Re: doomsday argument
Saibal wrote: >An interesting article by Ken Olum can be obtained from: > >http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/0009081 > >In short you don't get any information by observing your age, because you >made two observations: > >1) I exist > >2) I am one year old > >When you compute your updated probability distribution according to Bayes' >theorem by taking into account 1) and 2), you find that the updated >probability distribution is the same as the original one. > >The mistake is to use 2) and omit 1). > >Nick Bostrom has argued against including 1) (Self Indicating Axiom) in >Bayesan reasoning. This leads to all sorts of nonsensical results. E.g.: > [...] Interesting paper, thanks. I appreciate very much the idea to put "existing" and possible on the same setting. It is that very idea that I translate in arithmetic, when I go from the thaetetus idea of 1-knowledge, where p is known if p is provable and true: provable(p) & p ([]p & p) toward the 1-plural measure: provable(p) & consistent(p)([]p & <>p) Consistency is the arithmetical version of possibility. Note that G* can prove that provable(p) entails p, and provable(p) entails consistent(p). But G, which represents the machine from its own perspective cannot. (ex: The machine cannot prove provable(f) -> f because this is equivalent to "not provable(f)" which is equivalent to its consistency, which is unprovable (by the consistent machine)). Bruno PS I hope everyone can verify with truth table that (p -> f) is equivalent with (not p). I recall f is the constant false, and t is the constant true.
Re: Logically possible universes and Occam's razor
Russell Standish wrote >Marchal wrote: >> >> Russell Standish wrote: >> >> >I raised this very issue in "Why Occams Razor", and came to the >> >conclusion that the only satisfactory "interpreter" is the observer >> >itself. >> >> And so the question resumes into 'what is the observer itself'. >> I propose the answer 'the self-referentially sound Lobian machine' (LM). > >At this stage, I believe this is but one answer as to what an observer >is. Noone has proved that Bruno's Loebian machine satisfies my >"postulates of consciousness" (CLASSIFICATION, TIME and PROJECTION), >however it seems likely (the first two look like fairly trivial >properties of a Turing automata, and maybe one gets PROJECTION from the >UDA). I suspect many models of the observer are possible, including >non-deterministic ones. Mmmh... Remember that all self-referentially correct machine able to prove elementary statement in classical logic are provably Loebian. The key thing: those machine are humble and does not prove that what is provable by them is true in general. For instance they can infer the danger of communicating that they are consistent. (G proves []<>t -> []f). Of course other models exist. The purely intuitionistic (solipsist) machine does not (directly) obey G and G*. We do get PROJECTION from UDA indeed, if I understand what you mean exactly by that. We do get a promising (imho) road toward SWE also. A road which does not take any mathematical presupposition for granted except number theory. Bruno
Re: doomsday argument
Bruno wrote: > Charles wrote: > > >(BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who > >"finds himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll > >live to be 80 is 1/80?) > > This argument (against Leslie Bayesian Doomsday argument) has been > developped by Jean Paul Delahaye in the journal "Pour la Science" > (french version of the "Scientific American"). > I have not the precise reference under the hand. I think it is > a good point against too quick use of Bayes in infinite or continuous > context. An interesting article by Ken Olum can be obtained from: http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/gr-qc/0009081 In short you don't get any information by observing your age, because you made two observations: 1) I exist 2) I am one year old When you compute your updated probability distribution according to Bayes' theorem by taking into account 1) and 2), you find that the updated probability distribution is the same as the original one. The mistake is to use 2) and omit 1). Nick Bostrom has argued against including 1) (Self Indicating Axiom) in Bayesan reasoning. This leads to all sorts of nonsensical results. E.g.: ``Bostrom points out that if one accepts the doomsday argument one must also accept a number of very strange similar arguments. For example, suppose that there is some kind of a natural happening that we have no control over but nevertheless wish to avert. For example, suppose that we learn that a nearby star has a 90% chance of becoming a supernova, causing significant destruction on earth but not killing everyone. Now we make the plan (and make sure that it will be carried out) that if the supernova occurs we will start an aggressive program of space colonization, leading to a huge increase in the number of people that will eventually exist, while otherwise we will not. Now the same doomsday argument that says that the human race is likely to end soon tells us that the supernova is not likely to occur. If it did occur, we would then be in the first tiny fraction of humanity. Not only does this seem to allow us to affect things over which we should not be able to have any control, but it even works backward in time. By exactly the same argument, even if the supernova has or has not already occurred in the past, and its effects have not reached us, we can change the chance of its having occurred by the above procedure. Obviously this kind of paranormal and backward causation is ridiculous. Bostrom says that it is not as bad as it seems, but to do so he has to resort to some rather strange argumentation including the claim that given some action A and some consequence C, one can consistently believe \If we do A then we will have brought about C" and \If we don't do A then the counterfactual 'Had we done A then C would have occurred' is false". It would seem easier just to say that the type of argumentation that gives us these paranormal powers, and thus the Doomsday Argument as well, is simply incorrect. ´´ Saibal
Re: FW: Conditional probability & continuity of consciousness
Charles Goodwin wrote: >> From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] >> >> I mean the feeling of being spotted could perhaps be explained, and >> certainly is in need for an explanation. > >You lost me with that last sentence, and just when I thought I was doing >so well. (I assume it has nothing to do with chicken >pox...) Jesse Mazer was proposing a collection of all observer-moment, but was adding a sort of external spotlight going through that set for justifying actuality. I was saying that that feeling of actuality is build in in the observer-moment. No need of that spot, which would have need an external absolute time (if I don't simplify to much Jesse Mazer post). Bruno
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Charles wrote: >(BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who >"finds himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll >live to be 80 is 1/80?) This argument (against Leslie Bayesian Doomsday argument) has been developped by Jean Paul Delahaye in the journal "Pour la Science" (french version of the "Scientific American"). I have not the precise reference under the hand. I think it is a good point against too quick use of Bayes in infinite or continuous context. Bruno
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Charles Goodwin wrote: >I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be physically >possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave >equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but the SWE is the >constraining factor. Why? You postulate physicalism. Show me your theory of mind, please. By UDA it cannot be computationalist. With comp it can be argued that the constraining factors are only logico-arithmetical. The SWE should be emerging. We must explain why quantum computation described by "e^iH" seems, from the point of view of the observer, to supersede classical computation described by "H". Bruno
RE: Immortality
Charles Goodwin wrote: >> -Original Message- >> From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] >> >> Perhaps. But if you do that move, everyone is resurrected in >> everyone, and >> there is only one person in the multiverse. I don't know. James Higgo >> was more radical on this, he defended the idea of zero person. >> With just comp this issue is probably undecidable. I guess >> comp (perhaps >> QM too) can lead to a vast variety of incompatible but >> consistent point of >> view on those matter. Comp is compatible whith a lot of personal >> possible interpretations of what is identity. What is >> possible to prove >> with comp is the non normative principle according to which personal >> identity is *in part* necessarily a matter of personal opinion. >> What remains to do is to compute the "real" probabilities to >> backtrack with >> amnesia compare to the probability to quantum/comp-survive >> big injuries. >> I doubt we have currently the tools to do those computations. > > >I will be interested to know the results when you do! The only result I get is that the "measure 1" obeys sort of quantum logic (like "measure 1" in QM obeys Birkhof-von Neumann QL). >Of course the doctrine of reincarnation (it always seemed to me) >only requires one soul - a bit like Feynman's one-electron >universe, it just zip-zags back and forth... Yes. That is why comp could make altruism an egoist necessity. Bruno
RE: Narrow escapes
Charles Goodwin wrote: >If you drive carefully are you merely ensuring that >elsewhere in the multiverse you aren't??? If you drive carefully, you are ensuring that you drive carefully in the "normal" worlds. The majority of worlds/computations are normal. The measure on computational continuations can make this last statement precise. Bruno
immortality
--- Charles Goodwin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:> > -Original Message-> > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of rwas> > > > Eh? If I understood this statement then I must object. I have quite> clear> > memories of before-death, during-death, and after-death. I realize > > that within the context of the narrow communication style> prevailent here that this > > claim means nothing. But your statement would seem to attempt> rewrite my > > experiences as false by default.> > > > I resent that.> Preempting my question, there was an immediate post: > That's very interesting. What experiences are you refering to?> > Charles [G]Somehow I missed rwas's reply detailing those 'experiences. Could anybody supply them to me? Or perhaps C. Goodwin himself who now wrote: "Mystic experiences of course. Experiences which have renderedunderstanding which makes participating in the predominate discoursefound on this list very painful to endure. Sequential, temporal,in-the-box thinking is not how to transcend the physical in my view." Maybe this paragraph is the answer. In which case I rest my case. John Mikes
