Re: belief, faith, truth

2006-02-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 14-févr.-06, à 05:19, danny mayes wrote (to Ben):


 I doubt Marchal's ideas will be made widely known or popularized in  
the foreseeable future. 



This looks like an encouraging statement :-)



The problem isn't with the name of his theory, or with any problem  
with Bruno per se beyond
this:  There doesn't seem to be an easily reducible way to summarize  
the theory in a
manner that is digestible to anyone beyond the highly specialized in  
similar fields. 



I doubt this. I would even say that highly specialized people have more  
difficulties due to the lack of a panoramic view of the subject, and  
the lack of knowledge in the adjacent fields. Logicians doesn't really  
know the conceptual problem of QM. And Physicist rarely know what a  
formal system is all about. Both are unaware of the mind-body problem,  
etc.
Probably popularization is technically more easy (but professionally  
more dangerous).
 My theory, in a first approximation, is just Mechanism, the  
doctrine that we are machine, in the sense that we cannot see any  
difference once we are substituted at some level of description of  
ourselves. That theory already appears in some ancient Indian and  
chinese texts, and is often attributed to Descartes.
Somehow my theory is already popularized in many science-fiction  
books and essays. Dennet and Hofstadter are quite close in the book  
Mind's I, which I recommend. They didn't see the first person comp  
indeterminacy though. And, given that Hofstadter wrote an impressive  
book on Godel's theorem, where he criticizes correctly the use of  
Godel's incompleteness against mechanism, I thought awhile that it was  
not even necessary I wrote my work. Almost like Judson Web, Hofstadter  
sees that Godel's theorem could be a good news for Mechanism/Comp. My  
work preceded those books for ten years, but has been trapped in a sort  
of typically european bureaucratic nightmare which will make me  
abandoning research for a while.
Have you read the Mind's I book? I think you could follow the UDA  
argument easily if you have done that. The argument requires only some  
passive understanding of what a digital universal machine (computer)  
is.
I keep saying I have no theory. I have just a theorem or an argument  
(informal and (hopefully) rigorous) according to which, if we take the  
comp hyp. seriously enough then eventually physics should be  
retrievable from [computer science + the amount of theological faith  
needed for saying yes purposefully to the doctor].







 I certainly understand the basics of some of his ideas,



If you understand the UDA, you get the point  If not, you can  
always ask questions or make critics.





but when it gets into all
his logical analysis I just have never found myself willing to devote  
myself to the
time required to really get into the detail of where he is coming  
from. 



... because the logical analysis does not add anything. The UDA  shows  
that comp entails that necessarily physics is a branch of computer  
science (in a large sense).
The logical analysis is the beginning of an *actual* derivation of  
physics from computer science. This *illustrates*  how such a  
derivation, which is made necessary by UDA, can *actually* be  
undertaken. The logical analysis also shows the relative consistency of  
the enterprise. Would Godel's theorem be false, i.e. would truth be  
equal to provability, all hypostases would collapse into classical  
logic. Thanks to Godel's theorem, they are all different.





And I
would consider myself highly interested in these topics and at least  
reasonably intelligent.



Do you have the little book by Smullyan Forever Undecided?  It is a  
very cute introduction to the logic G. Once you understand what is G,  
you can understand all the other arithmetical hypostases (effective and  
non effective person points of view, Theaetetical variants, see below).






 Even something as mundane as the MWI (to this group at least) runs  
into a
brickwall when presented to the layperson.  You should see the  
conversations
I have with my wife.  Tell people everything is made of strings.  Or  
space and

time can be warped and curved.  They may not understand the science and
math behind it at all, but at least you are speaking their language. 



I think you have too much imagination which make you think my work is  
technically difficult. It isn't. In Brussels my work has been  
criticized has being too much easy. Argument of the type: my two years  
old niece can do that! (*).






 The world is not ready for his ideas. 



From -500 to +500, the world has been ready for quite similar Platonist  
Questioning, I tend to think now. And actually Plotinus seem to have  
got the main points with almost all details (without comp!). After:   
just 1000 years of a sort of obscurity with respect to the fundamental  
questioning, and so much religious or ideological brainwashing that in  
some countries we can even 

Re: belief, faith, truth

2006-02-17 Thread Kim Jones
Which is very interesting, isn't it? People do seem want the kind of  
modelled structure for their existence that theology projects. Even  
though G means we can never know the truth of it, theology tells us  
it is nonetheless there.


Has anyone on this list read Neale Donald Walsch's Conversations  
with God? series of books? Bruno may well be interested to read at  
least Volume 1 if he hasn't yet encountered it. The whole book IS the  
interview with the self-referentially-correct  Loebian machine! I  
realised this yesterday after re-reading sections of it and comparing  
them to Bruno's thinking.


regards

Kim Jones




On 18/02/2006, at 7:31 AM, uv wrote:




Theology
books tend to sell well.





Is a self-referentially-correct Loebian machine Omniscient?

2006-02-17 Thread Stephen Paul King

Dear Bruno,

   Kim Jones' post prompts me to ask whether or not a 
self-referentially-correct  Loebian machine involves an infinite regress 
or a non-well founded structure. Given that it is typical to include the 
idea of a non-prescripted interview, where the questions can have follow ups 
based on answers given and thus not prespecified, how does a Loebian machine 
prevent a pathological regress? Is this where one is really coming up with a 
fancy secular notion of omniscience (infinite computational/simulation 
power)?


   Any idea?

Onward!

Stephen

- Original Message - 
From: Kim Jones [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To: uv [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Everything-List List 
everything-list@eskimo.com

Sent: Friday, February 17, 2006 7:05 PM
Subject: Re: belief, faith, truth


Which is very interesting, isn't it? People do seem want the kind of 
modelled structure for their existence that theology projects. Even 
though G means we can never know the truth of it, theology tells us  it is 
nonetheless there.


Has anyone on this list read Neale Donald Walsch's Conversations  with 
God? series of books? Bruno may well be interested to read at  least 
Volume 1 if he hasn't yet encountered it. The whole book IS the  interview 
with the self-referentially-correct  Loebian machine! I  realised this 
yesterday after re-reading sections of it and comparing  them to Bruno's 
thinking.