Re: Reasons and Persons
Saibal, your phrase: >"...very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the qualia we experience. .."< includes "laws": the recurring observational portions in the model observed, (if our view extends, the 'laws' may alter) and a restriction to what "we experience". Which is continually expanding as our epistemic enrichment goes on - and/or as we learn to 'think' better. I may compare your position in hard/soft ware dichotomy to my ignorance is computer science what I never learned: I "see" lights on/off and some hardware when I peek into the box and hear noises, and read what comes on the screen. As an engineer I may guess that the hardware turns and contacts lick off signs, organize them, but from software I have no idea (not compiler, not programs, not how your name comes out of 0,1, but I accept it and manipulate my computer (poor soul!) to DO what I want. This is the level I feel in your (and others) position about "our brain (even if it includes the software) "simulating us" even understand the universe. Starting with that 'nothin' we know and speculating about the rest. The ideas may be recent, but the modus operandi (mental) is ancient. Thanks for the reply John M - Original Message - From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "everything" ; "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 11:50 AM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons > > John, actually I don't want to do that per se. I think that ultimately we live in a > universe described by the very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the qualia we > experience. Perhaps it is better to say that we are such complex universes. We are > simulated in a universe described by simple laws of physics. Our brains are simulating > us. We shouldn't confuse the hardware with the software > > > Saibal > > > Quoting "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > > And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons > > only? > > Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of > > the > > totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on? > > Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons? > > > > John M > > - Original Message - > > From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: > > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM > > Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
John, actually I don't want to do that per se. I think that ultimately we live in a universe described by the very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the qualia we experience. Perhaps it is better to say that we are such complex universes. We are simulated in a universe described by simple laws of physics. Our brains are simulating us. We shouldn't confuse the hardware with the software Saibal Quoting "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons > only? > Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of > the > totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on? > Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons? > > John M > - Original Message - > From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM > Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons > > > > > > There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in > terms > > of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are > > connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the > high-level > > algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified > by > > the neural network. > > > > The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high > level > > language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the > other. > > For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the > program > to > > the corresponding neural network. > > > > - Original Message - > > From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: > > Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM > > Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons > > > > > > > > > > Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > >On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > > > > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing > through > > > > > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After > all, > > > > > there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a > > > > > fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in > common > > > > > mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. > > > > > However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that > > *if* > > > > > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so > that > > your > > > > > > > >We need to be a bit more precise than "magically". In Parfit's book > he > > > >talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in > > > >Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at > > > >present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and > > > >suffices for doing the teleporting experiment. > > > > > > > >The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely > > > >differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and > > > >connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain. > > > > > > I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a > nonfunctional > > > state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a > sort > > of > > > split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting > in > > > the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. > But > > > this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was > > making, > > > because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like > > "let's > > > assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons > and > > > synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and > Napoleon's > > > brain such that every intermediate state would have a single > integrated > > > consciousness". There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists > (and > > of > > > course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated > > > consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible. > > > > > > Jesse > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > No virus found in this incoming message. > > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > > Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.0/353 - Release Date: 05/31/06 > > > > > > > > > -- _ Tele2 - The company that brings you small bills! http://www.tele2.nl --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons only? Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of the totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on? Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons? John M - Original Message - From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons > > There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms > of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are > connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level > algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified by > the neural network. > > The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high level > language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the other. > For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the program to > the corresponding neural network. > > - Original Message - > From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM > Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons > > > > > > Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > > > > >On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > > I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through > > > > non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, > > > > there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a > > > > fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common > > > > mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. > > > > However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that > *if* > > > > (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that > your > > > > > >We need to be a bit more precise than "magically". In Parfit's book he > > >talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in > > >Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at > > >present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and > > >suffices for doing the teleporting experiment. > > > > > >The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely > > >differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and > > >connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain. > > > > I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional > > state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort > of > > split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in > > the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. But > > this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was > making, > > because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like > "let's > > assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons and > > synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's > > brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated > > consciousness". There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists (and > of > > course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated > > consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible. > > > > Jesse > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.0/353 - Release Date: 05/31/06 > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
Le 01-juin-06, à 03:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I don't see that there have been any scientific developments in the last twenty years which make Parfit's thought experiments more or less plausible. I think so. The only exception I can think of is in his favour: there is speculation that teleportation may indeed be theoretically possible. I think that classical teleportation is theoretically possible almost by definition (assuming comp). I guess you are thinking about quantum teleportation which has indeed be realized on "large" distance (about 20 up to 40 km, to my knowledge). But this is quite different: in quantum teleportation of a quantum state the "original" state has to be destroyed, for example. In any case, it is telling that even Parfit's philosophical adversaries do not focus on lack of scientific plausibility as an argument against *philosophical* validity. For the most part, he could have made the same points had he been writing a century ago, drawing on religious mythology rather than science fiction for his thought experiments. Perhaps a philosopher on the list could comment? Oops, sorry. But perhaps I am a philosopher too? After all Pythagoras invented the term :) In any case I agree with you. Thought experiment on soul and identity, including what happens in case of duplication appears already implicitly in Plotinus, and explicitly in Augustine. Bruno PS: I will comment some ascension's posts tomorrow (hopefully: if not it will be for Saturday). http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
