Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
Dave Ketchum wrote: I do not understand 'no resolution': By time N1 there have been 10 votes in the poll - to analyze as a complete Condorcet election. By time N2 there have been 2 more, for a total of 12 to analyze as if a complete election. Any such election may produce a CW. Those that do not produce a CW result in a cycle... Meaning indecision? Maybe it's best to leave it at that. To resolve it and report it as a decision is to report a fabrication. (I was taking your preference for a hands-off resolution to the extreme. When faced with cycles, meaning indecisions, nothing gets done to encourage or discourage their existence. Let the indecision be. Let be be finale of seem... Let the lamp affix its beam.) Or meaning the Condorcet count is unable to see the decision? Then: ... I suggest at least the ability to implement multiple cycle resolution formulas, to support comparison of the resolutions provided by various formulas. And maybe combine their resolving power? Where a telescope is unable to resolve a faint star, an array of telescopes can do better. Here I see Votorola offering a useful, though incomplete, service. What I see desirable for Condorcet is an external site using that service. I guess it depends on where you're aiming. You can test resolution mechanisms under simulation in vitro. Why test them in vivo? -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 04:12:21 -0400 Michael Allan wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: I do not understand 'no resolution': By time N1 there have been 10 votes in the poll - to analyze as a complete Condorcet election. By time N2 there have been 2 more, for a total of 12 to analyze as if a complete election. Any such election may produce a CW. Those that do not produce a CW result in a cycle... Meaning indecision? Maybe it's best to leave it at that. To resolve it and report it as a decision is to report a fabrication. (I was taking your preference for a hands-off resolution to the extreme. When faced with cycles, meaning indecisions, nothing gets done to encourage or discourage their existence. Let the indecision be. Let be be finale of seem... Let the lamp affix its beam.) Or meaning the Condorcet count is unable to see the decision? Then: Condorcet CAN see - perhaps each formula can be described as representing view via different glasses. Perhaps three groups of voters have come to SOLID decisions as to their preferences, but their decisions conflict - AB, BC, and CA. ... I suggest at least the ability to implement multiple cycle resolution formulas, to support comparison of the resolutions provided by various formulas. And maybe combine their resolving power? Where a telescope is unable to resolve a faint star, an array of telescopes can do better. We want to see which telescope does best - we are far from the point where merging the conflicting results would help us toward truth. Here I see Votorola offering a useful, though incomplete, service. What I see desirable for Condorcet is an external site using that service. I guess it depends on where you're aiming. You can test resolution mechanisms under simulation in vitro. Why test them in vivo? Good question. Trying: In simulation there is value, and sometimes excessive temptation, in tailoring test cases to favor a desired result. In vivo, as I proposed, you get all kinds of test cases exposed to multiple formulas, but not necessarily a good variety of test cases. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ANYTHING cam get tampered with if enough doors are left ajar, including paper ballots (such as discarding, editing, or replacing some). True, but paper ballots must be tampered with one at a time and it takes many many more persons to affect any election by tampering with paper ballots. Whereas electronic ballots can be tampered with en masse by one rogue programmer who can fraudulently alter an entire county's or an entire state's election outcomes. The risk is far greater for electronic fraud which is also much more difficult to detect and secure against. Paper ballots are much easier to secure in a way that is understandable and transparent to citizens and far more difficult (would take a far larger conspiracy) to tamper with. Watch this film for an education. It's great. http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/ Cheers, Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
On Fri, 3 Oct 2008 11:45:16 -0600 Kathy Dopp wrote: On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: ANYTHING cam get tampered with if enough doors are left ajar, including paper ballots (such as discarding, editing, or replacing some). True, but paper ballots must be tampered with one at a time and it takes many many more persons to affect any election by tampering with paper ballots. Whereas electronic ballots can be tampered with en masse by one rogue programmer who can fraudulently alter an entire county's or an entire state's election outcomes. Paper ballots can be discarded a handful or a boxful at a time. Rogue programmers SHOULD NOT be invited in, and the real programmers should provide for noticing if such sneak in. The risk is far greater for electronic fraud which is also much more difficult to detect and secure against. Paper ballots are much easier to secure in a way that is understandable and transparent to citizens and far more difficult (would take a far larger conspiracy) to tamper with. Agreed that unprotected electronic ballots can suffer major theft beyond what can happen to paper ballots. More complete defenses are possible with electronics. Mixed into this, Plurality is easily done with paper; better systems, such as Condorcet, are difficult with paper, but easily handled with electronics. Watch this film for an education. It's great. http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/ Cheers, Kathy -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why We Shouldn't Count Votes with Machines
On Fri, Oct 3, 2008 at 1:23 PM, Dave Ketchum [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: More complete defenses are possible with electronics. Totally FALSE statement. In fact there has never been even a theoretical design for an electronic voting system or even electronic paper ballot vote counting system that does not have known security leaks. In fact some computer scientists just recently mathematically PROVED that it is impossible to even verify that the certified software is actually running on a voting machine. You are showing a lack of knowledge in the field of computer science by making such an obviously false, already disproven statement. Luckily most people disagree with your incorrect opinion and another state, KY just joined the list of states planning to scrap unauditable e-ballot voting systems, joining, TN, IA, FL, CA, MD, and a few other states and a lot of other counties that don't immediately come to mind now. Mixed into this, Plurality is easily done with paper; better systems, such as Condorcet, are difficult with paper, but easily handled with electronics. Well that is a very good reason to avoid implementing them - because if they can't be easily done with paper ballots, then they cannot be assured to be counted accurately. Watch this film for an education. It's great. http://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~seclab/projects/voting/ Cheers, Kathy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] the 'who' and the 'what' - trying again
Dave Ketchum wrote: In simulation there is value, and sometimes excessive temptation, in tailoring test cases to favor a desired result. Maybe try an open simulator. Make the electorate engine pluggable so experimenters can try different voting behaviours. That should protect against bias. In vivo, as I proposed, you get all kinds of test cases exposed to multiple formulas, but not necessarily a good variety of test cases. It's nice to go live, but the up front costs will be high. It's risky too because you have to follow the crowd. Sites will offer alternative voting methods and electors will vote with their feet. There's no telling where they'll be attracted, or whether it'll jive with the test plans. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
