Re: [EM] Three rounds
Yes, IRV is a good example. Most Condorcet methods do the comparisons/evaluation just once (when all the candidates are in the same situation). Juho --- On Tue, 11/11/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Tuesday, 11 November, 2008, 2:47 AM > If I understand you 'sequential elimination' is IRV > and not Condorcet. > > DWK > > On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 00:01:36 + (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote: > > The sequential elimination processes tends to > introduce additional problems. Most Condorcet methods > don't have this problem. > > > > Condorcet may have some other problems that the > sequential elimination based approach may avoid, but > especially in large public elections with independent voter > decision making and without too accurate knowledge about the > behaviour of other voters the performance of Condorcet > methods is very good. > > > > (Just checking how one could eliminate some of the > problems of sequential elimination (e.g. by using approval > and avoid losing the "eliminated" candidates).) > > > > Juho > > > > > > --- On Mon, 10/11/08, Dave Ketchum > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > >>From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >>Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds > >>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >>Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > >>Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 8:10 PM > >>How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a > competitor? > >> It: > >> Normally is defined as not doing runoffs. > >> Has no problem with voters offering whatever > quantity > >>of ranks they choose, including doing bullet > voting. > >> > >>DWK > >> > >>On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 + (GMT) Juho Laatu > wrote: > >> > >>>FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the > >> > >>presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct > two > >>round method has been used. Before that (in most > elections) > >>the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who > then > >>voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last > round). > >> > >>>Reasons behind moving to the direct two round > system > >> > >>included assumed general popularity of a direct > election, > >>some problems with heavy trading and planning of > votes by > >>the electors, possibility of black horses and other > voting > >>patterns that are not based on the citizens' > votes. > >>Maybe three rounds / three election days in a > direct > >>election would have been too expensive and too > tiring. > >> > >>>- - - - - > >>> > >>>One somewhat related method: > >>> > >>>I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV > one would > >> > >>not totally eliminate the least popular (first > place) > >>candidates but would use some softer means and > would allow > >>the "eliminated" candidates to win later > if they > >>turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after > their > >>first preference candidates have lost all chances > to win). > >> > >>>One could e.g. force supporters of the > >> > >>"eliminated" candidates to approve more > than one > >>candidate (at least one of the > "remaining" > >>candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their > second > >>preference). On possible way to terminate the > algorithm > >>would be to stop when someone has reached >50% > approval > >>level. > >> > >>>Also in "non-instant" runoffs one > could e.g. > >> > >>force the voters to approve at least one on the > >>"remaining" candidates. (One could > eliminate more > >>than one candidate at different rounds.) > >> > >>>Juho > -- > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek > Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 > 607-687-5026 > Do to no one what you would not want done to > you. > If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits etc. (correction)
At 10:30 PM 11/8/2008, Kathy Dopp wrote: Abd ul, From what I can tell, having read all of the affidavits and responses of the plaintiffs (but not being an attorney), the case against IRV is only in very small part based on BvS, and is based more on the requirements of the US and Minnesota constitutions that IRV/STV violate. Here is the problem they face: the matter has been tested many times. The only state which has found, to my knowledge, preferential voting to be unconstitutional, per se, is Minnesota, through Brown v. Smallwood. STV has been in long use. Instant Runoff Voting has been in long use. The plaintiff argues rights that only Brown v. Smallwood previously found. They also argue a totally new right, the "right to associate" with a candidate, and they raise issues of ideology, which likewise have no foundation in constitutional law and are entirely new, as far as I know. The only grounds they have of any reasonable likelihood of prevailing is that IRV is preferential voting and Brown v. Smallwood explicitly outlawed preferential voting, not merel the specific method used in Duluth, Bucklin voting. The rights the plaintiffs are asserting, quite simply, don't exist, or at least there is no legal precedent for them, except for Brown v. Smallwood. "The case against IRV" which is being presented is essentially that it is a punk method, that it is hard to audit, etc. These are issues which are normally resolved, in the absence of specific legislation, by deliberative bodies or procedures. I.e., the judge is either the elected representatives of the people, or the people themselves in the initiative process. The courts will not second-guess the decisions of those, discarding them in favor of invented or newly discovered rights. There are exceptions, where courts have reinterpreted previous constitutional rights to include new territory. Same-sex marriage. Privacy rights. Etc. However, that's not the rule. Brown v. Smallwood, which likewise invented a new right, the right of a voter to vote for the candidate of the candidate's choice, without "interference" from votes from other voters, was idiosyncratic and not confirmed by any other court in the many years that have elapsed. Preferential voting has been used in many places. The only other example I know of it being terminated by an unconstitutionality decision was Oklahome, where the decision hinged not on the concept of preferential voting, but on the fractional vote values they assigned to lower preferences. There is a superficial resemblance in the Oklahoma decision to the vote fractions used in multiwinner STV, but they are really entirely different. The fractional votes in Oklahoma had the effect of giving those who preferred a minor candidate less say in the "real election." Whereas STV uses fractional votes to preserve the value of the voter's vote while not being unfair to others. That is, STV fractional votes make it happen that a voter more commonly exercises one full vote in the election that actually has an effect. This is opposite to the Oklahoma case. It may be very likely that BvS could be overturned, yet IRV/STV still declared unconstitutional on grounds that would *not* apply to most other alternative voting methods. It's highly unlikely. Either BvS will be confirmed (which is a loss for election reform) or it will be entirely discarded and IRV will be allowed, as it has been allowed everywhere else. There is a possibility, though, that, if FairVote arguments prevail, BvS will be confirmed, but considered not to apply to IRV because of its Later No Harm compliance. That would be bad law. BvS did not depend or hinge on Later No Harm. The possible mention of it was dicta, not central, and not repeated in the restatements of the grounds for the decision. Other statements made it clear that the very idea of a voter voting for one, faced with other voters voting many alternate preferences, was rejected by the court. Don't mistake this for an opinion that the BvS court was correct. It wasn't, it was a travesty of a decision. But it is law in Minnesota, until and unless overturned. I read the plaintiff's arguments carefully. They are defective and mostly are claims that IRV has this or that supposedly bad characteristic -- or, for that matter, really bad characteristic -- but such problems don't make the method unlawful. The Court, to find IRV unconstitutional, would have to find Plurality and Top Two Runoff unconstitutional -- unless it relies on the BvS precedent, in which case it would continue to prohibit all forms of preferential voting. Note that the BvS court said that election method performance, or the superiority of preferential voting -- which it practically acknowledged -- wasn't the issue. The issue was that a change like that involved in bringing preferential voting was, to them, a constitutional change requiring a constitutional amendment.
Re: [EM] Three rounds
If I understand you 'sequential elimination' is IRV and not Condorcet. DWK On Tue, 11 Nov 2008 00:01:36 + (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote: The sequential elimination processes tends to introduce additional problems. Most Condorcet methods don't have this problem. Condorcet may have some other problems that the sequential elimination based approach may avoid, but especially in large public elections with independent voter decision making and without too accurate knowledge about the behaviour of other voters the performance of Condorcet methods is very good. (Just checking how one could eliminate some of the problems of sequential elimination (e.g. by using approval and avoid losing the "eliminated" candidates).) Juho --- On Mon, 10/11/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 8:10 PM How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a competitor? It: Normally is defined as not doing runoffs. Has no problem with voters offering whatever quantity of ranks they choose, including doing bullet voting. DWK On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 + (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote: FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct two round method has been used. Before that (in most elections) the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who then voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last round). Reasons behind moving to the direct two round system included assumed general popularity of a direct election, some problems with heavy trading and planning of votes by the electors, possibility of black horses and other voting patterns that are not based on the citizens' votes. Maybe three rounds / three election days in a direct election would have been too expensive and too tiring. - - - - - One somewhat related method: I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV one would not totally eliminate the least popular (first place) candidates but would use some softer means and would allow the "eliminated" candidates to win later if they turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after their first preference candidates have lost all chances to win). One could e.g. force supporters of the "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one candidate (at least one of the "remaining" candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval level. Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. force the voters to approve at least one on the "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more than one candidate at different rounds.) Juho -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Three rounds
The sequential elimination processes tends to introduce additional problems. Most Condorcet methods don't have this problem. Condorcet may have some other problems that the sequential elimination based approach may avoid, but especially in large public elections with independent voter decision making and without too accurate knowledge about the behaviour of other voters the performance of Condorcet methods is very good. (Just checking how one could eliminate some of the problems of sequential elimination (e.g. by using approval and avoid losing the "eliminated" candidates).) Juho --- On Mon, 10/11/08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 8:10 PM > How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a competitor? > It: > Normally is defined as not doing runoffs. > Has no problem with voters offering whatever quantity > of ranks they choose, including doing bullet voting. > > DWK > > On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 + (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote: > > FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the > presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct two > round method has been used. Before that (in most elections) > the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who then > voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last round). > > > > Reasons behind moving to the direct two round system > included assumed general popularity of a direct election, > some problems with heavy trading and planning of votes by > the electors, possibility of black horses and other voting > patterns that are not based on the citizens' votes. > Maybe three rounds / three election days in a direct > election would have been too expensive and too tiring. > > > > - - - - - > > > > One somewhat related method: > > > > I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV one would > not totally eliminate the least popular (first place) > candidates but would use some softer means and would allow > the "eliminated" candidates to win later if they > turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after their > first preference candidates have lost all chances to win). > > > > One could e.g. force supporters of the > "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one > candidate (at least one of the "remaining" > candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second > preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm > would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval > level. > > > > Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. > force the voters to approve at least one on the > "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more > than one candidate at different rounds.) > > > > Juho > -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] > people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek > Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 > 607-687-5026 >Do to no one what you would not want done to > you. > If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Three rounds
--- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] Three rounds > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com > Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 7:59 PM > On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > One could e.g. force supporters of the > "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one > candidate (at least one of the "remaining" > candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second > preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm > would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval > level. > > > > Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. > force the voters to approve at least one on the > "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more > than one candidate at different rounds.) > > That is kinda like Bucklin, though without the approval > threshold > changing in each round for all voters. > > The process could be > > 1) Each candidate is designated a strong candidate > 2) Each ballot is considered to approve the highest ranked > strong > candidate and all candidates ranked higher. > 3) If the most approved candidate has > 50%, then that > candidate is elected. > 4) Re-designated the least approved strong candidate a weak > candidate > and goto 2). Yes, could go this way. > > It still suffers from centre squeeze effects, though. > > For example > > 45: A>B>C > 9: B>A>C > 46: C>B>A > > Round 1 > > A: 45 > B: 9 > C: 46 > > no winner, B designated 'weak' > > Round 2 > > A: 54 > B: 9 > C: 41 > > A wins. How about continuing and allowing the C supporters to compromise and approve also B. (Just didn't use the 50% termination rule this time.) After this round B would win and there would be no more interest to compromise (all voters already either approve the to be winner or would approve it as a compromise). > > The method has potential strategic truncation incentives. > > If B voters bullet voted for B, the result would have been > > Round 2 > > A: 46 > B: 9 > C: 41 > > C designated 'weak' > > Round 3 > > A: 46 > B: 55 > C: 41 > > B wins > > Ofc, the other voters can use counter strategies. > > It might be worth adding a rule that if all candidates on > a ballot > are weak, the ballot counts as approving everyone. Yes, short ballots like "B" would be seen as "B>A=C". The unlisted A and C candidates are at shared last position. B supporters are not allowed to refuse to compromise after B is declared "weak", so they have to approve both A and C. Juho Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Three rounds
FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct two round method has been used. Before that (in most elections) the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who then voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last round). Reasons behind moving to the direct two round system included assumed general popularity of a direct election, some problems with heavy trading and planning of votes by the electors, possibility of black horses and other voting patterns that are not based on the citizens' votes. Maybe three rounds / three election days in a direct election would have been too expensive and too tiring. - - - - - One somewhat related method: I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV one would not totally eliminate the least popular (first place) candidates but would use some softer means and would allow the "eliminated" candidates to win later if they turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after their first preference candidates have lost all chances to win). One could e.g. force supporters of the "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one candidate (at least one of the "remaining" candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval level. Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. force the voters to approve at least one on the "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more than one candidate at different rounds.) Juho --- On Mon, 10/11/08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > From: Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Subject: Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic > voting methods & IRV/STV > To: "Abd ul-Rahman Lomax" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], "EM" > Date: Monday, 10 November, 2008, 2:30 PM > On Sun, Nov 9, 2008 at 1:16 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Top Two Runoff has an obvious problem, if the first > round is simple > > vote-for-one. Sometimes a compromise candidate fails > to make it into the > > runoff. This is really the same problem as IRV, but > the problem doesn't > > exist -- or is ameliorated -- under some election > rules. In particular, > > Robert's Rules, for runoff elections, does not > allow ballot restriction. > > As a compromise to repeating the balloting until the > deadlock is > resolved, what about the following rules > > Round 1 > > - All candidates on the ballot > - If a candidate gets a majority, he is elected and no > further rounds held > > Round 2 > > - All candidates on the ballot > - The top 2 from round 1 appear first on the ballot and are > marked as top-2 > - If a candidate gets a majority, he is elected and round 3 > is not held > > Round 3 > > - One of the top 2 from round 1 is on the ballot > -- (the one who received the most votes in round 2) > > - The plurality winner of round 2 is on the ballot > -- (excluding the above candidate) > > - Candidate with the most votes wins > > This gives the voters 2 chances to pick a majority winner > before going > to run-off. > > In a 'normal' top-2 situation, the top 2 will also > be the top 2 in > round 2 and they will be the 2 candidates for round 3. In > fact, it > would likely result in round 2 being the last round as one > of them > would get a majority. > > Election-Methods mailing list - see > http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad Thing Worse)
On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 10:37:35 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Dave Ketchum wrote: On Sat, 08 Nov 2008 18:45:38 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: ... States have differing collections of candidates: In theory, could demand there be a single national list. More practical to permit present nomination process, in case states desire such. Thus states should be required to prepare their NxN arrays in a manner that permits exact merging with other NxN arrays, without having to know what candidates may be in the other arrays. The easiest way to do this is probably to have the candidates sorted (by name or some other property, doesn't really matter). When two matrices with different entries are joined, expand the result matrix as appropriate. Since the candidate indices are sorted, there'll be no ambiguity when joining (unless two candidates have the same names, but that's unlikely). Two candidates with the same name is a problem to solve regardless of method. Sorting could be part of the joining, but I demand the results be exactly the same as if the ballots had been counted into the final matrix. Doable, but takes a bit of planning. A possible tiebreaker for same names would be to prepend (or append) the state of origin to each candidate name. In case two have the same name in the same state, the state decides who gets to be "number one" and "number two". These corner cases would be extremely unlikely, but it doesn't hurt to specify them. My point was that this is a problem affecting ANY election method, thus not needing special attention for Condorcet. The results should be the same with a plain merge as with a single count, since a Condorcet matrix entry cm[a][b] just lists how many voters ranked A > B. Consider voters that couldn't vote on a given candidate as if they had no effective preference regarding that candidate. Then, by including the results of some other Condorcet matrix, if A and B wasn't on that other matrix, cm[a][b] won't change. Not being sure what you mean by "simple merge", I will repeat my demand. For example, assume A is a write-in which CANNOT be planned on but must be adjusted for when counting the ballots. The national NxN array must include A reflecting proper counts for all votes in the US. True that such an A is unlikely, but to be expected more if you assume it will never happen. -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Three rounds
How do your thoughts compare with Condorcet as a competitor? It: Normally is defined as not doing runoffs. Has no problem with voters offering whatever quantity of ranks they choose, including doing bullet voting. DWK On Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:05:16 + (GMT) Juho Laatu wrote: FYI. Finland used to have three rounds in the presidential elections. Since 1994 a typical direct two round method has been used. Before that (in most elections) the voters first elected 300 (or 301) electors who then voted in three rounds (two candidates at the last round). Reasons behind moving to the direct two round system included assumed general popularity of a direct election, some problems with heavy trading and planning of votes by the electors, possibility of black horses and other voting patterns that are not based on the citizens' votes. Maybe three rounds / three election days in a direct election would have been too expensive and too tiring. - - - - - One somewhat related method: I sometimes played with the idea that in IRV one would not totally eliminate the least popular (first place) candidates but would use some softer means and would allow the "eliminated" candidates to win later if they turn out to be the favourites of many voters (after their first preference candidates have lost all chances to win). One could e.g. force supporters of the "eliminated" candidates to approve more than one candidate (at least one of the "remaining" candidates) (instead of just bullet voting their second preference). On possible way to terminate the algorithm would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval level. Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. force the voters to approve at least one on the "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more than one candidate at different rounds.) Juho -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Three rounds
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 4:05 PM, Juho Laatu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > One could e.g. force supporters of the "eliminated" candidates to approve > more than one candidate (at least one of the "remaining" candidates) (instead > of just bullet voting their second preference). On possible way to terminate > the algorithm would be to stop when someone has reached >50% approval level. > > Also in "non-instant" runoffs one could e.g. force the voters to approve at > least one on the "remaining" candidates. (One could eliminate more than one > candidate at different rounds.) That is kinda like Bucklin, though without the approval threshold changing in each round for all voters. The process could be 1) Each candidate is designated a strong candidate 2) Each ballot is considered to approve the highest ranked strong candidate and all candidates ranked higher. 3) If the most approved candidate has > 50%, then that candidate is elected. 4) Re-designated the least approved strong candidate a weak candidate and goto 2). It still suffers from centre squeeze effects, though. For example 45: A>B>C 9: B>A>C 46: C>B>A Round 1 A: 45 B: 9 C: 46 no winner, B designated 'weak' Round 2 A: 54 B: 9 C: 41 A wins. The method has potential strategic truncation incentives. If B voters bullet voted for B, the result would have been Round 2 A: 46 B: 9 C: 41 C designated 'weak' Round 3 A: 46 B: 55 C: 41 B wins Ofc, the other voters can use counter strategies. It might be worth adding a rule that if all candidates on a ballot are weak, the ballot counts as approving everyone. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] IRV and PR-STV Re: examination of plaintiff's memorandum re IRV in Minneapolis
On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 3:32 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Is this complicated? Yes. Is it fair? Well, up to the election of the last > candidate, yes, it is clearly fair. With the last candidate, the election > effectively becomes the same as an instant runoff voting election, with the > problems associated with that. I don't see why the last seat being filled is that much different from the others. The negative effects are always there, though because factions aren't quite solid coalitions in practice, PR-STV doesn't display the effects quite so much (maybe). For example, assume that 2 seats are being filled A faction 16: A1>A2>A3 5: A2>A1>A3 14: A3>A2>A1 B faction 14: B1>B2>B3 5: B2>B1>B3 16: B3>B2>B1 C faction 30: C A2 and B2 (and C) are the condorcet winners in their own factions. PR-STV will run as follows Quote = 35 (approx) Round 1 A1: 16 A2: 5 A3: 14 B1: 14 B2: 5 B3: 16 C: 30 B2 and A2 both eliminated as their total is less than the next highest (14) Round 2 A1: 21 (+5) A2: 0 A3: 14 B1: 19 (+5) B2: 0 B3: 16 C: 30 A3 eliminated Round 3 A1: 35 (+14) A2: 0 A3: 0 B1: 19 (+5) B2: 0 B3: 16 C: 30 A1 elected as met the quota. No surplus transfers as exact quota, so B3 is eliminated Round 3 A1: 35 (+14) A2: 0 A3: 0 B1: 35 (+16) B2: 0 B3: 0 C: 30 B1 elected. So, the winners are (A1,B1). However, they were not the condorcet winners of their respective factions. Within each faction, standard PR-STV elects the IRV winner. CPO-STV would solve the issue. Comparing (A1,B1) to (A2,B2) A1: 16 A2: 19 B1: 14 B2: 21 A1+B1 = 30 A2+B2 = 40 Thus (A2,B2) would be CPO winners. Also, the 30 C voters would be able to upset factional 'purity' by also voting for B and C faction candidates. It is like in condorcet voting where voters of the minority party get to pick which of the candidates of the majority party gets elected. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] language/framing quibble
Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Morning, Kristofer re: "Even without rigid monitoring, there should be a counteracting measure. After all, the councilmembers work on behalf of the people, so if they start consistently diverging from what the people want, there should be a way of directing them back. This way must not be too strict, or we get short term interest on one hand and populism on the other. It should still be there; I think that's partly the point of the bidirectionality we're talking about, although it's not limited to "counteraction", but also involves information (to guide)." Absolutely!!! The other day, you mentioned the idea that those not selected at the highest level should have a role in advising the person selected (You may not have said it exactly that way, but that's the way I interpreted it.) I'd like to look at that a bit more carefully. At present, in the United States, our elected officials have 'staffs', including legislative assistants. I understand many of our (so-called) representatives do not even read the legislation they vote on ... they let their 'legislative aides' do it. Now, that's a travesty, if I've ever heard one. The people who reach the highest levels have already been carefully examined. They advanced because they were considered worthy by a large number of people. We should avail ourselves of that pool of talent. I've already mentioned using them as a source from which appointive offices are filled. In addition, following your thought, they can function as advisors to the elected official. The only question is the level of formality we attach to the role. I suggested that there would be little formality, so that the method treats people close to the top and far away from it consistently. Otherwise, there would have to be some cutoff point, and it's not obvious where that point would be. In a parliament and similar, the cutoff point is simply the parliament: there's the council/parliament and the voters (notwithstanding the external structure such as ministers, bureaucracy, which is supposed to be subordinate to the parliament in any case). From this I got the message passing idea. If some group is going to advise the members of the council, then they must have near-immediate feedback; that is, they have to be able to communicate with the council in a way that isn't drowned by other noise. From that, in turn, rises the weighting idea; those immediately below the selected would have a high weight, so when they speak or advise, their messages cut through the background (as it were). Still, people lower down in the pyramid can send messages, so there's a continuum. I can see the limitations, however. Message passing is not presence. Perhaps one could have a list for each member of the body, where the list is ordered by the degree to which a given person on it supported the member, or helped him become selected in the first place. Then pick the upper n (for some value of n to be decided later), and that's that member's advisory group. The method would have to be a bit more complex than that, in particular if a given person should be limited to advising one member at most (to prevent conflict of interest type scenarios). Whoops! That's exactly what you're saying, isn't it: "My idea was that even the unselected helped the selected become selected. In one sense, they used their power (what one may call that power) to reach an agreement. Therefore, the selected are to some extent accountable to them; which makes sense if you go all the way down, where the people (except the candidates) are all ultimately unselected. As you say, formal power might not be the way to do so, though." I was wrong. In addition to the points you've made, such an arrangement would provide a training ground for candidates by exposing them to the legislative process. It would also provide an anti-corruption buffer. I'm not sure how we should implement the concept, but I'm sure we should do so. We seem to be in agreement that the bidirectional capability of the process affords us the means of allowing the electorate to influence their representative's acts, after election. I think we're agreed that those who reach the highest levels but are not elected should have a role in, at least, advising our elected officials. We have not yet precisely described the method of implementation, but that's because we're still exploring the possibilities. In short, if we already have a pyramid, why not make use of it; and if the point of the pyramid structure is to, when we need to discard something to make management simpler, discard only that which matters least, and we apply that to candidate selection, then why not apply the same ideas to feedback as well? The idea of matrices seems (to me) to add complexity. It's true the data can be processed by machine, a
Re: [EM] New MN court affidavits by those defending non-Monotonic voting methods & IRV/STV
On Sun, Nov 9, 2008 at 1:16 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Top Two Runoff has an obvious problem, if the first round is simple > vote-for-one. Sometimes a compromise candidate fails to make it into the > runoff. This is really the same problem as IRV, but the problem doesn't > exist -- or is ameliorated -- under some election rules. In particular, > Robert's Rules, for runoff elections, does not allow ballot restriction. As a compromise to repeating the balloting until the deadlock is resolved, what about the following rules Round 1 - All candidates on the ballot - If a candidate gets a majority, he is elected and no further rounds held Round 2 - All candidates on the ballot - The top 2 from round 1 appear first on the ballot and are marked as top-2 - If a candidate gets a majority, he is elected and round 3 is not held Round 3 - One of the top 2 from round 1 is on the ballot -- (the one who received the most votes in round 2) - The plurality winner of round 2 is on the ballot -- (excluding the above candidate) - Candidate with the most votes wins This gives the voters 2 chances to pick a majority winner before going to run-off. In a 'normal' top-2 situation, the top 2 will also be the top 2 in round 2 and they will be the 2 candidates for round 3. In fact, it would likely result in round 2 being the last round as one of them would get a majority. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Election-Methods Digest, Vol 53, Issue 21
> > From: "James Gilmour" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > If I have understood the various submissions correctly, the principal > > objection to IRV on THIS ground, is that the ballot papers of voters > > who express different numbers of preferences are thereby treated > > differently, and in such a way and to such an extent that these > > differences should render the IRV voting system "unconstitutional". > Kathy Dopp > Sent: Monday, November 10, 2008 2:32 AM > FALSE. What is false in my statement? > How many candidates are there likely to be in Minneapolis? Of what possible relevance could the number of candidates in any particular election be to the evaluation of the general principles of a voting system with regard to whether it treats different ballot papers (and hence voters) in different ways to such an extent that the adoption of that voting system would be "unconstitutional"? James Gilmour No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com Version: 8.0.175 / Virus Database: 270.9.0/1778 - Release Date: 09/11/2008 14:14 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] In defense of the Electoral College (was Re: Making a Bad Thing Worse)
Dave Ketchum wrote: On Sat, 08 Nov 2008 18:45:38 +0100 Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: I'll add that this phrasing would give states the same power no matter the relative turnout. If that's not desired, it could be rephrased differently, but giving states the same power is closer to the current state of things. The continuous electoral college variant does not take into account the 23rd Amendment, either. Ugh. All of which is fixable. I was just trying to give a rough idea of how it may be phrased. Yes. What I'm saying is that it's theoretically possible to incorporate any voting method into this; however, the results might be suboptimal if you try to aggregate, say, IRV results this way, since you'd get both the disadvantages of IRV and Condorcet (nonmonotonicity for the former and LNH* failure for the latter, for instance). IRV is a distraction since such ballots could and should be counted as Condorcet. Should be a method that at least tries for a result based on comparative strength of candidates. Again, that's true. The point of my generalized transformation scheme is that any method could, theoretically, be incorporated into this form of compact. Therefore, complaints that it's biased in favor of explicit Condorcet methods would be weakened (although not completely eliminated, because of the intersection of limits I mentioned). States have differing collections of candidates: In theory, could demand there be a single national list. More practical to permit present nomination process, in case states desire such. Thus states should be required to prepare their NxN arrays in a manner that permits exact merging with other NxN arrays, without having to know what candidates may be in the other arrays. The easiest way to do this is probably to have the candidates sorted (by name or some other property, doesn't really matter). When two matrices with different entries are joined, expand the result matrix as appropriate. Since the candidate indices are sorted, there'll be no ambiguity when joining (unless two candidates have the same names, but that's unlikely). Two candidates with the same name is a problem to solve regardless of method. Sorting could be part of the joining, but I demand the results be exactly the same as if the ballots had been counted into the final matrix. Doable, but takes a bit of planning. A possible tiebreaker for same names would be to prepend (or append) the state of origin to each candidate name. In case two have the same name in the same state, the state decides who gets to be "number one" and "number two". These corner cases would be extremely unlikely, but it doesn't hurt to specify them. The results should be the same with a plain merge as with a single count, since a Condorcet matrix entry cm[a][b] just lists how many voters ranked A > B. Consider voters that couldn't vote on a given candidate as if they had no effective preference regarding that candidate. Then, by including the results of some other Condorcet matrix, if A and B wasn't on that other matrix, cm[a][b] won't change. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] (no subject)
> On Sun, 9 Nov 2008 23:28:01 - James Gilmour wrote:> > > > There is only one legitimate interpretation of the "A>B" ballot paper > > in a Condorcet count with regard to the "C" vs. "D" pair-wise contest > > - the voter has given the Returning Officer no information. No-one > > is entitled make any supposition - that voter has expressed no > > preference at all as between "C" and "D". > From: Dave Ketchum > Sent: Monday, November 10, 2008 12:24 AM > Disagreed, for Condorcet will see that the voter has assigned > equal rank. Will you please provide me with a reference to Condorcet election rules for a public election that instruct the Retuning Officer to interpret blanks on a ballot paper as "equal rank"? James Gilmour No virus found in this outgoing message. Checked by AVG - http://www.avg.com Version: 8.0.175 / Virus Database: 270.9.0/1778 - Release Date: 09/11/2008 14:14 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
