user has somehow marked as insecure (means
no Debian QA, ie no security patches).  Anybody thinking "yeah, but not
that insecure" should probably read this bug report:

https://github.com/npm/npm/issues/19883

The idea Debian would by default prevent that from trashing my laptop
is real appealing.

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Re: Debian Stretch new user report (vs Linux Mint)

2017-12-04 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2017-12-04 at 21:01 +, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> I end up needing non-free firmware on most bare metal systems, but
> nothing else from non-free.  I never remember how to include it at
> installation time.  And I don't want us to gloss over the fact that
> it is non-free and therefore not part of the official Debian system.

Yes, that is the core issue, isn't it?  In this corner case we are
being used as a pipe to carry a non-free blob from the manufacturer to
hardware.  That blob isn't part of Debian, any more than a bittorrent
stream is part of ComCast.  Yet both of us are being forced to carry
stuff we find obnoxious.

Luckily for Comcast they will work perfectly fine without the content
they would to charge more for.  All they have to do is convince the
politicians to let them do it.

We aren't so fortunate.  If we want to use Debian as a tool to educate
people on what free software is about, they have to be able to install
the thing.  That means we must swallow our pride and allow non-free
blobs for network drivers, GPU's, mass storage and what not onto our
install media.  So we fine ourselves in a catch 22 - if we want to
promote DFSG to the masses, we must break the DFSG for our very own
install media.  Worse, we must get permission from ourselves to do
this, and it seems we aren't as easily to manipulate as some
politicians.  Or maybe we are, because we already do distribute non
DFSG images.

Personally, I find the cognitive dissonance created hard reason about,
let alone swallow.  It seems like the DFSG contains it's own antidote. 
If true the DFSG needs to change to accommodate this corner case,
otherwise it will remain a festering auto immune disease we pick at for
eternity.

That doesn't seem like an impossible ask given the pipe analogy.  The
DFSG is ultimately about letting anyone start with Debian, and build
something new from it as easily as we can.  If we can
acknowledge Debian packages can serve as a mere communication channel
for blobs of data without compromising the "as easily as we can" bit,
then we have a way forward.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2017-07-27 at 10:05 +, Sam Morris wrote:
> You'd have to use BindsTo=sys-subsystem-net-devices-blah.device. But 
> BindsTo= and device units are a bit fiddly, see  systemd/systemd/issues/4413>.

I had a systemd enthusiast sitting beside me who recommended that.  I
was suspicious after reading the description of BindsTo
in systemd.unit(5).  It makes absolutely no mention of that behaviour. 
I thought I was vindicated when it failed.

Now you are telling it was merely buggy code and buddy doco.  That
means latent may have been right.  It's rare, but I guess it had to
happen sometime.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-15 Thread Russell Stuart
On Sat, 2017-07-15 at 07:46 +0200, Tollef Fog Heen wrote:
> Doesn't something like:
> 
> [Unit]
> Description=My hook for foo.link
> After=foo.link
> BindsTo=foo.link
> 
> [Service]
> Type=oneshot
> ExecStart=/usr/local/sbin/whatever
> RemainAfterExit=yes
> 
> [Install]
> WantedBy=multi-user.target
> 
> work to hook into when a link unit is activated?
> 
> (Or just a Wants and Before in the foo.link unit)

When I discovered .link and .network files the first thing I looked up
in the doco was whether that sort of thing was possible.  I decided it
wasn't and wrote it off as useless for me.

Now you've made me check for real.  After setting up the unit files you
suggested I get this message in journalctl:

  Failed to add dependency on foo.link, ignoring: Invalid argument

So now I'm fairly convinced the above isn't a thing.  systemd unit
files and udev unit files live in two different worlds - they can't
refer to each other.

That aside, it wouldn't work for my most advance use case anyway.  My
issue is I have boxes literally 1000's of km's away.  Occasionally it
all goes wrong, the only way to fix it is ssh in but "all" includes the
internet connection.

My fix was to detect when a mobile phone was plugged in via USB, then
create a vpn connection home. This is all doable with a few lines in
/etc/network/interfaces - the hard bit is detecting when some random
USB device is a mobile phone.  Standard udev rules can't do it, and so
systemd.link being less powerful doesn't have a hope.  This isn't a
reflection on either of them really - it's a very specialised use case.
  However, I do expect them to provide an escape route.  Udev does - it
can run a program to decide.  systemd.link can't.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-14 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2017-07-14 at 18:31 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> I didn't think anyone was claiming they would, so I'm not sure why
> you felt like it was necessary to say this.

It's the same reason you feel like it was necessary to say this, I
guess:

On Fri, 2017-07-14 at 09:11 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> I just also don't particularly care; I've stopped using ifupdown and
> am using *.link units for network configuration

How is you stopping using ifupdown relevant to interface renaming?  It
isn't.  Nonetheless I find it interesting to learn how others solve the
same problems I face, and appreciated you taking the time to make the
comment.  But your approach doesn't work for me and I thought others
might be interested to know why that is so.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-14 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2017-07-14 at 09:11 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Right, I'm completely happy with the current behavior.  I have no
> objections to the change.  I just also don't particularly care; I've
> stopped using ifupdown and am using *.link units for network
> configuration, which makes all of this trivial and uninteresting and
> means I don't care in the slightest what names are assigned to
> interfaces.

Which means that while true, this was largely irrelevant:

On Thu, 2017-07-13 at 09:07 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Er, I saw this all the time without udev persistent naming.  Every
> time we rebooted one of our servers, the four onboard NICs (of which
> we were only using one -- long story, but basically that's just what
> the systems came with out of the box and my employer at the time
> wasn't a big enough customer to customize the hardware) would get
> randomly different ethN device names assigned to them.  That's *why*
> udev persistent naming was so important when we were using ifupdown
> to manage static network configuration on servers.

As I saw it the discussion pertinent to two classes of people:

(a) Those who typed in the device names regularly.  As far as I can
tell those people either don't see kernels interface names changing
or don't care about it.  I gather from the responses here there 
quite a few people fit into this category.

I am sort of one.  I often use my laptop to configure some
recalcitrant device.  I like most don't see the kernel assigned
names change (because as Greg Kroah-Hartmanboth said, it's very
rare), and I wouldn't care if they did change because the are 
managed by Network Manager.  But when I'm doing the "bash (pun
intended) some device into submission" thing I use a USB dongle
which I have to manually configure and I detest having to enter
the new scheme's 16 character interface name multiple times.

(b) Those who enter the debian device names manually into config
files, and have machines that network device names even though
no one armed with a screw driver has been near the thing.
These people would very much care.  I was asking whether they
exist.  So far I've seen person say they are one.

To put it another way: there are a lot of opinions being expressed
here, but I suspect most aren't coming from people with skin in the
game.

As for *.link files, syntactically they like all systemd stuff are a
huge improvement on what came before them.  But the old ugly udev rules
have one thing over them - they provide hooks for scripts to cover
cases they haven't thought of.  Scripts seem to be an anathema to the
author's of systemd.  While that remains true they will never be able
to replace udev rules in all cases.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-14 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2017-07-14 at 11:20 -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> MOST PCI/PCIe NICs indeed use "ethX", etc.  But the naming scheme
> really is device driver-specific, and the "default" name used by a
> driver is considered part of the kernel stable ABI, and cannot be
> changed on the kernel side unless it is done opt-in at kernel config
> time (kconfig) or at boot time (kernel command line, device tree,
> etc).

Which is a PITA.  Even though udev does it's best to work around it,
the advice "don't clash with the kernel's naming scheme" is excellent
advice.  It's just a shame the kernel doesn't have a well defined
naming scheme, so it's impossible to follow in the general case.

The funny thing is the despite all the heat generated by this
persistent network interface discussion, it's not a huge problem
because the tools exists to work around it.  You just have to know
where to look.

What I do get regularly bitten by is other devices changing their
names, in particular tty's coming back as different names when someone
reconnects a USB cable.  If there is a general, scriptable way around
that problem that means I don't have to say "reboot the box" I haven't
found it.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-13 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2017-07-13 at 09:07 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Er, I saw this all the time without udev persistent naming.  Every
> time we rebooted one of our servers, the four onboard NICs (of which
> we were only using one -- long story, but basically that's just what
> the systems came with out of the box and my employer at the time
> wasn't a big enough customer to customize the hardware) would get
> randomly different ethN device names assigned to them.  That's *why*
> udev persistent naming was so important when we were using ifupdown
> to manage static network configuration on servers.

Fair enough.  So now I have my example.

Possibly a compromise would be not to assign persistent names if you
have to use the mac address in the name.  I think it's only 73-usb-net-
by-mac.rules that does it this way.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-13 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2017-07-13 at 11:21 +, Clinton Roy wrote:
> Unfortunately, others have (well, not the kernel, but PCI):
> 
> https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2017-May/038924.
> html

If you plug new hardware devices in then of course things are going to
change.  The claim really is "I don't change the hardware, I don't
change the kernel version, but the hardware changes names".  It's hard
to swallow.  I've never seen it.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-13 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2017-07-13 at 05:20 -0400, Tom H wrote:
> Stateless "/etc".
> 
> Systems with multiple NICs where the order in which they're
> recognized by the kernel can vary.

I asked for a person.  I guess I really asking for a use case. 
"Stateless /etc" isn't either.

I've never seen the kernel vary the order it enumerates a PCI bus. 
This isn't an accident.   Quoting "According to: "PCI Express System
Architecture" R. Budruk, D. Anderson, T. Shanley, ADDISON-WESLEY
DEVELOPER´S PRESS, 2003. ISBN: 0-321-15630-7, page 743":

The specification states that the enumeration software must
perform a depth-first search, so before proceeding to discover
additional functions/ devices on bus 0, it must proceed to search
bus 1.

I can imagine times where stateless etc is important - like embedded
boxes VM's configured by etcd.  But invariably in those environments
all devices are attached to PCI or similar.  Even if they aren't those
types of environments are managed by highly skilled people striving for
mass produced repeatability.  Tailoring systems to cope with /etc in a
ROM is their day job.  They aren't going to use Debian as it is served
up by netinst.

Personally I don't particularly care one way or the other.  But I've
seen a lot of complaints here about how frustrating the new system is
to use in real life, but I don't recall seeing any about how it helped.
 Maybe I missed it.

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Re: IMPORTANT: Do live Debian images have a future?

2017-07-12 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2017-07-12 at 21:00 +0530, shirish शिरीष wrote:
> On 12/07/2017, Fernando Toledo  wrote:
> > Our Use-case:
> > 
> > We develop a derivated distro from Debian called Huayra GNU/Linux,
> > this is for educational program of government in Argentina. This
> > big program ship around 5 millons of netbooks to highschool
> > students.
> 
> 
>
> In short, this alone use-case answers Steve's original question which
> was primarily are there any users who use or would use this tool or
> his time would be better spent somewhere else. I think just the above
> use-case and number of users answers the need for a tool like
> live-wrapper. As has been pointed out by me and others, it just needs
> more testing (documentation and love by devs.) to drive more usage
> forwards.

I do a similar thing, although not on quite that scale.

However I thought Steve's question was about maintaining particular
live images, not live-wrapper itself. I too would be very disappointed
to see live-wrapper go.

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Re: Naming of network devices - how to improve it in buster

2017-07-12 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2017-07-12 at 17:35 +0200, Marc Haber wrote:
> I'd rather have breakage in this case than having to look for the
> interface every fscking time I need to run tcpdump, or having to
> adapt to an entirely new name schema like lanc0 and lanw0 to not
> stomp in the kernel's name space when using my own naming scheme.
> 
> My finger memory will still type tcpdump -i eth0 before the brain can
> intervene ten years from now.

I still don't understand what use case the current scheme is aimed at.

It's not Network Manager users - they don't care about names.  I know
because I used Network Manager on my laptop.

It's not sysadmin's managing fleets of machines.  They need persistent
names, but you rapidly go insane if the lan NIC isn't named "lan0" or
something regardless of the machine your platform is running on.  So
you end up dropping your own customer files in /etc/udev/rules.d
anyway.  At least that's what I do.

It's not cli user who have plugged in a box and want to configure it
with the keyboard.  Anything attached to a PCI bus is usually
"persistent enough" because something hand crafted can also be hand
maintained if it does change.  As Marc says for devices whose names do
change en48e244f61c1b is not a sane solution. Even just having a
template file in /etc/udev/rules.d to jog the memory on how to assign a
persistent name is a better idea.

So who is the person who actually likes typing en48e244f61c1b?

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Re: UMASK 002 or 022?

2017-06-30 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2017-06-30 at 21:22 +1000, Scott Leggett wrote:
> If windows is different, it looks to be the outlier because macOS
> behaves the same way as Debian[0]:
> 
>   > For example, the default umask of 022 results in permissions of 644
>   > on new files and 755 on new folders. Groups and other users can read
>   > the files and traverse the folders, but only the owner can make
>   > changes.
> 
> [0] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201684

Windows being an outlier is a recent thing.  Earlier versions behaved
like the rest of us.  Such behaviour originated in a time when computer
users were once Uni students themselves.  They knew what file
permissions were and how to change them, and were smart enough to not
be scared of sharing as the default philosophy.  Unfortunately for gwmf
m...@openmailbox.org most Debian developers come from that cohort.

gwmf...@openmailbox.org is right in saying today's computer users don't
have the "sharing is what makes us bigger than the sum of the parts"
philosophy.  Where he goes wrong is in assuming they share their
computers.  While there was a time many people shared a single CPU,
today many CPU's share a person.  Or less obliquely, everyone has their
own phone / tablet / laptop, which they don't share with anyone except
US border agents.  In this environment umask is a quaint hallmark of a
bygone time.

The one example he gave of students sharing a University computer is a
furphy.  It's true it still such sharing still happens.  But the person
in charge of the machine isn't some naive first year pleb.  It's a
battle hardened university sysadmin who, god bless his black heart, has
faced down 1000's of aspiring university student training in the art he
long ago mastered. He knows how to wield a umask with power and
precision.  He doesn't whinge about pam_umask not being the default, he
fixes it and while he's at it alters the shell scripts in
/etc/X11/Xsession.d/ gets exactly the umask they deserve.

TL;DR - this complaint is 20 years too late.

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Re: "Ask HN: What do you want to see in Ubuntu 17.10?"

2017-04-06 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2017-04-06 at 09:22 +1000, Russell Stuart wrote:
> Anyway, this discussion prompted me to get off my bum and look at why
> unattended-upgrades wasn't working.  Turns out the default install
> has "label=Debian-Security", and all these laptops are running
> testing.  I guess the assumption that people running testing have the
> wherewithal to configure their machines properly isn't unreasonable.

And ... that wasn't the full story.  The full story is when you install
unattended-upgrades it defaults to "off", or more precisely this
debconf setting default to "false":

unattended-upgrades/enable_auto_updates

This sort of thing drives me insane.  Unattended-upgrades doesn't do
anything if you don't set this to true, and why would you install it if
you didn't want it to run?  I guess it must be because some packages
depend on it, and maybe they run it themselves rather than relying on
anacron.  If that's the reason the solution is to split into two
packages, maybe "unattended-upgrades" which does do what it says on the
box and "unattended-upgrades-common" witch other packages can depend on
safely.

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Re: "Ask HN: What do you want to see in Ubuntu 17.10?"

2017-04-05 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2017-04-05 at 12:38 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
> Me too.  I guess it depends very much on whether one can afford to
> buy a good laptop which works well with Linux.

Not in this case.  My laptop concerned is an Dell XPS 9550.  It wasn't
cheap and in the 12 months of ownership I'd describe the hardware as
better than "good".  Dell's part of the design is not big part of the
total of course, Intel, Sony, Broadcom, Samsung to name a few all have
their fingers in the pie, as they do in every laptop.  But bits Dell
did contribute are extraordinarily well done, with the exception of the
keyboard layout.  It's definitely the best laptop I've ever owned.

My pain is largely self inflicted: I covet shiny bits.  Lots of
companies sell new laptops with bits a couple of years old that work
with Debian stable.  Knowing this, I bought the XPS anyway.

Although there are components in this laptop, almost of the pain come
from one: Intel's Skylake CPU.  (The touchpad also contributed but the
libinput maintainers were fantastic, going way above and beyond the
call of duty and contacting me directly when I complained on LWN.  It
now works wonderfully; worth the early adopter pain then some.) 
Getting Intel's CPU and in particular it's internal GPU working took
far longer and involved more pain than that I bargained for.  Just to
put this into perspective: they didn't work on Windows either.  Intel
CPU's are not something you can avoid by buying a more expensive
laptop.

All this new hardware has meant I have had to run Debian Testing. 
Combine shiny new hardware with the shiny new software needed to drive
it, and random little surprises become part of ones life.  Coming close
to dropping your new laptop because of a burning sensation as you
retrieve it from it's bag wasn't surprising or even unexpected - not to
me anyway.

Anyway, this discussion prompted me to get off my bum and look at why
unattended-upgrades wasn't working.  Turns out the default install has
"label=Debian-Security", and all these laptops are running testing.  I
guess the assumption that people running testing have the wherewithal
to configure their machines properly isn't unreasonable.


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Re: "Ask HN: What do you want to see in Ubuntu 17.10?"

2017-04-04 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2017-04-05 at 11:18 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
> Not AFAIK. I would guess that needrestart would need to be promoted
> to standard priority and needrestart-session would need to be added
> to tasksel's task-desktop package, or to each of the task-*-desktop
> packages; this adds wxWidgets to the default install though. The
> latter would allow different desktops to add different
> implementations, for example if someone wrote a GNOME Shell extension
> to highlight windows of applications that need restarting.

The original thread HN thread that trigged this was more about personal
machines, ie laptops and tablets.  That is were I'm coming from anyway.
 As it happens, Steve McIntyre was looking at the server side and
specifically excluded laptop's from his auto install security patch
deliberations, so nominally there isn't an overlap.

As far as I can tell, for laptop's rebooting is a non-issue mainly
because suspend is not reliable enough to use safely [0] - so they are
rebooted every day.  Ergo just fixing bug #744753 would be the cure if
it is indeed the problem - but it doesn't sound like it to me as this
isn't a suspend issue.

The itch I'm trying scratch is I've convinced some co-workers to ditch
Windows for Linux.  All our infrastructure and development is done
under Linux, so it makes sense.  For the most part it works very well,
apart from the 3 issues I raised earlier.  Fortunately they don't use
the tablet mode and they don't have HDPI displays, so they aren't
issues for them.  But the not installing security updates thing means I
have to remember do it for them.


[0] By "not safe" I mean suspend can destroy hardware.  Not directly of
course.  The first issue is modern laptops have so much DRAM it
can drain the battery overnight, which makes suspend pretty useless
if you are expecting it to reliably save your work.  The solution
is put the laptop into hibernate mode if it's been suspended too
long.  This works mostly - but it has one disastrous failure mode.
It must wake the laptop up to put it into hibernate mode but
sometimes it doesn't wake successfully. The result is the
motherboard is powered up, the laptop is in the bag with no 
ventilation and the thing cooks.




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Re: "Ask HN: What do you want to see in Ubuntu 17.10?"

2017-04-03 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2017-04-03 at 15:35 +1000, Brian May wrote:
> On 2017-04-03 10:10, Russell Stuart wrote:
> > The first is better HDPI handling.  This will require Wayland ...
> >  
>  
> Did I miss something? I thought Ubuntu was doing their own thing and
> not using Wayland.
>  
> https://wiki.ubuntu.com/Mir/Spec

Yep.  But I was referring to Debian.

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Re: "Ask HN: What do you want to see in Ubuntu 17.10?"

2017-04-02 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2017-03-31 at 21:48 +0100, Chris Lamb wrote:
> There's a very active conversation happening on Hacker News right
> now entitled «What do you want to see in Ubuntu 17.10?»:
> 
>   https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14002821
> 
> I haven't read every comment yet, but are there any feature requests
> that seem particularly relevant to us?
> 
> (As a meta-comment, I was quite struck by the number of requests that
> should "obviously" be requested upstream instead. I wouldn't want to
> label this as "wrong" but I think this might speak to the different
> perception we have towards the upstream → distro → user
> relationship.)

I was fascinated to see the two top ones were also my two top ones. 
But both are upstream issues.

The first is better HDPI handling.  This will require Wayland as X11
simply can't handle connecting to monitors with wildly different DPI
settings. But even just handling HDPI is problematic - fixing it with
my 300 dpi screen took multiple manual hacks including in Gimp's case
installing an icon pack not available in Debian.

The second was better gesture recognition.  I'd put onscreen keyboard
into that basket too.  This in particular effects 2in1 laptops - those
a standard OS (ie, Windows / Linux) but can be both touch only or touch
+ keyboard.  At the low end things appear to be in the process of
wiping out tablets, which is good for us.  But because the onscreen
keyboard doesn't work and gestures aren't supported uniformly well by
all apps these things aren't usable currently, and they have to be
usable out of the box with a standard install - just like Windows
manages to do.

Note these two cover the largest growth groups - the very low end, and
laptops with HPDI monitors.

The third one that got my attention is security updates that can be
trusted to work on a standard desktop install.  Where we take the
approach that creating our own security patches is just too hard, this
means stable must just follow upstream (like Firefox ESR),
automagically.  They don't do this reliably now for the default
install, even with unattended-grades, on a machine that's
intermittently on. This one is definitely in our court, and it's an
absolute must IMO, but is been already been discussed to death here.

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Re: Feedback on 3.0 source format problems

2017-01-09 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2017-01-09 at 17:33 +, Ian Jackson wrote:
> All of this applying and unapplying of patches around build
> operations is complete madness if you ask me - but I don't see a
> better approach given the constraints.  dgit sometimes ends up doing
> this (and moans about it), which is even madder given that dgit has
> git to help it out.

To state the bleeding obvious, it arises because on day 1 Debian
decided to do the builds in the original source tree, then tries to
recover the original source at the end by running "debian/rules clean".
 When I moved from rpm's to deb over a decade ago, I was surprised by
this.  Rpm's create temp build directory, so the "debian/rules clean"
step can be handled reliably 100% of the time by the rpm build tool.
Debian insisting you write it creates extra work.  But when in Rome do
as the Romans do and all that.

Later when I started to work on other peoples packages it became
apparent that many of the Romans didn't bother with it.  So the
debian/rules binary; dpkg --install; test; debian/rules clean; fix;
rinse and repeat cycle doesn't work at all for maybe 1/3 of packages,
and another 1/3 occasionally fail when something goes wrong during the
patch / build process.

When it goes wrong your only option is "rm -r; dpkg-source -x; manually
reapply your changes" which is tedious, error prone, and for me least
conducive to losing a days work.  It is indeed utter madness that over
a decade later we still allow this work flow. 

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Re: Converting to dgit

2017-01-03 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2017-01-04 at 14:47 +1000, Russell Stuart wrote:
> The central
issue here appears to be that none of the proposed ways
> of using git
within Debian help with that task.

On Wed, 2017-01-04 at 04:42 +, Colin Watson wrote:
> 
> git-dpm does too, and I agree it's nice.
> 
> It produces a patches-applied tree *and* the separated upstream
> patches in debian/patches/.  You never actually touch the latter by
> hand; they're purely an export format.

I stand corrected.  It seems to be precisely what is needed.

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Re: Feedback on 3.0 source format problems

2017-01-03 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2017-01-03 at 18:37 -0800, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Even if we never used tarballs, and instead our unit of operation was
> the upstream Git repository plus Debian branches, I would maintain a
> rebased branch of Debian changes to upstream

This is not a novel requirement.  Most projects I've worked with insist
you rebase your patches.  This is not new.  Before git they insisted
your patches applied cleanly - which amounts to the same thing. 
Breaking up large patches into a series of smaller independent patches
each with a simple and documented purpose isn't an unusual requirement
either.

To me this is just the software engineering 101 rule "break just large
software projects into smaller, easily understood and documented
modules" applied to change control.  The reason is identical - it's so
someone coming along behind you can easily understand what you have
done and why.   For those of us at a certain age, that someone else
coming along behind might be ourselves a few months later.

Whether it's mandatory seems to depend on how big the team is.  A large
DD team packaging who submits patches upstream to large project will
find it unavoidable.  (The Debian kernel currently carries 400 patches,
totalling 50K lines.  Managing that as a single lump would be
impossible.)  On the other hand a one person team who doesn't
contribute upstream could reasonably say it's pointless.  I know most
Debian packages are a one horse affair, but I am still surprised by the
number of DD's here claiming this software 101 process is _always_
pointless.

Source format "3.0 (quilt)" is a straightforward way of storing a
series of small documented patches.  This is in contrast to quilt(1)
the program, which is a way maintaining those patches.  I'm not fond of
quilt(1) as I regularly manage to get myself into states I can only get
out of using "rm -r; dpkg-source -x ...; reapply work done so far".

The kernel uses git as a better quilt (both are spin-offs from  the
kernel).  Gits adds some new tricks.  It doesn't get into impossible to
recover from states (yeh!).   The history it keeps allows it compare
and merge change sets - something that has to be done manually with
quilt.  That history also provides some extra features like git bisect,
and the ability to trace copyright - but they aren't so important.

What is important is git as it is used by the kernel devs still
produces small, rebased, documented patches.  If it didn't I doubt the
kernel would be using it.  The central issue here appears to be that
none of the proposed ways of using git within Debian help with that
task.  Debian packages that do use git and have patches don't use git
to generate the patches.  Eg, the kernel team appears[0] to use
quilt(!) to maintain its patch series, even though they use git too. 
If you are using quilt anyway because you like small documented
patches, but you are a one horse team and so aren't concerned about
parallel work flows a reasonable question is: why use git at all?


[0] I'm not on the kernel team, so I can't be sure about them using
quilt.  I guess they do because their debian/bin/test-patches tool
does use quilt.


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Re: Can we kill net-tools, please?

2016-12-31 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2016-12-30 at 16:09 +0100, Bjørn Mork wrote:
> Fix it instead :)

I have submitted patches for kernel the network stack to improve QoS
for ADSL (ie where ATM cells are the link layer carrier).  I'm not
terribly forgiving of the long drawn out initiation rites the kernel
dev's seem to demand, so I eventually gave up.  (It didn't help that
the kernel networking dev's all seemed to use cable and so didn't
notice the issue.  As I was a heavy ADSL user it was a very pertinent
itch for me.)  My co-conspirator, Jesper Brouer, did persevere in the
area and is now a name some in kernel development might recognise. 
Years later he re-submitted the patch.  When it was rejected by the
same people in much the same way he responded "please lets not go
through this again", and it was accepted.

> FWIW, I find it much harder to document a new feature than
> implementing it. And I believe many others feel the same.  Any help
> improving the docs is greatly appreciated.

As it happens I did write documentation.  Not stuff most people consume
directly, but in a effort to use QoS I pored through the kernel source,
documented what it did and put the result up in a public place.  That
documentation is now referenced in a number of places.  For example
it's in the "SEE ALSO" of the tc-u32 man page, I think because it
copied large chunks of it.

> New networking features often have a narrow target and are added by a
> person knowing the specific area pretty well, but not necessarily 
> everything else...  Writing good docs in this context is difficult
> because your point of view is so different from the readers.

I acknowledge it's hard to write good documentation.  But I wasn't
talking about language skills.  I was talking about writing a single
word.  There wasn't one for tc for a long while.  Some modules of tc
are still only mentioned in examples - like the ifb device (which sadly
because it's a key part of the traffic control puzzle).

Some get an introductory para only:

  atm - a scheduler for ATM VC's. 
  gact - probabilistic filter action.
  gred - generalised random early detection scheduler.
  hhf - Heavy-Hitter Filter scheduler.
  multiq - driver for multi queue devices, disguised as a scheduler
  rsvp - Match Resource Reservation Protocol filter.
  qfq - better version of pfifo, maybe.

At least a casual user can find the above and look up the kernel source
if they are desperate enough (I did it after all).  But there are other
parts still haven't attracted a single word:

  blackhole - a scheduler that always drops packets.
  canid - a filter that looks at CAN bus ID's.
  mq - the default scheduler used for virtual devices.
  plug - scheduler allowing user space start / stopping of flows.
  teql - link bonder disguised as a scheduler.
  text - filter matching strings of text in a packet.

> Note that the reason there are two sets of tools is exactly because
> they *didn't* turn the existing tools into something
> unrecognisable.  The existing tools were left alone when the kernel
> API went from ioctls to netlink.

You learn something new every day.  I had read the kernel devs had
rewritten net-tools.  I presumed that was because the ioctl interface
had gone, so they were doing it out of the kindness of their hearts to
reduce the impact of the change over. Now I've looked at the source I
see that isn't so.

> But I see no point in the subject of this discussion. 

It always puzzles me when I see someone make a point like this - right
after adding another 100 words to the very discussion they say is
pointless!

> Leave net-tools as they are for anyone used to them.

There are 2(!) versions of ifconfig available - one in inettools and
one in net-tools.  I don't recall anybody suggesting we remove either.

The issue is the new maintainer of net-tools is changing it's output. 
This could reasonably be expected to break scripts scraping it.  Since
its been superseded the suggestion is packages using it switch to
iproute2 rather than simply adapting to the change.  Re-wording that in
Debian terms: that means no packages should depend on it.

Granted this simple suggestion has prompted several people to charge
off on vaguely related hobby horses, and I'm a prime if not the major
offender.  Undoubtedly this has distracted from the original
discussion.  That is unfortunate as the original idea seemed sound to
me - and not at all pointless.

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Re: Can we kill net-tools, please?

2016-12-30 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2016-12-30 at 10:42 +0100, Vincent Bernat wrote:
> > I bet the bash authors use that argument when they add another
> > feature.  In reality all code has a cost.
> 
> The only additional cost is the cost to check if the routing entry is
> a blackhole (while the check for anything else already exists). Even
> FreeBSD supports this feature since a long time.

I wasn't talking about the merits of doing it in any particular place. 
It was about the same thing being done in multitudes of places - in a
different way in each case, with a different API, with different code
pulling apart the packet.

> The flexibility is also what people like with Linux.

True.

> hence the need to be able to drop earlier (even adding filters
> directly in the NIC).

Of course - bypassing the entire stack is always going to be faster.

The reason I have the irritates is because I don't bypass it.  I use
the multiple routing tables, the traffic control engine, iptables,
tunnels, bridges, tun/tap, ipsec, veth, vlan's.  I tried to collect
information on flows - but that slowed throughput to the point people
actually noticed it on a 10M bit/sec link.  Thus my complaining about
having to use a different syntax every time I recognise a packet, how I
have to set MARK's to communicate between different levels of the
stack.

And also thus my long and loud whining about the lack of documentation.

It turns out such whining isn't entirely pointless.  While looking  at
the kernel code again I came across the net/openvswitch.  Implemented
as yet another bolt on, of course.  But if it does what it says on the
box it may be the answer to my complaints.  This quote from the web
site is heartening: "The goal with Open vSwitch is to keep the in-
kernel code as small as possible (as is necessary for performance)". 
Indeed.

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Re: Can we kill net-tools, please?

2016-12-30 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2016-12-30 at 07:51 +0100, Vincent Bernat wrote:
> The same work is not repeated over and over again. The kernel keeps
> the needed information in a structure to avoid parsing the packet
> several times.

Yes, it does indeed keep the offset of the headers for the various
protocol layers (link, ip, transport) in the skbuff.  And yes, it uses
them where it can - for example when routing it knows it will be
looking at the destination ip address, and when routing it can use
those fields.  In netfilter (iptables) has a separate block of code for
each test, so it can use them so the test knows .  Unfortunately this
comes at a large cost - sequential execution.  In the traffic control
engine the main filter, u32, doesn't have a clue what you are looking
at, so it can't.  nftables could conceivably do it - but internally is
structured like u32 so it doesn't.  eBpf could also conceivably do it -
but it has less of an idea of what it is looking at than u32 so it
doesn't either.

Linux provides what 2(?) API's for manipulating files - read/write and
memory mapped io.  Want to count the number of ways it provides to
dissect and act upon network packets?  These aren't the esoteric things
the file system hides under ioctl's either (which is arguably how it
the main API remains so clean) - all these ways of pulling apart and
manipulating packets are in the fast path.

> When you need to decide how to route the packet, you need to do a
> route lookup. If the route entry you find happens to be a blackhole
> route, you drop the packet. You didn't do any additional work.

I bet the bash authors use that argument when they add another feature.
 In reality all code has a cost.  Do you remember Van Jacobson's
suggestion for speeding up Linux's network stack?  (It's mentioned in
his Wikipedia page.)  I was lucky enough to be at linux.conf.au when he
first presented it.  He provided working code and some very impressive
benchmarks.  It went nowhere because of that cost thing - the code
doesn't have to be executed in order to slow down development.  I think
Linux's networking mob pretty much gave up after the ipchains to
iptables transition.  Now stuff doesn't get ripped out and replaced,
instead new ideas are bolted onto the side - creating a bigger ball of
wax that's even harder to move.  Which is how we got to having the
ability to drop packets added in so many different places.

> Those benchmarks show huge differences between Linux distributions
> for a kernel-related task. Like all phoronix benchmarks, it should
> not be trusted.

Maybe you trust Facebook's opinion instead (it's weird - that wasn't
easy to write):

   http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2359272/f

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Re: Can we kill net-tools, please?

2016-12-29 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2016-12-29 at 11:38 -0800, Russ Allbery wrote:
> It certainly doesn't provide a man page that doesn't start with a BNF
> syntax description.  The iproute2 documentation is awful.
> 
> Also, this is not at all easy to parse:
>
> # ip -o address
> 1: loinet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo\ valid_lft foreverpreferred_lft 
> forever

All true.  In particular the documentation produced by kernel's
networking group is a pet hobby horse of mine.  To paraphrase an old
joke - you can't complain about most of it, because it doesn't exist.
[0]

When it comes to parsing they look equally bad once you have used them
for a while.  Worse from my point of view they are both unnecessarily
difficult to scrape in a script.  The "ip" does have one outstanding
attribute though - it is complete.  ifconfig doesn't list multiple ipv4
address (but does list multiple ipv6 addresses - what's up with that?).
 route can't handle multiple routing tables let alone routing rules. 
The equivalent of "ip tunnel" doesn't exist - and it goes on and on. 
net-tools might still be useful for configuring your laptop - but it's
now useless for any serious networking work.

To me this thread looks like a bunch of old men grumbling that the
young'ins have taken over what they created and turned the tools they
were comfortable with into something unrecognisable.  It's true - they
did do that, and it's true it was unnecessary.  They could have just
extended net-tools.  But this is how the young'ins have behaved for
time immemorial - when they take over the reins from the previous
generation and make it their own.  Look on the bright side.  They've
given the kernel's networking stack a large array of new tools that
weren't envisaged when net-tools was conceived - like QoS.


[0] Now I've started, the Linux kernel's networking stack is a mess.
From the outside it looks like a mob of warning tribes, each 
developing with their own way of doing the same thing.  To people 
not familiar with it this will sound like a hyperbolic claim.  So 
lets consider one simple task: dropping a packet.

- Did you know the routing table can drop a packet?
  "ip route add w.x.y.z/c blackhole" and
  "ip route add w.x.y.z/c prohibit" and
  "ip route add w.x.y.z/c unreachable" all do that.

- The traffic control engine can "police" packets.  You can "shot"
  a packet during policing.  (Being Australian, I find this odd,
  but I'm sure US citizens will be comfortable with it).

- Traffic control engine schedulers can also drop packets, (as well
  as move them like a bridge, create duplicates and a lot of other
  things).

- Iptables can drop packets.  This how most people do it.

- The new nftables can drop packets. 
  
Not only can they drop packets, each has their own way of figuring
out what packets to drop.  Which means each must pull apart the
packet to see it it matches, so the same work is being repeated
over and over again.

This has real impacts.  One is this spaghetti you see at the API 
level is reflected underneath, making for one large, complex, hard 
to understand and consequently fragile lump of code.  Another is 
the the BSD networking stack is faster than Linux - sometimes near 
an order of magnitude faster(!)

http://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=article=netperf-bsd-linux


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Re: Can we kill net-tools, please?

2016-12-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2016-12-28 at 03:08 +, Wookey wrote:
> If we are supposed to change to something newer these days

We've been discussing doing that for 8 years now:

https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2009/03/msg00780.html

> a pointer to a 'conversion' document would be nice.

https://wiki.debian.org/NetToolsDeprecation

(There are links on that page).

It's not a changeover document, but as I said earlier my favourite
resource is: http://baturin.org/docs/iproute2/

> Like Andrew I don't like the tone of these 'get rid of this crap'
> messages.

The issue is ifconfig was the tool up until Linux 2.2, but then the
kernel developers favoured iproute2.  The kernel has moved on and they
maintained iproute2, but ifconfig has remained static.  It now doesn't
support the most mundane things like multiple IP addresses per
interface, let alone multi routing takes, routing rules and the various
tunnelling protocols, or virtual ethernet devices needed by containers
to name but a few.
 
I don't know whether "crap" is the right word, but it is certainly
baggage from a bygone era.  "Baggage" here means that if we are nice to
our users (ie, Debian sysadmins), we should not force them to know two
tools.  We only have one complete tool set available: iproute2.  This means at 
the very least ifconfg can not appear in any conffile, nor can it really appear 
in documented shell scripts like dhclient-script.

Unfortunately this pain does not end at ifconfig. iwconfig has suffered
the same fate.  If you want to use Linux wireless in anger, then that's
the tool you have to use.  It's doubly annoying because of the "Do NOT
screenscrape this tool, we don't consider its output stable" warning it
issues.  It's not like you have much of a choice any more.

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Re: Can we kill net-tools, please?

2016-12-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2016-12-27 at 01:02 -0800, Josh Triplett wrote:
> The rest of net-tools aside (which have sensible replacements), what
> replaces netstat in the absence of net-tools?

/bin/ss, which is part of iproute2

It's probably wise to 'dpkg -L iproute2 | grep bin/'.  They are the
tools provided by the current kernel network maintainers for
manipulating the kernel's network stack.  You will find some surprising
things in there, like tipc.

If you are contemplating moving to iproute2 this web page is
invaluable:

  http://baturin.org/docs/iproute2/



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Re: Crowd funding campaign to package browserify in debian

2016-12-26 Thread Russell Stuart
On Sun, 2016-12-25 at 19:17 +0100, Stéphane Blondon wrote:
> Perhaps I missed something, so I'm curious to learn more about it (a
> link or some keywords can be a good start).

The buzz work mix is:

- vue-loader
- webpack
- webpack plugin for .vue files (mix of HTML, CSS/sass/stylus, and JS).

and some browser plugin that automagically reflected any source code
changes on disk in the browser immediately, including tool messages (eg
, compile errors).


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Re: Crowd funding campaign to package browserify in debian

2016-12-23 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2016-12-23 at 21:36 +, Jonas Smedegaard wrote:
> This list is about development of Debian.
> 
> Not about how to raise money to ease developing Debian.

The first condition is fulfilled - the email is about getting
development done within Debian.  In fact given ITP's I've seen floating
by, it's about something that is getting a lot of development done
within Debian.

Obviously it's the asking for money that rankles.  If he was asking for
some rare hardware to test on, or documentation, or even assistance you
would be fine with it.  Any normally I'd agree - money is such a
difficult topic.  I also would intensely dislike seeing repeated posts
on this list begging for money on a promise of getting some work done. 
But it should be obvious by now that isn't what's happening here. He
hasn't raised much of his target, but the work is getting done anyway. 
Clearly his main passion is to get the JS development tools into
Debian.  Money is just lubricant to make the task easier.  

JS development; the techniques they use, the appalling version control,
the tendency to mash together various bits of code with no respect to
licences, the propensity to download code they are about to run from
random sites is must be contrary to the bulk of our standing
policies.  Twisting this mess into something that can be used within
Debian is understandably difficult.  But also necessary, given it is
the most active area development on the planet right now. [0]

So add he is cracking a very tough nut that no one else has much much
of a dint in so far, and maybe we can be a little flexible?



[0] I was proudly shown some production "web code" yesterday.  Cutting 
edge stuff, apparently.  A single file contained HTML, css, and JS.
 
The first thing that hit me is JS didn't contain any semicolon's - 
something I found disquieting.  I was told "no, we don't use them 
any more".  But what about the problems with that pointed out by 
"Javascript - The Good Parts", I asked.  The reply was, "oh, no 
one does this stuff without running it through an aggressive 
linter, so its completely safe - mostly strictly type safe in 
fact".  (That was nice - evidently at least some of the scars
carried by the C using forbears had been noticed.)

But how could a linter process that, I asked - it was some  unholy 
mess of 3(? maybe more) intermixed languages.  It gently explained 
this was the source code form.  A large tool chain would digest 
it, turning it into something no sane human would look at.  It was 
broken into single language modules that were digestible by a 
browser, downloaded by some dynamic linker created by the tool 
chain that GET's the requisite parts as the running code links to 
it while executing.  It was complete with debugging symbols packed 
into separate files, so they were there if needed.  From the 1000' 
view it was not unlike the m4 / cpp / gcc / ld / ldd GNU tool 
chain - but created in some parallel universe.

Then I noticed some JS/Typescript/? syntax I hadn't seen before.  
Not wanting to let any more grey show through I decided to chase 
it down myself.  It took a while - it was some variant of the 
new JS spreader syntax - but it wasn't in ECMAScript 2015 and 
wasn't recognised by any shipping browser.  I knew this new 
generation of our profession didn't share my aversion to 
releasing production code developed in a language that hasn't been 
standardised yet - but it wasn't in ECMAScript 2017 either.  
Turned out it was a proposed addition to ECMAScript 2017 
implemented by a grand total of 2 transpilers.  In production 
code!  (The mere existence of those bloody transpilers makes the 
statement "written in Javascript" near inscrutable.)

    Many of bed rock of rules I built my career on are viewed as road
blocks to progress by this new generation, and treated accordingly.
It made me feel like I had been run over by the generation gap
bus.  They feel similarly I think - now they have containers they
configure with makefiles and rebuild nightly, they are 
understandably wondering where a monolithic solution like Debian 
fits in.  Pirate has evidently decided to work full time on
bringing these two worlds together.  Yes, he is using a rather
"novel" approach, but the entire situation is novel.  I say cut
him some slack.

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Accepted fdb 1.6.1+dfsg1-1 (source all) into unstable

2016-12-05 Thread Russell Stuart
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Version: 1.6.1+dfsg1-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Changed-By: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Description:
 python-fdb - Python2 DB-API driver for Firebird
 python-fdb-doc - Python DB-API driver for Firebird documentation
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 fdb (1.6.1+dfsg1-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
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Re: unattended-upgrades by default?

2016-11-03 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2016-11-03 at 18:47 +, Steve McIntyre wrote:
> To solve the issue and provide security updates by default, I'm
> proposing that we should switch to installing unattended-upgrades by
> default (and enabling it too) *unless* something else in the
> installation is already expected to deal with security updates.

I am amazed we don't do this already.  Effectively it makes us insecure
by default.

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Re: When should we https our mirrors?

2016-10-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2016-10-27 at 08:35 +0200, Vincent Bernat wrote:
> Moreover, the download speed can be very slow, either from work or
> from home (100M fiber connection). Sometimes 100kbytes/s. That's a
> pain.
> 
> I am a bit worried for deb.debian.org to become a default as it
> doesn't work well for me. Am I alone to have such problems?

It's *far* better than httpredir.  But given adding httpredir as a
backup has become a net negative for me, that's not saying much. 
deb.debian.org so far has been net positive.

Yes, it's slow.  But for those of us who live on the east cost of
Australia our choices are ftp.au.debian.org (rock solid but 5Mm away,
connected to the east by wet string or carrier pigeon - pabs will
advise) or an Eastern mirror (fast but unpredictable and unreliable,
possibly because pabs doesn't live here[0]) it's the reason we need a
backup.  I was hoping for better given fastly has POP's in Australia,
but apparently the nearest fastly POP for Debian is in the US.

The real problem is mirroring infrastructure for Debian badly needs
some love.  As Raphael spelt out when explaining the current state of
httpredir - the problem lies deeper than httpredir itself. 
deb.debian.org can bypass most the mess because they control both ends
- debian and the "mirror".

I'm sure Debian is riddled with people who could fix the mirror
network.  In the usual Debian way (why does heart bleed spring to
mind?) it will become an impossible to ignore itch before one of us
gets off our fat arses to does something about it. [1]



[0] pure speculation.

[1] Antarctic penguins spring to mind.  All hungry, all standing on the
ice starring at the sea wondering if there are leopard seals waiting
for dinner to deliver itself, all hoping someone else will be hungry
enough to be the test the dinner theory before them. 

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Accepted pam-python 1.0.6-1 (source amd64 all) into unstable

2016-08-27 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Sat, 27 Aug 2016 21:37:03 +1000
Source: pam-python
Binary: libpam-python libpam-python-doc
Architecture: source amd64 all
Version: 1.0.6-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Changed-By: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Description:
 libpam-python - Enables PAM modules to be written in Python
 libpam-python-doc - Documentation for the bindings provided by libpam-python
Closes: 833411
Changes:
 pam-python (1.0.6-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * New upstream.
   * Add debian specific patch to link sphinx to python-doc instead
 of online version.  (Closes: #833411).
   * Bump standards version.
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Re: GR: Declassifying debian-private: First call for votes

2016-08-06 Thread Russell Stuart
On Sun, 2016-08-07 at 01:48 +0200, Debian Project Secretary - Kurt
Roeckx wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> This is the first call for vote on the General Resolution about
> declassifying debian-private.
> 
>  Voting period starts  2016-08-07 00:00:00 UTC
>  Votes must be received by 2016-08-20 23:59:59 UTC
> 
> The following ballot is for voting on declassifying parts of -private
> of
> historical interest.
> 
> This vote is being conducted as required by the Debian Constitution.
> You may see the constitution at https://www.debian.org/devel/constitu
> tion.
> For voting questions or problems contact secret...@debian.org.
> 
> The details of the general resolution can be found at:
> https://www.debian.org/vote/2016/vote_002
> 
> Also, note that you can get a fresh ballot any time before the end of
> the vote by sending a signed mail to
>    bal...@vote.debian.org
> with the subject "gr_private".
> 
> To vote you need to be a Debian Developer.
> 
> 
> BALLOT OPTIONS
> 
> Choice 1: Allow declassifying parts of debian-private
> =
> 
> Title: Declassifying parts of -private of historical interest
> 
> 1. The 2005 General Resolution titled "Declassification of debian-
> private
>    list archives" is repealed.
> 
> 2. Debian listmasters and/or other individuals delegated by the DPL
> to
>    do so are authorized to declassify excerpts of -private of
> historical
>    interest by any process which at minimum provides sufficient time
> and
>    opportunity for Debian Developers to object by GR prior to
>    declassification.
> 
> 3. In keeping with paragraph 3 of the Debian Social Contract, Debian
>    Developers are strongly encouraged to use the debian-private
> mailing
>    list only for discussions that should not be disclosed.
> 
> Choice 2: Further Discussion
> 
> 
> This is the default option. Rank this option higher than the
> unacceptable
> choices.
> 
> 
> HOW TO VOTE
> 
> To cast a vote, it is necessary to send this ballot filled out to a
> dedicated e-mail address, in a signed message, as described below.
> The dedicated email address this ballot should be sent to is:
> 
>   gr_priv...@vote.debian.org
> 
> The form you need to fill out is contained at the bottom of this
> message, marked with two lines containing the characters
> '-=-=-=-=-=-'. Do not erase anything between those lines, and do not
> change the choice names.
> 
> There are 2 choices in the form, which you may rank with numbers
> between
> 1 and 2. In the brackets next to your preferred choice, place a 1.
> Place a 2 in the brackets next to your next choice. Continue until
> you
> reach your last choice. Do not enter a number smaller than 1 or
> larger
> than 2.
> 
> You may skip numbers, leave some choices unranked, and rank options
> equally. Unranked choices are considered equally the least desired
> choices, and ranked below all ranked choices.
> 
> To vote "no, no matter what", rank "Further Discussion" as more
> desirable
> than the unacceptable choices, or you may rank the "Further
> Discussion"
> choice and leave choices you consider unacceptable blank. (Note: if
> the
> "Further Discussion" choice is unranked, then it is equal to all
> other
> unranked choices, if any -- no special consideration is given to the
> "Further Discussion" choice by the voting software).
> 
> Finally, mail the filled out ballot to: gr_priv...@vote.debian.org.
> 
> Don't worry about spacing of the columns or any quote characters
> (">") that
> your reply inserts.
> 
> NOTE: The vote must be GPG signed (or PGP signed) with your key that
> is
> in the Debian keyring. You may, if you wish, choose to send a signed,
> encrypted ballot: use the vote key appended below for encryption.
> 
> The voting software (Devotee) accepts mail that either contains only
> an
> unmangled OpenPGP message (RFC 2440 compliant), or a PGP/MIME mail
> (RFC 3156 compliant). To avoid problems I suggest you use PGP/MIME.
> 
> 
> VOTING SECRECY
> 
> This is a non-secret vote.  After the voting period is over the
> details on
> who voted what will be published.  During the vote itself the only
> information that will be published is who voted. 
> 
> You can encrypt your message to the voting system to keep your vote
> secret
> until the end of the voting period.  The software will also try to
> keep
> your vote secret and will encrypt the reply it sends to you.
> 
> 
> - - -=-=-=-=-=- Don't Delete Anything Between These Lines =-=-=-=-=-
> =-=-=-
> 4896c7a8-1d45-49db-ba5e-490da5ed275c
> [  1 ] Choice 1: Allow declassifying parts of debian-private
> [  2 ] Choice 2: Further Discussion
> - - -=-=-=-=-=- Don't Delete Anything Between These Lines =-=-=-=-=-
> =-=-=-
> 
> ---
> ---
> 
> The responses to a valid vote shall be signed by the vote key created
> for this vote. The public key for the vote, signed by the Project
> secretary, is appended 

Accepted spyne 2.12.11-1 (source all) into unstable

2016-07-24 Thread Russell Stuart
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Format: 1.8
Date: Sun, 24 Jul 2016 21:08:56 +1000
Source: spyne
Binary: python-spyne
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Version: 2.12.11-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Changed-By: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Description:
 python-spyne - Python library for writing and calling soap web service
Closes: 831937
Changes:
 spyne (2.12.11-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * Get rid of bad $(DH_INTERNAL_OPTIONS) in rules.  Closes: 831937
   * New upstream version
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Accepted fdb 1.6+dfsg1-1 (source all) into unstable

2016-07-24 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Sun, 24 Jul 2016 19:52:54 +1000
Source: fdb
Binary: python-fdb python3-fdb python-fdb-doc
Architecture: source all
Version: 1.6+dfsg1-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Changed-By: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Description:
 python-fdb - Python2 DB-API driver for Firebird
 python-fdb-doc - Python DB-API driver for Firebird documentation
 python3-fdb - Python3 DB-API driver for Firebird
Closes: 831940
Changes:
 fdb (1.6+dfsg1-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * Get rid of bad $(DH_INTERNAL_OPTIONS) in rules.  Closes: 831940
   * New upstream version
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Re: synaptics vs libinput and GNOME 3.20 no longer supporting synaptics

2016-07-13 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2016-07-14 at 14:13 +1000, Russell Stuart wrote:
> The second component is that apparently tapping doesn't work when
> > enabled. That's most probably a bug, file one against libinput at
> > bugs.freedesktop.org and it'll get fixed.
> 
> Done.

For anyone still following along it is possible to get libinput to work
as least as well synaptics on my laptop (and I presume all others):

    https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=96925#c6

Short form: there are bugs somewhere, but you can work around them.

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Re: synaptics vs libinput and GNOME 3.20 no longer supporting synaptics

2016-07-13 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2016-07-14 at 13:41 +1000, Peter Hutterer wrote:

Thanks for the thorough analysis.

> The second component is that apparently tapping doesn't work when
> enabled. That's most probably a bug, file one against libinput at
> bugs.freedesktop.org and it'll get fixed.

Done.  Having to filing it against a Wayland component was novel, and
encouraging.

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Re: synaptics vs libinput and GNOME 3.20 no longer supporting synaptics

2016-07-12 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2016-07-12 at 10:07 +0300, Lars Wirzenius wrote:
> I've been using the following script, with variations on the
> parameters to find a working setup. The values below are the best I
> could manage, and they aren't any good.
> 
> #!/bin/sh
> 
> synclient \
>   TapButton1=1 \
>   TapButton2=2 \
>   TapButton3=3 \
>   PalmDetect=1 \
>   PalmMinWidth=50 \
>   PalmMinZ=10 \
>   VertSCrollDelta=-41 \
>   HorizScrollDelta=-41 \
>   TouchpadOff=0 \
> "$@"

For what it's worth, for me on stretch synclient isn't too reliable.
 Eg, "synclient TapButton1=0" has no effect - it should disable one
fingered taps.  The libxinput equivalent (xinput --set-prop) doesn't
work for libxinput either.

The only thing that has proved reliable is putting a file in
/etc/X11/xorg.conf.d/touchpad.conf:

Section "InputClass"
  Identifier"Touchpad twofinger scroll"
  MatchIsTouchpad "yes"
  Driver"synaptics"
  Option"ZAxisMapping"  "4 5"
  Option"HorizTwoFingerScroll"  "true"
  Option"VertTwoFingerScroll"   "true"
  Option"FastTaps"  "on"
  Option"PalmDetect""on"
  Option"AccelFactor"   "0.1028806" #2x
  Option"AdaptiveDeceleration"  "10"
  Option"MinSpeed"  "0.5"
  Option"MaxSpeed"  "4.75"
  Option"TapButton1""1"
  Option"TapButton2""3"
  Option"TapButton3""2"
EndSection

I would happily use libxinput if it extricated me from this mess, but
right now it seems to be bugs all the way down.

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Re: synaptics vs libinput and GNOME 3.20 no longer supporting synaptics

2016-07-11 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2016-07-12 at 07:48 +0300, Lars Wirzenius wrote:
> After Raphael's mail yesterday, I switched from the synaptics driver
> to the xinput one (by removing xserver-xort-input-synaptics) and
> since then, I've not had a single case of moving the mouse or
> clicking by tapping by accident. When the opposite change happened a
> few weeks ago, the accidents started happening with such frequency
> that I could barely finish a sentence in the same window I started
> it.

For me at least the problem isn't palm detection, because in the end
it's a kludge that can at best only partially work.  For synaptics the
solution for this is syndaemon, and the problem it's broken right now:

    https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=818471

Maybe libinput does the typing detection syndaemon does, but I can't
find any evidence for it.

> Tapping and two-finger scrolling work perfectly fine with the xinput
> driver, too.

As a touchpad that doesn't move the mouse as I type is hugely
attractive, I tried libxinput again.  Same result.  Palm detection
works wonderfully, but only because it doesn't recognise a tap from
finger either.  Clicking (ie a tap heavy enough to activate the
mechanical switch underneath) does work.

If I configure synaptics to ignore TapButton1 taps (as opposed to
clicks), it also has faultless palm detection.

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Re: synaptics vs libinput and GNOME 3.20 no longer supporting synaptics

2016-07-11 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2016-07-11 at 23:51 +0200, Raphael Hertzog wrote:
> Well, if some KDE/XFCE/etc. packages work only with synaptics and not
> with libinput, then we should get those packages updated to depend on
> xserver-xorg-input-synaptics, no?

I don't know about KDE/XFCE, but in the etc category is LXDE, and it
works with both.  I'd be surprised if KDE and XFCE didn't work with
both too as libinput and synaptics are drivers, and as such are hidden
by the X API these window managers use.  The surprising thing for me is
GNOME evidently isn't using the X API, but instead talking to the
driver directly.

In my case, the thing that broke when xserver-xorg briefly switched to
using libinput instead of synaptics wasn't LXDE, it was me.  The
reasons are spelled out in the bug that was filed when the change was
made:

    http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=822835

Briefly: synaptics is much better touchpad driver than libinput.
 Libinput treats a touchpad as a mouse.  Modern MAC like touchpads are
great input devices, but when you strip them of multitouch and gesture
recognition they become so unwieldly people give up and plug in a real
mouse.

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Re: Thinking about a "jessie and a half" release

2016-07-05 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2016-07-05 at 08:25 +0100, Rebecca N. Palmer wrote:
> Have you reported this bug (with the full warnings)?  If not, please
> do so.

I haven't.  If I got a response at all to "My monitor doesn't work" it
looks to me it would be: compile latest source with instrumentation
turned on and send log.  I've tried compiling the Intel drivers before
- I could not get patches to apply.

Fortunately, others get the same backtrace:

  https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1523088

It probably isn't related to my monitor not displaying, but I won't be
able to tell until 4.8, when the patch addressing that report is
scheduled to make it to a released kernel.  Like I said, progress is
slw.

My point is really the 4.4 kernel is nothing special for amd64.
 Laptop's with Intel chipsets that started shipping over 6 months ago
don't work 100% with it.  Actually from memory the Intel GPU driver
opps's on occasion in 4.4.

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Re: Thinking about a "jessie and a half" release

2016-07-04 Thread Russell Stuart
On Tue, 2016-07-05 at 00:38 +0200, Ben Hutchings wrote:
> As I understand it, xserver-xorg-video-modesetting should be used
> instead of xserver-xorg-video-intel, for chips supported by the i915
> kernel driver.  So the latter should be changed to limit the device
> IDs it claims, then both of them should be backported.

Currently 4.6.0 doesn't work with skylake for me when I plug in a
3440x1440 monitor on a Dell XPS 9550, both with and without xserver-
xorg-video-intel installed.  It never has worked reliably on any kernel
version.  Currently, the monitor works maybe 20% of the time - so if
you persist for 5 boots you've got a reasonable chance of getting
lucky. The only noticeable change from 4.5 to 4.6 is in the kernel
backtraces produced - they have got fewer, and they are only warnings
now.

So from my point of view Intel still hasn't produced a working kernel
driver for hardware they released a year ago.  I sincerely hope they
get the thing stable before we get to stretch, but to date progress has
been very slow.

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Re: trying to use wireless not from gnome... what's the incantation?

2016-05-26 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2016-05-26 at 12:15 -0800, Britton Kerin wrote:
> On Thu, May 26, 2016 at 4:35 AM, Andrew Shadura 
> wrote:
> > There's no need in any of this, ifupdown already supports this mode
> > without anything apart from wpa-conf.
> > 
> > See /usr/share/doc/wpasupplicant/README.Debian.gz for more detals.

It does say that.  Maybe on Debian stable it even works.  However on my
laptop something was starting wpa_supplicant as a service at boot, and
I had to stop it in order to make it work from ifupdown.

> Ok, this approach does work if rfkill is added to the equation.  I
> tried it originally and it didn't seem to.  The problem is that my
> card boots up with rfkill activated, and ifup doesn't seem to know
> about this and reacts strangely.

I had the same problem on a machine running hostapd.  I thought it was
very odd the system booted with rfkill softly enabled.  Unlike you I
didn't believe the card or the driver would do something so daft, so I
went hunting for the culprit.  It turned out NetworkManager soft
turning rfkill on at boot, even though the interface was listed in
/etc/network/interfaces.  The ifupdown stanza for that interface is now
(somewhat elided):

auto wlan0
iface wlan0 inet manual
pre-up  nmcli radio wifi off || :
pre-up  rfkill unblock wifi || :
        hostapd /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf

Both the nmcli and rfkill lines are absolutely required, and this is on
Jessie.  They may only be two extra lines, but it took me hours to
chase down what was happening so I could get hostapd running and while
giving the user pretty GUI interface for the other networks.

Given the NetworkManager.conf is as appears below, it seems to be
happing despite what the doco says.  It is this sort of crap that gives
these GUI interfaces a bad name among sysadmins.

[main]
plugins=ifupdown,keyfile

[ifupdown]
managed=false

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Re: trying to use wireless not from gnome... what's the incantation?

2016-05-26 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2016-05-26 at 10:24 +0200, Michael Biebl wrote:
> It's hard to say though. For this we'd need proper debug logs to
> further investigate this.

You shamed me into doing something about it.  But now I test it,
network-manager works.  It's been 3 months and a similar number of
kernels, so who knows what it was.

Wicd still doesn't work.  If the interface hasn't been initialised with
ifupdown, it doesn't seem to realise the laptop has a wifi card.  When
it does know it has a Wifi card, it can't successfully connect.

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Re: trying to use wireless not from gnome... what's the incantation?

2016-05-26 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2016-05-23 at 08:28 +0200, Adam Borowski wrote:
> Using low-level tools can indeed be tricky, so while they're more
> powerful than anything NM or wicd can do, they're an overkill and a
> waste of learning time if what you want is regular use of a single
> interface.

I have a new laptop on which only Stretch worked - and then only
partly.  Among the things that didn't work were wicd (kept on
reinitialising the interface every 10 seconds or so) and network-
manager (didn't recognise the interface at all).  This initially caused
a lot of head scratching and wasted time because I blamed the drivers
of new hardware.  But it worked 100% reliably when in desperation I
configured it manually.

If you are posting to debian-devel manual configuration should not be
hard for you.  Ensure ifupdown and ifplugd are installed.  Add this
into /etc/network/interfaces:

auto wifi_interface
iface wifi_interface inet dhcp
pre-up  systemctl stop wpa_supplicant || :
post-down   systemctl start wpa_supplicant || :
wpa-driver  nl80211,wext,wired 
wpa-conf/etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf

And add stanza's like this to /etc/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
for each WiFi network you want to use:

network={
ssid="a-network-i-use"
psk="super-secret"
}

network={
        ssid="another-network-i-use"
psk="another-secret"
}


Doing it like this drops the amount of code between you and the metal
by an order of magnitude.  Reliability goes up accordingly.  Day to day
usage is identical - it just works wherever you are, connecting you to
the local network at boot without you having to raise a finger.  Ease
of configuration is a matter of taste - I happen to prefer to being
able to see all my wifi networks in a text editor, so I won't be using
wicd or network-manager for wifi again.

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Accepted conspy 1.14-1 (source amd64) into unstable

2016-02-16 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2016 20:41:44 +1000
Source: conspy
Binary: conspy
Architecture: source amd64
Version: 1.14-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Changed-By: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Description:
 conspy - Remote control of Linux virtual consoles
Closes: 813034 813035
Changes:
 conspy (1.14-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * Describe kernel limitations in man pages.
 Closes: #813034.
   * Infer size of large consoles.
 Closes: #813035.
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Re: An abrupt End to Debian Live

2015-11-09 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2015-11-09 at 17:47 +0100, Daniel Baumann wrote:
> An abrupt End to Debian Live

As a person who recently used Debian Live to set up a PXE boot image
after trying several different alternatives including debian-cd, I am
sorry to hear this and sad to see debian-live go.  It will be missed, by
me at least.  It saved me a lot of time.

Not only that, but it was an impressive piece of software that as a DD I
was proud to point to.  I've built live boot systems from RedHat,
debian-installer, DSL and a number of others over the years.  Nothing
else came close to debian-live in flexibility.  It was literally a
breath of fresh air to me - the tool everyone in working in that space
should be emulating.  Despite it's flexibility it also managed to be
simple to use - it did what it said on the box, the documentation was
good and the interface was straightforward to use.

All in all, a credit to those who designed it and worked on it.  I wish
you all well.


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Accepted conspy 1.13-1 (source amd64) into unstable

2015-09-20 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2015 09:41:02 +1000
Source: conspy
Binary: conspy
Architecture: source amd64
Version: 1.13-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Changed-By: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Description:
 conspy - Remote control of Linux virtual consoles
Changes:
 conspy (1.13-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * New upstream release.
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Accepted conspy 1.12-1 (source amd64) into unstable

2015-09-16 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 21:23:59 +1000
Source: conspy
Binary: conspy
Architecture: source amd64
Version: 1.12-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Changed-By: Russell Stuart <russell-deb...@stuart.id.au>
Description:
 conspy - Remote control of Linux virtual consoles
Changes:
 conspy (1.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * New upstream release rebasing for sourceforge.
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Accepted fdb 1.4.9+dfsg1-2 (source all) into unstable

2015-08-18 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2015 21:49:08 +1000
Source: fdb
Binary: python-fdb python3-fdb python-fdb-doc
Architecture: source all
Version: 1.4.9+dfsg1-2
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Changed-By: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Description:
 python-fdb - Python2 DB-API driver for Firebird
 python-fdb-doc - Python DB-API driver for Firebird documentation
 python3-fdb - Python3 DB-API driver for Firebird
Changes:
 fdb (1.4.9+dfsg1-2) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * Fix uscan.
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Accepted fdb 1.4.9+dfsg1-1 (source all) into unstable

2015-08-11 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2015 16:45:29 +1000
Source: fdb
Binary: python-fdb python3-fdb python-fdb-doc
Architecture: source all
Version: 1.4.9+dfsg1-1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Changed-By: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Description:
 python-fdb - Python2 DB-API driver for Firebird
 python-fdb-doc - Python DB-API driver for Firebird documentation
 python3-fdb - Python3 DB-API driver for Firebird
Closes: 794128
Changes:
 fdb (1.4.9+dfsg1-1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * New upstream version.
 .
   * Remove python-nose dependency so dh-python doesn't run nose.
 closes: 794128
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Re: Metapackage dependencies: Depends or Recommends?

2015-07-31 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2015-07-30 at 08:57 +0200, David Kalnischkies wrote:
 This example makes it quite obvious that your requirements are keep
 a minimal set of packages installed while the requirement of libapt's
 autoremove is suggest only packages for removal which are completely
 safe to remove.

If Suggest only packages for removal which are completely safe to
remove  is supposed to be list all which are completely safe to
remove then it doesn't manage to do that either.  It fails given
circular references, ie A depends on B depends on C depends on A.

I guess it's designed for the cleanup packages I played with for a
short while on my laptop use case.  It does a sort of OK job at that.
Only sort of, because when you move across flag days the dregs left
libapt leaves behind can get it confused over which packages should
removed so the upgrade can proceed.

For my servers it's different.  The inherent ambiguity of Debian
dependency system that libapt tries hide becomes intolerable, meaning I
don't want something to just choose between the possibilities on my
behalf, I want to be informed so I can see the choices and have my
decision explicitly recorded to I can repeat it.  Leaving garbage
packages (think garbage as in garbage collector) lying around on
servers that are supposed to be clones left alone to maintain themselves
for a while is equally unacceptable.

In the end I gave up up on libapt and wrote my own dependency resolver.
Fortunately libapt makes that relatively easy because it's API gives you
access to all its internal working so you can re-use most of it.


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Re: git and https

2015-05-29 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2015-05-29 at 22:21 +1000, Riley Baird wrote:
  LetsEncrypt will save us!
 
 I just looked that up. What a wonderful idea!

I don't know how you missed it.  My tongue has been hanging out for a
year now.  Finally, sanity prevails.

A https cert is supposed to certify www.someone.com is the person who
controls the servers managing www.someone.com.  Traditionally, the
certifiers have relied on business names, trademarks, directors names -
all sorts of things that have one thing in common - they don't actually
prove you control www.someone.com.  The more things unrelated to whether
you controlled www.someone.com they asked you to prove, the more they
charged for the certificate.  If you wanted an example of marketing
triumphing over engineering, the CA system is it.

LetsEncrypt is a pure embodiment of the you control it you own it
principle.

They could do better.  A lot better.  For example they could insist you
control www.someone.com for a while - say repeatedly confirm over a
month.  This would thwart the guy who took over www.hotmail.com for a
while [0].  And they could allow people to register an interest in
someon.com or someon.co, so if someone registered a cert with it they
would know.

Regardless, when LetsEncrypt works we will have made a step forward.



[0] 
http://news.cnet.com/Good-Samaritan-squashes-Hotmail-lapse/2100-1023_3-234907.html
Fortunately for Microsoft it was a Linux nutter.  When he couldn't
access his hotmail account he diagnosed it, registered the domain,
and then gave it back to Microsoft.



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Re: Bug#786902: O: ifupdown -- high level tools to configure network interfaces

2015-05-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2015-05-27 at 12:33 +0200, Marco d'Itri wrote:
 (I am shocked, shocked that there is no flood of people here rushing to 
 save ifupdown... :-) )

Until systemd-networkd can run scripts on events no defence is required.
It would be like comparing a calculator to a computer.  Sure, the
calculator is simple and lightweight, but there are some things you just
can't do with a calculator.

Right now systemd-networkd looks like a wasted opportunity - maybe it's
work in progress.  It has some wonderful pattern matching stuff but once
it matches the pattern ... there is very little you can do.  All the
dependency processing packaged with systemd.unit is oddly missing.


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Re: Bug#786902: O: ifupdown -- high level tools to configure network interfaces

2015-05-27 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2015-05-27 at 19:27 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
 Your mail is missing some things:
 
 To: 786...@bugs.debian.org
 Control: retitle -1 ITA: ifupdown -- high level tools to configure
 network interfaces
 Control: owner -1 !

If you mean it has been orphaned, it will work for while yet even if it
is unmaintained.  As the bug notes:

In current state ifupdown is probably good enough for what it is
used for

That's an understatement.  It's plugin based architecture that makes it
such a flexible tool for sysadmin's has also meant it's been able to
adapt to newer technology for 15 years now.  So there is no rush.

I agree there is room for improvement.  Systemd-networkd's pattern
matching make ifupdown's mapping look like a hack, it lacks any
dependency processing, I suspect the shell script's architecture
responsible for it's flexibility is also responsible for it's bugs and
it only provides tools for address assignment - other tasks like
firewalls and traffic control aren't there.

But they aren't there in the proposed replacements either, so we are a
long way from having a new solution.  Fortunately we have do time.


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Re: Proposal: enable stateless persistant network interface names

2015-05-13 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2015-05-13 at 17:16 +0200, Vincent Lefevre wrote:
 Well, having some of the network traffic (more precisely, connections
 to machines that have an IPv6 address) re-routed to some unknown
 machine on the local network is not a nice feature.
 
 IMHO, such a feature should be enabled only by the network management
 system, not by default at the kernel level.

Now I've looked up what Marc is referring to in an earlier reply, SLAAC
and DHCP look pretty similar to me.  Both have the re-route your NIC to
some unknown machine feature.  I'm sure everybody here will be the
victim of a rouge router sending NDP responses, just as everybody has
already been the victim of a rouge DHCP server.

Not having the automatically make my NIC usable on bootup feature
enabled by default would seem like a major omission to me.

The one difference between the two right now is dhclient make it easy
for the client to watch for changes using scripts.  AFAICT, there is no
off the shelf way of doing it for SLAAC.  It's easy enough to do - just
have a daemon listen to kernel netlink messages and fire off a script.
The right place to put that now would be in systemd, but if they are
opposed to scripts as Marc says that ain't going to happen.  Sigh.


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Re: Proposal: enable stateless persistant network interface names

2015-05-11 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2015-05-11 at 09:29 +0200, Marc Haber wrote:
 For example, it doesn't know dependencies between Interfaces, which is
 rather common for a server jockey (consider a VLAN on a bridge which
 is connected to the network via a bonding device)

I haven't had to solve that example, but I have had a problem again
involving bridges that sounds similar.  It was solvable with ifup/down -
by calling ifup in the /etc/network/interfaces pre-up.  I'll grant you
it's not pretty, but I've only had to do it once so I forgive aj.


 [ifupdown] it doesn't handle IP addresses that come and go
 at run time (as it is to be expected on IPv6 networks).

Could you explain when IPv6 addresses come and go?  You are talking to a
IPv6 neophyte here.  In the IPv4 world addresses handed out by DHCP do
come and go.  It's true that isn't handled by ifupdown, but that's not a
problem because if you want to do something about it, you do it in the
dhclient hook.  It seems the right place to me.

That aside, I don't see anything in man systemd.network that allows
you to watch for IPv6 addresses coming and going, or for that matter
anything else coming and going except devices.

 And, when it comes to scriptability and flexiblity, systemd-networkd
 is vastly superior. It was made with a server in mind.

This para is the real reason I'm responding.  I must be missing
something, because nowhere in man systemd.network do I see to a way to
run a script of any sort.  For me the acid test is can it do totally
manual configuration, ie the equivalent of ifupdown's manual method.
(I occasionally use manual - it's a great way of ensuring there are no
surprises.)  systemd.network's [Match] section combined with the sort of
demonstrated by ifupdown's manual method would be a match made in
heaven.  But if it exists I've missed it.  You could perhaps emulate it
if it were possible to make a systemd.service depend on a
systemd.network, but that appears to be right out of scope.  As it
stands, networkd looks to be one of the least scriptable networking
configuration options I've seen since ... oh redhat 7.0 or so.

 Otoh, it is much harder to debug, extend and modify than ifupdown,
 which has a _very_ flexible script interface.

Up until recently I thought the systemd mob had solved the visibility
problem by logging everything written to stdout and stderr with
journald.  I was disabused of that notion just this weekend, when
apache2 failed to start after an apt-get dist-upgrade.  journalctl -xn
helpfully told me:

$ ssu journalctl -xn
-- Logs begin at Mon 2015-05-11 21:16:17 AEST, end at Mon 2015-05-11 
22:22:42 AEST. --
May 11 22:21:43 russell-laptop systemd[1]: apache2.service: control 
process exited, code=exited stat
May 11 22:21:43 russell-laptop systemd[1]: Failed to start LSB: Apache2 
web server.
-- Subject: Unit apache2.service has failed
-- Defined-By: systemd
-- Support: http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
-- 
-- Unit apache2.service has failed.
-- 
-- The result is failed.

Which is about as useful as a hip pocket in a singlet.  In the end this
told me what was going on:

$ _SYSTEMCTL_SKIP_REDIRECT=true /etc/init.d/apache2 start
[FAIL] Starting web server: apache2 failed!
[warn] The apache2 configtest failed. ... (warning).
Output of config test was:
apache2: Syntax error on line 141 of /etc/apache2/apache2.conf: Could 
not open configuration file /etc/apache2/mods-enabled/php5_cgi.conf: No such 
file or directory
Action 'configtest' failed.
The Apache error log may have more information.

Having to troll through scripts in /var/lib/lsb in order to figure out
how to disable the systemd redirect in order to see the error message
the sysV init script sent to stdout is NOT an improvement.  (The Apache
error log was empty.)

If debugging networkd stuff is harder, then ... *shudder*.


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Re: Proposal: enable stateless persistant network interface names

2015-05-10 Thread Russell Stuart
On Sun, 2015-05-10 at 17:11 +0200, Vincent Bernat wrote:
 The disease is that actual servers running actual free software can
 break at each boot because we cannot have both a persistent naming
 scheme and use the eth* prefix is worse that the cure because old
 versions of Novell ZENworks may stop to work on upgrade?

Speaking as someone who runs Debian on his servers and laptop, I don't
care about what you guys choose.

I don't care on the laptop mostly because of the reasons Josh Triplet
pointed out earlier.  I manage the network through GUI interfaces, and
it doesn't care what the interfaces are called.

For servers the interfaces are all assigned fixed, well known names.
The reason is their configuration is completely automated through 100's
of scripts.  In all instances I've seen it done like this well known
interface names are used.  It's not difficult to understand why if
you've done it - you can sort out what NIC is supposed to be doing at
install or boot up and rename it accordingly, or you can do it in every
script that deals with the network.  The choice is obvious.

You have the disease wrong.  These scripts have been around for over a
decade.  In that time various fashions in interface naming have come and
gone.  This is yet another one.  The disease isn't the kernel choosing
different names on boot up, it's people inventing new interface naming
schemes every few years, just as being done here.  Everyone who has had
to support many servers over a long period gets sick of this and writes
yet another script that does in the renaming in the way they want, in a
way that will be stable forever more.  Thus they don't care what choice
is made here - as they have already given up relying on Debian to do it,
because Debian isn't stable enough.

That said when writing our own scripts most of us long ago came to the
conclusion the bus path to the interface was the most useful way to
identify it.  Again the reason is straight forward - if you have an
image tuned for a piece of hardware that you have deployed en-masse the
one thing that is the same on all of them is the paths to the NIC's.
Note that when, long ago, the kernels actually managed to repeatability
name the NIC's eth0, eth1 etc, it was because the buses were enumerated
in a repeatable order so the NIC's got seen in a repeatable order.  So
in effect the name was determined by the bus path.  Ergo, nothing has
changed in 20 years.

I get the distinct feeling some people posting here consider ifup/down
old fashioned.  Granted it doesn't have a nice GUI, but from the point
of view of someone who deploys lots of similar machines a GUI of any
sort is a negative, and it has a far nicer property - it is easily
scriptable.  In fact underneath the hood it's driven by scripts.  If
there is a network configuration it isn't capable of setting up, I
haven't seen it.  In my very brief look at networkd it didn't provide
anything like the same amount of flexibility.


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Re: debian github organization ?

2015-04-17 Thread Russell Stuart
First a Mel Cupa.  I called the SourceForge system Apollo.  It's actual
name is Apache Allura.  Brain fart.

On Thu, 2015-04-16 at 23:13 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
 Er, they did, didn't they?  I could have sworn that they only supported
 CVS initially, and then only added Subversion, and getting Git support
 took forever.

Pretty much.  Of course that may have something do with the respective
VCS being born in that order.  For comparison in the speed of addition,
GutHub opened for business in April 2008.  SourceForge added support for
git in March 2009.

 However, I still stand by the decision to only support a single VCS, at
 least when you start, because you can move a lot faster and implement a
 lot more functionality that people care a great deal about.

Woo, slow down there.  Here I was thinking the discussion was about
spinning up a server using exist software.  Has the discussion moved to
writing our own or even modifying something to suit Debian's needs?  If
so, is that justified by history?  Was there a period when not only was
Alioth's bug queue serviced, but we actually did some heavy lifting?  If
not than any discussion of adding functionality is probably fanciful.

In any case using an existing project and contributing any changes
upstream sounds like a much better plan to me - particularly if the
project is packaged in Debian.  They means we can just install auto
upgrades to keep it secure.

As for one DVCS to rule the world - that also sounds like a bit of a
stretch.  If we are going to do that, can we also settle on a preferred
computer language and force everyone to use a single debian packaging
method?  It would make life sooo much easier.


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Re: debian github organization ?

2015-04-16 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2015-04-16 at 19:37 +0200, Sven Bartscher wrote:
 On Thu, 16 Apr 2015 09:04:07 -0600
 Dimitri John Ledkov x...@debian.org wrote:
 
  I'd rather see gitlab.debian.net :)
 
 I don't  a reason to have gitlab/github/someother git stuff for debian,
 since we already have alioth.
 Maybe someone can enlighten me.

Probably not.  UI's are a personal thing and if you've looked at the
others and still the UI provided by FusionForge, that's unlikely to
change.

But do acknowledge that makes you unusual.  Github has all but
annihilated SourceForge in the hosting market place, and the stand out
change is it's UI.  That is in spite of SourceForge's impressive mirror
network and SourceForge being VCS agnostic.  So it's not surprising some
DD's want to move away from the FusionForge UI.

I'm on SourceForge now.  [0]  I'd prefer to be on Debian's
infrastructure of course, but Alioth is so poorly maintained it was
unusable for me [1].

Of the suggestions so far only Kallithea is VCS agnostic, but Kallithea
only supports source code hosting - no Ticketing (eg bug tracking), no
web project web page, no release hosting (binaries).  Maybe that's an
advantage for Debian projects because it forces you to use Debian's
existing infrastructure for everything else, but for me it makes it a
no-go.

Gogs looks to be similar, but is unstable.  Gitlab is git only and
doesn't support releases.

SourceForge's Apollo is an open source project supporting all those
features plus a heap more, but the UI is not code centric like the
others - it feels more like FusionForge.  That said, unlike FusionForge
modern work flows (forking, pull requests and the like) - it's just they
aren't a prominent in the UI.



[0]  http://sourceforge.net/u/rstuart/

[1]  https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2014/05/msg00463.html

 That triggered this response, but it read like someone in denial
 rather than acknowledging the problem:

 https://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2014/06/msg00435.html

 Acknowledging the problem is always the first step in fixing it,
 and I think it's significant the number of open bugs has gone up by
 20% since then.



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Re: Who gets an email when with bugreports [was: Re: Unauthorised activity surrounding tbb package]

2015-01-21 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2015-01-21 at 21:10 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:
 So anyway, nn-subscribe can be used to spam confirmation messages
 currently, and general mail to the bts from an unknown address will
 end up doing the same, but it's basically a non-issue because it's a
 rather uninteresting thing to do for anyone that might consider
 wanting to do it.

I don't know how interesting it would be on an absolute scale, it
certainly would be more interesting than it is now if we remove the
authentication we have.

The reason is all that happens now is you get one unwanted email and
that is the end of it.  In particular the attacker can't force you do to
something to prevent the bugs.debian.org from sending further unwanted
emails.  If you get rid of authentication then the victim, be it you, or
your mother, or your local police constable, will have to tell the
Debian bugs system to unsubscribe them from a list they never subscribed
to in the first place.

Perhaps you can suggest a way of explaining the situation to our mothers
or local law enforcement agents so they don't end up blaming the Debian
bugs system for putting them in this predicament.  I struggling to come
up with something they would swallow once they learn we could have
designed the system to avoid it, but chose not to because we found it
convenient to inconvenience them.


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Re: Who gets an email when with bugreports [was: Re: Unauthorised activity surrounding tbb package]

2015-01-19 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2015-01-19 at 16:57 -0500, Michael Gilbert wrote:
 Isn't the spam vector already wide open for
 nn-subscr...@bugs.debian.org, which isn't much (ab)used today?
 
 I fail to see how any of the discussed changes open an abuse vector
 that doesn't already exist.

OK, so let me help you see.

The vector you are pointing to doesn't exist.  You can _not_ subscribe
to a bug by sending email to -subscr...@bugs.debian.org.  You
subscribe to a bug by sending an email to an address that looks like
this:

  
701234-subyes-8aba1368a9ac33362ea1f68c28446c15-65bf3bd3886fb8abfe59d40709c84...@bugs.debian.org

I presume this invite address is unforgeable (because Ian Jackson's
expertise is in crypto, and he said earlier he designed the system).

Sending an email to -subscr...@bugs.debian.org just asks the system
to send an invite containing such an address to someone.  I'm not sure
what email address gets the invite - it could be the envelope MAIL FROM,
or the Reply-To, or the From.  But really who doesn't matter.  All the
matters is the only a person controlling an email address is able to
subscribe it to a bug, not some random noob.

For what it's worth, the invitation contains full text of the
subscription request, including all the RFC5322 headers.  If it was
someone doing something unpleasant it gives you some hope of tracking
them down, or blocking them.

In other words the current system contains robust defences against such
an attack.  All I (and I presume Ben) are saying is removing those
defences is not a good idea, given it's easy enough to design a system
that keeps them.  Currently most of the auto subscription proposals
appearing here do remove them.


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Re: Who gets an email when with bugreports [was: Re: Unauthorised activity surrounding tbb package]

2015-01-19 Thread Russell Stuart
On Mon, 2015-01-19 at 10:03 +0100, Tomas Pospisek wrote:
 Am 19.01.2015 um 02:03 schrieb Ben Hutchings:
  No, this would turn the BTS into a (worse) spam vector.
  
  But the acknowledgement mail should tell you how to subscribe, if you
  aren't already subscribed.
 
 But isn't subscribing participants natural?

It may be natural, but IMO you are underestimating the spam vector
problem.

Debian's bug submission mechanism does not try to verify you control the
email address you are submitting from.  Most other bug tracking systems
do such authentication, usually by requiring you to create an account.
Since there is no verification it becomes trivial to sign someone up to
1000's of bugs using a script.

Treating every bug submission as a subscribe request (by putting a
subscribe link in the ack) is one compromise. (I am sort of surprised
that doesn't happen already.)  Automatically subscribing a DD to any bug
he sends a signed message to is another.

I am partial to the latter, even though it is a partial solution.  It
encourages DD to sign their bug reports.  IMHO anything we can do to
encourage DD's to sign their emails to the project improves our
security.


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Re: policy regarding redistributable binary files in upstream tarballs

2014-11-21 Thread Russell Stuart
On Fri, 2014-11-21 at 17:39 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
 On Fri, Nov 21, 2014 at 5:25 PM, Matthias Urlichs wrote:
 
  These days, they might just push their repo to github and let its machinery
  generate the tarballs, which TTBOMK aren't guaranteed to be 1:1 identical to
  another tarball of the same commit that's downloaded a week later. Or a
  year.
 
 I tried downloading a tarball just now and got identical results. I
 guess they are just using git archive, which produces identical
 results for me too.
 
 https://github.com/whohas/whohas/archive/0.29.tar.gz

It doesn't matter whether git supplies a tool that provides reproducible
tar balls.  If there was a target in debian/rules responsible for it
something like this would work:

pristine-source:
rm -rf debian/pristine-source.tmp
mkdir debian/pristine-source.tmp
git clone http://... debian/pristine-source.tmp
cd debian/pristine-source.tmp  \
  git checkout $(get commitish from debian/changelog somehow)
dpkg-pristine-source --format=git pristine-source.tmp

The spec for dpkg-pristine-source is roughly:

- Inputs: source directory(s) and their formats.
- Outputs:
 .orig.tar, and
 hashes written to debian/pristine-source.hashes

Which is not what I said before, but this is WIP.

Now that I think about if dpkg-pristine-source is possibly an overkill.
Any repeatable process would do.  Even:

  find debian/pristine-source.tmp \
-path debian/pristine-source.tmp/.git -prune ! -type d | \
LANG=C sort debian/x
  cpio -o -H ustar debian/x | \
gzip -9 ../$(sed 's/\(.*\) (\(.*\).*/\1_\2/;q' 
debian/changelog).orig.tar.gz
  rm -f debian/pristine-source.hashes
  xargs -d '\n'  debian/x cat | sha256sum | \
sed s/-/URL/ debian/pristine-source_sha256.hash

All of the above was written after a couple of glasses of wine and has
never been tested.  Regardless, I hope is demonstrates the point: it is
possible to compute a immutable hash if upstream provides a
reproduceable way to retrieve the same sources.  As far as I know every
SCM post CVS does. 

That was a statement of the obvious I guess.  But it show what I am
proposing is not pie-in-the-sky.  It's achievable, and not even that
hard.


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Re: policy regarding redistributable binary files in upstream tarballs

2014-11-20 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2014-11-20 at 13:46 +0800, Paul Wise wrote:
 On Thu, Nov 20, 2014 at 1:14 PM, Ben Finney wrote:
 
  But a growing number of upstreams disagree, so those upstreams are
  likely to be actively opposed to your recommendation to patches 
  which remove non-source files from the VCS repository.
 
 I wonder about the basis for that disagreement.

In the GNU model the tarball doesn't just provide sources.  It is a
complete packaging system.  It checks for build prerequisites, does the
build, checks for install prerequisites, does the install, and does
uninstall.  It does all that because upstream wants people to use their
project - regardless of whether their distro packages it.  Combine that
with wanting to keep the perquisite list small including things like
minified jquery libraries is exactly the right thing to do.

 Putting all third-party libraries into a separate place (tarball,
 repo, branch or dir).
 
 Putting all pre-built files into a separate place (tarball, repo,
 branch or dir).

Those suggestions may make things easier for Debian, but they do so by
making life harder for upstream's other users.  That isn't going to
happen, or at least for me it wouldn't.  If my DD alter ego asked my
upstream ego to make things much harder for his other users, he would be
politely told where he could shove his suggestion.

Personally, I think Debian passing judgement on what is upstream
pristine tarballs is over the top.  It's upstream's original work, not
Debian's.  Ideally we are just mirroring it.  (That we often aren't is
part of the problem.)  We should be happy enough to accept their
assurances on having obtained whatever licenses they need for what is in
them. [0]

Admittedly this meshes well with my experience that they are often
fairly lax about what they put in those tarballs.  Their make
distclean scripts are often not as good as they could be, which means
all sorts of crap it left lying around. Vim .swp files and compiler
intermediates spring to mind.  I have no idea what license would apply
to a .swp file, but I do know that for all practical purposes it doesn't
matter and I'd rather Debian didn't insist I find out. [1]

That's just me being lazy I guess.  But there is a deeper issue.  For me
it is vital there be an audit trail from the pristine upstream tar ball
to the binaries we distribute. [2]  In pursuing licensing purity we have
been gradually destroying what little of that audit trail we used to
provide.  To put it bluntly: as a DD I do care about licensing, but when
it comes to day job where I have to ensure hundreds of computers are
reliable and secure so the licensing of of tarballs I don't download let
alone use takes a distant second place to security.  So in my view we
are making life difficult for our users on the altar of FSF style
idealism.

Maybe if we were forced to choose between the two that would be right
choice to make.  But technically there are a ways to be FSF idealists
and provide something akin to an audit trail.  So we aren't forced to
choose - but we just deprive our users of the audit trail anyway.  That
is bad.

What follows is something I am sure has been covered before by someone
somewhere, before I started following the project in earnest.  I can't
find it - so I apologise in advance for the repetition.

I start my Linux life as a RedHat user, and I wrote RPM packages for my
own use.  Then about a decade ago I moved to Debian, and of course
started writing Debian packages.  During the transition I was struck by
how much better Debian's binary packaging was compared to RPM, and yet
RPM's source packaging was so much better than Debian's.

To explain why I'll step back a bit.  If I were writing a book on how to
design a packaging system it would start by introducing these 5 steps:

A.  The process is ideally [3] a pure function.  It's input is the
pristine source.  It's output is the binary packages.  So the 1st
step is to obtain the input - the pristine source, and record it
in the output so anyone else can reproduce what you have done.

B.  These inputs are fed to packaging process a program, written by the
packager, that implements the function doing the transformation.
In debian, this is debian/rules.  This function is split into
standardised steps.  The second step is unpacking sources from
whatever format they are in into a build directory. [4]

C.  The third step is to tailor the pristine sources to match the
requirements of the distribution.  This is done in a standardised
way: by applying a series of patches in a well defined format, each
with a clearly documented purpose.

D.  Run the build process as supplied by upstream, but perhaps modified
by step (C).

E.  Collecting the output of the build process into binary packages. [5]

And that is exactly what RPM's did over a decade ago.  Debian mashed
steps (A), (B) and (C) into what could only be described as a mess.

Time has moved on, and things have changed.  

Re: Bug#752450: ftp.debian.org: please consider to strongly tighten the validity period of Release files

2014-10-30 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2014-10-30 at 01:40 -0400, Michael Gilbert wrote:
 There are also end-of-life announcements, which maybe the
 debian-security-support package now addresses in a somewhat automated
 fashion.

I wasn't aware of that.  Thanks.

 Anyway, it is entirely understandable that reading can be hard, but at
 a minimum the truly security-conscious need to be to do so.

Yes, fine.  But a truly security conscious distribution doesn't depend
on its users being truly security conscious.

And on that note, I applaud the Debian Security Team for  demonstrating
their awareness of this by releasing debian-security-support.


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Re: Bug#752450: ftp.debian.org: please consider to strongly tighten the validity period of Release files

2014-10-30 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2014-10-30 at 16:06 +0100, Wouter Verhelst wrote:
 On Thu, Oct 30, 2014 at 03:59:33PM +1000, Russell Stuart wrote:
  Yes, fine.  But a truly security conscious distribution doesn't depend
  on its users being truly security conscious.
 
 I would hope Debian never becomes a truly security conscious
 distribution by that definition. It implies the distribution thinks it
 knows better than its users what the right security trade-off is, and
 that way lies disaster.

You are reading way too much into it.  It's meant to express something
uncontroversial.

There is the spectrum ranging from: The default install priorities
should be (...put your fetishes here - eye candy, small, have
everything, [not] run systemd...).  If the user wants security they can
customise it later.  To: The default install should be as secure as
possible.  If the user wants to weaken that in favour of (...put your
fetishes here...), they can customise the system later.  IMO, on the
spectrum Debian must be heavily biased towards favouring security.

So it just expresses what I presume to be the consensus.  As such I
really should not have wasted your time by writing it, but there was an
element of conceit involved - I was taken with the turn of phrase.


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Re: Bug#752450: ftp.debian.org: please consider to strongly tighten the validity period of Release files

2014-10-29 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2014-10-29 at 19:39 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
 But we shouldn't confuse that with the right way to check 
 for security updates for Debian systems.  People who
 care about security updates need to be subscribed to
 debian-security-announce and reading the DSAs.

If there are two ways and one requires a human and the other is
completely automatic, all other things being equal for me the right
way is the automated one.  I know my limitations - not being
conscientious when doing manual repetitive labour is one of them.

 It seems to me that if you want to lower the chances of a downgrade attack
 for your systems, setting the validity period on your systems is exactly
 the tool that you need.  There's no need for anything to change on the
 server side for you to get that protection.

Yes, I agree.  But for me apt.conf/Max-ValidTime is useless unless the
release file is guaranteed to be updated more frequently than its
Valid-Until: header implies.  Is it, and is that undertaking
documented somewhere?


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Re: Bug#752450: ftp.debian.org: please consider to strongly tighten the validity period of Release files

2014-10-29 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2014-10-29 at 21:58 -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
 Also, this means that you completely miss security advisories that *don't*
 involve changing a package in the archive, like this thing is a disaster,
 so we're pulling it from the archive entirely and suggest you stop using
 it.

If it is so that much of a disaster that it warrants pulling a package
from stable, surely a little more notification than an email to a list
most people don't monitor would be warranted?  Something like replacing
it with an package that sends email daily to root explaining the
situation would be the very least you could do.

But then the bash function bug made my local TV news, and bash remains
in the archive.  If it warranted pulling a package from stable I'd wager
you would have to be living under a rock not to hear about it.


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Re: GPL-3 openssl: provide a -nossl variant for a library

2014-10-22 Thread Russell Stuart
On Thu, 2014-10-23 at 12:46 +1100, Brian May wrote:
 On 23 October 2014 04:03, Russ Allbery r...@debian.org wrote:
 It's usually more immediately useful to just
 upload the package with an explanation of the issues in
 debian/copyright
 and see what the ftp-master team says.
 
 
 This is probably getting off-track, however I have a package that has
 been stuck in NEW for over a month because ftp-master won't give
 feedback on what they see as a legal issue with my package. I
 disagreed with their verdict, gave good reasons, indicated that
 another package already in Debian would have the same issues, and got
 no response.

Yeah, that's been my experience too.  I waited a week for a reply, but
none was forthcoming.  I took that as a no.  They are busy people
after all, and probably don't have time to engage in what could be long
discussions.  Particularly now when everyone is rushing to get in before
the freeze.

I wasn't happy at the time, but in retrospect it seems like a reasonable
process to me.  I assume they are consistent as they can be, so their
decisions reflect Debian's current consensus (written or otherwise) on
what is allowed into Debian.  If you disagree strongly enough to want a
debate that changes it, that debate should be held here on debian-devel
where everyone can participate.

You don't need a debate or a reply to reach a compromise - just
re-submit with your compromises.  It has the advantage of forcing them
to give you an answer :D.  If you aren't prepared to compromise, either
have the debate or drop the package.



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Accepted fdb 1.4.1+dfsg1-4 (source all) into unstable, unstable

2014-10-22 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2014 08:50:10 +1000
Source: fdb
Binary: python-fdb python3-fdb python-fdb-doc
Architecture: source all
Version: 1.4.1+dfsg1-4
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Changed-By: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Description:
 python-fdb - Python2 DB-API driver for Firebird
 python-fdb-doc - Python DB-API driver for Firebird documentation
 python3-fdb - Python3 DB-API driver for Firebird
Changes:
 fdb (1.4.1+dfsg1-4) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * debian/copyright: acknowledge BSD license for
 sphinx/fdbtheme/static/epub.css and
 sphinx/fdbtheme/static/fdbtheme.css_t
   * Rename repacked .orig.tar to show files have been
 removed.
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Accepted smstools 3.1.15-1.1 (source amd64) into unstable

2014-10-20 Thread Russell Stuart
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Date: Thu,  9 Oct 2014 17:07:32 +1000
Source: smstools
Binary: smstools
Architecture: source amd64
Version: 3.1.15-1.1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Changed-By: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Description:
 smstools   - SMS server tools for GSM modems
Closes: 750350
Changes:
 smstools (3.1.15-1.1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * NMU - preventing smstools from entering jessie.
   * Fix syntax error in src/Makefile, override in wrong place.
 debian/patches/fix-makefile-override.patch
 (Closes: #750350)
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Re: bash exorcism experiment ('bug' 762923 763012)

2014-10-16 Thread Russell Stuart
On Wed, 2014-10-15 at 23:36 +0100, Ian Jackson wrote:
 Actually, the problem is indeed in policy.  In its resolution of
 #539158 the TC decided unanimously (but unfortunately slightly
 implicitly) that printf ought to be provided by our /bin/sh.

 Unfortunately the policy has not been properly clarified.  This leaves
 us in the somewhat unsatisfactory situation where our real
 compatibility requirement is de facto rather than de jure.
 
 As the maintainer of a minority shell, Thorsten has the most interest
 in regularising this.  Perhaps Thorsten would like to propose a
 suitable policy wording (with a view to changing posh to match).
 
 Obviously that wording ought to be consistent with the TC's decision
 in #539158 - ie, it should specify printf as a builtin.

The arguments about printf in #539158 also applies to '['.  POSIX does
not say '[' must be a built in (in POSIX's terminology is part of the
'Special Built-In Utilities').  Thus if the shell didn't implement '['
udev would fail since uses [ and sets PATH to be /bin:/sbin.

The reality is in a POSIX (or a minimal Policy 10.4) world shell scripts
must have access to bulk of the stuff that is both covered in the man1p
pages and is required in Debian.  Turns out only three commands fall
into that category: [, printf, and test.

And yes, to me the obvious fix is say in policy /bin/sh have those
commands as builtins.


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Accepted roundcube 0.9.5+dfsg1-4.1 (source all) into unstable

2014-10-15 Thread Russell Stuart
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

Format: 1.8
Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2014 09:51:17 +1000
Source: roundcube
Binary: roundcube-core roundcube roundcube-mysql roundcube-pgsql 
roundcube-sqlite3 roundcube-plugins
Architecture: source all
Version: 0.9.5+dfsg1-4.1
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: low
Maintainer: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Changed-By: Russell Stuart russell-deb...@stuart.id.au
Description:
 roundcube  - skinnable AJAX based webmail solution for IMAP servers - metapack
 roundcube-core - skinnable AJAX based webmail solution for IMAP servers
 roundcube-mysql - metapackage providing MySQL dependencies for RoundCube
 roundcube-pgsql - metapackage providing PostgreSQL dependencies for RoundCube
 roundcube-plugins - skinnable AJAX based webmail solution for IMAP servers - 
plugins
 roundcube-sqlite3 - metapackage providing SQLite dependencies for RoundCube
Closes: 736782
Changes:
 roundcube (0.9.5+dfsg1-4.1) unstable; urgency=low
 .
   * NMU - rc bug preventing roundcube from being included in jessie.
   * Changed debian/watch  debian/copyright so uscan repackage
 upstream tarball to remove files without source.
 Closes: #736782.
   * Added sources for jquery-ui and jstz.js to debian/missing-sources.
   * Modified debian/copyright to acknowledge copyrights of
 files in debian/missing-sources.
   * Added debian/create-jquery-ui-custom.sh that creates the
 jquery-ui-1.9.1.custom.min.js from upstream source.
   * Modified debian/rules to create jstz.min.js and
 jquery-ui-1.9.1.custom.min.js form the versions we have
 sources for.
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roundcube-sqlite3_0.9.5+dfsg1-4.1_all.deb
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roundcube-plugins_0.9.5+dfsg1-4.1_all.deb
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roundcube_0.9.5+dfsg1-4.1.debian.tar.xz

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