Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Dear Abd ul-Rahman, I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions; What exactly is majority consent? In my understanding consent means *all* voters share some opinion... what do you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority? It is not democratic whenever some group can impose its will on the others (in the sense of making their preferred outcome certain). No matter whether that group is a majority or a minority. From this it follows that a method which is always deterministic cannot possibly be democratic. Question: if the majority explicitly consents to this for a specific election, does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion? If the system would have allowed the majority to decide otherwise, the *system* is majoritarian. I'm not sure at all what a just share of power is. Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually begin. What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain sufficient information to determine justice. Yes it does. I gave a reasoning why I consider C the more just solution because everyone prefers it to the democratic benchmark. Again, without defining justice, but relying upon common understanding of it, we can easily construct scenarios that fully explain the ratings as sincere, but which have quite different implications regarding justice. In the challenge election, to repeat, we have 55: A 100, B 0, C 80 45: A 0, B 100, C 80 It was assumed that the ratings were sincere, though that was not defined. I gave at least two interpretations of this, so it was defined. I prefer the preferences over lotteries interpretation. Now, it's obvious that C is what we would ordinarily understand as the best winner. But a majority will disagree, and thus the challenge. I don't recall the exact wording, but is there a method which, if adopted, would cause C to win, even if the A and B voters are selfish, and we might assume, the A voters know that they are in the majority? The answer given was Borda with equal ranking prohibited. Now, when I first read this, I did not properly understand it. I should repeat what I did before, only correctly. Let me be explicit about how this could elect C. I will modify the way Borda count from how it is usually stated to make it equivalent to a Range 2 election (CR 3). Sincere votes. 55: ACB 45: BCA Counts: A, B, C 55: 2 0 1 45: 0 2 1 totals: A 110, B 90, C 100. This does not elect C. However the B voters, if they understand the situation, can vote 45: CBA or counts A, B, C: 45: 0 1 2 totals: A 110, B 45, C 145. C wins, so it appears a quite desirable strategy for the B voters, as we would understand the sincere ratings. Is there a counter-strategy? What if the A voters reverse their second and third preferences? 55: 2 1 0 With the strategic votes from the other side the totals are A 110, B 100, C 90; they defeat the compromise attempted by the B voters. However, the gain is relatively small, it would seem (but there is an assumption that a gain of 20 in rating is small. Not necessarily.) and with the original sincere Borda votes from the B voters, this counterstrategy would give us totals A 110, B 135, C 90. So, somewhat off the topic, but interesting nevertheless, the B voters, being not only selfish, but clever, mount a secret campaign to get all the B voters to vote the strategy. However, they also arrange to leak this information to the A voters, and, *supersecretly*, they are not going to do that, they are going to vote sincerely. If the A voters fall for it and vote strategically, to defeat the nefarious stratagem of the B voters, and the B voters then simply vote sincerely, B prevails, which is a disaster for the A voters and a total victory for the B voters. The A voters are *probably* better off simply voting sincerely. And that was Jobst's point. I don't think that was my point. In order to get a stable situation, i.e. a group strategy equilibrium, all voters should order reverse to make sure the other faction cannot reverse the outcome to their advantage. So the A voters are better off voting CAB. For this reason, I consider Borda a possible but not a good solution to the problem. Juho's suggestion to use weights like 1.4, 1, and 0 improves this since with them C is already elected with sincere ballots. Explicitly, Jobst stated that the ratings given were not utilities, and that he doesn't believe in utilities as having any meaning. Again, this is not true. I only stated that I don't believe in *measurable* utilities or, most importantly, even in *commensurable * ones. That does not mean I regard the term utility as meaningless. When someone prefers some A to some B, I think we can
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Seems there's something seriously broken with copy/paste on AIM mail. From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary accomodations. In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process. Taking that analogy further. If there was a civil war between a 55/45 split of the popluation, there would be lots of damage to both sides. The 'nuclear option' doesn't quite simulate that. However, it does impose some cost on the majority, without preventing them from doing whatever they want. Another proposal I had was that the majority should be allowed to pass bills without a supermajority, but the minority had the authority to delay them. This prevents the minority rule effect, while still giving the minority some power. For example, A proposal to pass a bill (or maybe just to bring it to a vote) can be passed by - 1 count with 2/3 support - 2 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 62.5% support in both counts - 3 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 57.5% support in all counts - 4 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 52.5% support in all counts - 5 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with majority support in all counts This allows a 1/3 minority to delay any bill by 1 month a 37.5% minority to delay any bill by 2 months a 42.5% minority to delay any bill by 3 months a 47.5% minority to delay any bill by 4 months From the war analogy, a strong minority could delay the majority implementing its proposals immediately, even if they ultimately lost. The next question is what would be acceptable to get the above rule implemented in the first place. A referendum to modify the constitution with 50%+1 support ? I'm not sure at all what a just share of power is. Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually begin. In Northern Ireland, they have a power sharing executive. Each member of the assembly declares as a member of a party. Cabinet positions are then allocated using the d'Hondt method. The party leader can assign anyone from the assembly to the cabinet position. This somewhat discriminates against smaller parties as the largest parties always gets to pick first. Assuming that the seats aren't all roughly equal, the best one or 2 will be assigned before a small party gets a chance. Also, there has been some strategic moves from one party to another after the election. I would probably have implemented it using Jan's tree structure. Groups of parties can form a super-party (and maybe some party members could form a sub-party). The seats are assigned to the group using d'Hondt and then between the parties in the group. The parties in NI would probably split into groups, unionist, nationalist and neither. Strategic party changes have been used to shift total cabinet seats between unionist and nationalist. Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all. That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It is only a formal equality. It is actually equal, one vote is perfectally replacable by another. The problem exists outside the individual voter. The problem is caused when you have a majority that is block voting. This is kinda like a monopoly in the free market. The standard benefits break down. Logrolling means that in Congress, there is a certain amount of vote trading which means that the result is closer to utility optimal. However, they don't always (ever?) actually look at what they are giving up in exchange for votes later on. Also, in a non-2 party system, there is often more than one potential coalition. This leads to negotiation between the parties and again that should lead to all opinions being considered. Ofc, in practice, only certain coalition permutations are possible. This can lead to some parties not having much power. However, if a coalition was to form that was seriously a problem, the party members could break ranks and give their support to the least bad option so that the worst doesn't happen. This is a safety valve that doesn't really occur. Alternatively, they could go for something like Germany's current grand coalition. Also, even in parties with a strong tradition of cohesion, if the party leadership was to agree to something unacceptable, they could break ranks. Finally, even if none of the above applies, you don't want to alienate potential future coalition partners to much. And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise, it fails. What you call a pure democratic process is just what
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
At 04:18 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Abd ul-Rahman, I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions; What exactly is majority consent? In my understanding consent means *all* voters share some opinion... No. That's consensus. Consent is individual acceptance of a result, majority consent refers to consent by a majority. what do you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority? It is not democratic whenever some group can impose its will on the others (in the sense of making their preferred outcome certain). No matter whether that group is a majority or a minority. From this it follows that a method which is always deterministic cannot possibly be democratic. This is a serious error. It treats democracy as an absolute, when, in fact, it is relative. We have complete democracy, with respect to some decision, when everyone consents. And we have no democracy if nobody consents. A situation is more democratic when not when a majority consent. This is the point where we can start to term the result democratic. But its not fully democratic unless everyone consents. Question: if the majority explicitly consents to this for a specific election, does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion? If the system would have allowed the majority to decide otherwise, the *system* is majoritarian. No, that was not the question, which was quite specific. It's a bit rude not to answer the question! I did not ask if the system was majoritarian, and that is not clearly defined. I'm not sure at all what a just share of power is. Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually begin. What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain sufficient information to determine justice. Yes it does. I gave a reasoning why I consider C the more just solution because everyone prefers it to the democratic benchmark. But your democratic benchmark, apparently, requires consensus. Yet you would, it appears, impose the result of C even if the A voters don't consent. The word justice does not refer to any democratic benchmark. Democracy and justice are not synonyms. Again, without defining justice, but relying upon common understanding of it, we can easily construct scenarios that fully explain the ratings as sincere, but which have quite different implications regarding justice. In the challenge election, to repeat, we have 55: A 100, B 0, C 80 45: A 0, B 100, C 80 It was assumed that the ratings were sincere, though that was not defined. I gave at least two interpretations of this, so it was defined. I prefer the preferences over lotteries interpretation. That's correct, a definition was given. My apologies. However, the central point is that these are relative ratings, not absolute ones. They are not commensurable, so aggregating them in this form is vulnerable to imbalances that can represent injustice. We'd see this if we were to implement an auction that created a transfer of value such that true utilities become known (Which would you prefer, a payment of +/-$X or the victory of A?). If you are poor, you might prefer the money and then live with the inconvenience of, say, increased travel. That's fair! But you probably would not, even if poor, shift your vote significantly for $5. Explicitly, Jobst stated that the ratings given were not utilities, and that he doesn't believe in utilities as having any meaning. Again, this is not true. I only stated that I don't believe in *measurable* utilities or, most importantly, even in *commensurable * ones. That does not mean I regard the term utility as meaningless. When someone prefers some A to some B, I think we can interpret this as A having more utility for her than B. But this more need not be representable by real numbers. Real utilities can be discovered by various means, and so made commensurable. It's not difficult to think of schemes for this, but it does not have to be part of the election method itself. Rather, it can be something that the public engages in voluntarily. Using it, we could make Plurality elections quite fair! And fully democratic. If you can get the large majority of people to agree, and you should be able to do this through appropriate negotiation -- in general, not always -- then these people will simply vote in their own interest and in agreement and you will get more complete democracy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
At 09:16 AM 8/25/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: I don't think nearly half of the electorate should pay the other half for getting what is the more just solution in my eyes. Perhaps that is a difference in culture? No. It's an understanding of what utilities mean. If A does not win, the supporters of A lose something. They are in the majority. If each of them grabs a B supporter and wrestles with him, or her, I suppose, the excess A supporters can then arrange things the way they like. A drastic picture, but actually part of the theory behind majority rule. If C wins, the B supporters gain 60% utility, that's large. If they pay the A voters the equivalent of the A loss, 20%, they are still way ahead. It is a very good deal for the B voters and, in fact, the A voters might hold out for more, knowing this. Why shouldn't everyone benefit from the improved result? A free negotiation would effectively generate a bid based on the *real* utilities, and these have been posited as stated. A free negotiation collapses what might be incommensurable utilities into whatever medium of exchange is used. Money is only one option, others are possible. (And, strictly speaking, if it were a Clarke tax, the payment is a reduction in taxes, effectively.) I'm not suggesting that this is practical, but rather pointing out that it is far more fair than we might, with certain knee-jerk responses, assume. We think of plutocracy when proposals like this are floated, but the scale is such that the truly large sums of money that are available to be transferred are mostly contributed by the average person. Jobst regards it as unjust that the majority should be paid by the minority to get an outcome he regards as more just. However, he isn't looking at the utilities, he is simply regarding these numbers as representing, perhaps, some degree of consent. The actual consequences of the election are irrelevant to him. Suppose this is not candidates for office being considered, but actual choices for the community. There are three projects, and it is considered that the community can only afford to build one. Let's even say that there is one project but three *sites*. Which site shall be chosen? If site A is chosen, the majority will find it maximally convenient, site C is almost as good, and site B is terrible. The B faction, the minority faces the reverse situation, Sure, if we have an assumption of equal taxes and all the rest, and if the stated ratings are based, say, on travel cost and value of time spent driving, then site C is the best choice. But this is a democracy. Sure, one can imagine systems where majority rule is not sufficient for making decisions, and many communities use them. Contrary to what Jobst might assume, I have a lot of experience with consensus communities, both positive and negative. My comments about majority rule proceed from that experience, they are not merely theory. However, when you get down to the nuts and bolts of a system, *including how the system is implemented,* majority rule has proven itself to be practical *and* sustainable. Consensus systems get people all excited at first, particularly when they discover that obtaining full consent is not as difficult as many would think, it is exhilarating to sufficiently satisfy *everyone*. However, over years, going through what becomes tedious meeting process to do it gradually exhausts many members of the community, and, further, they start to discover what happens when the status quo favors a minority. Perhaps a decision was made some years back that did not anticipate the full impact it would have. It can't be changed without full consensus. I have seen this be literally oppressive, causing direct harm to a substantial minority (I've never seen it seriously harm the majority, probably because there are certain natural restraints. People can walk away from consensus communities and create standard ones, and sometimes the consensus rules are not legally enforceable. But I'm not aware of any legal tests of that.) Point is, when you don't have majority rule, you have decisions being made by something *other* than the majority, even if it is only the default decision to change nothing. And a determined minority can then hold its right to withhold consent over the rest of the community, in order to get what it wants. Again, it would never, in that context, blatantly do this, but it happens, social dynamics do not disappear in consensus communities. There is nothing magic about 50%, it is simply the point where there are more people on one side than another, there are more saying Yes to a motion than No. Or the reverse. In real communities, other than seriously unhealthy ones, the majority is restrained. It does not make decisions based on mere majority, ordinarily, it seeks broader consent, and deliberative process makes this happen. As an example of how majority rule is modified in
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions]
Original Message Got lost? Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2007 14:32:55 -0400 On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 09:28:24 -0300 Diego Renato wrote: 2007/8/22, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... Good luck have fun :-) Since A has a majority, no method is guaranteed to elect C. If both A and B voters are not sure which faction is larger, it is possible vote for their preferred candidate and C under approval voting, or put C highly rated under range voting, and C be elected. Diego lists both: Approval - at least 56 A and B voters also approving C - reducible by some giving up on approving A or B. Range - similar adjustment via ratings. NOT MENTIONED - Condorcet: 46 A voters ranking C at top, without any giving up on the A vs B competition - reducible by B voters cooperating in this. Diego Santos -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
At 02:55 AM 8/22/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... Okay, here is my solution. The B voters gain some very substantial advantage for the election of C over the favorite of the A voters, who have only a substantially smaller preference for A over C. So the B voters offer something of value to the A voters to compensate them for their loss. As an example, they promise to donate to the public treasury an amount sufficient to compensate the A voters for their loss of value, thus, essentially, paying a differential tax in order to get what they want. The payment is either irrevocably secured, if C is elected, or on deposit with a trustee. The original conditions assume commensurability of utilities, so the ability to pay is actually equal among the voters. Payment might not be in cash, but in terms of some other cooperation. (This is somewhat counter-intuitive, but I won't explain it here.) In deliberative process, this happens all the time. I'll vote for your bill if you will vote for mine. Logrolling, it's called, and it is a basic feature of democracy, making majority rule far more flexible than it might otherwise be. Sometimes common practices are there for a reason, and taking steps to outlaw them or make them difficult could actually harm the process far more than allowing it, and, perhaps, making it more explicit. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Dear Rob! It is possible (otherwise I would not have posted this challenge :-) But of course it is not possible with a majoritarian method (that's what you observed). Keep on, one of the possible solutions is really simple (though not very good in other respects)... Yes, it is not possible with a majoritarian method, but supermajoritarian methods can work good! My first suggestion is a modified form of bucklin voting with 2/3 threshold. If no candidate reaches a double majority, a new election is held. If no candidate has 2/3 of the votes after add all preferences, bullet votes are proportionally completed. I dislike any undeterministic method, except for tie-braking Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
2007/8/23, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: I dislike any undeterministic method, except for tie-braking And I dislike methods that give all power to only one half of the voters and can be used to oppress 49% of the electorate :-) In most societies, the majority dictatorship is not a major problem because electors' preferences shift along time, and the 49% can became the majoritarian faction in the next elections. In divided societies for ethnic, cultural or religious system, where consensus is desirable, proprotional representation for legislatures and supermajoritarian methods for single-winner elections (as for head of state in many parliamentary republics) are better than probabilistic methods. Diego Santos Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... Good luck have fun :-) Jobst _ In 5 Schritten zur eigenen Homepage. Jetzt Domain sichern und gestalten! Nur 3,99 EUR/Monat! http://www.maildomain.web.de/?mc=021114 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Jobst Heitzig wrote: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! approval, would work if voters approval cutoff is below 80, as would honest range. The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... dang! I would suggest using one of the above methods and removing any knowledge from the voter of how any of the other voters will vote. No Media coverage. No predictions by political analysts. No talking with your family/friends/co-workers about who you will vote for. This would limit the voters ability to vote strategically. i.e. if the group of 55 voters don't know they have a majority they would probably vote honest in order to get the best result. Good luck have fun :-) Jobst _ In 5 Schritten zur eigenen Homepage. Jetzt Domain sichern und gestalten! Nur 3,99 EUR/Monat! http://www.maildomain.web.de/?mc=021114 Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Jobst Heitzig wrote: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... If the majority is close (ie 55-45) and you randomly select only a small number of ballots (say 10ish). It is possible that B will have more supporters selected. fear of this will lead supporters of A to vote true preference, as will the reverse in B supporters. Then we can use approval or Range. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
On Wed, 22 Aug 2007 09:28:24 -0300 Diego Renato wrote: 2007/8/22, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... Good luck have fun :-) Since A has a majority, no method is guaranteed to elect C. If both A and B voters are not sure which faction is larger, it is possible vote for their preferred candidate and C under approval voting, or put C highly rated under range voting, and C be elected. Diego lists both: Approval - at least 56 A and B voters also approving C - reducible by some giving up on approving A or B. Range - similar adjustment via ratings. NOT MENTIONED - Condorcet: 46 A voters ranking C at top, without any giving up on the A vs B competition - reducible by B voters cooperating in this. Diego Santos -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
(temporarily exiting lurk mode since this one grabbed my attention) I don't think it's possible, assuming the voters know what other voters' preferences are, and that they know that the other voters have the same information and will also vote optimally. The 55% in the first group will know that candidate B will never win, period. So they have no incentive to compromise. Since they don't have to worry about B, their only motivation is to make sure A, not C, wins, and any deterministic system will allow them to do just that. Howard's suggestion, that you prevent them from knowing other's preferences, is the only way it could select C. But that is unrealistic and inherently unstable in the real world. -rob On 8/21/07, Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: A common situation: 2 factions 1 good compromise. The goal: Make sure the compromise wins. The problem: One of the 2 factions has a majority. A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... Good luck have fun :-) Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
At 11:38 AM 8/22/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote: A concrete example: true ratings are 55 voters: A 100, C 80, B 0 45 voters: B 100, C 80, A 0 THE CHALLENGE: FIND A METHOD THAT WILL ELECT THE COMPROMISE (C)! approval, would work if voters approval cutoff is below 80, as would honest range. Of course. But that, of course, is not the problem he intends to present: The fine-print: voters are selfish and will vote strategically... dang! I would suggest using one of the above methods and removing any knowledge from the voter of how any of the other voters will vote. Use the handy-dandy Mind Eraser, patent pending. Zero knowledge is, unfortunately, not part of election methods. It's a condition, not a method. No Media coverage. No predictions by political analysts. No talking with your family/friends/co-workers about who you will vote for. No freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, why bother with voting at all? If you have the power to do all this, why are you running an election? You just take a poll, at most, if you want to please your subjects, and, of course, you let anyone know that if they lie on the poll as to their real preferences -- and you have spies everywhere -- you will shoot them. This would limit the voters ability to vote strategically. i.e. if the group of 55 voters don't know they have a majority they would probably vote honest in order to get the best result. Probably. Zero knowledge strategy with those utilities -- which don't have to be in common units, they are simply relative for each voter -- would encourage, probably, approval-style voting in Range including C. Or so-called sincere Range, assuming that the Range method had an accurate choice. (Range 2 (CR-3) would not, the approval vote would be more accurate). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
