What Every Startup Needs to Know About NEBS

2002-05-06 Thread Dave Lorusso
FYI,  
 
I just had an article published in Evaluation Engineering magazine titled:
What Every Startup Needs to Know About NEBS.  You can view it at:
 
http://www.evaluationengineering.com/archive/articles/0502emc.htm
http://www.evaluationengineering.com/archive/articles/0502emc.htm 
 
The article details the steps we took at General Bandwidth to pass NEBS
testing our first time out.  There's a pretty good resource section at the
end that's not in the print copy.  I hope the group finds it useful.
 
Best regards,
 

Dave Lorusso

Director of Product Integrity
General Bandwidth, Inc.
12303 Technology Blvd.
Austin, TX 78727
512-681-5480 (phone)
512-681-5481 (fax)
dave.loru...@genband.com mailto:dave.loru...@genband.com 
www.genband.com http://www.genband.com/ 


Re: SIL Ratings

2002-05-06 Thread ggarside


See also my posting on 21 Dec 2001, giving a link to the IEC FAQ:
http://www.iec.ch/61508/

EXTRACT: What is meant by a SILn system, subsystem or component?
 A safety integrity level (SIL) is not the property of a system,
subsystem or component. However, the above phrase is often used to denote
that the system, subsystem or component is capable of providing safety
functions with a safety integrity level up to n.  [end of quote]

It is indeed appropriate to evaluate the safety function(s) of a PLC (or
other electronic sub-assembly of a safety-related system) to determine
their SIL rating. This facilitates their selection and integration into a
complete safety system.

Of course, a standard PLC is not suitable for a safety application. To
achieve the SIL rating you need to meet specific requirements for failure
rate, architecture, and (most especially) diagnostic coverage. In practice,
a safety PLC will almost certainly be either dual- or triple-redundant.
Also, IEC 61508 takes a life-cycle approach, so it is supposed to be
considered at the design stage of the PLC. (If you have good design and
production control processes, you may be able to assess compliance
retrospectively.)

You may also be interested in an FAQ that I wrote a while back.
[Disclaimer: has a small amount of commercial content.]
 http://www.tuvasi.com/faq-fs.htm
See http://www.tuv-fs.com/plclist.htm for some certified examples.
[Disclaimer: This is  on a website operated jointly by two test agencies].

As to what standard your enquirer referred to, the answer probably depends
on the industry and the region:

-IEC 61508 is international and generic (all industries). Published in 7
parts, total 700 pages approx.

-ANSI/ISA-84.01-1996  Application of Safety Instrumented Systems for the
Process Industries
   is for the (USA/Canada)  PROCESS industry.  It was published in 1996
when IEC 61508 was still at draft stage.

-EN 61508 is identical to IEC 61508

-A process-industry-specific functional-safety standard is at draft stage,
IEC 61511
-A machinery-industry-specific functional-safety standard is at draft
stage, IEC 62061

(The sector-specific standards will apply the relevant principles and
methods of IEC 61508 to a specific industry.)

-Some other key differences:
 -ANSI/ISA S84.01 uses only three SIL levels (SIL 1 to 3)
 -IEC 61508 uses all four SIL levels (1 to 4)
 -S84.01 does not address the complete product life-cycle, from design
to decommissioning, IEC 61508 does.
-For a complete analysis, see clause 12 of S84.01. (Clause 12 was written
in 1996, hence is somewhat out-of-date.)

Per ISA: This standard [S84.01] is process industry specific within the
framework of the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) draft
Publication 1508.
 There are significant differences in S84.01 from IEC draft
Publication 1508-1995, as described in Clause 12.  However, IEC draft
Publication 1508 was still being developed at the time that S84.01 was
published.  As a result, ISA SP84 will continue to support and monitor IEC
draft Publication 1508 development, and will modify S84.01 as needed when
IEC draft Publication 1508 is published.

Per IEC: The standard [IEC 61508] is generic and can be used directly by
industry (as a 'standalone' standard) and also by international standards
organisations as a basis for the development of sector standards (e.g. for
the machinery sector, for the process sector or for the nuclear sector).
The standard will therefore influence the development of electrical,
electronic and programmable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related systems
across all sectors.

best regards, glyn

--
TUV Rheinland of North America, Inc.
Product Safety  Quality
Industrial Machinery Division (Chicago Office)

Glyn R. Garside
Senior Engineer
1945 Techny Rd, Unit 4
NORTHBROOK, IL 60062-5357, USA
TelĀ  (847)562-9888 ext 25
email ggars...@us.tuv.com
http://www.us.tuv.com



 
Dan Kinney (A)
 
dan.kin...@heapg.comTo: 
'emc-p...@majordomo.ieee.org' emc-p...@majordomo.ieee.org  
Sent by:  cc:   
 
owner-emc-pstc@majordom   Subject: SIL Ratings  
 
o.ieee.org  
 

 

 

Re: Thermal Testing

2002-05-06 Thread Doug McKean

richwo...@tycoint.com wrote: 
 
 Do any of you monitor and record component temperatures during safety
 testing using PCs and data capture I/O cards? If so, what hardware and
 software to you use?

I do any monitoring any temp testing with a Fluke Hydra II and 
associated PC software. Set up and define probes, start software, 
dump into an Excel spreadsheet or report.  Communication between 
the Fluke and the PC is done through serial ports.  - Doug McKean 



---
This message is from the IEEE EMC Society Product Safety
Technical Committee emc-pstc discussion list.

Visit our web site at:  http://www.ewh.ieee.org/soc/emcs/pstc/

To cancel your subscription, send mail to:
 majord...@ieee.org
with the single line:
 unsubscribe emc-pstc

For help, send mail to the list administrators:
 Ron Pickard:  emc-p...@hypercom.com
 Dave Heald:   davehe...@attbi.com

For policy questions, send mail to:
 Richard Nute:   ri...@ieee.org
 Jim Bacher: j.bac...@ieee.org

All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at:
http://ieeepstc.mindcruiser.com/
Click on browse and then emc-pstc mailing list


Re: Stun Guns on Aircraft.

2002-05-06 Thread Fred Townsend

 I hate to pull rank here but I doubt if any of you have designed cock pit 
equipment,
tested it, or done a FAA flight certification submittal.  I have.  Let me reply,
below, to points made by Jeff and Gregg.



Collins, Jeffrey wrote:

 Group,

 I happened to be flying on United Airlines this weekend and thought I'd run
 this topic by a few pilots. (I got a chance to speak with 4 pilots
 separately) The consensus from the UA pilots was:

 * The stun guns have been thoroughly tested in the cockpit and had no effect
 on the avionics systems.

 * Type of stun guns( Taser only) would be the type that shoot the electrode
 through the air at the target.

 * They all preferred hand guns with bullets over the Tasers. They all claim
 that tests have been done unloading
   several rounds of bullets into the fuselage of an aircraft at critical
 altitudes without having severe affects.

I am in total agreement.  High Voltage guns, whatever you call them, deliver a 
high
voltage at a very low current. I have not tested with Tasers but I have done 
ESD.
Tasers are roughly equivalent to an ESD test.  ESD Tests showed occasional  
minor
damage to microphones, particularly those mounted on the wall to the side of the
pilot or the autopilot might disengage if the yoke were zapped.  Pilots are 
trained
for autopilot disengagement.

Redundancy was tested in many ways.  One was to shoot virtual bullets at 
equipment.
Virtual paths were selected at random.  All equipment in the path was suddenly 
turned
off by tripping the breakers.  No single virtual bullet ever effected the 
flyability
of the airplane.

Two bullets on opposite sides of airplane could be troublesome but probably not
fatal.  All tests were conducted using simulation on the ground.

L



 The field of my survey was small and only targeted a single airline so I
 don't know how this would correlate across the entire pilots union. Just
 thought I'd share this piece of info for what its worth.

 Regards,

 Jeff Collins

IGregg Kervill wrote:

 Dear All,

 Many thanks for your comments - I think it may be worth making some comments
 in summary:

 1-  Lightning has the same effect. Disagree - lightening is an external
 effect - Physics 101 and the Ice Pail experiment.   If anyone doubts the
 difference go and visit the Munich Science Museum where every day (I think
 they still do it) a volunteer climbs into a metal 'pod' and is winched
 between two electrodes (about 20 feet apart) and becomes part of the
 discharge path. Seeing it sure beat reading about it at school.  Any
 discharge on the inside of the Ice Pail is transferred 'instantaneously to
 the outside surface - this is, after all, the principle upon which the Van
 de Graff(sp?P generator is based. (Note the volunteer does NOT wave out of
 the window!!!)

You are partially correct.  Lightning is a much bigger problem.  The E field 
is
external to the airplane.  The B field enters the airplane and penetrates most
shielding and therefore is internal.

Stun guns are mostly a E field problem.  The Ice Pail shows immunity to E
fields.  The same is true of the cockpit equipment.  It is almost perfectly 
contained
within ice pails called ATR boxes.  The same protection is afforded to stun 
guns. ATR
boxes usually do not protect against B fields making lightning the bigger 
problem.

Because lightning is not a question of IF, but rather of WHEN,  and because
lightning is bigger problem, equipment is designed to survive lightning.



 2-  Holes in structure versus hole and carriers in semiconductor 
 substrates
 (yes it was a pun). I agree with those who preferred the idea of perforated
 eardrums (depressurization) to perforated electronics.

 3-  Dead Pilot versus Dead Electronics. Neither is ideal - but many (most)
 commercial aircraft are fly be wire - One of my clients make Simulators -
 and I flew (for the first time ever) and Air Bus (simulator) from London
 Heathrow to London Gatwick - Landed (ON THE RUNWAY) and taxied (the most
 difficult part) to the airport.  I had full control of the simulator and was
 flying by instruments. The controls are ALL electronic and if there had been
 multiple (i.e. non-random) fails then even a pilot would not have been able
 to move the control surfaces.

I'm not sure what your point is here.  Air Buses use fiber optics for most 
flight
critical systems.



 4-  Testing - at 50kV? any comments from ESD engineers out there?

My tests only went to 25KV.  I think it largely a matter of current which is
determined by the size of the storage capacitor, more than the voltage.



 5-  TASER versus Stun gun - thanks for correcting my misunderstanding - 
 Two
 comments -  First - if the stun gun is discharged through the airframe there
 will be an induced potential in local electronic systems.

Correction.  There will be an induced current.  The potential will be almost 
zero
across the very low resistance of airframe.

 Second - if I must
 turn off my tape 

stun guns on aircraft

2002-05-06 Thread Ted Rook

and other safety considerations

keep the hijackers off planes using ground security

an airplane in flight is not the place to have gun fights

too many lives are at risk

the first priority is to get the plane safely on the ground, anywhere

then at least the passengers have a chance

Most citizens of most countries enjoy the security that comes from having 
thrashed out land rights, territorial disputes, and the systems of law and law 
enforcement before firearms were invented.

America is one of the few places in the West that relies on firearms as a 
negotiating tool.
This is poor judgement. 
Firearms are offensive weapons not negotiating tools. 
Giving someone a gun escalates an already dangerous situation. 
Now you want the pilot to not only assure the safety of the plane but also be 
an effective executioner. 
Asking too much IMHO.
Unfortunately America was taken by force and is defended by force and is 
unlikely ever to change.




---
This message is from the IEEE EMC Society Product Safety
Technical Committee emc-pstc discussion list.

Visit our web site at:  http://www.ewh.ieee.org/soc/emcs/pstc/

To cancel your subscription, send mail to:
 majord...@ieee.org
with the single line:
 unsubscribe emc-pstc

For help, send mail to the list administrators:
 Ron Pickard:  emc-p...@hypercom.com
 Dave Heald:   davehe...@attbi.com

For policy questions, send mail to:
 Richard Nute:   ri...@ieee.org
 Jim Bacher: j.bac...@ieee.org

All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at:
http://ieeepstc.mindcruiser.com/
Click on browse and then emc-pstc mailing list


Re: Be set last

2002-05-06 Thread Doug McKean

--  Virus Warning Message (on gemini2)

Found virus WORM_KLEZ.H in file SK
The file is deleted.

If you have questions, contact virus-ad...@ieee.org

-

Thank you!  
Regards, Doug McKean 


---
This message is from the IEEE EMC Society Product Safety
Technical Committee emc-pstc discussion list.

Visit our web site at:  http://www.ewh.ieee.org/soc/emcs/pstc/

To cancel your subscription, send mail to:
 majord...@ieee.org
with the single line:
 unsubscribe emc-pstc

For help, send mail to the list administrators:
 Ron Pickard:  emc-p...@hypercom.com
 Dave Heald:   davehe...@attbi.com

For policy questions, send mail to:
 Richard Nute:   ri...@ieee.org
 Jim Bacher: j.bac...@ieee.org

All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at:
http://ieeepstc.mindcruiser.com/
Click on browse and then emc-pstc mailing list


RE: Stun Guns on Aircraft - summary and comments GK

2002-05-06 Thread Robert Wilson

Regarding the perforation of the aircraft by bullets, and the supposed
gradual depressurization that should occur, it might be worth
remembering the disaster of the world's first fleet of jet passenger
aircraft, the British Comet. In the early 1950s they were falling out
of the sky in some numbers. Very inconvenient. This was some 5 years
before Boeing came out with its 707. 

Stress cracking caused a single, small window (about the same size as
normal side windows) that the plane had on the top of the cabin, to
begin to weaken. At some point the window began to crack and then
suddenly gave way. 

The result was that nearly the entire contents of the cabin were
explosively sucked through the open window. It took years to understand
what had happened since all they could find was plane wreckage (usually
under water) with bodies and seats scattered over an improbably large
area. The result is that until the problem was found some years later,
and corrected, the aircraft was taken out of service. It was this that
allowed Boeing with its 707 (and shortly later, Douglas with its DC8) to
catch up and dominate the market at the time.

Suggesting that the only problem with bullet holes is that the
pressurization system couldn't keep up with the air leakage, is
therefore rather simplistic. The real problem is what happens when a
window is hit and the pressure differential takes over causing explosive
decompression.

Bob Wilson
TIR Systems Ltd.
Vancouver.

-Original Message-
From: Gregg Kervill [mailto:gkerv...@pgtv.net] 
Sent: May 6, 2002 9:42 AM
To: emc-p...@majordomo.ieee.org
Subject: RE: Stun Guns on Aircraft - summary and comments GK


Dear All,

Many thanks for your comments - I think it may be worth making some
comments
in summary:

1-  Lightning has the same effect. Disagree - lightening is an
external
effect - Physics 101 and the Ice Pail experiment.   If anyone doubts
the
difference go and visit the Munich Science Museum where every day (I
think
they still do it) a volunteer climbs into a metal 'pod' and is winched
between two electrodes (about 20 feet apart) and becomes part of the
discharge path. Seeing it sure beat reading about it at school.  Any
discharge on the inside of the Ice Pail is transferred
'instantaneously to
the outside surface - this is, after all, the principle upon which the
Van
de Graff(sp?P generator is based. (Note the volunteer does NOT wave out
of
the window!!!)

2-  Holes in structure versus hole and carriers in semiconductor
substrates
(yes it was a pun). I agree with those who preferred the idea of
perforated
eardrums (depressurization) to perforated electronics.

3-  Dead Pilot versus Dead Electronics. Neither is ideal - but many
(most)
commercial aircraft are fly be wire - One of my clients make Simulators
-
and I flew (for the first time ever) and Air Bus (simulator) from London
Heathrow to London Gatwick - Landed (ON THE RUNWAY) and taxied (the most
difficult part) to the airport.  I had full control of the simulator and
was
flying by instruments. The controls are ALL electronic and if there had
been
multiple (i.e. non-random) fails then even a pilot would not have been
able
to move the control surfaces.

4-  Testing - at 50kV? any comments from ESD engineers out
there?

5-  TASER versus Stun gun - thanks for correcting my
misunderstanding - Two
comments -  First - if the stun gun is discharged through the airframe
there
will be an induced potential in local electronic systems. Second - if I
must
turn off my tape recorder (powered but a single AA cell) because it may
affect systems then how is discharging 50k considered to be  safe and
OK???

6-  Design of interfaces to cope - some of the prototype systems
that I did
safety and reliability work on in (1995)uses surface mount components to
provide lightening protection - these devices would not provide Creepage
distances of more than a couple of millimeters.

7-  Ground computers - I agree that this is worrying - the UK has
even more
out of date equipment and then the new system (that will control air
traffic
in the South of England) used equipment (and software) purchased in the
late
80's early 90's. I just hope that it still works when they take it out
of
the box. The point is that RANDOM failures exist and there procedures
have
been developed (and practiced) to deal with them.  Anything that induces
non-random and multiple failures is - I suggest - another ball game.

8-  The chances are low - I agree - I was flying back from the west
coast the
morning of 9-11 and I did not get a warm fuzzy feeling about probability
when I watched the news footage - but I have made many flights since and
it
will not stop me from flying. I am grateful for the fact that Europe and
the
middle East are sharing their security experiences with the US. Security
is
a cultural thing and the US has a long way to go before it provides the
same
level of security from officials AND MORE IMPORTANTLY from 

Be set last

2002-05-06 Thread ballybeg

--  Virus Warning Message (on gemini2)

SK is removed from here because it contains a virus.

-

RE: Stun Guns on Aircraft.

2002-05-06 Thread David_Sterner

Relax.  The worst would be a modern Windows-based system that must be
rebooted after the 'blue-screens' and 'general protection faults'.

David

-Original Message-
From: Fred Townsend [mailto:f...@poasana.com]
Sent: Friday, May 03, 2002 2:24 PM
To: Gregg Kervill
Cc: emc-p...@majordomo.ieee.org
Subject: Re: Stun Guns on Aircraft.



Do you think the EMI from a stun gun can compare to the airplane being hit
by
lightning? World wide, airplanes are hit by lightning every  day.  They
don't
crash.  Relax

If you want something to worry about... worry about the FAA flight tracking
computers that were built the 1970s that fail every day somewhere across the
USA.  Be very worried.

Fred Townsend

Gregg Kervill wrote:

 There have been several reports here (in the US) that airlines are placing
 guns or stun-guns on aircraft.

 I understand the risk of a bullet - I understand that the risk can be
 reduced by using a flat, disc-shaped, rubber projectile. BUT, the though
of
 ANYONE discharging a stun gun on a flight deck full of mission critical
 (and sometimes not well buffered) electronics scares me more that the
though
 of a terrorist.

 Please can someone tell me that I should not worry - or to stop flying.

 Best regards

 Gregg

 ---
 This message is from the IEEE EMC Society Product Safety
 Technical Committee emc-pstc discussion list.

 Visit our web site at:  http://www.ewh.ieee.org/soc/emcs/pstc/

 To cancel your subscription, send mail to:
  majord...@ieee.org
 with the single line:
  unsubscribe emc-pstc

 For help, send mail to the list administrators:
  Ron Pickard:  emc-p...@hypercom.com
  Dave Heald:   davehe...@attbi.com

 For policy questions, send mail to:
  Richard Nute:   ri...@ieee.org
  Jim Bacher: j.bac...@ieee.org

 All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at:
 http://ieeepstc.mindcruiser.com/
 Click on browse and then emc-pstc mailing list



---
This message is from the IEEE EMC Society Product Safety
Technical Committee emc-pstc discussion list.

Visit our web site at:  http://www.ewh.ieee.org/soc/emcs/pstc/

To cancel your subscription, send mail to:
 majord...@ieee.org
with the single line:
 unsubscribe emc-pstc

For help, send mail to the list administrators:
 Ron Pickard:  emc-p...@hypercom.com
 Dave Heald:   davehe...@attbi.com

For policy questions, send mail to:
 Richard Nute:   ri...@ieee.org
 Jim Bacher: j.bac...@ieee.org

All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at:
http://ieeepstc.mindcruiser.com/
Click on browse and then emc-pstc mailing list

---
This message is from the IEEE EMC Society Product Safety
Technical Committee emc-pstc discussion list.

Visit our web site at:  http://www.ewh.ieee.org/soc/emcs/pstc/

To cancel your subscription, send mail to:
 majord...@ieee.org
with the single line:
 unsubscribe emc-pstc

For help, send mail to the list administrators:
 Ron Pickard:  emc-p...@hypercom.com
 Dave Heald:   davehe...@attbi.com

For policy questions, send mail to:
 Richard Nute:   ri...@ieee.org
 Jim Bacher: j.bac...@ieee.org

All emc-pstc postings are archived and searchable on the web at:
http://ieeepstc.mindcruiser.com/
Click on browse and then emc-pstc mailing list