Enabling OCSP Stapling by default (was Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings)

2011-02-09 Thread Rob Stradling
On Wednesday 05 Jan 2011 10:03:19 Rob Stradling wrote:
 On Friday 24 December 2010 16:24:03 Igor Galić wrote:
 snip
 
  If we want to see more extensive testing in the field,
  then this is the right time to make 'On' the default.
 
 Steve, has Igor persuaded you?

I was hoping to generate a bit more discussion and to reach consensus on the 
when question here on-list, but never mind.

I've just filed Bug 50740 - Enable OCSP Stapling by default.

Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


Re: Enabling OCSP Stapling by default (was Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings)

2011-02-09 Thread Rob Stradling
On Wednesday 09 Feb 2011 09:39:36 Rob Stradling wrote:
 On Wednesday 05 Jan 2011 10:03:19 Rob Stradling wrote:
  On Friday 24 December 2010 16:24:03 Igor Galić wrote:
  snip
  
   If we want to see more extensive testing in the field,
   then this is the right time to make 'On' the default.
  
  Steve, has Igor persuaded you?
 
 I was hoping to generate a bit more discussion and to reach consensus on
 the when question here on-list, but never mind.
 
 I've just filed Bug 50740 - Enable OCSP Stapling by default.

On a related note, I've also just filed Bug 50742 - Detect when the OpenSSL 
runtime library is vulnerable to CVE-2011-0014.  I think it makes sense to 
*not* enable OCSP Stapling by default when a vulnerable version of OpenSSL is 
being used.

Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


Re: Enabling OCSP Stapling by default (was Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings)

2011-02-09 Thread Joe Orton
On Wed, Feb 09, 2011 at 09:39:36AM +, Rob Stradling wrote:
 On Wednesday 05 Jan 2011 10:03:19 Rob Stradling wrote:
  On Friday 24 December 2010 16:24:03 Igor Galić wrote:
  snip
  
   If we want to see more extensive testing in the field,
   then this is the right time to make 'On' the default.
  
  Steve, has Igor persuaded you?
 
 I was hoping to generate a bit more discussion and to reach consensus on the 
 when question here on-list, but never mind.

Has anybody got results of testing the OCSP stapling code that they can 
share?

I would be sympathetic to an on by default for 2.3.N campaign if the 
lobbying came with some successful test results.  What code have you 
tested, how did it work, what configuration, what responder vendor, etc?

Regards, Joe


Re: Enabling OCSP Stapling by default (was Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings)

2011-02-09 Thread William A. Rowe Jr.
On 2/9/2011 5:15 AM, Joe Orton wrote:
 On Wed, Feb 09, 2011 at 09:39:36AM +, Rob Stradling wrote:
 On Wednesday 05 Jan 2011 10:03:19 Rob Stradling wrote:
 On Friday 24 December 2010 16:24:03 Igor Galić wrote:
 snip

 If we want to see more extensive testing in the field,
 then this is the right time to make 'On' the default.

 Steve, has Igor persuaded you?

 I was hoping to generate a bit more discussion and to reach consensus on the 
 when question here on-list, but never mind.
 
 Has anybody got results of testing the OCSP stapling code that they can 
 share?
 
 I would be sympathetic to an on by default for 2.3.N campaign if the 
 lobbying came with some successful test results.  What code have you 
 tested, how did it work, what configuration, what responder vendor, etc?

FWIW www.apache.org was running OSCP for some time.  It's temporarily
disabled in light of the pending 1.0.0d update.


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2011-01-05 Thread Rob Stradling
On Friday 24 December 2010 16:24:03 Igor Galić wrote:
snip
 If we want to see more extensive testing in the field,
 then this is the right time to make 'On' the default.

Steve, has Igor persuaded you?

Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-12-24 Thread Igor Galić
  More significantly the code hasn't been tested extensively in the
 field
  so there may be problems that have yet to be uncovered.
 
 That's a fair point.
 
  My personal opinion would be to, at least initially, require an
 explicit
  directive to enable it and leave the option in future to have it
 enabled by
  default.
 
 Makes sense.  tested extensively in the field isn't likely to happen
 until 
 httpd 2.4.x is released and significant numbers of sites upgrade. 
 Hopefully 
 it would be safe to enable it by default in a fairly early 2.4.x
 point 
 release.
 
  Anyone else have any thoughts on the matter?

If we want to see more extensive testing in the field,
then this is the right time to make 'On' the default.
 
  Steve.
 
 Rob Stradling
 Senior Research  Development Scientist
 COMODO - Creating Trust Online

i

-- 
Igor Galić

Tel: +43 (0) 664 886 22 883
Mail: i.ga...@brainsware.org
URL: http://brainsware.org/


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-12-23 Thread Rob Stradling
On Wednesday 22 December 2010 16:11:21 Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
 On 22/12/2010 15:32, Rob Stradling wrote:
  On Friday 03 December 2010 10:31:24 Rob Stradling wrote:
  snip
  
  Would it be possible to make OCSP Stapling enabled by default (when the
  server certificate contains an OCSP Responder URL in the AIA extension)
  instead of disabled by default?
  (Perhaps SSLUseStapling could be replaced by SSLDisableStapling)
  
  Steve et al,
  
  Could you possibly spare a moment to answer this question?
 
 I was seeing if anyone else would comment on this first. It is of course
 technically possible.
 
 The OCSP stapling code requires an additional directive to enable an OCSP
 stapling cache: so this would break existing configuration files if enabled
 by default.

Would it be possible to change the OCSP stapling code so that it will setup 
the OCSP stapling cache with some sensible default settings if the 
SSLStaplingCache directive is not specified anywhere in the config files?

 More significantly the code hasn't been tested extensively in the field
 so there may be problems that have yet to be uncovered.

That's a fair point.

 My personal opinion would be to, at least initially, require an explicit
 directive to enable it and leave the option in future to have it enabled by
 default.

Makes sense.  tested extensively in the field isn't likely to happen until 
httpd 2.4.x is released and significant numbers of sites upgrade.  Hopefully 
it would be safe to enable it by default in a fairly early 2.4.x point 
release.

 Anyone else have any thoughts on the matter?
 
 Steve.

Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-12-22 Thread Rob Stradling
On Friday 03 December 2010 10:31:24 Rob Stradling wrote:
snip
 Would it be possible to make OCSP Stapling enabled by default (when the
 server certificate contains an OCSP Responder URL in the AIA extension)
 instead of disabled by default?
 (Perhaps SSLUseStapling could be replaced by SSLDisableStapling)

Steve et al,

Could you possibly spare a moment to answer this question?

Thanks.

 I just wonder how many webmasters would bother to add SSLUseStapling on
 to their config files, even though OCSP Stapling benefits all parties.
 
 I understand that Microsoft IIS 7.x enables OCSP Stapling by default.

Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-12-22 Thread Dr Stephen Henson
On 22/12/2010 15:32, Rob Stradling wrote:
 On Friday 03 December 2010 10:31:24 Rob Stradling wrote:
 snip
 Would it be possible to make OCSP Stapling enabled by default (when the
 server certificate contains an OCSP Responder URL in the AIA extension)
 instead of disabled by default?
 (Perhaps SSLUseStapling could be replaced by SSLDisableStapling)
 
 Steve et al,
 
 Could you possibly spare a moment to answer this question?
 

I was seeing if anyone else would comment on this first. It is of course
technically possible.

The OCSP stapling code requires an additional directive to enable an OCSP
stapling cache: so this would break existing configuration files if enabled by
default.

More significantly the code hasn't been tested extensively in the field so
there may be problems that have yet to be uncovered.

My personal opinion would be to, at least initially, require an explicit
directive to enable it and leave the option in future to have it enabled by 
default.

Anyone else have any thoughts on the matter?

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson. Senior Technical/Cryptography Advisor,
Open Source Software Institute: www.oss-institute.org
OpenSSL Core team: www.openssl.org


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-12-03 Thread Rob Stradling
On Tuesday 30 November 2010 00:55:48 Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
 On 30/11/2010 00:03, Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
  On 29/11/2010 21:46, Guenter Knauf wrote:
snip
  I think that we had some similar already in the past, and you suggested
  a change which was compatible with both 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 branches, but I
  cant recall ... Or do we need to cleanly solve this with some
  version-depent defines?
  
  See of the patch for bug #50121 resolves this for you.
 
 There's a slightly cleaner way of doing that r1040366 in trunk fixes it for
 me.
 
 Steve.

Steve, thanks for cleaning and applying my patch.  A quick question, if I 
may...

Would it be possible to make OCSP Stapling enabled by default (when the server 
certificate contains an OCSP Responder URL in the AIA extension) instead of 
disabled by default?
(Perhaps SSLUseStapling could be replaced by SSLDisableStapling)

I just wonder how many webmasters would bother to add SSLUseStapling on to 
their config files, even though OCSP Stapling benefits all parties.

I understand that Microsoft IIS 7.x enables OCSP Stapling by default.

Rob Stradling
Senior Research  Development Scientist
COMODO - Creating Trust Online


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-11-29 Thread Dr Stephen Henson
On 29/11/2010 21:46, Guenter Knauf wrote:
 Hi Steve,
 ssl_util_stapling.c issues warnings / breaks when compiled with OSSL 1.0.0; 
 MSVC
 warns:
 \modules\ssl\ssl_util_stapling.c(140) : warning C4133: '=' : incompatible 
 types
 - from 'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *' to 'struct stack_st_STRING *'
 C:\buildprep\httpd-2.3.x.10\modules\ssl\ssl_util_stapling.c(142) : warning
 C4133: 'function' : incompatible types - from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 'struct stack_st *'
 C:\buildprep\httpd-2.3.x.10\modules\ssl\ssl_util_stapling.c(148) : warning
 C4133: 'function' : incompatible types - from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *'
 
 and my picky CodeWarrior breaks:
 Compiling ssl_util_stapling.c
 ### mwccnlm Compiler:
 #File: ssl_util_stapling.c
 # 
 # 140:  aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x);
 #   Error: ^
 #   illegal implicit conversion from 'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *' to
 #   'struct stack_st_STRING *'
 ### mwccnlm Compiler:
 # 142:  cinf-uri = sk_STRING_pop(aia);
 #   Error:   ^
 #   illegal implicit conversion from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 #   'struct stack_st *'
 ### mwccnlm Compiler:
 # 148:  X509_email_free(aia);
 #   Error: ^
 #   illegal implicit conversion from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 #   'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *'
 
 Errors caused tool to abort.
 
 I think that we had some similar already in the past, and you suggested a 
 change
 which was compatible with both 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 branches, but I cant recall ...
 Or do we need to cleanly solve this with some version-depent defines?
 

See of the patch for bug #50121 resolves this for you.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson. Senior Technical/Cryptography Advisor,
Open Source Software Institute: www.oss-institute.org
OpenSSL Core team: www.openssl.org


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-11-29 Thread Dr Stephen Henson
On 30/11/2010 00:03, Dr Stephen Henson wrote:
 On 29/11/2010 21:46, Guenter Knauf wrote:
 Hi Steve,
 ssl_util_stapling.c issues warnings / breaks when compiled with OSSL 1.0.0; 
 MSVC
 warns:
 \modules\ssl\ssl_util_stapling.c(140) : warning C4133: '=' : incompatible 
 types
 - from 'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *' to 'struct stack_st_STRING *'
 C:\buildprep\httpd-2.3.x.10\modules\ssl\ssl_util_stapling.c(142) : warning
 C4133: 'function' : incompatible types - from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 'struct stack_st *'
 C:\buildprep\httpd-2.3.x.10\modules\ssl\ssl_util_stapling.c(148) : warning
 C4133: 'function' : incompatible types - from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *'

 and my picky CodeWarrior breaks:
 Compiling ssl_util_stapling.c
 ### mwccnlm Compiler:
 #File: ssl_util_stapling.c
 # 
 # 140:  aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x);
 #   Error: ^
 #   illegal implicit conversion from 'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *' to
 #   'struct stack_st_STRING *'
 ### mwccnlm Compiler:
 # 142:  cinf-uri = sk_STRING_pop(aia);
 #   Error:   ^
 #   illegal implicit conversion from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 #   'struct stack_st *'
 ### mwccnlm Compiler:
 # 148:  X509_email_free(aia);
 #   Error: ^
 #   illegal implicit conversion from 'struct stack_st_STRING *' to
 #   'struct stack_st_OPENSSL_STRING *'

 Errors caused tool to abort.

 I think that we had some similar already in the past, and you suggested a 
 change
 which was compatible with both 0.9.8 and 1.0.0 branches, but I cant recall 
 ...
 Or do we need to cleanly solve this with some version-depent defines?

 
 See of the patch for bug #50121 resolves this for you.
 

There's a slightly cleaner way of doing that r1040366 in trunk fixes it for me.

Steve.
-- 
Dr Stephen N. Henson. Senior Technical/Cryptography Advisor,
Open Source Software Institute: www.oss-institute.org
OpenSSL Core team: www.openssl.org


Re: mod_ssl ssl_util_stapling.c warnings

2010-11-29 Thread Guenter Knauf

Am 30.11.2010 01:55, schrieb Dr Stephen Henson:

See of the patch for bug #50121 resolves this for you.


There's a slightly cleaner way of doing that r1040366 in trunk fixes it for me.

thanks Steve, works fine. I've closed bug #50121.

Gün.