Re: [EM] language/framing quibble
Fred Gohlke wrote: Good Morning, Kristofer re: I agree with your first point [that extending the rights of humans to non-human entities is a flawed concept], but the precedent seems to go all the way back to 1886. Precedent has a place in our lives but it ought not, and need not, be the noose by which we strangle ourselves. Is it not sufficiently evident that the laws and governing bodies that allowed, nay, encouraged, the excesses that led to our present financial debacle were enacted and supervised by the politicians selected and financed by those immense non-human entities that control our existence and decimate our environment? From whence came the notion that some corporations are too big to fail? In what way is their existence a benefit to the people? The 100-plus years that have elapsed since that precedent was set have given us time to understand the evils of not discriminating between human and non-human entities. But, have we the courage to change it? How can we do so as long as we let political parties serve as conduits for the corruption that ensures our laws are dictated by, and our government controlled by, the same non-human entities that owe their existence to that vile concept? We should never forget that morality is a top-down phenomenon. Our parents set our initial moral code. As we mature, we adapt our code to accommodate the will of those who control our existence. When unprincipled people achieve leadership positions and control our destiny, they infect society ... as has been so clearly demonstrated throughout history and, most recently, by the extraordinary breakdown of our economic system. If we want to improve society, the first step is to improve the quality of those who represent us in our government. I agree that the precedent shouldn't have been set (and it seems to have been set in a rather indirect manner); what I am saying is that in trying to change it, those who put value on precedent will use that precedent as an argument. That said, things are not hopeless. Some towns have taken the more direct route in countering the precedent by direct law - see http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2006/11/when_is_a_corporation_like _a_freed_slave.html . [The following continues our examination of corruption among elected officials.] re: If what you're saying is correct, does that mean that the first phase of Practical Democracy has the same effect (or nearly so) in the long run limit case as does a very competitive traditional election method? I'm sorry, but I don't know what a 'long run limit case' is, so I can't comment on that. However, the first (or, as you mentioned, selection) phase is incomparably more competitive than the most competitive traditional election method because the participants must persuade competitors for the same position that they are most deserving of selection. What I mean by long run limit case is the case in which a competitive traditional election method is left to run for as many elections as possible: as one approaches the limit of infinite time, the difference between the two systems vanish. The point is to say that if Practical Democracy can be divided into two parts, then one can treat the first part as if you had some magical election method that was, as you put it, more competitive than the most competitive traditional election methods, and that further, Practical Democracy really then has two parts - the selection phase and the continuation phase. It might be possible to improve one of the phases without having to improve the other, thus making the reform more continual (if the opposition is too great to do it all at once). re: I'm wondering about that because you say that the problem of keeping the elected/selected candidates honest is one that applies to both Practical Democracy and more traditional solutions. The Practical Democracy method ensures (to the maximum extent it can be ensured) that the people we elect to public office are honest ... people of high principle. This differs from partisan electoral methods which elevate unscrupulous people by design. Those elected by the Practical Democracy method will have a pre-disposition toward integrity. However, once people have achieved public office ... by whatever means ... they are still humans; they will pursue their own interest. If we want them to maintain their integrity, we must provide an environment in which integrity can survive. Some part of this is connected to the first step of Practical Democracy, so I suppose I contradict myself now. Keeping record of the pyramid structure for later message passing, for instance, would be one such part. Yet other parts may be applicable to all types of representative democracy; for instance, staggered elections (such as having different election periods for different areas of the nation, so that the council
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 04:44 AM 12/28/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: [it was written:] I am satisfied that there are perfectly adequate vote once systems available for all public elections, both single-office elections and assembly elections. If they are good for public elections, why are they *never* used for smaller organizations where repeated ballot is easy? Wouldn't it save time? Yes, advanced methods *can* save time, *if* a majority is still required. Otherwise the result can *easily* be one that a majority would reject. How often? Depends on the method, I'm sure, but my estimate is that it's about one in ten for IRV in nonpartisan elections in the U.S. It's pretty easy to show. Wouldn't that be because you can do RRO type iteration because of the small size? Of course. (i.e., nobody considers using advanced methods in such organizations when, for example, face-to-face meetings are possible and normal for election. There are exceptions, and, I'd say, they have been warped by outside political considerations; there is a sense among some student organizations, for example, that by implementing IRV, they are advancing a general progressive cause. They've been had.) Consider the extreme, where there's just you and a few friends. There would seem to be little point in voting when you can just all discuss the options and reach a conclusion. Absolutely. However, this kind of direct process indicates the foundations of democracy. There are problems of scale as the scale increases, but the *substance* does not intrinsically change, until not only the scale has become large, but the culture expects alienation and division. When the scale is small, people will take the time to resolve deep differences, ordinarily (if they care about the cooperation being negotiated). That cannot be done, directly, on a large scale. *However, it can be done through a system that creates networks of connection.* These networks are what we actually need, and not only is it unnecessary to change laws to get them, it actually would be a mistake to try to legislate it. If it's subject to law, it is subject to control and corruption. It would be like the State telling small groups how they should come to agreement! I would say that the problem is not just that culture expects alienation, but that a full on everybody discusses with everybody else scales very poorly (worst case quadratic) so that the common opinion never converges, or converges very slowly. This is somewhat related to Parkinson's coefficient of inefficiency - as the number of members in a committe grows, subgroups form and there's no longer direct discussion. The networks of connections would presumably make groups that readjust and form in different configurations according to the political positions of the people - like water, hence *Liquid* Democracy. I think vote buying would be a problem with that concept, though, because if the network of connections is public, then those who want to influence the system can easily check whether the members are upholding their ends of the bargain (votes for money). Perhaps there would be if you just can't reach an agreement (okay, this has gone long enough, let's vote and get this over with). Absolutely. And this happens all the time with direct democratic process. And those who have participated in it much usually don't take losing all that seriously, provided the rules have been followed. Under Robert's Rules, it takes a two-thirds majority to close debate and vote. Common respect usually allows all interested parties to speak before the question is called. However, it takes a majority to decide a question, period, any question, not just an election. That's the bottom line for democracy. Taking less may *usually* work well enough, but it's risky. It can tear an organization apart, under some circumstances. That's why election by plurality is strongly discouraged in Robert's Rules. Given the above, maybe advanced methods would have their place as figurative tiebreakers when one can't reach a majority by other means. Say that the discussion/meeting goes on for a long time, and a supermajority decides it's been long enough. If there are multiple proposals, one could then have an election among those (law, no law, law with amendment, law without rider, whatever). If there is no method that's good enough to provide the majority certification you seek, there could be a runoff afterwards - but I'll note that a runoff doesn't magically produce majority support, since if one of the runoff candidates/options is bad, most would obviously align themselves with the other. The Le Pen situation would be a good example of that. Just because Chirac got 82%, that doesn't mean that Chirac is best, just that he's best in that one-on-one comparison. In short, you'd have something like: for very small groups, the cost
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 10:36 AM 12/28/2008, James Gilmour wrote: Kristofer Munsterhjelm Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2008 9:45 AM The UK is also parliamentary, so I suppose there would be few places where you could actually have a runoff. Given that all members of the UK Parliament are elected from single-member districts (UK constituencies) and that all districts were contested by at least three candidates (max 15 in 2005), it would be theoretically possible to have run-off elections in all 645 districts. In the 2005 general election, 425 of the districts were won with a plurality of the votes not a majority, so that could have been 425 run-offs. Quite a thought! Sure. Consider the implications. Most of those who voted, in those districts, did not support the winner. Odd, don't you think, that you imagine an outcry over a weak Condorcet winner, when what is described is, quite possibly, an ongoing outrage. Is it actually an outrage? It's hard to tell. It's quite possible that the majority was willing to accept the winner; that is normally the case, in fact. Bucklin would have found some majorities there. IRV probably -- in spite of the theories of some -- probably a bit fewer. In nonpartisan elections, IRV almost never finds a majority when one is not found in the first round, but those were, I presume, partisan elections, where finding a majority is more common.) However, consider this: the Plurality voting system (FPTP) encourages compromise already. There would have been more sincere first preference votes. My guess, though, is that the use of, say, Bucklin, would have resulted in *at least* half of those pluralities becoming a majority, possibly more. However, this is the real effect of the system described: In maybe one election out of 10, were it top two runoff, the result would shift, which, I contend, is clearly a more democratic result. There might be a slightly increased improvement if the primary method weren't top two Plurality, majority win, but a method which would find a Condorcet winner or at least include that winner in a runoff. How much is it worth to improve the result -- it could be a very significant improvement -- in 10% of elections? I'd say it's worth a lot! I'd also say that even if you had a magic best utility single-winner method, it wouldn't be the right method to use in a parliamentary context. If a majority of the voters agree with some position (and we discard gerrymander-type effects, intentional or not), then the parliament will agree with that position, unanimously. Hence... PR is needed. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Does IRV elect majority winners?
I take offense at Abd repeatedly suggesting I am a liar or am engaging in deception. We have a legitimate difference of opinion about the appropriate use of the term majority and interpretation of RRONR. At the outset, we might all agree that no system can really assure a _true_ majority winner in an ultimate sense, since there may be a tie, or there may simply be no candidate running who a majority of voters can abide. The core of my argument is that if the winner of a traditional two-round runoff system (without write-ins) is appropriately called a majority winner, so can the winner of an instant runoff election. The term majority simply means more than half, and it is regularly applied to different denominators...a majority of the entire membership, majority of those present and voting, majority in the second round of a runoff system, etc. In governmental elections we generally use the short-hand majority without specifying all of the exclusions from the denominator. Abd is insisting that uniquely for IRV elections, we should list the exclusions (i.e.. a majority of unexhausted ballots, or a majority of those who expressed a preference between the final two candidates, etc.). It is acceptable to make this detailed explanation, but not necessary in normal speech. In a typical U.S. governmental runoff election we do not list the exclusions from the denominator when naming a majority winner...We do not say Jane Smith won with a majority, excluding those who were eligible but did not register to vote, or registered but did not cast a ballot, or cast a ballot but skipped the race, or that ballot was blank, or spoiled, or illegal, or contained identifying marks, and excluding those who may have participated in the first round of voting but not the second. We just say she was the majority winner. Abd accepts that the winner of a top-two runoff (TTR) system (without write-ins) is appropriately called a majority winner, but not necessarily the winner of an instant runoff. He treats the majority winner of a two-round runoff as somehow better, or more valid. Ironically, it is typical for the winner of an IRV runoff to have won more total votes within a given jurisdiction and have a larger majority threshold to reach, than a majority winner of a two-round runoff, simply due to higher voter participation resulting from a single trip to the polls (yes, I know this is not an absolute as separate runoffs do on rare occasions have higher turnout). One essential difference between these two majority winners is simply the duration of time between the beginning and ending of he candidate marking process, in that the IRV ballot allows the voter to complete the task in a single visit to the polls. (Yes, I know voters also get to have a second-look, etc. but that is irrelevant to the majority issue here). A top two runoff system, JUST LIKE IRV, finds a majority winner by excluding from the denominator any voters who expressed a preference in the first round of counting, but whose preferred candidate gets eliminated and who express no preference between the two final candidates for the final round of counting. Let me set out some thought experiments (these are silly, perhaps, but are presented to illustrate an underlying point.)... 1. First, I still think my interpretation of RRONR's use of the word abstention is sound (that not indicating any preference between finalists can reasonably be deemed an abstention that RRONR says should NOT be counted in the denominator). Note that on page 394 in the section on the Right of Abstention RRONR points out that in an at-large election a voter may partially abstain by marking fewer candidates than allowed. In other words, the voter has participated in the election with some marks for some candidates, but may still be said to abstain from some aspect of that contest. Thus Abd's insistence that under RRONR a ballot with some candidates marked cannot also be an abstention is incorrect. Abd agrees that RRONR says to treat each segment of a ballot separately in considering blanks and abstentions. I have argued that each possible pairwise final runoff combination is functionally the same as a separate segment of the ballot. To explain...imagine if the IRV ballots were inefficiently, but logically, divided into a series of questions or segments as follows: Section A. Rank the candidates in the order you would prefer they be included as finalists in a runoff count. Jane1 2 3 4 Mary 1 2 3 4 Stan1 2 3 4 Dave 1 2 3 4 Section B. In each possible final runoff pairing below mark an x for the one candidate you would prefer. (1) Jane __ vs. Mary__ (2) Jane __ vs. Stan __ (3) Jane __ vs. Dave__ (4) Mary__ vs. Stan __ (5) Mary__ vs. Dave__ (6) Stan __ vs. Dave__ Now suppose a voter completely marks the ballot except in segment B. (4) of this unusual, but functional, IRV ballot where the voter abstains and
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
Just for clarity, can we agree that In Bucklin, after the first round, there is no majority. is a non-sequitor? There aren't rounds in Bucklin. All counts for all (#voters ranking alternative x = rank n are known simultaneously. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
At 12:55 PM 12/30/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: However, consider this: the Plurality voting system (FPTP) encourages compromise already. There would have been more sincere first preference votes. My guess, though, is that the use of, say, Bucklin, would have resulted in *at least* half of those pluralities becoming a majority, possibly more. However, this is the real effect of the system described: In maybe one election out of 10, were it top two runoff, the result would shift, which, I contend, is clearly a more democratic result. There might be a slightly increased improvement if the primary method weren't top two Plurality, majority win, but a method which would find a Condorcet winner or at least include that winner in a runoff. How much is it worth to improve the result -- it could be a very significant improvement -- in 10% of elections? I'd say it's worth a lot! I'd also say that even if you had a magic best utility single-winner method, it wouldn't be the right method to use in a parliamentary context. If a majority of the voters agree with some position (and we discard gerrymander-type effects, intentional or not), then the parliament will agree with that position, unanimously. Hence... PR is needed. I was considering single-winner context. Yes. For representation, single-winner is, almost guaranteed, a nondemocratic proposition. If I have to contend with you to determine who represents the two of us, it can't be said that whoever wins actually represents us both. Only if I can choose my representative can I be truly said to be represented fairly. STV methods approach this, but Asset simply does it. I choose the candidate I most trust, there isn't any reason to vote for anyone else. I can, perhaps, even register as an elector-candidate and vote for myself, if I'm willing to go to the trouble of participating in further process. And then this person will either end up representing me in the assembly, or will, again, choose the person who does end up in the assembly. In an Asset system, it may not be necessary that the votes be passed on, as in a delegable proxy system. Rather, the electors would negotiate, and when enough of them agree with each other on the identity of the seat, they register the required quota of votes and it is done. I've been recommending the Hare quota, not the Droop quota, because it is theoretically possible that all the votes would be used; the Droop quota assumes wasted votes. Further, because I'm looking to the possibility that electors might be able to vote directly in the Assembly, the voting power of the seats is equal to the summed voting power of the votes transferred by the supporting electors to the seat. Because it's very likely that *some* votes will be wasted, i.e., won't create a seat, for some reason or other, I'd rather aim for a number of seats but tolerate that normally, there would be a vacancy. There might be even more than one! If the electors can vote directly, they actually don't lose that much if they are unable to elect a seat. If they can vote by proxy, it's almost as good! -- but they wouldn't have deliberative rights, just voting rights. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Why I think IRV isn't a serious alternative 2
At 12:46 PM 12/30/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: At 05:48 AM 12/28/2008, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote: That makes the entire cycle, including polls and feedback, into one election system. Method is too narrow, because the system isn't just input, then function, then output; it doesn't just translate individual preferences into social preferences. Election systems in the real world are extraordinarily complex. Voting systems are methods for taking a ballot and generating a result; sometimes this is a fixed and final result, sometimes it is feedback for subsequent process, which may include a complete repetition, repetition with some restrictions, or even a coin toss. Individual preferences do not exist in a vacuum, there is inherent and massive feedback in real societies. The idea that there are these isolated voters who don't talk to each other and don't influence each other by their positions is ... ivory tower, useful for examining certain theoretical characteristics of systems, but not for predicting the function of systems in the real world. It can be useful, sometimes, but we must remember the limits on that utility as well. Thats all nice, but with the versatility of that wider definition, you get the chance of problems that accompany systems that include feedback within the system itself. Such can include cycling, and too much of either stability (reaches a compromise that wasn't really a good compromise) or instability (doesn't settle, as with cycling, or reaches a near-random result depending on the initial state of the system). We are now considering as relevant cycling within the entire electorate, within the process by which a whole society comes to an election with the set of preferences and preference strengths that they have. Human societies have been dealing with this for a long, long time, and the best answers we have so far are incorporated in traditional deliberative process, which insures that every point of view of significance is heard, that possible compromises are explored, and that there is an overall agreement that it is time to make a decision, before the decision is actually made. And then the decision is generally made by or with the explicit consent of a majority of those voting, with the implicit consent of those not voting (but able to vote). In short, there's a wider range of possible outcomes because the system permits many more configurations than a simple one-shot election method. This is good when it leads to a better result from voters optimizing their votes in a way that reaches the true compromise, but it's bad when factions use that increased range to try to game the system. If Range voters (for instance) need to consult polls or the prevailing atmosphere to gain knowledge of how to express their votes, then that too is something the strategists can manipulate. Range voters don't need to consult polls! They can do quite well, approaching the most strategic possible vote, without them, voting purely based on their opinions of the candidates and some common sense. Those who strategize, who do something stronger than this, are taking risks. All the groups will include people who strategize When one uses strategy to construct a wider mechanism on top of a single election method by adding a feedback system (such as one may say is done by Range if it's used honestly), then that's good; but if one uses strategy to pull the method on which the system is based in a direction that benefits one's own preferences at the expense of others, giving oneself additional power, then that is bad. Even worse is if many factions do so and the system degrades further because it can't stabilize or because the noise swamps it; or if the combined strategizing leads to a result that's worse for all (chicken-race dynamics) The pulling of a group toward its preferred result is, however, what we ask voters to do! Tell us what you want, and indicate by your votes how strongly you want it! Want A or you are going to revolt? You can say that, perhaps, though we are only going to give you one full vote to do it with. Want to pretend that you will revolt? -- or merely your situation is such that A is so much better than the others that you don't want to dilute the vote for A against anyone by giving them your vote? Fine. That's your choice. It helps the system make its decision. Be aware that if the result is not going to be A, you have abstained from the result. If there is majority failure, you may still be able to choose between others. (IRV *enforces* this, you don't get to cast a further vote unless your candidate is eliminated.) *Truncation will be normal*. And, in fact, represents a reasonably sincere vote for most voters! (In most common elections under common conditions). Why are these strategic voters different. I realized the error
